Aristotle's Practical Side

On his Psychology, Ethics, Politics and Rhetoric

BY

WILLIAM W. FORTENBAUGH

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ARISTOTLE'S PRACTICAL SIDE

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ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY

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For Diane Smith

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PREFACE

The articles brought together in this volume are all concerned in one way or another with Aristotle's practical side, i.e., his moral psychology, his ethical and political thought, and his writings on rhetorical persuasion. The articles number twenty-four and were written over more than four decades. Each has benefited from the helpful criticism of some colleague, interested scholar or anonymous referee. I cannot begin to thank all these individuals by name; indeed, in the case of an anonymous referee, the identity of the individual remains unknown. But I can say up front, that without considerable help by many different persons, my work would never have developed as it has. I am grateful and hope that in the following years, however many they may be, I can make a return by assisting younger colleagues and scholars working on Peripatetic subjects.

Certain persons should, however, be picked out for special recognition. I begin by naming Glenn Morrow, who was my dissertation advisor at the University of Pennsylvania. He deepened my understanding of Aristotle and took an interest in my work even after I had completed my doctoral studies and taken a position at Douglass College, Rutgers University. During my early years at Douglass, two philosophers were especially supportive. One was Dick Henson, who was chairman of the Department of Philosophy, and the other was William Alston, who discussed with me his work on emotion and behavioral regularities. These discussions had a direct influence on more than one article appearing in this volume. Another philosopher deserving recognition is Richard Sorabji. His interest in my early work and his generous comments and thoughtful suggestions over more than three decades have been invaluable. Among philologists, I would like to mention Herwig Görgemanns, who was my Betreuer in Heidelberg and whose work on Plato's *Laws* stimulated my thinking about Aristotle's doctrine of moral virtue. Also to be named is Eckart Schütrumpf, whose contributions were more indirect but nevertheless of considerable help during the years that I was working on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

Several funding agencies and research centers have provided assistance at opportune moments. They are The Center for Hellenic Studies, The American Council of Learned Societies, The Alexander von

Humboldt-Stiftung, The National Endowment for the Humanities, The Kellogg Foundation, The Day Family Foundation and The Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study. To all these institutions I owe a debt of gratitude.

I want to make special mention of two of my graduate students at Rutgers University: Michael Sollenberger and David Mirhady. Michael has contributed to this volume by contacting editors and publishers for permission to reprint my articles on Aristotle. More importantly he has been an invaluable help not only in reading Greek manuscripts but also by assuming responsibility for the vita material that has been included in the 1992 edition of the fragments of Theophrastus. David has made similar contributions. He read and commented on several of my articles prior to publication and has often offered advice in regard to Greek oratory and rhetoric. Together we edited *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*, which is volume 6 of *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities*. In addition, his is the political material that has been published among the fragments of Theophrastus. I am indebted to both these men and proud of their work.

A third graduate student, who has recently come to Rutgers University and helped me with this volume, is Elizabeth Gloyn. She has read through the page proofs and spotted errors that had escaped my eye. She has also prepared the index of Ancient Sources that will be found toward the end of the volume. I am grateful for her timely assistance.

Finally, I come to Diane Smith, who took xerox copies of the articles appearing in this volume, scanned them into a computer, and in this way produced machine readable text that could be edited for publication. I am grateful, and all the more so for some fifteen years of continuous collaboration. Diane began working with me when I and other members of Project Theophrastus were editing and translating the fragments of Theophrastus. She produced the camera-ready copy that became the two volumes of *Sources*, published by Brill in 1992. She also produced camera-ready copy both for my edition of Theophrastus' opusculum *On Sweat*, Brill 2003, and for my *Theophrastean Studies*, Steiner 2003. The last ten volumes of *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities*, Transaction 1989–2006, are hers as well. For such dedication, I express my gratitude by dedicating this volume to Diane, a valued collaborator and friend.

WWF
March 2006

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The articles reprinted in this volume are listed below with the place of original publication. I am most grateful to the named journals and publishers for granting me permission to reprint.

1. "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions," *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970) 40–70
2. "A Note on Aspasius, *In EN* 44.20–21," *Proceedings of the World Conference on Aristotle* vol. I (Athens: Department of Culture and Sciences 1981) 175–178
3. "On the Antecedents of Aristotle's Bipartite Psychology," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 11 (1970) 233–250
4. "The Account of the Soul in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.13," originally published as "Zu der Darstellung der Seele in der *Nikomachischen Ethik* I.13," *Philologus* 114 (1970) 289–291
5. "Bipartition of the Soul in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7 and 1.13," originally published as "Zur Zweiteilung der Seele in *EN* I 7 und I 13," *Philologus* 120 (1976) 299–302
6. "Aristotle and Theophrastus on the Emotions," forthcoming in *Passions and Progress in Greco-Roman Thought*, ed. J. Fitzgerald (London: Routledge)
7. "Aristotle: Emotion and Moral Virtue," *Arethusa* 2 (1969) 163–185
8. "Aristotle and the Questionable Mean-Dispositions," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 99 (1968) 203–231
9. "Aristotle: Animals, Emotion and Moral Virtue," *Arethusa* 4 (1971) 137–165
10. "Aristotle's Distinction between Moral Virtue and Practical Wisdom," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy IV, Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. by J. Anton and A. Preus (Albany: State University of New York Press 1991) 97–106, originally published as "Un modo di affrontare la distinzione fra virtù etica e saggezza in Aristotele," *Museum Patavinum* 5 (1987) 243–258
11. "Τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος and Syllogistic Vocabulary in Aristotle's *Ethics*," *Phronesis* 10.2 (1965) 191–201
12. "Aristotle's Analysis of Friendship: Function, Analogy, Resemblance and Focal Meaning," *Phronesis* 20 (1975) 51–62
13. "Menander's *Perikeiromene*: Misfortune, Vehemence and Polemon," *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 430–443
14. "Aristotle on Slaves and Women," *Articles on Aristotle* II, ed. by J. Barnes et al. (London: Duckworth 1976) 135–139
15. "Aristotles's Natural Slave," previously unpublished
16. "Aristotle on Prior and Posterior, Correct and Mistaken Constitutions," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 106 (1976) 125–137
17. "Aristotle on Persuasion through Character," *Rhetorica* 10 (1992) 207–244

18. "Aristotle's Accounts of Persuasion through Character," in *Theory Text and Context*, ed. Chr. Johnstone (Albany: State University of New York 1996) 147–168
19. "*Benevolentiam conciliare* and *animos permovere*: Some Remarks on Cicero's *De oratore* 2.178–216," *Rhetorica* 6 (1988) 259–273
20. "Aristotle's Platonic Attitude toward Delivery," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 19 (1986) 242–254
21. "What Was Included in a Peripatetic treatise Περὶ λέξεως?" in *Noctes Atticae: Studies Presented to Jørgen Mejer*, ed. B. Amden *et al.* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum 2002) 93–102: revised and expanded with material taken from "Eudemus' Work *On Expression*," in *Eudemus of Rhodes*, ed. I. Bodnár and W.W. Fortenbaugh = *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 11 (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction 2002) 77–82.
22. "Persuasion through Character and the Composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 134 (1990) 152–156
23. "On the Composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: Arguing the Issue, Emotional Appeal, Persuasion through Character, and Characters Tied to Age and Fortune," in *ΛΗΝΑΙΚΑ. Festschrift für Carl Werner Müller*, ed. Chr. Mueller-Goldingen and K. Sier = *Beiträge zur Altertumskunde* 89 (Stuttgart: Teubner 1996) 165–188
24. "Cicero as a Reporter of Aristotelian and Theophrastean Rhetorical Doctrine," *Rhetorica* 23 (2005) 37–64

INTRODUCTION

I

The articles brought together in the present volume were written over a period of more than forty years. Indeed, the basic work for several of the articles was begun in graduate school at the University of Pennsylvania, where I had the privilege of working with Professor Glenn Morrow, who at the time was one of the leading figures in the study of Greek philosophy. We read together Aristotle's logical works, his ethical treatises, the *De anima*, and Plato's *Laws*. At the outset, I did not know where this reading would lead, but along the way I came realize that Aristotle's conception of moral virtue was inadequately understood. Far from being a simple control on the desires or drives that men share with animals, it guarantees the correctness of various judgments important to virtuous human action. And while logic is not ethics, Aristotle's remarks on practical deliberation in his ethical treatises involve words and phrases that are taken over from logical discourse and that need to be recognized as such. Finally the discussion of moral education in Plato's *Laws* is closely related to Aristotle's analysis of moral virtue, so that any study of the latter is apt to benefit from a thorough knowledge of the former.

Upon receiving my PhD and taking a job at Rutgers University (1964), I published my thoughts on syllogistic vocabulary in Aristotle's account of practical deliberation (1965, Chapter 11 in this volume). I also began to read what modern philosophers were saying about emotions and what may be called character traits. In regard to the former, I came to realize that Aristotle had anticipated much of the work being done by modern philosophers, in that he analyzed emotions like anger and fright in terms of belief and goal directed action. In regard to the latter, it became clear to me that Aristotle had difficulty dealing with traits like friendliness truthfulness and dignity, which are not closely tied to emotional response and which are exhibited throughout a man's behavior. These two insights were for me a major breakthrough, as a result of which a series of seminal articles were written—some at the

Center for Hellenic Studies, where I benefited from a year of unencumbered research (1967–1968). One article concerned the different treatment of character traits in the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* (1968, Chapter 8). Several others dealt with emotion. Most important was "Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions," in which I argued that Aristotle regarded belief, i.e., factual and evaluative judgments, to be essential to emotional response *qua* efficient cause. The consequences for rhetoric and ethics were clear. In the former, emotional appeal came to be viewed as reputable, because it can and often does proceed by reasonable arguments that determine what a listener believes and therefore what emotion he experiences. In the latter, emotional response was recognized as an intelligent form of human behavior that can be reasonable as well as unreasonable. In addition, moral virtue came to be viewed as a correct disposition in regard to emotion: e.g., courage guarantees a correct response to fearsome situations, and good temper does the same in regard to situations that provoke anger (1970, Chapter 1).

In a separate article, I distinguished between moral virtue and practical wisdom by reference to the everyday distinction between emotional response and reasoned deliberation. The former is the sphere of moral virtue and the latter that of practical wisdom. Plato made use of the distinction in his *Laws*, and Aristotle made it the basis of his moral or bipartite psychology, i.e., that psychology which divides the soul into logical and alogical parts (Chapter 7, 1969). The origin of Aristotle's bipartite psychology was the primary focus of a separate article, in which I argued that bipartition did not arise by simply collapsing together the two lower parts of Plato's tripartite soul, the *thymoeides* and the *epithymêtikon*. Rather, bipartition is Aristotle's formulation of the distinction between reason and emotion, which was ready at hand in popular thought and clearly implied in a tragedy like Euripides' *Medea* (1970, Chapter 3). In still another article, I focused on the difference between Aristotle's biological psychology as presented in the *De anima* and the moral psychology that underlies his writings on ethics and politics. The former is concerned with all living things. It recognizes three faculties: a single faculty of thought, which is restricted to human beings and distinct from the faculties of sensation and nutrition, which are characteristic of animals and plants, respectively. The latter is a peculiarly human psychology. It postulates two parts, both of which are cognitive. Reflection and deliberation are assigned to the logical half and emotional response to the alogical (1970, Chap-

ter 4).[1] From these considerations, it is a short step to denying animals a share in moral virtue, for they lack the faculty of thought and therefore lack emotion, which is the sphere of moral virtue (1971, Chapter 9).

A year in London on a grant from the American Academy of Learned Societies (1972–1973) was of great assistance by providing me time for research and enabling me to interact with Professor Richard Sorabji. We gave a seminar together, in which familiar themes were expanded and new ones developed. In the immediately following years, I composed a monograph, *Aristotle on Emotion*,[2] and wrote several articles on particular issues. Aristotle's bipartite psychology was shown to underlie Aristotle's view of women and natural slaves. Women possess deliberative capacity, but this capacity is said to lack authority. In other words, a woman is unable to control her emotions; the logical half of her soul is ineffective vis à vis the alogical half. Natural slaves have a different problem. They are said to lack deliberative capacity altogether, so that they do well to follow the reasoned advice of their masters (1976, Chapter 14).[3] Aristotle's analysis of friendship was given a new interpretation in terms of function, analogy and resemblance (1975, Chapter 12). In addition, Aristotle's remarks on correct and mistaken constitutions received a new interpretation. Teleology, conceptual dependence, grading, asymmetrical pairs and connections with Plato's *Laws* are all involved (1976, Chapter 16). Finally, an earlier interest in character traits was revived and applied to Menander's comedy, *She Who is Shorn*. An interpretation that emphasizes the first of Aristotle's four categories of harm, i.e., misfortune, is set aside or at least supplemented by a new interpretation that focuses on temperament: in this case, vehemence *qua* trait that manifests itself across a person's behavior (1974, Chapter 13).

An Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship took me to Heidelberg, where I worked for a year and a half, often interacting with Professor Herwig Görgemanns (1976–1977). Old interests did not disappear, and soon after returning to Rutgers I wrote a short article in which I offered an answer to the question how the commentator Aspasius

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[1] See also Chapter 5 (1976), in which criticism of the earlier article (1970, Chapter 4) is refuted.

[2] London; Duckworth 1975, second edition with epilogue 2002.

[3] See also Chapter 15, which is an unpublished article in which I reply to certain criticisms that have been brought against my interpretation of Aristotle's natural slave.

could say that he found no definition of emotion among the older Peripatetics (1981, Chapter 2).[4] I also introduced a largely untried approach to Aristotle's distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom: namely, an investigation of discussions of character and thought found outside the ethical treatises (1987, Chapter 10). Nevertheless, new interests came to the fore. I turned to Theophrastus, Aristotle's pupil and successor as head of the Peripatetic School, and wrote a book on his ethical thought.[5] I also decided to put together a team of scholars and to do a complete edition of the fragments of Theophrastus together with an English translation. That project took some thirteen years to complete and resulted in a two-volume work that runs 1170 pages.[6] In the course of those years, I devoted considerable time to acquainting myself with Greek and Roman rhetoric. For not only was I was responsible for editing the rhetorical fragments, but I had also agreed to write a commentary on these fragments. As a result I found myself working on parts of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* that had never interested me, for these parts were fundamental to understanding Theophrastus' rhetorical doctrine. Not surprisingly, I had new thoughts on the *Rhetoric*, and that led to a series of eight articles. Three were written before a stay at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (1990–1991), one during that stay, and four afterwards.

Of the eight articles dealing with rhetorical topics, several are concerned with persuasion through character. The earliest contrasts Aristotle's account of persuasion through character with Cicero's remarks on winning goodwill. Whereas Aristotle is concerned with establishing the credibility of the orator without diminishing the impartiality of the audience, Cicero recommends arousing favor in such a way that the audience becomes emotional and is no longer impartial (1988, Chapter 19). Two other articles focus entirely on Aristotle. One discusses in detail the three attributes that make an orator trustworthy: wisdom, virtue and goodwill. The attributes are shown to be traditional and to work an effect (i.e., instilling trust) that is different from the arousal of mind-bending emotions (1992, Chapter 17). A second article takes account of the fact that Aristotle's initial presentation of persuasion

[4] The article was written in 1978, but publication was delayed three years.
[5] *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts* (Amsterdam: Grüner 1984).
[6] Project Theophrastus was founded in the spring of 1979. The two volumes of text and translation, *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence* = *Philosophia Antiqua* 54, were published by Brill (Leiden 1992).

through character in *Rhetoric* 1.2 is different from the subsequent presentation in 2.1. The former is shown to be oriented toward judicial oratory, while the latter is focused on deliberative oratory (1996, Chapter 18).

Two articles take up topics in Book 3 of the *Rhetoric*. One is concerned with delivery, which is characterized as vulgar and necessary rather than correct. This negative judgment is shown to be out of line with other portions of Aristotle's rhetorical theory and with his philosophy in general. Apparently Aristotle's remarks on delivery are very much influenced by Plato and are likely to have been written during Aristotle's residence in the Platonic Academy (1986, Chapter 20). The other article turns our attention to expression. Peripatetic works on the subject are shown to have dealt not only with the style of elevated literature, poetry as well as prose, but also with logical issues including the structure of syllogisms and the difference between genuine and apparent enthymemes (2002, Chapter 21).

Two further articles are concerned with the composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. The earlier of the two observes that both Books 1 and 3 have two introductions and that in each case one of the introductions omits any reference to persuasion through character. It is argued that the omission is the mark of an early stage in the development of Aristotle's doctrine (1990, Chapter 22). The other article is a more inclusive study. In addition to persuasion through character, arguing the issue, emotional appeal and characters tied to age and fortune are studied with a view to understanding the development of Aristotle's thinking about rhetoric (1996, Chapter 23). A third article, the most recent of the articles on rhetoric, concerns the influence of Aristotle and Theophrastus at the end of the Hellenistic period: in particular, whether Cicero's reports of their rhetorical doctrines are reliable and based on a first-hand knowledge of their treatises. It is argued that modern scholarship has been too generous; Cicero's value as a source should not be overstated (2005, Chapter 24).

One article remains for comment. It is the newest of the twenty-four articles that make up this volume. In it I revisit Aristotle's analysis of emotional response and take account of what Theophrastus had to say on the subject. Finding something funny is distinguished from other kinds of laughter that do not count as emotional responses, and analyses in terms of similarity and difference in degree are introduced (Chapter 6).

II

Collections of articles by a single author are sometimes arranged chronologically, i.e., by date of publication. Such an arrangement highlights the author's own development, and given the biographical remarks of Section I, one might expect the present collection to be ordered in this manner. Nevertheless, a different arrangement has been preferred. For while chronological arrangement seems appropriate to a collection in which the articles are largely unrelated, the twenty-four articles brought together in this volume are all in one way or another concerned with Aristotle's practical philosophy. For that reason, an arrangement by topics or areas has been chosen, for it better enables the reader to make connections between the several articles and to appreciate the coherence of Aristotelian doctrine. Four major areas have been identified: psychology, ethics, politics and rhetoric. While the collected articles fit conveniently into one or another of these areas, certain relationships between the areas are striking and ought not to be ignored. That is most obvious in regard to emotional response, for Aristotle's work on the emotions finds expression in all four areas. The same may be said of moral virtue and deliberative capacity. Accordingly, I have not hesitated to add cross-references in the notes to articles appearing in different sections of the volume. Sometimes these references are added to existing notes. On other occasions, I have added an entirely new note. In such cases, an asterisk has been used, in order that the original numbering of the notes may be maintained.[7]

At the rear of the volume, I have placed two indices to assist the reader in searching this volume. The first is the customary index of ancient sources cited in the articles. The second is an index of subjects discussed in the articles. Here I have tried to reach a balance between citing only the most important topics and bloating the index with unimportant items.

[7] All new notes, whatever their purpose, are marked by an asterisk.

I

PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER ONE

ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC ON EMOTIONS[1]

Should the account of emotion given by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* be dismissed as a popular treatment that avoids precision? I think not and in this paper want to argue that the *Rhetoric*'s treatment of emotion is important not only for rhetorical theory but also for ethical theory and philosophical psychology. Nevertheless there is a considerable body of scholarly opinion that looks upon this treatment of emotion as superficial.[2] The *Rhetoric*'s contribution, we are told, does not lie in the analysis of individual emotions but rather in the fact that emotional appeal is

[1] At the outset I want to acknowledge my debt to the National Endowment for the Humanities and to the Center for Hellenic Studies. Their support enabled me to read and work upon this topic. I am especially grateful to the Director of the Center for Hellenic Studies, Professor Bernard Knox, and to the Junior Fellows (1967–1968) for discussing with me points made in this paper. I am also indebted to Professors Glenn R. Morrow and Charles H. Kahn who have made most helpful suggestions that I have endeavored to incorporate in this paper. Any mistakes or deficiencies remaining in the paper are, of course, entirely my own failing.

[2] See, for example, C. Brandis, "Über Aristoteles *Rhetorik* und die griechischen Ausleger derselben," *Philologus* 4 (1849) 27, *Handbuch der Geschichte der griechisch-römischen Philosophie* (Berlin: Reimer, 1860) 3. 1. 192. Brandis argues that Aristotle's treatment of emotions is concerned only to describe their modes of expression (*Äußerungsweisen*). According to Brandis, Aristotle is concerned neither with giving an exhaustive treatment of emotions nor with pinning down their place in inner experience. Instead Aristotle follows his general procedure (see below, n. 4), avoiding precision and presenting common opinion. Brandis is followed by E.M. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's* Rhetoric (London: Macmillan, 1867) 13–14, *Aristotle's* Rhetoric (Cambridge: University Press, 1877) 2. 8 and by E.L. Hunt "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," in *Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in Honor of James Albert Winans* (New York: Century, 1925; reprinted with identical pagination by Russell and Russell, New York, 1962) 57–58. Both Cope and Hunt see Aristotle's discussion as an imprecise and popular treatment of the way emotions "express themselves outwardly," of their "external manifestations" (Brandis' Äußerungsweisen). L. Cooper, *The* Rhetoric *of Aristotle* (New York: Appleton-Century, 1932) xx describes Aristotle's treatment as "a popular account." M. Dufour, *Aristote*, Rhetorique (Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," vol. 1, 1932 and vol. 2, 1960) 2.20–21 says that the definitions of individual emotions are of an oratorical and contingent character, that the traits that serve to define the emotions are taken from current opinion. G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: University Press, 1963) 95, n. 92 cites without comment Hunt's (58) assessment of Aristotle's analysis as "a popular and inexact discussion of the external manifestations of character and emotions." See also the "Rhetoricus Philosophicus" who passes over Aristotle's treatment of emotion, calling it "the usual material on manipulating the emotions of the hearer to the speaker's advantage" (*Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1 [1968] 51).

promoted to a mode of persuasion coordinate with character and proof or apparent proof. Whereas previous authors of rhetorical treatises had treated emotional appeal as part of the prooemium and the epilogue, Aristotle considered emotional appeal independently of particular portions of an oration. He conceived of emotional appeal as a tool that could be employed throughout an oration for the purpose of persuading the audience.[3] But when Aristotle came to discuss the individual emotions he did not break new ground. True to the method that he himself proclaimed appropriate to rhetoric,[4] he did not seek exactitude but contented himself with what was generally acceptable.

There have been scholars who gave Aristotle's treatment of emotions a higher rating.[5] But these scholars are, I think, a minority whose

[3] It is generally accepted that Aristotle's recognition of emotional appeal as a mode of persuasion coordinate with character and proof is new and important. See F. Solmsen, "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings," *Classical Philology* 33 (1938) 393–394; D.L. Clark, *Rhetoric in Graeco-Roman Education* (New York: Columbia, 1957) 75, 80; Kennedy (above, n. 2) 94. The goal of this paper is not so much to emphasize the role Aristotle assigns to emotional appeal as to emphasize his analysis of individual emotions. It is the latter which needs to be re-evaluated.

[4] For the view that Aristotle did not think exactitude appropriate to rhetoric and so did not strive for precise definitions and analyses when treating the subject matter of deliberative, epideictic, and judicial oratory (1.4–14), see Brandis, "Über Ar. Rhetorik," (above, n. 2) 4, 27–29, *Handbuch* (above, n. 2) 185–192; Cope, *Introduction* (above, n. 3) 11–14; Hunt (above, n. 2) 51–52; E. Zeller *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics*, translated by Costelloe and Muirhead (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962) 296; C.S. Baldwin, *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic* (New York: Macmillan, 1924) 15–16; Sir David Ross, *Aristotle*, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, 1960) 272; A.-J. Festugière, *Aristote, Le Plaisir* (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1936) LXII–LXIV; R. Gauthier and J. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1959) 2.781, n. 14; I. Düring *Aristoteles* (Heidelberg: Winter, 1966) 139–140, 144, 148. Perhaps I may single out Hunt's position both because it is forcefully stated and, I think, widely read. Hunt argues that for each of the three branches of oratory: deliberative, epideictic, and forensic oratory, Aristotle offers a cursory treatment of the usual subject matter: "a superficial political science," "a conventional ethics," and "a very loose and inexact criminal jurisprudence" (51). After pointing out that the definition of pleasure is repudiated in the *Ethics*, Hunt concludes that "the ethical conceptions of the *Rhetoric* are the conceptions of the man in the street." It is not in his rhetorical writings but in his political and ethical writings that Aristotle made an effort to attain concepts that could withstand criticism (52).

[5] Th. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, translated by G. Berry (New York: Scribner, 1912) 4.436 speaks of the exhaustiveness and great strength and depth of the *Rhetoric*'s treatment of emotions and character. M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tubingen: Niemeyer, 1963) 138 credits Aristotle with the first systematically executed investigation of emotions that has come down to us. F. Solmsen, *The Rhetoric and the Poetics of Aristotle*, Modern Library (New York: Random House, 1954) xvi sees in the *Rhetoric* "a precise and carefully worded definition" for each emotion. See also Solmsen "Aristotle and Cicero" (above, n. 3) 393–394. While P. Aubenque, "La définition aristotélicienne de la colère," *Revue*

opinions have been without their proper influence. Accordingly, I want to focus upon and to re-evaluate Aristotle's treatment of individual emotions. My approach will be in two parts. In the first part, I shall argue rather generally that the *Rhetoric*'s analysis of individual emotions did receive the close attention of Aristotle and so should not be passed off as popular and imprecise. In the second part, I shall argue that the *Rhetoric*'s account of emotion enjoys a threefold significance, because it looks upon cognition as an essential element in emotion. First, by making cognition an essential part of emotional response, the *Rhetoric* offers an answer to Academic debate concerning the relationship of emotion to cognition. Secondly, in pointing out the involvement of cognition in emotion, the *Rhetoric* makes clear that emotions can be reasonable and that emotional appeal need not be a matter of charms and enchantments. And finally, this emphasis upon cognition helps to distinguish emotions from bodily drives and so helps to develop an adequate moral psychology.

I

I begin with some concessions. It is true that the *Rhetoric* explicitly disclaims exactitude in analysis and definition (1359b2–8, 1360b7–8, 1366a32, b24, 1369b31–32) and that in one important case (pleasure, 1369b33–35), the *Rhetoric* offers a definition that is rejected by the *Nicomachean Ethics*. It is also true that when the *Rhetoric* comes to consider happiness, it offers a disjunctive definition and then adds that nearly everyone would agree that one or more members of the disjunction constitute happiness (1360b14–18). These points may be admitted. But it would be unreasonable, I think, to conclude that the analyses and definitions given in the first two books of the *Rhetoric* are simply popular and in no way represent Aristotle's own views.[6] Take the case of happi-

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Philosophique 147 (1957) 300–317 emphasizes (correctly) that the definitions advanced in the *Rhetoric* do not satisfy the standards of natural philosophy (see below, n. 26), nevertheless he is quite clear that the definitions do give the form of individual emotions and deserve serious attention.

[6] See G. Lieberg, *Die Lehre von der Lust in den Ethiken des Aristotele* = Zetemata 19 (München: Beck, 1958) 23–27. Lieberg argues that the definitions in Books I and II of the *Rhetoric* are offered as serious definitions and not simply popular opinions. Lieberg sensibly allows that in particular instances Aristotle may be following someone else's view. But when he does so, he adopts the view as his own.

ness. Here Aristotle does not offer a tidy definition. He satisfies himself with a definition that may be considered sufficient (1366b24, 1369b31) and appropriate to the occasion (1359b5, 1366a21, b24). But—and this is the important point—when he claims the assent of nearly everyone, Aristotle is primarily thinking of the members of the Academy. He is not especially concerned with people in general. Rather, he offers a disjunction that is meant to cover the various views or at least the most important views under debate in the Academy. This is, of course, an old point.[7] But it must be emphasized, because it shows that in lecturing on rhetoric, Aristotle's thoughts are very much focused on the Academy and the views being advanced by its members. This is not to say that Aristotle is totally unconcerned whether his disjunctive definition of happiness finds acceptance outside the Academy. But it is to say that Aristotle's primary audience is within the Academy and that his definitions and analyses may be expected to reflect the interests and opinions current within the Academy.

Rather similar remarks can be made concerning the *Rhetoric*'s definition and analysis of pleasure as a movement of the soul and an intense and perceptible settling down into the natural state (1369b33–35). Aristotle's treatment of pleasure is not oriented toward the ordinary man.[8] It takes its impetus from the Academy. In the case of pleasure, however, Aristotle does not offer a disjunctive definition that might satisfy all or most members of the Academy.[9] Instead, he offers a particular view of

[7] See J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London: Methuen, 1900) 1, n. 1 and 3, n. 3; Festugière (above, n. 4) LXIII. According to Burnet and Festugière all four members of the disjunction can be connected with the Academy. The first definition belongs to a particular class of definitions under study in the Academy (*Topics* 160b27). The second definition relates to *Definitions* 412B6 and may originate from *Philebus* 20Cff. as well as definitions of happiness attributed to Speusippus and Xenocrates. (See Burnet 3 n. 3). The third definition seems to be associated with Eudoxos, while the fourth alludes to Xenocrates. Whether or not we follow Burnet and Festugière in every detail, we must admit that they are correct in referring the definition of happiness to discussion within the Academy. The *Rhetoric*'s definition of happiness is not simply in accord with common opinions (Brandis, "Über Aristotles' Rhetorik" [above, n. 2] 4, *Handbuch* [above, n. 2] 186). Rather the definition is in accord with opinions common in the Academy. The definition of happiness takes its thrust and formulation from the Academy and so can be expected to satisfy nearly everyone in the Academy.

[8] See, for example, Hunt (above, n. 2) 52 who first points out that the *Rhetoric*'s definition of pleasure is repudiated in the *Ethics* and then concludes that "the ethical conceptions of the *Rhetoric* are the conceptions of the man in the street."

[9] According to Brandis, "Über Aristoteles' *Rhetorik*" (above, n. 2) 27, Aristotle offers an account of pleasure and pain as movement not because he totally endorsed the Platonic notion, but because he was concerned only with an easily understandable

pleasure that was made prominent within the Academy by Speusippus' polemic against Eudoxus[10] and is familiar to us through Plato's *Philebus* and *Timaeus*. Still, Aristotle does not simply report the view of other members of the Academy. He seems to modify and supplement the view and so to make it his own.[11] I do not want to press this point. It cannot, I think, be established firmly that at the time of writing this portion of the *Rhetoric* Aristotle accepted without reservation the view of pleasure as a kind of motion. It is perhaps likely that he did. At least the view is found not only in the *Rhetoric* but also in another early work, Book VII of the *Physics*.[12] It is, of course, possible that in two different works Aristotle offered a view to whose truth he was indifferent, but it is more likely that he offered the same view on two separate occasions, because he found the view more or less acceptable. However, this same view of pleasure as a kind of motion is treated negatively in still another early work, the *Topics* (121a27–39). In order to illustrate a particular method for rejecting alleged genera, Aristotle introduces the proposition that motion is the genus of pleasure and argues that

explanation that avoided raising disputed points. I agree with Brandis in allowing the possibility that Aristotle set forth a view about which he had reservations. But I find it difficult to imagine this particular view avoiding controversy. Even if the dispute between Speusippus and Eudoxus was for the most part over and even if this view of pleasure had been advanced by Plato, it is unlikely that opinion within the Academy had formed a consensus in favor of this view. *Topics* 121a27–39 is, I think, a clear echo of continuing debate within the Academy. See also *An. Pr.* 25a9–12.

[10] The view of pleasure as a perceptible process toward one's natural state is attributed by the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1152b12–15) to those who deny altogether that pleasure is good. This group of persons is represented most especially by Speusippus. See Festugière (above, n. 4) LXII; R. Gauthier and J. Jolif (above, n. 4) 2.777, 785, 788.

[11] The *Rhetoric*'s definition of pleasure should be compared with the view set forth at *Philebus* 31D8–9, 42D5–6, 46D6 and *Timaeus* 64D1–2, 65A1. Lieberg (above, n. 6) 27–42 examines in detail the dependence of the *Rhetoric* upon the *Philebus* and shows how Aristotle adopted with some modification the physiological conception of pleasure as a return to one's natural state. According to Lieberg, Aristotle's interest in the Platonic precedent coupled with his attention to and modification of particular details (e.g., replacing the pronoun αὑτῆς or αὑτῶν [*Phil.* 31D8, 42D5] with his own term ὑπάρχουσαν [1369b34–35]; developing or adding to the Platonic position so as to recognize a highest form of pleasure that occurs after the return to the natural state [1370a4–5]) makes evident that the *Rhetoric*'s account of pleasure should be taken seriously, that Aristotle is not simply trotting out a popular or current opinion but is concerned with establishing his own conception of pleasure.

[12] See *Physics* 246b20–247a19. At 247a16 Aristotle connects pleasure with a particular kind of motion, ἀλλοίωσις or alteration. Düring, *Aristoteles* (above, n. 4) 119 n. 7 recognizes that the conception of pleasure advanced in the *Rhetoric* fits that found in *Physics* VII 3. Düring also thinks that *Rhetoric* 1370b27 has wording similar to *Physics* 247a7–8. For similar wording I would point to 1370a29, 33–34 and 247a9.

because pleasure is neither locomotion nor alteration nor any other specific kind of motion, pleasure cannot be a motion. It is difficult to be certain of Aristotle's attitude toward any particular example in the Topics. He may think that this argument against pleasure as a kind of motion is a telling argument, or he may not.[13] Perhaps we may say that Aristotle introduced this particular argument against pleasure as a kind of motion because it was current in the Academy. Like other members of the Academy he was able to criticize the view of pleasure as motion, but he was also prepared on occasion, to advance the view, perhaps because he found the view on the whole acceptable or at least better than any other view current in the Academy.

Concerning the analyses of happiness and pleasure more could be said. But perhaps enough has been said to suggest strongly that these and other analyses presented in the *Rhetoric* are serious efforts that should be seen within the context of Plato's Academy. If so, let us begin to focus on the treatment of individual emotions in Book II, considering first an old objection to taking the treatment as a serious effort deserving close study. The objection is philological in nature: Aristotle introduces the definitions of individual emotions with the word ἔστω ("let [it] be" 1378a30, 1380a8, b36, 1382a21, 1383b12, 1385a17, b13), and this word is a sign that the definitions are of only a popular nature. Aristotle, it is argued, begins his definition of anger with the words "let anger be" (1378a30) and thereby indicates the provisional nature of the definition.[14] But is this argument as strong as it is old? Certainly the use of ἔστω in definitions is a characteristic of the *Rhetoric*[15] and on occasion, it is possible that Aristotle uses this word to indicate the tentative nature of a definition. The disjunctive definition of happiness

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[13] I. Düring, "Aristotle's Use of Examples in the Topics," in *Aristotle on Dialectic*, ed. G.E.L. Owen (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968) 210 takes this passage as a rejection by Aristotle of Plato's opinion that pleasure is a kind of motion. I respect Düring's judgment but cannot myself justify so positive a stand. On the general relationship between the *Topics* and *Rhetoric* see J. Brunshwig, *Aristote, Topiques* (Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1967) 1. XCVI–CIII.

[14] The view that Aristotle used ἔστω in the *Rhetoric* specifically to introduce imprecise and popular definitions goes back at least as far as L. Spengel, *Specimen Commentariorum in Aristotelis Libros de Arte Rhetorica* (München: Libraria Scholarum Regia, 1839) 16–17. Spengel was followed by Brandis, "Über Aristotles' Rhetorik" (above, n. 2) 28 n. 42 and Cope, *Aristotle's* Rhetoric (above, n. 2) 1.73, 97, 188, 2.8. See also Dufour (above, n. 2) 1.39, 46, 47, 54, 2.20, 21, Festugière (above, n. 4) LXIII, Aubenque (above, n. 6) 305, and Düring (above, n. 4) 140.

[15] For ἔστω in Book I, see 1355b25, 1360b14, 1362a21, 1363b7, 1368b6.

begins with ἔστω (1360b14) and this may be a sign that the definition is meant to cover the several Academic views without making precise which view or combination of views captures the essence of happiness. But it should be observed that when Aristotle returns to a definition introduced by ἔστω he may give no indication that the definition is less than his own.[16] Moreover, at least one definition introduced by ἔστω cannot be described plausibly as a popular definition. This is Aristotle's definition of rhetoric: let rhetoric be a faculty of considering in each case the possible means of persuasion (1355b25–26). Here, Aristotle seems to be giving us his own definition of rhetoric. He neither follows the lead of Plato's *Phaedrus* nor adopts the view of rhetoric current among professional rhetoricians. Aristotle ignores Plato's insistence upon becoming a philosopher (*Phdr.* 261A4) and being gifted in division (*Phdr.* 263B7, 266B3–C9, 270B4, 271C10-D5, 273D8–E4). Moreover, Aristotle's emphasis upon the persuasive (1355b11, 15–16, 26, 32–33) seems discordant with Plato's emphasis upon truth in comparison with the persuasive and plausible (*Phdr.* 250E–262C, 272D–273E) and with Plato's insistence that knowledge of truth is not a separable preliminary but a part of rhetoric (*Phdr.* 260E6).[17] Aristotle, it seems, is not following the leader of the Academy. Yet neither is he following the view of professional rhetoricians. For these men considered rhetoric to be the art of effecting persuasion. Gorgias called rhetoric the artificer of persuasion (πειθοῦς δημιουργός, Plato, *Gorgias* 453A2)[18] and in this definition seems to have been followed by Isocrates (Quintilian, *Instit. Orat.* 2.15.4).[19] For professional rhetoricians, success was essential to rhetoric; for Aristotle, it was not. Modifying the current view, he suggested viewing rhetoric as the faculty of observing and discovering the possible means of persuasion (1355b10–14, 25–26; cf. *Topics* 101b5–10).[20]

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[16] See 1363b13 and 1364b17 where Aristotle refers to the definition of goodness by saying simply "we call" and "has been defined."

[17] With *Phdr.* 260E6, see R. Hackforth, *Plato's* Phaedrus (Cambridge: University Press, 1952) 120, n. 2. For a general discussion of Aristotle's divergence from Plato see Dufour (above, n. 2) 1.11–14, Hunt (above, n. 2) 49–59.

[18] Cf. Plato, *Philebus* 58A7–B2, *Republic* 365D4 and Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* 2.15.18. The label "artificer of persuasion" may have originated before Gorgias in the circle of persons around Tisias and Korax. See L. Radermacher, "Artium Scriptores: Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik," Sb. Ak. Wien 227.3 (1951) 30; B ii 13.

[19] According to Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Rhet.* 62, Isocrates said that orators practice nothing else than the science of persuasion (ἐπιστήμη πειθοῦς).

[20] On Aristotle's rejection of success as an essential feature of rhetoric see Quintilian,

It may be, of course, that this definition of rhetoric is to some extent deficient or incomplete and that ἔστω helps to point out this inexactitude. Perhaps the definition does need further qualification, for it contains no stated limitation upon the kinds of persuasion with which rhetoric concerns itself. There is a need to add a qualifying *in oratione*.[21] The rhetorician is concerned only with those means of persuasion that involve speech. Aristotle himself would acknowledge the need for this qualification. He had after all, studied the *Gorgias* and so would be familiar with Gorgias' suggestion that the great benefit of rhetoric is the ability to persuade with speeches (*Gorg.* 452E1). But to acknowledge that the *Rhetoric*'s definition is in this way incomplete is not to say that it is popular or merely thrown out by way of example. On the contrary, it is simply to admit that this definition, like most definitions and analyses in the *Rhetoric*, aims at being sufficient and appropriate to the occasion (1359b5, 1366a20–21, b24, 1369b31).

Sometimes Aristotle's interest in a definition may even lead him to seek an exactitude beyond that claimed for rhetoric. Consider his definition of goodness. This definition begins with an ἔστω (1362a21) and lists various marks of goodness. In a certain sense the definition is popular. As in the case of happiness, so here, everybody would endorse one or more of the enumerated marks of goodness. But while the several marks of goodness would be generally accepted, they would also be accepted by Aristotle. The definition includes nothing that is contradicted by the *Ethics*. Further and perhaps more significant, Aristotle extends the definition to cover not only things good in themselves but also things good as means. This is not a sign of indifference or carelessness on the part of Aristotle. The goods as means are all carefully grouped together (1362a27–29) and important terms are explained (1362a29–34). First he explains "follows" by drawing a distinction between following simultaneously and following subsequently. Then he illustrates three different senses of "productive." A thing may be productive in the way that being healthy is productive of health, or

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Instit. Orat. 2.16.13: *Quidam recesserunt ab eventu sicut Aristoteles dicit: rhetorice est vis inveniendi omnia in oratione persuasibilia*. See also Cope, *Introduction* (above, n. 2) 28–33.

[21] See Quintilian, *Instit. Orat.* 2.15.6–13 where Quintilian criticizes those persons who define rhetoric by reference to persuasion without delimiting the kind of persuasion with which rhetoric is concerned. In what appears to be a carelessly written passage (2.15.13). Quintilian first adds the qualifying phrase in *oratione* to Aristotle's definition of rhetoric and then seems to criticize Aristotle for failing to add this qualification. See Cope, *Introduction* (above, n. 2) 34.

in the way that food is productive of health, or in the way that taking exercise is productive of health. The example of being healthy producing health is of especial importance. For the example recurs in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1144a4, 1174b25) and introduces Aristotle's own notion of a formal cause.[22] Without overstating our case, we can say that Aristotle is interested in this definition. If he is presenting a definition that is generally acceptable either within the Academy or possibly outside the Academy as well, he is not doing so independently of his own views. An initial ἔστω need not imply a popular definition unrelated to Aristotle's own philosophical commitments.

In respect to the treatment of individual emotions we can be quite certain that the definitions offered are not just examples thrown out by way of illustration. Aristotle was well aware that emotion affects judgment (1354b8–11, 1356a15–16, 1377b30–1378a5, 19–20). He recognized the importance of emotional appeal and treated persuasion "through the hearers" (1356a14) as a special mode of persuasion coordinate with persuasion "through demonstration" and persuasion "through character." For Aristotle a correct understanding of emotion was an essential part of the art of rhetoric. Each individual emotion, he tells us, must be analyzed in three ways. The condition of men prone to an individual emotion, the objects of an individual emotion, and the grounds for an individual emotion must all be grasped. If the orator's understanding of individual emotions is deficient in any of these three areas, then he will be unable to arouse emotional response (1378a23–26).[23] Aristotle was not going to be satisfied by mere popular opinions, for he was well aware that a mastery of emotional appeal belongs only to the man that has investigated and come to understand what characterizes and what causes individual emotions (1356a21–25).[24]

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[22] Cf. *Metaph.* 1070a21–23, b28. The proper interpretation of *EN* 1144a4 and 1174b25 has been a matter of considerable discussion. For a survey of the literature see Gauthier and Jolif (above, n. 4) 2.542–547, 839–841.

[23] Gomperz (above, n. 5) 435 gets this correct when he says that "this triple knowledge is the preliminary condition for the rousing of emotions by oratory."

[24] It should be emphasized that when Aristotle discussed the individual emotions he was providing his pupils not only with an interesting exercise in philosophical psychology but also with a mode of persuasion. In analyzing the nature of individual emotions, Aristotle was providing the knowledge necessary for successfully arousing and allaying emotion (1355b21–25, 1378a24–26). This close tie with a mode of persuasion seems to be lacking in the discussion of particular premises (εἴδη or ἴδιαι προτάσεις 1358a31) that occupied so much of Book I. In discussing the particular premises Aristotle is primarily providing materials for persuasion "through demonstration." He is not elucidating a mode of persuasion but rather supplying materials for enthymemes. (Of course, the

Although the definitions of individual emotions may begin with ἔστω, these definitions are to be taken seriously. Aristotle is not throwing out popular definitions without regard to their truth or adequacy. This is not to say, that the definitions are precise in every detail. Such an assertion is too easily refuted by the *De Anima*. For in this treatise, Aristotle criticizes the rhetorical or, as he styles it, the dialectical definition of anger.[25] Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the *De Anima* does not reject the *Rhetoric*'s definition of anger. It simply (and predictably) suggests that this definition of anger falls short of standards appropriate to physical investigation. The definition is not erroneous, but it is incomplete. For while it does give the form of anger, it makes no mention of matter or a bodily correlate. On the other hand, anger cannot be defined adequately simply by reference to a bodily correlate. Neither the dialectician who defines anger as a desire for retaliation nor the materialistic student of nature who defines anger as boiling of blood around the heart (*De An.* 403a30-b1) offers a definition that satisfies the requirements of natural philosophy. A competent student of nature will construct his definition from both of these definitions (*De An.* 403b7–9).[26] It is clear, therefore, that the definitions of anger and other emo-

discussion of virtue is also connected with persuasion "through character" [1366a25–27, 1378a15–17]). These materials, it might be argued, may be popular opinions. For if an orator is to be persuasive he cannot use controversial premises. His demonstrations must begin from generally accepted premises. (Cf. 1357a12–13 and Plato, *Phdr.* 259E7–260A4, 272D2–273A1). This argument has some force as long as it is directed at the discussion of particular premises in Book I. But it loses its force when transferred to the discussion of emotions in Book II. For in discussing emotions Aristotle is primarily concerned with a mode of persuasion. He is no longer supplying "filler" for the enthymemes of deliberative, epideictic, and judicial oratory. Instead he is conveying an understanding of individual emotions that is fundamental to mastering persuasion "through the hearers." The definitions of individual emotions are not external to a method that can be mastered independently of the definitions. While it is possible to master persuasion "through demonstration" without mastering any particular set of premises, persuasion "through the hearers" cannot be mastered apart from an understanding of individual emotions. While the former mode of persuasion belongs to the man who is able to "syllogize," the latter mode belongs to the man who is able to investigate and so understand the nature of emotional response (1356a21–25). The definitions and analyses of individual emotions are not external to the mode of persuasion but rather what a man learns when he learns the mode. See A. Stigen, *The Structure of Aristotle's Thought* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1966) 371.

[25] Clearly the dialectician's definition of anger as a desire for returning pain (*De An.* 403a30–31) is to be connected with the *Rhetoric*'s definition of anger as a desire for revenge (1378a30). See Cope, *Introduction* (above, n. 2) 13, Aubenque (above, n. 5) 304, 311, and D.W. Hamlyn, *Aristotle's* De Anima (Oxford: Clarendon, 1968) 80.

[26] Cope, *Introduction* (above, n. 2) 13 suggests that the natural philosopher's definition

tions given in the *Rhetoric* are not so much rejected by the *De Anima* as supplemented. They are accepted and completed.[27]

We have been arguing that the occurrence of ἔστω in a definition is not in itself grounds for dismissing a definition as something popular and philosophically unimportant. We have acknowledged that the treatment of individual emotions is incomplete but have argued that this deficiency can be pinned down and does not constitute grounds for dismissing the *Rhetoric*'s treatment of emotions as a popular account of little philosophical significance. We can now approach the treatment of individual emotions and inquire concerning their significance untroubled by the occurrence of ἔστω. But before moving on to the treatment of individual emotions, I would suggest that ἔστω is not used in the *Rhetoric* to mark the tentative nature of definitions. Rather, it is used as part of and possibly to emphasize the deductive method that Aristotle employs throughout large sections of Books I and II of the *Rhetoric*. Within the Academy Plato had criticized severely current rhetorical methods and had called for a new and philosophical rhetoric. If rhetoric was to be taught in the Academy, it had to acquire at least the appearance of scientific method. Toward this end, Aristotle imposed a demonstrative method both upon his discussion of particular premises in Book I and upon his discussion of emotions in Book II. He organized his material deductively, laying down definitions and drawing necessary conclusions.[28] But for Aristotle it was not simply a matter of

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of anger as a boiling of blood around the heart "endeavors to penetrate into its (anger's) true nature and to state what it (anger) is." This is overstatement. The *De Anima* is quite clear that neither definition is sufficient. Aubenque (above, n. 5) 314 tacitly corrects Cope when he says that the competent natural philosopher penetrates most deeply into the knowledge of anger, not because he knows the matter, but because he grasps how and why such matter is such form. In other words, competence in natural philosophy demands a knowledge of both form and matter.

[27] There is no reason to think that Aristotle ever shelved the treatment of emotions given in the *Rhetoric*. The evidence of the *De Anima* suggests the continuing importance of this detailed (if incomplete) treatment. Moreover, the mention of Deiopeithes (1386a14) indicates that Aristotle was still using and adding to this portion of the *Rhetoric* at least as late as 341 B.C. While most of the treatment of emotions was probably written during Aristotle's residence in the Academy, revision and addition may have occurred considerably later, possibly after 335 B.C. (Düring, *Aristoteles* [above, n. 4] 120).

[28] See, for example, the *Rhetoric*'s treatment of goodness. First Aristotle offers a definition of goodness that begins with ἔστω (1362a21) and enumerates several marks of goodness. After pausing to clarify two terms Aristotle resumes with the phrase "these things having been laid down" (1362a34) and proceeds to draw necessary (ἀνάγκη 1362a34, b3, 7, 10) inferences. See Solmsen "Aristotle and Cicero" (above, n. 3) 393 who neatly characterizes Aristotle's method in dealing with emotions: "Throughout

giving rhetorical instruction a scientific air. At this period in his career Aristotle was very much interested in logical method. The introduction of example and enthymene into the art of rhetoric is a clear sign of this interest. Aristotle had recently spent considerable time upon treatises devoted to logical method and was probably still at work upon these treatises.[29] He was, therefore, prepared to bring a deductive method to rhetorical instruction. It is not surprising to find in the *Rhetoric* a vocabulary and method that recall the *Analytics*. In particular, it is not surprising to find Aristotle using ἔστω to lay down a definition or premise from which he draws necessary conclusions.[30] The vocabulary and method are common in the *Analytics*.[31] Of course, in the *Analytics* the premises introduced by ἔστω are illustrative and are not advanced as propositions of philosophical importance. Indeed, letters may be used instead of for-

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these chapters Aristotle is anxious to base every assertion either on the definition itself, one of its component parts, or on something previously deduced from the definition." Cf. Solmsen, *The* Rhetoric *and* Poetics (above, n. 5) xvi.

29 It seems fairly certain that Aristotle composed the relevant portions of the *Rhetoric* either concurrently with or soon after the *Analytics*. See Düring (above, n. 4) 119 with n. 7, Kennedy (above, n. 2) 85, F. Solmsen, *Die Entwicklung der Aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1929) 223.

30 See above, n. 28 on goodness. For another example consider Aristotle's analysis of anger. He begins with the words "Let anger be (ἔστω) a desire for revenge" (1378a30) and after completing the definition of anger resumes with these words "If anger is this, then it is necessary (ἀνάγκη) that …" (1378a32–33). It may be noticed how Aristotle's procedure agrees formally with that recommended by Plato in the *Phaedrus*. A λόγος should begin with a definition (263D2–3) and subsequent portions should be arranged according to a certain necessity (ἀνάγκη 264B4, 7). But it would be false to suggest that Aristotle's immediate inspiration is this portion of the *Phaedrus*. For here Plato is concerned primarily with the organic unity of a λόγος (264C2–5) and possibly with the method of division (265D3–266B1) that he calls dialectic (266C1, *Phil.* 17A4). In proceeding deductively (see Solmsen quoted above, n. 28) Aristotle is not primarily influenced by the *Phaedrus* but by his own *Analytics*. In his use of ἔστω Aristotle seems to be drawing on the vocabulary of the *Analytics* (see below, n. 31) and in defining the individual emotions he seems to be offering causal definitions that meet the standards of the *Posterior Analytics* (see below, section 2) and that may have been worked out in his own *Diaireseis* (see below, n. 44).

31 ἔστω occurs in the *Analytics* both in connection with whole premises and in connection with single terms. The following list is only a sample: With premises *An. Pr.* 25a14; 30a37, b9; 31a5, 10, 24: *An. Post.* 75a6, 9; 81b30; 94b14; 98b26; 99a31; with terms *An. Pr.* 30b33; *An. Post.* 78a31, 40, b24; 84b9; 87b8; 93a29; 94a28; 98a9, b5, 12; 99b3. The plural ἔστωσαν also occurs: *An. Pr.* 27b12, 23. Professor Morrow has called my attention to the fact that ἔστω is also commonly used in Euclid's *Elements* to introduce the first premise of the "given" in a demonstration. ἔστω is part of the vocabulary of demonstration and as such had already been used by Aristotle not only in his *Analytics* but also in his *Rhetoric*.

mulated propositions (e.g., *An. Pr.* 30a37-b2, *An. Post.* 75a6–7, 9–11). But this does not imply that in the *Rhetoric* definitions introduced by ἔστω are merely illustrative and popular in nature. For the cases are not identical. In the *Analytics* Aristotle is primarily investigating logical method. In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle is *using* logical method to investigate the materials with which a rhetorician must be acquainted. In the investigation of logical method Aristotle will be satisfied with premises that illustrate the method under consideration. In the investigation of emotions he will not be satisfied with illustrative premises.

II

In the preceding section, I have argued that the *Rhetoric*'s account of emotions should not be dismissed as popular and of little philosophical importance. In this section, I shall ask what is the significance of this account both for the philosophy of mind and for the development of rhetorical and ethical theory. Let us start by looking at the *Rhetoric* itself. Here, at the beginning of Book II we find Aristotle introducing his treatment of emotion with the following statement: Emotions are that on account of which men so change as to differ in judgment and which are attended by pain and pleasure, for example, anger, pity, fear, all other such and their opposites (1378a19–22). This initial statement, we may suspect, is not offered as a final and precise definition of emotion. For it is too wide and can include physiological disturbances such as headaches and stomach-aches that are accompanied by pain and that do affect judgment. Qualification is needed.[32] In this respect Aris-

[32] It may be instructive to compare this initial statement concerning emotion with the definition of rhetoric given in Book I (1355b25–26). Both need qualification. In both cases Aristotle passes over without mention a qualification that had been insisted upon by Plato. We have noted already (above, in Section I) Aristotle's failure to add a qualifying *in oratione* to his definition of rhetoric although he was familiar with Plato's *Gorgias* and the suggestion that rhetoric is the ability to persuade with speeches (462E1). The failure is hardly serious. Aristotle's audience within the Academy would understand an *in oratione*, if Aristotle failed to make the qualification explicit. The same is true of Aristotle's initial statement concerning emotion. It needs a qualification that had been made already by Plato and that would be supplied by Aristotle's audience. For in the *Philebus* (46–48) Plato had distinguished itches and tickles, hunger and thirst from emotions such as "anger, fear, yearning, grief, emulation, envy and the like" (47E1–2). The former group he had referred to the body (more accurately, itches and tickles are referred to the body, while hungers and thirsts are referred to both the body and the soul [46B8–C4, 47C1–E3]) and the latter group to the soul. Aristotle's audience, like

totle's immediately following remarks are important. It is necessary, he tells us, to analyze each emotion in three ways. In the case of anger, for example, we must distinguish how men prone to anger are disposed, at whom they are accustomed to be angry and on what grounds (1378a19–24). The mention of objects ("at whom," τίσιν) and grounds (ἐπὶ ποίοις) is important; it strongly suggests that Aristotle does not dissociate cognition from emotion. Unless Aristotle is confused, he does not conceive of emotions simply as inner (mental or bodily) feelings or sensations.[33] For if he did conceive of emotions as mere sensations, he could not explain how emotions have objects and grounds. Stomach-aches, headaches, and other (bodily) sensations are not justified. They lack objects and grounds altogether. It is thoughts and beliefs that have objects, and it is the occurrence of these cognitions in emotional response that explains why we can ask a man at whom he is angry and whether his anger is reasonable. Instead of viewing emotions simply as particular kinds of inner (mental) feelings or sensations that impel a man to behave in certain characteristic ways, Aristotle, we may suspect, includes cognition within his conception of emotion.

The accounts of individual emotions confirm this suspicion. Consider anger. Aristotle begins his treatment of this emotion with a definition: let anger be a desire for revenge accompanied by pain on account of an apparent insult to oneself or one's own, the insult being unjustified (1378a30–32). The mention of apparent insult within the definition is important. The appearance of unjustified insult is for Aristotle an essential part of being angry. Whenever a man is angry, he thinks or believes or imagines that someone has done something and has

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Aristotle himself, would be familiar with the *Philebus'* distinction and so prepared to add a qualifying "psychic" to the initial statement concerning emotions.

[33] Cope (above, n. 2) 2.7 may err when he distinguishes between emotions proper and other "feelings or affections of like nature, such as the appetites, hunger and thirst." According to Cope, the appetites involve bodily pleasures and pains, while emotions involve mental pleasures and pains. Cope is correct to distinguish between appetites and emotions, but his statement of the difference is insufficient, if not erroneous. For in speaking of "feelings or affections of like nature," he suggests too great a similarity between emotional response and bodily upset. We are encouraged to think that being angry is like feeling pangs of hunger. In both cases a man experiences unpleasant sensations. Only in the case of anger the sensations are mental and not bodily. Sensations maybe part of emotional response, but they are not the whole of it. For as Aristotle sees, the involvement of cognition in emotional response is of especial importance for distinguishing emotional responses from bodily upsets and the occurrence of particular kinds of cognition in emotional response is important for differentiating between particular kinds of emotional response.

done it unjustly (1378a30-b1, 1379b11–12). His anger always involves the thought of unjust treatment. For anger does not occur when men think that they suffer justly. As Aristotle explains, they do not think that they suffer unjustly; and anger was (said to be) this (1380b16–18). More precisely, anger was defined in part by reference to apparent insult, so that part of being angry is thinking oneself unjustly treated. The thought of outrage is essential and whenever this thought is not present, neither is anger.*

Similar remarks can be made concerning Aristotle's analysis of other individual emotions. Fear, for example, necessarily involves the thought or belief of imminent danger. Fear is defined as a pain or disturbance resulting from the appearance of imminent evil (1382a21–22). The thought of impending danger is essential, so that a man cannot be afraid unless he thinks himself threatened. Aristotle makes this quite clear when he argues in the following manner: If fear is associated with the expectation of suffering something destructive, it is clear that no one is afraid who believes nothing can happen to him. No one is afraid of those things that he believes cannot happen to him, nor of those persons by whom and at those times when he thinks he cannot suffer harm (1382b29–32). The thought or imagination of imminent danger is part of the definition of fear, so that it is obvious and a matter of conceptual necessity (1382b33) that whenever men are afraid they think that they can suffer harm.

For students of philosophical psychology, Aristotle's analysis of emotional response is in itself interesting. His emphasis upon cognition and its necessary involvement within emotional response may be said to anticipate debate among contemporary philosophers.[34] Of equal inter-

* The references to appearance in the definitions of anger and other emotions like fear and envy (1382a21–22, 1387b23–24) have recently been interpreted as references to the biological faculty of *phantasia*. That is a mistake. Aristotle is offering definitions and analyses that facilitate 'persuasion through the listeners' (1356a14), i.e., emotional appeal, which is one of the three modes of persuasion that proceed through speech (διὰ τοῦ λόγου 1356a1). In this context, he is careful to take note of the fact that in courts of law and deliberative assemblies, as in many other contexts, emotions are rarely grounded on certain knowledge. Rather, they are grounded upon beliefs that may turn out to be false. What appeared to be, e.g., an insult turns out to be nothing of the kind. It was only an apparent insult. For fuller discussion with references to recent literature, see the epilogue to the second edition of my book *Aristotle on Emotion* (London: Duckworth 2002) 94–103.

[34] Aristotle's emphasis upon the necessary involvement of thought or belief in emotional response may be compared with the similar position of E. Bedford ("Emotions," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 57 (1956–1957) 281–304) and contrasted with the view

est and of more immediate importance to this paper is the way Aristotle's analysis relates to and indicates his answer to debate current within the Academy. For philosophical debate concerning the involvement of cognition in emotional response is not new. On the contrary, the debate was lively within the Academy and is reflected in Plato's *Philebus* and Aristotle's *Topics*. In the *Philebus*, Socrates finds himself constrained to discuss the relationship of cognition to emotion and other kinds of pains and pleasures, when Protarchus balks at calling pleasure and pain true or false. Protarchus allows that opinion (δόξα) may be true or false but refuses to admit that pleasure and pain, fear and expectation can be properly called true or false (36C6–D2). At first Socrates tries to win over Protarchus by pointing out similarities between opinion on the one hand and pleasure and pain on the other. Socrates' argument proceeds smoothly enough until he tries to establish that pleasures and pains, like opinions, can be mistaken. To establish this, Socrates argues that pleasures often occur together with (μετά 37E10) false opinion. Socrates' choice of words is unfortunate. Protarchus construes "with" as simple concurrence. He conceives of the opinion as something external to the pleasure[35] and so objects that in such a case the opinion would be false but no one would call the pleasure false (37E12–38A2). Refused an easy victory, Socrates undertakes a more exhaustive study of opinion and its relationship to pleasure and pain. He gives a rather graphic description of our thought processes and finally argues that just as opinions may lack a basis in reality, so pleasures and pains may be without grounds (ἐπί 40D8). And what is true of pleasures and pains in general is, of course, true of painful emotions such as fear, anger and the like. They may be without foundation and so said to be false (40E2–4). Protarchus agrees and does not object

of G. Pitcher ("Emotion," *Mind* 74 [1965] 326–346). Pitcher offers a Wittgensteinian analysis according to which certain kinds of cognition are characteristic of but not essential to particular kinds of emotional response.

[35] See R. Hackforth, *Plato's Examination of Pleasure* (Cambridge: University Press, 1958) 69, 77. Protarchus' "view is that the 'mistakenness' is something lying outside the pleasure, a wrong opinion held concurrently with the feeling" (69). Perhaps it should be noted that Protarchus does not claim the view as his own. When Socrates congratulates him on his defense of pleasure, Protarchus modestly replies that he is merely saying what he hears (38A5). Perhaps we may add "in the Academy." It is convenient to refer to this argument as Protarchus' view or, as I shall soon do, Protarchus' (mis)understanding, but we should remember that Protarchus does not claim the view as his own.

when a little later Socrates says that true and false opinions "fill up" pleasures and pains with their own affection (42A7–9).

The *Philebus* certainly makes clear that Plato saw an intimate relationship between emotion and cognition. But the *Philebus* does not make precise the relationship,[36] and we may guess that the relationship was still a matter of lively debate within the Academy.[37] We get some idea of this debate from the *Topics*. Cognition, it seems, was generally considered essential to emotional response. But in what way was cognition essential? There seems to have been a difference of opinion. Take, for example, anger. The *Topics* allows that the thought of outrage is essential to being angry (127b30–31). But in what way is it essential? Is it the genus of anger? Apparently not, for pain which is a more likely candidate is not the genus (127b26–32).[38] Can we say, then, that anger is pain with (μετά) the thought of outrage (151a15–16)? Not without clarification. After the *Philebus* and Protarchus' (mis-)understanding of the preposition "with," we cannot simply define anger as pain "with" thought of outrage. We must go on and make precise how we are using "with." For "with" can be construed in the following ways: "and" (150a4), "made up out of" (150a22), "in the same receptacle" (150b35), "in the same place" (150b36) and "in the same time" (150b36). But in none of these senses, the *Topics* argues, is anger correctly defined as pain with the thought of outrage. What the definition really wants to show is that the pain of anger occurs on account of (διά) such a thought (151a16–17). The *Topics*, it seems, prefers a causal definition: anger is a

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[36] "With" (37E10) only gets Socrates into trouble. "Follows" (38B9) needs qualification, while "fills up" (42A9) is a metaphor that may avoid but does not solve the problem.

[37] When Socrates finishes his account of envy and begs off giving a similar account of fear, love, and the other emotions, he wins Protarchus' consent by promising to continue the discussion tomorrow (50C10-E2). This promise may be a dramatic device to enable the dialogue to move on to new material, but it also may be viewed as a genuine reflection of discussion within the Academy. For emotions together with other kinds of pleasures and pains were a subject of current and lively debate among members of the Academy. When Plato makes Socrates promise to consider the subject again tomorrow, he would seem to be both reflecting and encouraging debate within the Academy.

[38] Brunschwig (above, n. 13) 1.109 n. 1 rejects ὀλιγωρίας at 127b31 as a gloss on the grounds that the passage is concerned with determining the genus of anger, and while ὑπόληψις is a genus, ὑπόληψις ὀλιγωρίας is not one. Whatever text we adopt, it remains true that this passage in conjunction with 151a15–16 and 156a32–33 reflects debate within the Academy concerning the relationship between emotion and cognition in general and anger and thought of outrage in particular.

desire for revenge on account of (διά) apparent insult (156a32–33), and in this preference agrees with the *Rhetoric* (1378a31) and reflects Aristotle's own contribution to the Academic debate.

To this Academic debate concerning the relationship between cognition and emotion, Aristotle brought his own logical skills. Agreeing with other members of the Academy that cognition and emotion are intimately connected and wishing to make clear the kind of connection that joins cognition to emotional response,[39] Aristotle opted for a connection that is both essential and causal. He analyzed cognition as the efficient cause mentioned in the essential definition. In the *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle had insisted that questions of essence (τί ἐστι) and questions of cause (διὰ τί ἔστιν) are one and the same. (*An. Post.* 90a14–15, 31–32, 93a3–4, cf. *Metaph.* 1041a28–29) and had illustrated this principle partly by reference to the eclipse of the moon. This stock example is especially clear and also relevant to our enquiry. For an eclipse has an efficient cause that is included in the essential definition. What is an eclipse? asks Aristotle. It is a deprivation of light from the moon by the obstruction of the earth. What is the cause of an eclipse, or why does the moon suffer eclipse? Because light fails owing to the obstruction of the earth (*An. Post.* 90a15–18). For Aristotle knowing the essence of an eclipse involves knowing the efficient cause (*An. Post.* 98b21–24). The obstruction of the earth is essential to the occurrence of an eclipse and so is mentioned in the definition. The efficient cause of an eclipse

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[39] It should be emphasized that Aristotle is clarifying or advancing the Academic discussion. He is not overthrowing previous work. This is particularly true in regard to the *Philebus*. This dialogue had not made precise the exact relationship between cognition and emotion, but it had emphasized an intimate relationship. Certainly Aristotle had learned much from studying this dialogue. We have already noticed a close relationship between the accounts of pleasure in the *Philebus* and in the *Rhetoric* (above, Section I and n. 11) and have suggested that the *Rhetoric*'s initial statement on emotions assumes certain distinctions already made in the *Philebus* (above, n. 32). We may add that there is close agreement between the accounts of envy given in the *Philebus* and *Rhetoric*. Both works agree in calling envy a pain (48B8, 50A7; 1386b18, 1387b23), in emphasizing the grounds (ἐπί) that explain an envious man's emotional response (48B11, 49D3, E9, 50A2, 5; 1386b19, 1387b22–23, 1388a25), in pointing out that envious men are delighted at the misfortune of a neighbor or peer (48B11–12, 50A2–3; 1386b32–1387a3, 1388a24–27), in associating envy with bad character (49D6–7; 1386b33–1387a1) and in dissociating envy from the fearsome (49A–C5; 1386b20–24). These similarities indicate, I think, the influence of the *Philebus* upon Aristotle's treatment of envy. This is not to say that Aristotle simply rewrote the account of envy given in the *Philebus*. But it is to say that even if Aristotle did not borrow directly from the *Philebus*, he did borrow indirectly through discussion in the Academy.

is part of the formal cause,[40] so that any definition of eclipse that fails to mention the obstruction of earth is to that extent imperfect (*Metaph.* 1044b13–15). In stating the essential nature of an eclipse we must give a definition that "shows why" (*An. Post.* 93b38), we must give "an account of the cause" (*Metaph.* 1044b15). We must define an eclipse as a deprivation of light on account of obstruction and so make plain that the obstruction of the earth is both essential to an eclipse and also the efficient cause of an eclipse.

The case of emotional response is similar. Cognition is both essential and the efficient cause and so is mentioned in a definition that "shows why." Just as Aristotle analyzes an eclipse by considering the total situation including the efficient cause, so Aristotle analyzes the entire emotional response including the thought or belief that moves a man to respond in a particular sort of way. He looks upon some sort of cognition as both essential to and also the efficient cause of emotional response. This comes out clearly in Aristotle's treatment of anger. The thought of outrage is essential to anger so that the absence of such a thought entails the absence of anger (1380b16–18). It is also the efficient cause of anger. Being wronged produces anger (1383b6–7). A man is moved to anger by a slight. For even a trifling slight such as a forgotten name can produce anger (1397b33–34). Outrage or more precisely the thought of outrage[41] is for Aristotle both essential to anger and also the efficient cause of anger. It is, therefore, included in the definition that "shows why." And it is just this kind of definition that Aristotle offers when he says, "Let anger be (ἔστω) a desire for revenge on account of (διά) apparent insult" (1378a30–31). It is simply not true that when Aristotle defines the individual emotion of anger he avoids ἔστι and employs ἔστω, because the former term signifies the essence (τί ἐστι) in the domain of truth while the latter introduces a definition that

[40] On the efficient cause as an element in the formal cause and in the essential definition, see Sir David Ross, *Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1949) 640; *Aristotle's* Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1958) 2.223, 235.

[41] Anger may be caused by the mere appearance of outrage. Of course, when outrage actually occurs, it is natural to refer to the outrageous act as the efficient cause. We may compare *An. Post.* 94a36-b8 where Aristotle introduces the Athenian attack upon Sardis as the efficient cause of the Persian Wars. Since the attack actually occurred, it is natural to pick out this attack as the efficient cause that moved the Persians to retaliate. Nevertheless, actual outrage is not essential to anger. Only the thought or imagination of outrage is essential, so that whenever a man is moved to anger he thinks or imagines himself insulted.

is merely sufficient and plausible in the domain of opinion.[42] Rather Aristotle gives us an essential definition that captures both the essence (τί ἐστι) and the cause (διὰ τί). He is following the practise of the *Posterior Analytics* and giving definitions that "show why." His definition is not a popular throwout. It is well formed and meets standards advanced in the *Posterior Analytics*.

We could go on and study each individual emotion, pointing out that some kind of cognition is both essential to and the efficient cause of each individual emotion. In the case of fear, for example, we might point out that Aristotle's definition is a causal definition. By including the appearance of imminent danger within the definition (1382a21–22), Aristotle forms a definition that "shows why."[43] And this "account with the cause" permits him to argue that necessarily such things are fearsome as appear to possess destructive power (1382a27–30). Fearsome things (that is, those things that inspire or arouse the emotion of fear) are necessarily things that appear to be harmful, because fear is by definition a pain or disturbance due to the appearance of imminent danger. Perhaps, however, we have gone far enough to say with some confidence that the definitions and analyses of individual emotions given in the *Rhetoric* are not popular definitions and analyses to whose truth Aristotle was largely indifferent. On the contrary the treatment of individual emotions given in the *Rhetoric* is Aristotle's own treatment. Moreover, it indicates Aristotle's own answer to the Academic debate concerning the relationship of cognition to emotional response. Cognition is not simply concurrent with (μετά) emotional response. It is essential to and the cause of emotional response. This answer is characteristically Aristotelian and should be recognized as such. This is not to say that the account given in the *Rhetoric* is written specifically to answer the

[42] Cf. Dufour (above, n. 2) 1.39: "ἐστι signifierait l'essence (τὸ τί ἐστι) dans l'ordre et le domaine de la vérité. ἔστω introduit une formule seulement suffisante et plausible dans l'ordre et le domaine de l'opinion."

[43] The fact that here (1382a21) Aristotle employs the preposition ἐκ and not διά (as in the case of anger, 1378a31) is not significant. Even in the *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle does not control carefully his use of prepositions. He uses διά to introduce the question of causation and to speak of definitions that "show why" (90a15, 93b39). But in giving causal definitions Aristotle does not insist on using διά. In the case of the eclipse, Aristotle may use ὑπό to introduce the efficient cause (90a16, 93b7, *Metaph.* 1044b14), or he may avoid a preposition by using a genitive absolute (90a18), or he may omit other elements in the definition and give the efficient cause in the nominative case (93b7, cf. *Rhet.* 1380b17–18 where Aristotle states that fear was (said to be) this, namely the thought of unjustified suffering).

Academic debate. It is not. The *Rhetoric* investigates emotion because it must instruct the orator in persuasion "through the hearers". Still, the *Rhetoric*'s account presupposes and reflects Aristotle's own answer to the Academic debate. It makes clear his own view that may have been worked out and fully stated in the *Diaireseis*.[44] That work has not survived. But the *Rhetoric* has, providing us with a rather clear indication of how Aristotle explained the relationship between cognition and emotional response.

Aristotle's analysis of emotion and in particular of the essential involvement of cognition in emotional response is an important contribution to philosophical psychology. It is also important for rhetorical and ethical theory because it makes clear that emotions are not blind impulses. When a man responds emotionally, he is not the victim of some automatic reflex. On the contrary, he is acting according to his judgment. When a man becomes angry, he takes revenge because he thinks himself insulted. He is prepared to explain and justify his action by reference to an insult. He may, of course, be mistaken. He may think himself insulted when he has not been and when it should be clear to him that he has not been. In this case his anger is unreasonable and criticized as unjustified. But he may not be mistaken in thinking himself insulted. He may be correct in his belief and also have good reason for his belief. In this case the man's anger is reasonable. Upon request he can state his reason for being angry, point out that his anger is not

[44] It is, I think, likely that Aristotle first worked out his views on emotions in his *Diaireseis* and then incorporated these views into his treatment of individual emotions given in the *Rhetoric*. The account of emotions presented in the *Diaireseis* was probably not restricted to a formal division or simple list. It probably divided or analyzed (διαιρεῖν, *Rhet.* 1378a22) each emotion in respect to the condition of the emotional man, the object of his emotion, and the grounds for his emotional response. On the *Diaireseis*, see H. v. Arnim, *Das Ethische in Aristoteles Topik*, Sb. Ak. Wien 205.4 (1927) 91–94, F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles, Eudemische Ethik* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1962) 242, 259, 356–357; *Aristoteles, Magna Moralia* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1958) 300–302. It should be added that it is at least debatable whether or not Aristotle wrote a *Diaireseis*. The fact that the catalogue preserved by Diogenes Laertius (5.23, number 42) mentions a *Diaireseis* in seventeen books cannot be taken as certain proof. See P. Moraux, *Les Listes Anciennes des Ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain: Éditions Universitaires, 1951) 83–86. The *Eudemian Ethics* (1220b10–12, 1221b34–35, 1234a26) refers to *Diaireseis* concerning emotions, faculties, and dispositions. Since most scholars now accept the *Eudemian Ethics* as a work of Aristotle earlier than the *Nicomachean Ethics*, it may seem that these references in the *Eudemian Ethics* settle the issue. But it would be a mistake to claim that there remains no room for doubt. Those who follow Moraux and think that the *Diaireseis* mentioned by Diogenes Laertius are pseudo-Aristotelian compilations may well think that the mention of such collections by the *Eudemian Ethics* is a sign that this treatise is not genuine.

based upon some momentary fantasy, and perhaps add that he is prepared to abandon his anger any time his beliefs are shown to be false or doubtful. His anger is reasonable in that it is justified by the particular situation and also open to reason in that it can be altered by reasoned consideration.

Emotional responses can be intelligent and reasonable actions. This is important for rhetorical theory and may explain in part at least why Aristotle not only recognized persuasion "through the hearers" as an effective means of persuasion but also dignified it by assigning it a position coordinate with persuasion "through demonstration." Persuasion "through the hearers" is not to be confined to the prooemium and the epilogue, for emotions can be aroused and allayed by reasoned argumentation. When an orator demonstrates that danger is imminent, he is arousing fear in the audience. His reasoned arguments lead the audience to conclude that danger threatens. The hearers think their lives threatened, become frightened, and begin to think about their own safety. Fear makes them deliberate (1383a6–7). Such men are not the victims of some irrational force that compels them to act as they do. On the contrary, their action is both intelligible and intelligent. Their fear is based upon a reasoned consideration of the situation and so is reasonable. Moreover, it may be allayed in the same way that it was aroused. Further deliberation may convince the hearers that danger is not imminent and so lead them to abandon their fear and become confident. The same is true of anger. When an orator demonstrates that a particular man has acted in an outrageous and insulting manner, he excites anger in the audience. Further deliberation, however, may lead to an abandoning of this anger. If subsequent reasoning shows that a benefit and not an outrage has occurred, the audience will shift from anger to gratitude. The response will be intelligent and reasonable. The hearers are responding according to reasoned judgment and are not the victims of some external power. In particular, they have not abandoned their anger because of some charm or enchantment such as that advertised by Thrasymachus (*Phdr.* 267C7–D1). Enchantments are outside the sphere of reason. They may cause or compel a man to behave in a particular way, but such behavior should not be confused with emotional response, reasonable or unreasonable.

This is an important point. For it helps us to understand the importance of Aristotle's analysis of emotion. As long as emotion went unanalyzed it was possible to look upon emotional appeal as a kind of persuasion distinct from and hostile to reasoned argumentation. In the

absence of an examination of emotion that made clear the involvement of cognition in emotional response, it was possible to think of emotional appeal primarily as a kind of charm or enchantment that overcomes the hearer, that works on him in the manner of a drug.[45] This comes out quite clearly in Gorgias' *Helen*. Here emotion is depicted as something that happens to an individual. It is like a disease (νόσημα) in that its victims suffer a misfortune (ἀτύχημα) and are outside the sphere of praise or blame (19). Emotional response is not so much an action as an unfortunate affliction that may be induced or caused in an individual. Emotional appeals are like drugs (φάρμακα 14) that work upon the patient. They may be administered in a systematic or rational manner, but they do not depend upon judgment and the patient's reason.[46] Like a noxious potion they work upon the patient, drugging and bewitching him (14). They have the power to charm (θέλγειν 10) their victim. He is overcome by wizardry (γοητεία 10) and so cannot be held accountable for his behavior. He may be said to suffer misfortune, but he cannot be said to do wrong (15).

As long as this view of emotional response and emotional appeal went unchallenged it was natural to oppose the arguments of reason to the inspired incantations (*Hel.* 10) of emotional appeal. We can understand why Gorgias made Padamedes tell the jury of Greek leaders that he would not try to arouse their pity but rather would try to instruct (διδάσκειν) them in the truth (*Pal.* 33). Similarly we can understand why Plato made Socrates reject emotional appeal in favor of instruction (*Apol.* 35B9–C2). Looked upon as an affliction divorced from reason, emotional response was naturally opposed to reasonable behavior. It was Aristotle's contribution to offer a different picture of emotional

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[45] While both Thasymachus and Gorgias spoke of charms and enchantments, neither seems to have investigated the nature of emotional responses like pity and fear. Such an investigation was left for Aristotle. See Solmsen "Aristotle and Cicero" (above, n. 3) 392, 404; C. Segal, "Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 66 (1962) 121, 133.

[46] Segal ([above, n. 45] 115–117) points out correctly that for Gorgias and Thrasymachus the ability to control emotion was α τέχνη. Like a doctor the skillful orator proceeds systematically and may be said to operate in an artful manner. But it is the orator who acts in a rational manner. The audience is conceived of as a patient upon whom the orator works. Gorgias seems to emphasize this when he speaks of the soul suffering its own suffering (πάσχειν, πάθημα, 9). This repetition of the idea of suffering in both verb and cognate accusative is emphatic and may recall the preceding mention of violent physical suffering (7). (See Segal 105.) For Gorgias being overcome by emotion is analogous to being raped.

response. Following the lead of Plato's *Philebus* and subjecting individual emotions to careful analysis, Aristotle developed a view of emotion that made clear the necessary involvement of cognition in emotional response and so made clear that emotional responses may be reasonable and unreasonable. Far from being hostile to reason, emotions are amenable to reason so that an orator can arouse and allay emotion while presenting reasoned arguments. By demonstrating that no unjust outrage has occurred, the orator allays anger and by demonstrating that the defendant is an innocent victim, he excites pity. It is to Aristotle's credit that he pointed out the occurrence of judgment in emotional response and promoted persuasion "through the hearers" to a position coordinate with persuasion "through demonstration."

It remains to speak briefly about the importance of Aristotle's analysis of emotion for ethical theory.[47] In picking out for analysis πάθη that are distinguished by the involvement of cognition, Aristotle was marking off those πάθη that are fundamental to his own bipartite or moral psychology and so of especial importance to his ethical theory. More precisely, in picking out and analyzing those πάθη that essentially involve some kind of thought or belief or imagination, Aristotle was picking out emotions and distinguishing them from bodily drives or directed dispositions such as hunger and thirst. Plato's tripartite psychology had not drawn this distinction clearly and so had not provided an adequate psychology for ethical theory. Hungers and thirsts are bodily drives, and in general do not depend upon a particular kind of cognition. When men are hungry, it is not normally because they think that something is the case. Rather they have an empty stomach. Their hunger is explained not by reference to certain beliefs but by reference to physiological causes. In contrast emotions are explained by reference to thoughts and beliefs. They involve an assessment of the particular situation and so may be reasonable and unreasonable. Unlike bodily drives, emotional responses are normally open to criticism and are important for understanding moral virtue. As Aristotle

[47] Once again we must allow the possibility that Aristotle wrote a *Diaireseis* which included a study of emotion (see above, n. 44), and which may have had a more immediate effect upon Aristotle's ethical theory than the account of emotions given in the *Rhetoric*. Still, the account given in the *Rhetoric* would reflect the study included in the *Diaireseis*. Moreover, in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle makes quite clear that rhetoric and ethics have common interests and that rhetoric is a kind of offshoot of ethics in so far as it studies character and emotion (1356a20–27, 1359b8–12). We are, I think, encouraged to look for relationships between the *Rhetoric* and Aristotle's ethical theory.

saw, the morally virtuous man is one who is properly disposed toward emotional response (*EN* 1105b19–1106a13, cf. 1104b13–14, 1106b16–17).

Let me expand this point. It is, I think, true that the bipartite psychology employed by Aristotle in his ethical and political writings was developed in Plato's Academy.[48] Bipartition may be spoken of as "a Platonic distinction."[49] Still, we must guard against an oversimplified view of this development within the Academy. It is not enough to say that bipartition arose from tripartition by bringing together the θυμοειδές and the ἐπιθυμητικόν[50] and to argue that this join was encouraged by the ambiguous position of the θυμοειδές[51] and prepared for in the *Timaeus* by the connection of tripartition with the dichotomy of an immortal and mortal soul.[52] It is, of course, true that the ambiguous position of the θυμοειδές between the λογιστικόν and the ἐπιθυμητικόν seems to have depended largely on the political structure of Plato's ideal state and that whenever such political considerations receded into the background, the θυμοειδές could be thought of in terms of an emotion like anger and joined with the ἐπιθυμητικόν to form the emotional side of man.[53] It is also true that the distinction between an immortal and mortal soul does encourage a bipartite view. Even though this dichotomy of an immortal and mortal soul is not conceptually identical with the dichotomy of moral psychology,[54] it does help to prepare for this dichotomy. Still, the move from tripartition to bipartition was not simply a matter of undoing the special status of the θυμοειδές and collapsing the two lower faculties into a single psychic faculty. The move to bipartition also required an alteration or clarification of the status of the ἐπιθυμητικόν. For the ἐπιθυμητικόν is frequently (though not exclusively) connected with bodily drives that are not emotions. Yet it is emotions with which the ἐπιθυμητικόν must be associated, if it is to join with the

[48] See D. Rees, "Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 77 (1957) 112–118.

[49] F. Solmsen, "Antecedents of Aristotle's Psychology and Scale of Beings," *American Journal of Philology* 76 (1955) 150.

[50] Arnim (above, n. 44) 7, cf. Plutarch, *Moralia* 442B.

[51] F.M. Cornford, "Psychology and Social Structure in the *Republic* of Plato," *Classical Quarterly* 6 (1912) 246–265; R. Hackforth, "The Modification of Plan in Plato's *Republic*," *Classical Quarterly* 7 (1913) 265–272; Rees (above, n. 48) 114.

[52] Rees (above, n. 48) 113; H.J. Kramer, *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1959) 146–147.

[53] Even *Republic* 439E5 suggests such a join.

[54] R. Heinze, *Xenocrates* (Leipzig, Teubner, 1892) 140–142; J. Burnet (above, n. 7) 63, n. 1, criticized by Rees (above, n. 48) 113, n. 30.

θυμοειδές in making up the emotional side of man, which is for Aristotle the sphere of moral virtue.

This point may be developed by reference to the *Timaeus*. Here we find the ἐπιθυμητικόν connected with hunger and other bodily needs (70D7–8) and quite indifferent to reason (71A3–5, D4). While the θυμοειδές listens to reason, the ἐπιθυμητικόν does not. It must be held down forcibly (70A5–6). It is like a wild beast feeding at a manger (70E4–6). The ἐπιθυμητικόν is associated with hunger. But hunger is not an emotion such as anger and fear. It is a directed disposition or bodily drive that maybe either held down or satisfied, but is not open to reason in the way that emotions are. For hunger does not depend upon an appraisal of the situation but rather arises on account of physiological causes.

The ἐπιθυμητικόν, it seems, is associated with bodily drives. This may be made clearer by considering sexual desire. For in the *Timaeus* sexual desire is treated in a manner similar to hunger. Both are depicted as animals (70E4, 91A2); both are presented as bodily conditions immune to reason. In the case of men, sexual desire is caused by marrow in the region of the genitals (91A4–B7). In the case of women sexual desire is touched off by protracted periods of barrenness (91B7–C7). In neither case does the desire depend upon an assessment of the situation. In both cases the desire is caused by bodily factors, so that relief comes not through reasoned argument but through intercourse and reproduction (91C7–D5). And if sexual desire does not depend upon an appraisal of the situation, neither does an excess of sexual desire. Sexual intemperance does not depend upon false assessments. It results from fluidity of marrow and porosity of bone. It deserves treatment and not censure (86C3–E3).

In the *Timaeus* hunger and thirst and sexual desire are not treated as emotions. They are depicted as bodily drives or directed dispositions that are not on a par with emotions such as anger and fear. There is merit in this analysis. The behavior of a hungry man is quite different from the behavior of an angry man. We respond to the former by meeting his need; we respond to the latter with reasoned argument. We give a hungry man food to calm his stomach and to alleviate painful sensations. We do not offer him reasoned arguments to alter his judgment. With appropriate qualifications something similar could be said about meeting the need of a man afflicted with sexual desire. My purpose, then, is not to criticize the account of hunger and sexual desire that is presented in the *Timaeus*. Rather I want to emphasize that this

account is an account of bodily drives and not of emotions. The *Timaeus* associates the ἐπιθυμητικόν with bodily drives and not with emotions, and this association creates difficulties for simply joining together the ἐπιθυμητικόν and the θυμοειδές to form the emotional side of man. Despite the fact that the *Timaeus* introduces a dichotomy between an immortal and mortal soul and groups together the θυμοειδές and the ἐπιθυμητικόν within the mortal soul, the *Timaeus* does not (without significant qualification) prepare the way for the dichotomy of bipartition. For bipartition is primarily a moral psychology. It is a psychology that is useful in ethical discussion because it enables one to distinguish between deliberate actions that are preceded by reasoned deliberation and emotional responses that involve perception and assessment but are not preceded by reasoned deliberation.[55] Both kinds of action are intelligent. The agent is responsible and can give reasons that explain and justify his behavior. In contrast the behavior that results from a directed disposition is hardly action at all. The victim of acute hunger explains his behavior not by citing reasons (how he sees the situation) but by citing bodily causes. He is driven and impelled. He is, as the *Timaeus* (86B1–87B9) points out, hardly a moral agent. His behavior falls outside the dichotomy of bipartition; it is like involuntary disease, not like human action.[56]

A word of caution is called for. The *Timaeus'* treatment of the ἐπιθυμητικόν may be considered special. For the *Timaeus* maintains a tripartite psychology even in sections of the dialogue that are marked by an obvious biological interest. The ἐπιθυμητικόν is closely connected

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[55] The dichotomy is not absolute. Emotional response may follow upon and be controlled by reasoned argumentation. We have already noticed that the reasoned arguments of an orator may lead an audience to judge that danger is imminent and so to become frightened. Similarly an individual person may reflect upon his situation, conclude that his life is in danger, and become frightened. Still, emotional responses are frequently (perhaps all too frequently) not preceded by any kind of deliberation. A man simply assesses his situation in a certain way and acts appropriately. His action is not preceded by deliberation, but it is intelligent and is open to evaluation. His emotional response may be said to be proper or improper. And it is the mark of a morally virtuous man that his emotional responses are correct. Cf. *EN* 1117a17–22 where Aristotle describes the most courageous individual who is fearless in the face of sudden danger. He responds properly on account of his virtuous character (ἕξις) and not as a result of deliberation (λόγισμος). For further discussion of this passage and in general of Aristotle's conception of moral virtue see my article "Aristotle: Emotions and Moral Virtue," *Arethusa* 2 (1969) = Chapter 7 in this volume, pp. 107–130.

[56] On involuntary disease as a misfortune, see Gorgias, *Helen* 19, discussed above, this section.

with bodily nourishment and even assigned to plants.[57] The concern of the *Timaeus* with bodily drives or directed dispositions such as hunger, thirst, and sexual desire may be thought to reflect the physiological interests of the dialogue. Directed dispositions may be assigned to the ἐπιθυμητικόν and in a dialogue like the *Timaeus* such an assignation is not surprising. But it would be a mistake to think that such directed dispositions constitute the entirety of the ἐπιθυμητικόν. For as the *Republic* makes clear, the ἐπιθυμητικόν has many forms (πολυειδία 580D11). It is connected with avarice (553C6, cf. 590B6), which does not depend upon a physiological cause but upon an evaluation (554A2, B2). Avaricious men are not driven to grasp at profit in the way that hungry men are driven to grasp at food. Their appetite is not caused by a physiological disorder but based upon an erroneous assessment. Yet their desires and actions are referred to the ἐπιθυμητικόν. Indeed, in one passage the appetitive faculty is even labeled money-loving and gain-loving (φιλοχρήματος, φιλοχερδές, 581A6–7, cf. 553C5).[58]

The ἐπιθυμητικόν is not a simple faculty. It includes a thrifty element (560C7), a niggardly and avaricious aspect, that cannot be construed as a directed disposition similar to hunger and thirst. Still, it is true to say that the desire for food and drink and the desire for sexual relations are for Plato central cases of appetition and of especial importance for understanding the ἐπιθυμητικόν. In the *Republic*, Plato calls hunger and thirst most clear cases of ἐπιθυμία (437D3–4) and then proceeds to use thirst as an example in establishing the existence of the ἐπιθυμητικόν, that faculty whereby the soul feels sexual passion, hungers, thirsts, and feels the flutter of other desires (439D6–8). And later when Plato wants to show how unreal are the pleasures of the ἐπιθυμητικόν, he uses hunger and thirst as examples (585A8). Hunger and thirst and sexual drive are central to an understanding of the ἐπιθυμητικόν. They are paradigm cases of appetition, but they are not emotions. They are directed dispositions resulting from bodily causes.[59]

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[57] On the general problem of adapting tripartition to biological investigation, see Solmsen (above, n. 49) 153–157, 160–161 and cf. M.J. O'Brien, *The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Mind* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina. 1967) 170–171.

[58] Here in Book IX of the *Republic* each of the three faculties is said to have its own ἐπιθυμίαι (580D8), so that the appetitive faculty cannot be called without awkwardness the ἐπιθυμητικόν. See the note of J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: University Press, 1963) 342–343.

[59] Cf. *Rep.* 439D1–8 and the comment of R.C. Cross and A.D. Woozley, *Plato's* Republic, *A Philosophical Commentary* (London: Macmillan, 1964) 122.

We can, I think, say that tripartition failed to draw a clear distinction between emotional responses and bodily drives. Tripartition did not pick out clearly that class of πάθη that are marked by the involvement of cognition, that are characterized by grounds and objects. This is not to say that Plato never saw the importance of this class of πάθη. He did and in the *Philebus* focused his attention upon "anger and fear and longing and grief and desire and emulation and envy and the like" (47E1–2). But it is to say that bipartition could not develop out of tripartition simply by joining together the ἐπιθυμητικόν and the θυμοειδές. It was first necessary to distinguish emotional responses from bodily drives, to focus upon those πάθη that necessarily involve cognition and so can be reasonable or unreasonable.[60] And it was to Aristotle's credit that he followed the lead of Plato's *Philebus* and pressed forward with an exhaustive analysis that was important not only for philosophical psychology and rhetorical theory but also for ethical theory. In analyzing emotional response, Aristotle was turning his attention toward those πάθη that are amenable to reason (*EN* 1102b30–1103a1) and are the domain of moral virtue (*EN* 1105b19–1106a13). He was developing a moral psychology that would serve him well in ethical and political investigations.

[60] This is not the only reason why bipartition could not arise by simply combining the θυμοειδές and the ἐπιθυμητικόν. An additional reason is the fact that the θυμοειδές and the ἐπιθυμητικόν together did not cover the entirety of man's emotional side. Shame is an important emotion and is assigned by the *Topics* (126a8) to the λογιστικόν. This assignation is in agreement with *Republic* 571C9 and in possible disagreement with *Phaedrus* 253D6, 254A2, 256A6. (See Arnim [above, n. 44] 68–71 and O'Brien [above, n. 57] 167–169). Whatever the proper assignation of shame it seems clear that tripartition was not well suited for picking out the emotional side of man. It was necessary to start over and to group together emotions, including shame (*Rhet.* 1383b11–1385a15), that involve cognition and are marked by grounds and objects (*Rhet.* 1378a23–24).

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CHAPTER TWO

A NOTE ON ASPASIUS, *IN EN* 44.20–21

In his commentary on the *EN* Aspasias asks what is meant by the claim that pleasure and pain follow every πάθος (42.27–28). He first considers sympathetically the view that pleasure and pain are to be construed as γενικώτατα πάθη, and then raises some difficulties for this interpretation (42.28–44.10). At this point Aspasius suggests that it might be better to step back and ask what πάθος is and what might be its εἴδη (44.10–12). After criticizing two Stoic definitions, Aspasius turns to the Peripatos and remarks that among the older Peripatetics he can find no definition of πάθος (44.20–21). That is a remarkable statement, which at first glance appears false (cf. Ar.'s *Rhet.* 2.1 1378a19–22). On reflection, however, it appears that Aspasius may have a point—namely, that the early Peripatetics did not offer a single definition of πάθος and did not do so partly because of difficulties in pinning down the relationship between πάθος and πρᾶξις.

It is, of course, true that Ar.'s *Rhet.* offers a definition of πάθος, but significantly this definition fails to give the essential marks of πάθη like anger and pity. Changing in regard to judgment (1378a20) is really a side effect that Ar. mentions because rhetoric is concerned with influencing judgment (1377b20–21). Ar. notes that things do not appear the same to men who are and who are not angry (1377b31–32), but when he comes to offer a definition of anger, he does not mention its effect on judgment (1378a30–32). Furthermore, the *Rhet.*'s definition of πάθος is too inclusive, for it does not rule out bodily affections, like headaches and stomachaches, which all too often affect a man's judgment. The particular class of πάθη that Ar. has in mind is best indicated by the illustrative list: anger, pity, fear and the like (1378a21). Only this list does not prepare one for the inclusion of a πάθος like χάρις (1385a16-b10). This πάθος is defined as service rendered (ὑπουργία 1385a18); no mention of affection (ἡδονή, λύπη, ταραχή, etc.) on the part of the agent occurs in the definition or in the subsequent discussion (and this despite the fact that ἡδονή and λύπη had been mentioned in the definition of πάθος 1378a20–21). Apparently Aristotle conceives of χάρις primarily as the act of doing someone else a favor or service (ὑπουργεῖν 1385a19,

ὑπηρετεῖν 1385a26).* This is not an odd conception of χάρις. We may compare Arius' survey of Peripatetic ethics, where three definitions of χάρις are given: χάριν δὲ λέγεσθαι τριχῶς, τὴν μὲν ὑπουργίαν ὠφελίμου αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, τὴν δ' ἄμειψιν ὑπουργίας ὠφελίμου, τὴν δὲ μνήμην ὑπουργίας τοιαύτης (Stob. 143.18–20). Arnim (*Arius Didymus* p. 76) comments that only the last of these three definitions is concerned with a πάθος; the first two define πράξεις.** This comment is intelligible enough. The first two definitions mention actions (ὑπουργία, ἄμειψις ὑπουργίας) that are only loosely, if at all, tied to feelings in the sense of passive affections. Nevertheless, Arnim's comment misses what seems to me to be the important point—namely, that many of the πάθη relevant to ethical theory are primarily πράξεις, that there is no clear dividing line between πάθη and πράξεις.

This point may be developed by considering the *EN*, *EE* and *MM*. All three of these ethical treatises explain πάθος by an illustrative list plus a reference to attendent pleasure and pain (*EN* 1105b21–23, *MM* 1186a12–14, *EE* 1220b12–14). There are differences between these explanations (most important is the qualification αἰσθητικὴ in the *EE*)*** but all share what seems to me a serious deficiency in an ethical context. This is the absence of any indication how πάθος relates to πρᾶξις. The absence is not to be ignored, for ultimately it affects our understanding of moral virtue as a ἕξις according to which one is well disposed toward πάθη (*EN* 1105b25, 28; *MM* 1186a16–22, 16–22; *EE* 1220b18–20). Moreover, the *EN* departs significantly from the other two treatises at exactly this point. When discussing the mean and defining virtue, it distinguishes between πάθη and πράξεις (1106b16–24, 1107a8–12, 1109a20–30), and when investigating the virtues and vices individually, it recognizes a special class concerned with λόγοι and πράξεις (1126b11–12, 1128b5–6). This is not the case in either the *MM* or the *EE*. In the former work moral virtue is explained as a μεσότης in regard to πάθη (1186a33–34, b33–34, cf. 1182a20–23); ἀλήθεια is said to be περὶ λόγους (1193a29) and yet treated alongside good temper as a ἕξις in regard to πάθος (1186a16–27); μοιχεία, which is classified

* On χάρις, χάριν ἔχειν and the subject of *Rhet.* 2.7, see *Aristotle on Emotion*, 2nd ed. with epilogue (London: Duckworth 2003) 107–109 and "Aristotle and Theophrastus on Emotion" in *Passions and Progress in Greco-Roman Thought*, ed. J. Fitzgerald (London: Routledge forthcoming) = Chapter 6 in this volume, pages 77–79.

** H. v. Arnim, *Arius Didymus' Abriss der peripatetischen Ethik* (SB Wien 204.3 1926) 76.

*** *Aristotle on Emotion*, 2nd ed. 111–112 and "Aristotle and Theophrastus on Emotion" = pages 97–98 in this volume.

as a πρᾶξις in the *EN* (1107a11), is now called a πάθος (1186a35–38); αἴδως, which is all but labeled a πάθος in the *EN* (1128b11), is now regarded as a disposition to do and to say the right thing at the right time (1193a1–10). The position of the *EE* is not very different. Moral virtue is explained as a ἕξις in regard to πάθη (1220b8–20); the list of virtues and vices mixes up the classification of the *EN* so that μεγαλοψυχία and μεγαλοπρέπεια come after ἀλήθεια (1221a5–12); μοιχεία is discussed together with ὕβρις and without reference to the Nicomachean distinction between πάθη and πράξεις (1221b20–26).

These differences have, of course, been observed and discussed before (e.g., Kapp, *Das Verhältnis* 42–48; Dirlmeier, *MM* 216).* What especially interests me is that these differences may be related to Peripatetic work on πάθος. We know, for example, that Theophrastus wrote a Περὶ παθῶν and that in this work he discussed μέμψις in conjunction with ὀργή and θυμός (Simplicius, *In Cat.* 235.8). For our purposes the important point is that μέμψις seems to be more a matter of saying something negative, i.e. faultfinding, than of feeling some passive affection. (Cf. *Char.* 17.1, where μεμψιμοιρία is defined as ἐπιτίμησις παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον τῶν δεδομένων and then illustrated by eight typical complaints). If Theophrastus and other Peripatetics focused on πάθη like μέμψις and χάρις, and if they came to the conclusion that there is no neat dividing line between πάθη and πράξεις, they may well have dropped the distinction in favor of a more inclusive notion of πάθος. This would be advantageous in ethical theory for it would eliminate the necessity of deciding whether a virtue like ἐλευθεριότης is related to a πάθος (charitable feelings) or to a πρᾶξις (act of charity). Kapp's claim "Mit der Bestimmung 'ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν' (1107a4) wird in der Tat das Gebiet der ethischen Tugend vortrefflich beschrieben, und die Vorteile, die eine solche lockerere Fassung mit Rucksicht auf eine Tugend wie etwa die ἐλευθεριότης empfahlen, sieht man leicht ein," seems to have things backwards. It is precisely the distinction between πάθος and πρᾶξις which generates classification problems. Anger is just as much a matter of plotting and taking revenging as feeling mistreated. Furthermore, the ethically important πάθη are precisely those πάθη which are closely tied to πρᾶξις. Pity and indignation may be commendable, but they are not closely tied to πρᾶξις

* E. Kapp, *Der Verhältnis der eudemischen zur nikomachischen Ethik* (Diss. Freiburg, Br. 1912) 42–48 and F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles*, Magna Moralia, *übersetzt und erläutert* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1958) 216.

and never directly related to moral virtue, for ἀρετή is πρακτική (*EN* 1140b27–28). It is, I think quite possible that these and other considerations may have prompted Theophrastus and other Peripatetics to drop the Nicomachean distinction between πάθος and πρᾶξις and to work with a more flexible and in regard to πρᾶξις more inclusive notion of πάθος. Such a notion of πάθος seems established in the *MM* and can perhaps be detected not only in Arius' general account of Peripatetic ethics (Stob. 128.18), but also in his special report on Theophrastus (141.3–5). But whatever one thinks concerning these last two passages, it seems to me likely that Aspasius found no (neat and tidy) definition of πάθος and that he did not, precisely because the older Peripatetics were themselves keenly interested in πάθη, that is to say, in investigating the different kinds of behavior that count as πάθη and not in legislating some narrow definition of πάθος.

CHAPTER THREE

ON THE ANTECEDENTS OF ARISTOTLE'S BIPARTITE PSYCHOLOGY

This essay is concerned with the antecedents of Aristotle's bipartite or moral psychology.[1] It considers two common theses: (1) Aristotle's bipartite psychology is in origin a popular psychology already present (though not clearly formulated) in Euripides' *Medea* and *Hippolytus*; (2) Aristotle's bipartite psychology developed out of tripartition by collapsing together the two lower elements of tripartition. Roughly, I shall be qualifying the first and rejecting the second thesis. In both cases I hope to develop and make more precise the origins of Aristotle's bipartite psychology.

I

It is generally recognized that Euripides' depiction of Medea in the tragedy bearing her name and of Phaedra in the *Hippolytus* involves some sort of distinction between passion and reasoned deliberation, and that this distinction is important for understanding the development of Greek psychology and ethics.[2] In particular the famous monologues of Medea (*Med.* 1021–1080) and Phaedra (*Hipp.* 373–430) are said to present a kind of psychic dichotomy that anticipates in some way the dichotomy of Aristotle's bipartite or moral psychology. In this sec-

[1] This article is an expanded and corrected version of a paper distributed to the members of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy and subsequently discussed by members of the Society on 30 December 1969 in San Francisco. I wish to thank all those who participated in the discussion and offered criticisms. My thanks go also to Professors Bernard M.W. Knox, Charles P. Segal and S. Marc Cohen, who communicated to me privately their reactions to an earlier version of this paper, and to Drs. Herwig Görgemanns and Gustav Seeck who discussed with me ideas presented in this paper. Finally, I want to acknowledge the helpful criticisms of an anonymous referee.

[2] See, for example, F. Dirlmeier, "Vom Monolog der Dichtung zum 'inneren' Logos bei Platon und Aristoteles," *Gymnasium* 67 (1960) 31–32; M. Pohlenz, *Freedom* in *Greek Life and Thought* (New York 1966) 67; H. Görgemanns, *Beiträge zur Interpretation von Platons Nomoi* (*Zetemata* 25, München 1960) 159; J.J. Walsh, *Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness* (New York 1963) 16–22. See also my n. 31 in "Aristotle: Emotion and Moral Virtue," *Arethusa* 2 (1969) 184 = Chapter 7 in this volume, p. 128.

tion, I want to clarify this thesis. First I shall try to make more precise the way in which Euripides' *Medea* may be said to anticipate and elucidate Aristotle's moral psychology. Then I shall point out that Euripides' characterization of Phaedra differs significantly from his characterization of Medea and that this characterization of Phaedra cannot be used without considerable qualification to illustrate Aristotle's bipartite psychology.

It is true, I think, that the *Medea* as a whole and the famous monologue in particular are especially useful for illustrating and understanding Aristotle's moral psychology, because they distinguish implicitly spirit or emotion from *both* deliberation about means *and* also reasoned reflection about emotional response. Medea's monologue implies two distinctions that have been present earlier in the play and that are essential for an understanding of Aristotle's bipartite psychology. Bipartition is not a simple dichotomy between emotional response and means-end deliberation alone. Rather it is a dichotomy between emotional response on the one hand and means-end deliberation *together with* reasoned reflection about emotional response on the other.[3] Let me develop this point by considering relevant portions of the *Medea*.

At the beginning of the play we learn from the nurse that Medea is filled with hate and grief (16, 24–35), because she thinks herself dishonored by Jason (20, 26). Medea's emotional state is not in doubt. What is in doubt, and what especially troubles the nurse, is Medea's plans or deliberations (βουλεύειν 37). Here we have a partial expression of the dichotomy of bipartition. Medea's anger and grief, or more generally her emotions, are distinguished from the deliberations that follow upon and are given direction by her emotions. Considering herself outraged and so desiring revenge, Medea must deliberate about how to achieve revenge. Some way or means must be discovered (260) before her emotion and desire for revenge can be translated effectively into action.

[3] A proper understanding of the dichotomy of bipartition is an essential prerequisite for an adequate understanding of Aristotle's distinction between moral virtue (ἠθικὴ ἀρετή) and practical wisdom (φρόνησις). As the psychic dichotomy does not oppose emotional response to means-end deliberation alone, so the distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom is not a simple distinction between perfection in regard to emotional response and perfection in regard to means-end deliberation alone. Practical wisdom has as its province both deliberation about means and reflection about emotional response, because the dichotomy of bipartition groups together both these performances and distinguishes them from emotional response. See below, note 11.

The same distinction between emotional response and means-end deliberation is implied later when Creon confronts Medea and orders her to leave Corinth. Creon acknowledges being frightened of Medea, and explains his fear by pointing out that Medea is clever (σοφή 285) and pained at the loss of Jason's love (286). In other words, Medea is not only angered by Jason's behavior but is capable of following up her anger with successful deliberations about means to achieve revenge. This same distinction between emotion and cleverness occurs again when Creon says that he fears lest Medea be planning something (317) and then adds that a sharp-tempered (ὀξύθυμος 319) person is easier to guard against than a silent but clever (σοφός 320) person. A sharp-tempered person responds emotionally straightway and without deliberation. The silent and clever person does not act without deliberation. In his case, anger is the occasion for deliberation about means.

Emotion is distinct from means-end deliberation, and this distinction is part of the dichotomy of bipartition. Emotion is also distinguished from reasoned reflection about emotional response, and this distinction, too, is part of the dichotomy of bipartition. We can gain a clearer understanding of this latter distinction if we consider Medea's first meeting with Jason. During this meeting Medea criticizes herself for having followed and aided Jason, describing herself as eager (πρόθυμος 485) rather than wise (σοφωτέρα 485). Medea does not, of course, mean that her actions on behalf of Jason were lacking in cleverness. On the contrary she makes clear that without her skills Jason would never have escaped danger. (She begins and ends her opening statement with the claim to have saved Jason [476, 515].) Her point is simply that reason was not controlling emotion when she aided Jason. Her actions were motivated by the particular emotion of love.[4] With this piece of self-analysis Jason is in full agreement. He credits Medea with a subtle mind (529) but restricts her clever deliberations to means-end reasoning. Love was dominant and determined the course of her deliberations (527–531). Medea's cleverness at finding the means to effect a desired goal is never in doubt. All Greece knows that Medea is clever (σοφήν 539). But if she is skilled in means-end deliberations following upon emotional response, she is not similarly effective in reflecting upon and altering her emotional response in accordance with reasoned consideration (cf. 600). In contrast, Jason's actions—or so

[4] At the opening of the play the chorus made it clear that, in regard to Medea's emotional side (θυμόν 8), love (ἔρωτι 8) was dominant. Cf. 330 and 530.

Jason claims—are guided by reasoned reflection. He is not motivated by desire (556). He has considered (βεβούλευμαι 567) his actions and their consequences and so can claim to be wise (σοφός 548).[5]

A similar distinction between emotion and reasoned reflection appears during the second meeting of Medea and Jason (866–893). In the course of this meeting, the emotion of Medea is alleged to be under the control of reasoned reflection. Medea begins by asking Jason to pardon her anger (ὀργάς 870) and by saying that she has engaged in discussion (λόγων 872) with herself. Then she subjects her angry emotion to criticism (873–881) and indicates that she will give up her anger (θυμοῦ 879). Claiming to have considered (ἐννοήσας 882) her children and the impending exile without friends, Medea states that she has exhibited a lack of good sense (ἀβουλίαν 882, ἄφρων 885) and that her anger has been foolish (883). She admits that her previous conduct was unreasonable, but claims now to have considered (βεβούλευμαι 893) the matter and come to a better understanding. Jason is fooled by Medea's speech and replies sympathetically. He allows that Medea's anger (ὀργάς 909) was after all quite natural and that now at last Medea has come to better reasoning (βουλήν 913). He credits Medea with having reflected reasonably and having altered her emotions in accordance with reason.

Emotion, then, may be distinguished from reasoned reflection as well as from means-end deliberation. It is now time to look at Medea's monologue which, as I have suggested, implies both distinctions and so may be said to illustrate fully the dichotomy of bipartition. Medea begins the monologue by reflecting upon the evil consequences of her actions, by considering the personal loss involved in killing her children (1021–1039). This reflection, together with the pathetic sight of her children,[6] causes her to alter briefly her intentions. She abandons her plans (βουλεύματα) and states that she will take her children away with

[5] Jason would say, of course, that in some sense his actions, too, are guided by emotion. He would say that he is motivated by feelings of friendly affection, by a desire to aid and preserve Medea and her children (595, 620). But he would add that his emotional responses and subsequent plans can stand and have stood the test of reasoned reflection. While Medea's emotions motivate her to act in unreasonable ways, Jason's emotions do not. At least, Jason thinks that he can defend and justify his own behavior.

[6] It would be wrong to say that Medea's reasoned reflections alone effected a momentary change in her emotional response and planned revenge. Certainly the sight of her children contributed to her momentary change, but so did her reflections, and it is these reasoned reflections that are of especial interest.

her (1040–1048). But her desire for full revenge returns swiftly. She chides herself for having listened to soft arguments (μαλθακοὺς λόγους) and sends the children indoors to await death (1049–1055). Then for a second time she falters, addressing her spirit (θυμός) and pointing out the joy that the children can bring in exile (1056–1058). This time her hesitation is of even shorter duration. Once again she determines to kill the children. She is quite conscious of the terrible path that she has chosen for herself and the even more terrible path that she has chosen for the children (1067–1068). But now she does not falter. She understands (μανθάνω) that her forthcoming deed is evil (1078), but she also realizes that her reasoned reflections are unable to alter her angry desire for full revenge. As she puts it, θυμός is stronger than βουλεύματα (1079).

By means of this monologue Euripides has depicted a mother torn between an angry desire for total revenge and the realization that total revenge is in the long run an evil for herself and her children. From a dramatic point of view, the monologue does not set forth explicitly the dichotomy of bipartition. For reasoned reflection and means-end deliberation are on different sides of Medea's dilemma. Her reflections enable her to see the horror of her planned revenge and so argue for abandoning the plans that bring total revenge. But if the dichotomy of bipartition is not dramatically set forth in this monologue, it is, I think, clearly implicit in the monologue. Medea's emotions are distinguished from her βουλεύματα. And these βουλεύματα include both the deliberate plans (1044, 1048) which follow upon and are given direction by emotion and also the reflections (1079) which consider the reasonableness of emotion and on occasion alter emotion. It would be, of course, overstatement to say that by using βουλεύματα in an inclusive sense, Euripides has captured (consciously) the dichotomy of bipartition: deliberation and reflection in contrast with emotional response. But it can be said that this double usage of βουλεύματα encourages the dichotomy of bipartition, that the dichotomy is implicit or latent in Medea's monologue, so that the monologue can be used with caution to illustrate the dichotomy of bipartition.[7]

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[7] H.D. Voigtländer, "Spätere Überarbeitungen im grossen Medeamonolog," *Philologus* 101 (1957) 228; A. Lesky, in *Euripide, Sept exposés* et *discussions* (Genève 1960) 83; and E. Schlesinger, "Zu Euripides' Medea," *Hermes* 94 (1966) 29–30, point out correctly that βουλεύματα is not restricted to a single, well defined (technical) usage. Certainly it is wrong to think that Euripides is operating with some clearly formulated psychology (like Plato's tripartite psychology, Schlesinger 29). But we can say that the opposition

It is this dichotomy with which Aristotle works and which enables him at one time to treat reason as something that follows emotion and at another time to treat reason as something that controls emotion. When Aristotle says that the alogical soul is obedient to reason (*EN* 1098a4, 1102b31), he is thinking primarily of reasoned reflection and its ability to control and alter emotion. A virtuous man subjects his emo-

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between θυμός and βουλεύματα reflects an everyday distinction employed by ordinary men in describing human action and subsequently formulated in the dichotomy of bipartition. H. Strohm, *Euripides* (*Zetemata* 15, München 1957) 103 n. 1, seems to go too far when he says that βουλεύματα cannot be selected as a label to designate the opposite of θυμός because in 1079 βουλευμάτων refers only to the preceding μανθάνω, while in 1048 βουλεύματα is used for the murder plans. Instead of ruling out βουλεύματα, this double usage may be thought to qualify βουλεύματα as a technical label for one-half of the dichotomy of bipartition. Taking βουλεύματα inclusively so as to include both deliberations about means (murder plans) and reflections about emotional response (whether this kind of angry response is an over-response), we can see in the usage of βουλεύματα and its opposition to θυμός a striking anticipation of Aristotle's logical soul and its opposition to τὸ ἄλογον.

H. Diller, "θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων," *Hermes* 94 (1966) 273–275, followed by H. Rohdich, *Die Euripideische Tragödie* (Heidelberg 1968) 64, does not recognize in Euripides a wide usage of βουλεύματα signifying deliberation and reflection in general. He interprets 1079 so that anger rules or guides (κρείσσων, cf. Walsh [above, note 2] 19, who seems to have anticipated Diller) Medea's plans (βουλευμάτων having the same reference as βουλεύματα in 1044 and 1048). This thesis seems to me unacceptable. In the first place, it seems more natural to construe βουλευμάτων (1079) closely with μανθάνω (1078). By reasoned reflection Medea has learned that she is about to do evil (1078). But her reflections are powerless to affect her emotion, so that she declares her angry emotion stronger than her reasoned reflections (1079). In the second place, and more importantly, Diller's argument seems to focus too closely on the single word βουλεύματα and on the monologue itself. We should, I think, take note of Medea's second meeting with Jason (866–893). For in the course of this meeting the emotion of Medea is said to be controlled by reasoned reflection, and this reflection is twice (893, 913) referred to by words cognate with βουλεύματα. Perhaps similarities in vocabulary should not be pressed. Still, it may be observed that this exchange between Medea and Jason agrees with the monologue in opposing θυμός or a cognate form (879, 883, 1056, 1079) to βουλεύειν or a cognate form (reflections: 882, 893, 913, 1079; plans or deliberations: 874, 1044, 1048) and in using the word λόγος in reference to reasoned reflection about emotional response (872, 1052). More important, however, is an agreement in content. Both passages oppose emotional response to reasoned reflection. Both passages indicate one important respect in which emotion is commonly opposed to reason. Emotional responses are subject to rational criticism and in many cases can be altered by reasoned reflection. Indeed, Medea's words to Jason are able to deceive just because Jason assumes that reasonable consideration will guide emotional response. Of course, Jason is deceived in this matter. But as a working hypothesis his assumption is not foolish. Much of the time reflection is able to guide emotional response, but not always. For in Medea's monologue it becomes clear that reason can fail, that emotion may be stronger than reasoned reflection (1079, cf. 447, 590).

tional responses to reasoned reflection.[8] He contrasts with Medea in that he heeds reason, altering or abandoning his emotional responses according to the dictates of reasoned reflection.[9] Still, the virtuous man is like Medea in regard to means-end deliberation. In this respect his reason may be said to follow his emotion. When Aristotle says that moral virtue makes correct the goal and practical wisdom the means (*EN* 1144a7–9, 1145a5–6), he is thinking primarily of means-end deliberation in relation to emotional response. Means-end deliberation follows upon and is given direction by emotional response.[10] Since the latter is the province of moral virtue, and the former of practical wisdom, Aristotle can say that moral virtue makes correct the goal and practical wisdom the means without implying that practical wisdom is altogether restricted to means-end deliberations.[11] The distinction between moral

[8] A qualification is necessary. A virtuous man subjects his emotional responses to reasoned reflection when time permits. The virtuous man confronted with sudden danger does not have time to reflect. He must respond out of character and without reasoning (*EN* 1117a17–22). To illustrate further emotional response in sudden situations we may take a hint from Plutarch (*Moralia* 475A) and refer to Odysseus' meeting with the dog Argos. When Odysseus and Eumaios reach the palace, they come upon the ancient and all but dead Argos. The dog recognizes his former master and struggles in vain to move off the dung heap where he lies. Odysseus is moved by the pathetic sight of Argos and turns aside to wipe away a tear, unnoticed by Eumaios (*Od.* 17.291–305). As Plutarch comments, Odysseus fell into this situation quite suddenly and unexpectedly (475A). His behavior is not the result of reasoning (whether reflection about how one should respond to the situation or deliberation about how to prepare for the situation). Rather it is an expression of emotion quite in keeping with Odysseus' character. He sheds a tear but also turns away and so escapes the notice of Eumaios. We can contrast this response with Odysseus' behavior a little earlier when reviled by the goatherd Melanthios. The words of Melanthios stir the heart of Odysseus (17.215–216). But after reflection Odysseus restrains himself (17.235–238). On this occasion Odysseus has time to reflect and to permit reason to control his emotional response.

[9] We may add that the virtuous man heeds not only his own reasoned reflections but also those of other men. Unlike the sullen man who hides anger within himself, so that no one can persuade him to give up his anger (*EN* 1126a23–24), the virtuous man pays attention to the reasoned arguments of others.

[10] Cf. *Rhet.* 1383a6–7, where Aristotle says that fear makes men deliberate. In other words, emotional response is often the occasion for means-end deliberation.

[11] I agree with D.J. Allen, *The Philosophy of Aristotle* (London 1952) 181–182, that Aristotle never wanted to restrict practical wisdom to means-end deliberations. But I cannot agree with Allen insofar as he (following R. Loening, *Die Zurechnungslehre des Aristoteles* [Jena 1903]) assumes an identity between the alogical soul of bipartition and the sensitive and motive faculties of the scientific psychology. Comparisons with the scientific psychology will not help and may impede an adequate understanding of why the logical soul of bipartition is not restricted to means-end deliberation. To understand Aristotle's dichotomy we should keep in mind that emotional response (which includes cognition as well as sensation and drive) is related to reasoning in two different ways.

virtue and practical wisdom is founded upon the dichotomy of bipartition, and this dichotomy is in a way complex. Reason is related to emotion not only as deliberation that follows emotion but also as reflection that can control emotion.

The *Medea* can also help us to understand Aristotle's assertion in the *Politics* (1260a13) that women possess the deliberative faculty (τὸ βουλευτικόν), but are lacking in authority (ἄκυρον). Aristotle does not mean that women cannot think straight. He is well aware that many women are like Medea in being able to deliberate and reflect. Aristotle's point is that their reasoning does not control their emotion. Just as Medea engaged in reflections concerning her response to Jason's betrayal but was not able to control her response, so for Aristotle women are able to reflect and in general to deliberate (they possess τὸ βουλευτικόν) but are unable to guide their emotions by reasoned reflection. In the case of women, reasoning is effective or authoritative only in the sphere of means-end deliberation. Within this area the deliberations of women can be most effective, and indeed disastrous. Women can be most clever contrivers of every kind of evil (409). But in the area of reasoned reflection about emotional response, a woman's reasoning is not authoritative. It cannot effectively guide or alter emotional response.*

We may be tempted to go on and illustrate further Aristotle's view of women by reference to Euripides' *Hippolytus*. For in this play Phaedra is presented as a woman who knows that she is behaving improperly but is unable to control her behavior. Like Medea, Phaedra reflects upon her dilemma in an impressive monologue and describes her weakness as a common failing: "We know and apprehend the good but do not bring it to fulfillment" (380–381). Phaedra recognizes that women are generally despised (406, cf. *Med.* 407–409, 889–890), and may be thought to illustrate together with Medea Aristotle's view of women. Here caution is necessary, for the characterization of Phaedra differs considerably from the characterization of Medea. Phaedra's behavior is not a clear case of uncontrolled emotional response. Unlike Medea, who perceives herself outraged,[12] and so responds angrily, Phaedra is

As the *Medea* illustrates, an enraged person may engage in reasoning either to realize a goal or to reflect upon his emotional state.

* On Aristotle's view of women, see "Aristotle on Slaves and Women," in *Articles on Aristotle* II, ed, J. Barnes et al. (London 1976) 135–139 = Chapter 14 in this volume and *Aristotle on Emotion*, 2nd ed. (London 2002) 57–61. Regarding Penelope (Aristotle, fragment 61 Rose³), see note 1 on page 61.

[12] See below, note 18.

said to be afflicted by a disease (νόσος and cognates, 40, 131, 176, 186, 205, 269, 279, 283, 293, 294, 393, 405, 463, 477). Diseases are not open to reasoned reflection in the way that anger and other emotions are. Anger invites reasoned criticism and is frequently abandoned, if shown to be unreasonable. A disease, however, is not an emotion and is not given up, if shown to be unreasonable. Indeed, diseases are neither reasonable nor unreasonable. They are afflictions that must be cured. While an emotion like anger is grounded upon evaluation or assessment (e.g., "Jason has treated me unjustly," *Med.* 26), a disease is not. It is caused by bodily disorder. So long as Phaedra is viewed as a victim of disease, her behavior is significantly different from that of Medea and cannot be used without considerable qualification to illustrate Aristotle's view of women and his bipartite psychology in general. A disease may be the occasion for means-end deliberation (how to restore health), but it does not invite reasoned reflection in the way that an emotion like anger does. Anger or fear or any similar emotion is not only the occasion for means-end deliberation; it also admits reflection concerning the reasonableness of the emotion itself.

Reasoning, then, is related to emotion in two distinguishable ways. This twofold relationship between reason and emotion is fundamental to Aristotle's moral psychology. It determines his account of moral virtue and practical wisdom and also his view of women. Still, this twofold relationship is not an Aristotelian discovery. It was ready at hand in popular thought and more or less clearly implied in a tragedy like Euripides' *Medea*. Aristotle along with other members of the Academy gave the dichotomy formal recognition, but they did not invent it.

II

If Aristotle's bipartite psychology developed out of a popular distinction between reason and emotion as explained in the preceding section, can it also be said to have developed out of Plato's tripartite psychology? More precisely, did Aristotle's own moral psychology develop through bringing together the θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν of triparition? Here I think we must say, not only that Aristotle's bipartite psychology is significantly different from such a bipartite version of tripartition,[13] but also

[13] Elsewhere ("Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 [1970] 40–70 = Chapter 1 in this volume), I have argued that Aristotle's moral

that Aristotle himself was aware of the difference and prepared to criticize bipartition whenever it took the form of a simplified tripartition. Perhaps I can support this claim, and at the same time clear up a persistent misunderstanding, by focusing upon the criticism of bipartition advanced in the *De Anima*.

Here (432a22-b7), at the beginning of his account of locomotion, Aristotle makes some prefatory remarks about psychic divisions and criticizes cursorily both those persons who offer a tripartite psychology and those who offer a bipartite psychology (432a24–26). It has been widely assumed and sometimes stated that this criticism of persons advancing bipartition is in part at least a self-criticism. Aristotle's remarks, we are told, are directed not only against members of the Academy who may have developed or advanced a bipartite psychology, but also against Aristotle himself, insofar as he employed bipartition both in earlier writings like the *Protrepticus* and *De justitia* and in more mature treatises like the *Ethics* and *Politics*.[14] This view seems to me

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psychology is significantly different from tripartition, because tripartition did not draw a clear distinction between emotional responses and bodily drives. Aristotle's moral psychology is a dichotomy between reasoning and emotional response—those πάθη that necessarily involve some assessment and so are amenable to reason. In contrast, bodily drives are caused by physiological disturbance and in general are not remedied by reasoned reflection.

[14] That Aristotle's criticism of bipartition applies in some way to his own bipartite psychology either is stated explicitly or seems to be implied in the comments of the following scholars: Simpl. 289.7–19; Philop. 547.1; E. Wallace, *Aristotle's Psychology* (Cambridge 1882) 294; R. Heinze, *Xenokrates* (Leipzig 1892) 142; R.D. Hicks, *Aristotle, De Anima* (Cambridge 1907) 550, cf. 300; D.A. Rees, "Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy," *JHS* 77 (1957) 118; R. Gauthier and J. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque* (Louvain 1959) 2.93; W. Theiler, Aristoteles, *Über die Seele* (Berlin 1959) 149–150; Sir David Ross, *Aristotle, De Anima* (Oxford 1961) 312; A. Jannone and E. Barbotin, *Aristote, De L'Ame* (Paris 1966) 109; D.W. Hamlyn, *Aristotle's* De Anima (Oxford 1968) 150. Cf. H. v. Arnim, "Das Ethische in Aristoteles Topik," *SB Wien* 205.4 (1927) 7, 66; P. Moraux, *Le Dialogue "Sur la Justice"* (Louvain 1957) 43–44; F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik*[3] (Berlin 1964) 278; *Aristoteles, Magna Moralia* (Berlin 1958) 164.

The comments of F. Trendelenburg, *Aristoteles, De Anima Libri Tres* (Berlin 1877) 441, and of G. Rodier, *Aristote, Traité de L'Ame* (Paris 1900) 2.529–530, suggest that the *De Anima*'s criticism does not apply to Aristotle's bipartite psychology because Aristotle does not commit himself to separate soul parts. Trendelenburg and Rodier are correct in ruling out Aristotle's own bipartite psychology as an object of criticism, but their reason does not get to the heart of the matter. The *De Anima* passage is concerned not only with whether or not there are spatially separate psychic parts (432a20), but also and primarily with how many parts or faculties are to be recognized (432a23). The advocates of bipartition are being criticized especially for having failed to distinguish adequately between the several psychic parts or faculties (432a24–26). And in this regard the criticisms developed in the *De Anima* do not seem to attack Aristotle's own

unacceptable. I want to suggest that Aristotle's criticism of bipartition is not a self-criticism. His remarks are directed against members of the Academy who had simply altered tripartition by collapsing the spirited and appetitive elements into a single psychic part and thereby created a particular kind of bipartite psychology. Aristotle's own bipartite or moral psychology differs in important ways from this Academic version and so should not be confused with it.

We may begin by considering two passages that create difficulties for anyone who tries to identify the bipartition criticized in the *De Anima* with Aristotle's own moral psychology. One of these passages occurs in Book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1097b33–1098a5). Here Aristotle is trying to pin down the function of man. Toward this end, he introduces first the nutritive life of plants, then the sensitive life of animals, and finally the practical life of the rational element. At this point he adds a note to the effect that the rational element is twofold: one part being obedient to reason, and the other part possessing it and being deliberative (1098a4–5).[15] This note is important, for it clearly relates Aristotle's bipartite or moral psychology to his scientific psychology. The division between the alogical and logical halves of the moral psychology occurs within the scientific faculty of intellect. The division does not coincide with the scientific division between sensation and intellect. The reason for this is clear enough.[16] Bipartition is a human psychology that is useful for explaining intelligent (human) actions.[17] It is based upon a distinction between emotional response (which is intelligent in that it necessarily involves certain kinds of cognitions[18]) and reasoned delibera-

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brand of bipartition. Even if Aristotle's bipartite psychology did involve a commitment to separable psychic parts (and it did not, *EN* 1102a28–32), this particular bipartite psychology would not seem to be under attack. As we shall see, the attack of the *De Anima* is directed against an Academic version of bipartition that differs in fundamental ways from Aristotle's own bipartite or moral psychology.

[15] On the genuineness of this note see my article (above, note 2) 181–182 n. 22 = Chapter 7 in this volume, page 124.

[16] See my article (above, note 2) 173–177 = Chapter 7 pages 122–130 in this volume. There I have tried to explain why the divisions of the moral and scientific psychologies do not coincide neatly.

[17] Cf. Moraux (above, note 14) 44, 47 and Simplicius *In De an.* 289.15–16.

[18] On the necessary involvement of cognition in emotional response, see my article referred to above, note 13 = Chapter 1 in this volume, pages 25–29. Here again it may be useful to refer to Euripides' *Medea*. At the outset of the play the nurse tells us that Medea perceives herself dishonored (26, cf. 20) and so is filled with hate and grief (16, 24–35). Her emotional condition is not in doubt. It is Medea's deliberations that are unknown and of especial concern to the nurse (37). We should note that the

tion. The alogical soul is primarily the capacity for emotional response, while the logical soul is primarily the capacity for reasoned deliberation. Both acts are intelligent, so that both capacities are cognitive. In contrast, the scientific faculty of sensation is not cognitive and so can be possessed by animals that cannot act intelligently.

It is, of course, possible to extend the alogical soul to include non-cognitive functions like nutrition and sensation. Aristotle does this in respect to nutrition at *EN* 1102a32-b12 (cf. *EE* 1219b31–32). But neither nutrition nor sensation are essential components of the alogical soul.[19] Bipartition is fundamentally a distinction between two kinds of intelligent action. Moreover, there can be no serious question about including either nutrition or sensation in the logical soul of Aristotle's moral psychology. Aristotle cannot seriously suggest that someone might try to house the scientific faculty of sensation within the logical soul of his own moral psychology. Such an attempt would be foolish. In regard to Aristotle's own bipartite psychology the assignment of sensation is clear. It is properly located outside (or "below") the dichotomy, though the alogical soul can be extended ("downward") to include it. And if this is true, difficulties arise for anyone who will refer the criticisms of bipartition advanced in the *De Anima* to Aristotle's own moral psychology. For in terms of Aristotle's own bipartite psychology, there can be no question concerning the assignation of the αἰσθητικόν. If the *De Anima* passage (432a30–31) presents a serious puzzle, it must be directed against a different version of bipartition that suggests the possibility of locating sensation in the logical as well as in the alogical part. As we shall see, the *Timaeus* suggests such a version of bipartition.[20]

nurse's remarks do not suggest a dichotomy that locates all cognition on the side of deliberation. Part of being angry is perceiving or thinking oneself outraged (26). This evaluation, together with the desire for revenge, may be distinguished both from the means-end deliberations that follow upon emotional response and also from the reasoned reflections that consider the emotional response—that is, the reasoning that asks whether the evaluation is correct and the desired goal appropriate, so that the emotional response may be deemed reasonable and justifiable.

[19] See Plutarch (*Moralia* 442B), who is correct insofar as he distinguishes the scientific faculties of nutrition and sensation from the alogical soul of bipartition on the grounds that nutrition and sensation are bodily off-shoots without any share in λόγος.

[20] It might be suggested that Aristotle is not presenting a "serious" puzzle or difficulty for bipartition. Aristotle says that the αἰσθητικόν cannot be classified easily as either alogical or logical (432a30–31), because he knows full well that his own scientific faculty of sensation is essentially outside the dichotomy of his own moral psychology. This suggestion seems to me unacceptable, not only because it reduces the stated difficulty to a mere quibble, but also because it fails to consider the entire criticism of

The second passage that causes difficulties occurs in the *Politics* (1334b6–28). Here Aristotle is concerned to point out that habituation is employed in education before λόγος is employed. In the course of his argument, Aristotle introduces his own moral psychology and locates θυμός, βούλησις, and ἐπιθυμία on the alogical side of the dichotomy (1334b22–23). This creates difficulties, if it is assumed that Aristotle's criticism of bipartition in the *De Anima* is directed in part against his own moral psychology. For in the *De Anima* Aristotle locates βούλησις on the logical side (432b5). This location may be necessary, if Aristotle is going to charge bipartition with splitting up ὄρεξις. But the location needs considerable explanation if it is assumed that the bipartition in question is Aristotle's own moral psychology. For as the *Politics* makes clear, Aristotle's own bipartite psychology locates βούλησις on the alogical side.[21]

These difficulties can be removed if we understand that bipartition takes more than one form. The fact that in the *De Anima* Aristotle does not seem to include himself among the proponents of bipartition and then brings forth arguments largely ineffective against his own moral psychology becomes intelligible when we realize that Aristotle is not criticizing his own bipartite psychology. Rather he is criticizing a particular kind of bipartition that was developed in the Academy out of tripartition by bringing together the spirited and the appetitive faculties. A closer look at 432b5–6 will help to make this point clearer. Here

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bipartition advanced in this portion of the *De Anima*. In particular, it ignores the fact that Aristotle goes on to say that bipartition splits up the ὀρεκτικόν (432b3–6). This is not true of Aristotle's own bipartite psychology. When both criticisms of bipartition (432a30–31, 432b3–6) are considered together, it becomes most unlikely that Aristotle is criticizing his own moral psychology.

[21] We cannot construe *De Anima* 432b5 to mean that βούλησις is a logical ὄρεξις only in that it responds to the injunctions of λόγος (see Alexander 74.6–13). The *De Anima* passage is quite clear in its wording. βούλησις is said "to occur in the λογιστικόν." As at *Topics* 126a13, βούλησις is located in the λογιστικόν. W. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford 1902) 3.456, following Eaton, suggests that Aristotle's usage of βούλησις is not uniform, for in the *Politics* βούλησις is connected with the alogical and not with the logical soul as in the *De Anima*. Certainly the word βούλησις is used in different ways. (See the remarks of H.G. Ingenkamp, *Untersuchungen zu den pseudoplatonischen Definitionen* [Wiesbaden 1967] 64–65.) For at least a partial understanding of the different usages of βούλησις and especially for a fuller understanding of why the *De Anima* and *Politics* differ in locating βούλησις, we should, I think, consider the possibility of two different kinds of bipartition: an Aristotelian version (*Pol.* 1334b6–28), and an Academic version that developed out of tripartition by bringing together the two lower faculties into a single ἄλογον (cf. *De An.* 432b5–6 with *Top.* 126a3–16, and see below).

Aristotle is criticizing bipartition, but instead of employing the label τὸ λόγον ἔχον to refer to the logical half, he uses the label λογιστικόν, which belongs to the vocabulary of tripartition (432a25). Is this a confusion? Perhaps, but only a very minor one. For Aristotle is criticizing a variety of bipartition which identifies the logical half of the dichotomy with the λογιστικόν of tripartition. Aristotle has in mind that kind of bipartition which is already suggested in the *Republic*[22] and clearly indicated in the *Timaeus*—a dialogue which groups together the spirited and appetitive elements as the mortal soul and opposes this combination to the λογιστικόν as the immortal soul. Apparently tripartition and this related form of bipartition enjoyed a contemporaneous life within the Academy. At least the *Topics*, which seems frequently to reflect discussion within the Academy, introduces for illustrative purposes not only tripartition but also that version of bipartition which is a variation on tripartition (129a10–16).[23] We may suspect that, just as in the *Topics* Aristotle takes note of two closely related Academic psychologies, so in the *De Anima* he is concerned with members of the Academy, when he criticizes those who advance tripartition and those who advance bipartition (432a24–26).

The *Timaeus* can help us to understand Aristotle's charge that the αἰσθητικόν cannot be comfortably located in either the logical or alogical soul (432a30–31). While the *Timaeus* introduces tripartition and even assigns each of the three psychic parts its own bodily location, the *Timaeus*, as we have already said, presents a bipartite version of tripartition. The λογιστικόν is divine and elevated spatially to a seat in

[22] At 439E5 Glaucon suggests that spirit is not some third psychic element but rather identical in nature to the appetitive element. At 571C3–572B1 Socrates describes two different kinds of sleep by opposing the λογιστικόν to the two lower elements. See Dirlmeier, *Nikomachische Ethik* (above, note 14) 278–279.

[23] To illustrate that a relative property may be a difference that holds usually and in most cases, the *Topics* distinguishes the λογιστικόν from the ἐπιθυμητικόν and θυμικόν and states that the one commands and the other serves usually but not always (129a10–16). This passage from the *Topics* names the three psychic parts of tripartition. In this respect it agrees with *De Anima* 432a25, which also names the λογιστικόν, θυμικόν, and ἐπιθυμητικόν. However, it seems to differ from *De Anima* 432a25 in an important respect. While *De Anima* 432a25 is introducing tripartition in contrast with bipartition, the *Topics* passage appears to be dealing with a bipartite version of tripartition. By grouping together the θυμικόν and ἐπιθυμητικόν in opposition to the λογιστικόν, the *Topics* passage creates a particular kind of bipartition—namely, that kind that is under consideration at *De Anima* 432b5–6 and that groups together spirit and appetite to form a single alogical faculty. On 129a10–16 and bipartition see Dirlmeier, *Magna Moralia* (above, note 14) 164; on tripartition in the *Topics*, see v. Arnim, (above, note 14).

the head. The other two psychic parts are mortal and are located in the trunk of the body. For our purposes the important point is that the *Timaeus* not only employs this bipartite version of tripartition but also attempts to handle sense perception. And this attempt seems to result in just the kind of difficulty that Aristotle asserts does occur when the sensitive faculty is referred to bipartition. For at one time the *Timaeus* seems to treat the λογιστικόν or immortal soul as the center of consciousness to which sensory motions are transmitted (43–44, 64B), and at another time it seems to associate the mortal soul with αἴσθησις (61C, 69D). In this regard certain passages are especially difficult, if not confusing. In explaining pleasure and pain, the *Timaeus* first connects sensation with the φρόνιμον (64B5, apparently the brain, which is the locus of the immortal soul or λογιστικόν)[24] and subsequently refers pleasurable sensations caused by sudden replenishments to the mortal soul (65A5). The sensation of taste is explained by reference to veins that are said to extend to the heart (which is in the region of the θυμοειδές) and that apparently do not continue on to the brain or seat of the λογιστικόν.[25] By contrast, the effect of bad odors is said to extend from the head to the navel (67A4–5) and so would seem to affect the entire soul, both its mortal and immortal portions.[26] Similarly, hearing is described as a process extending not only to the brain and head (67B3–4) but also to the liver (67B5).[27] And finally, discussing the maintenance of mortal crea-

[24] See the note of A.E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford 1928) 447.

[25] The account of tastes is particularly perplexing. It is not explicitly said that the veins terminate at the heart, and so the possibility is left open that the veins continue on to the brain. Taylor (above, note 24) 465, assumes some kind of connection between the heart and the brain. F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (London 1937) 270, suggests that the sense messages do not have to pass through the heart to reach the brain. Further, pungent tastes are associated with particles that rise toward the senses (or sense organs) in the head (65E7) and so seem to have little connection with the veins extending to the heart. F. Solmsen, "Antecedents of Aristotle's Psychology and Scale of Beings," *AJP* 76 (1955) 156 n. 26, cautions that the heart is not strictly speaking the seat of the θυμοειδές (the heart is in the region of and closely associated with the θυμοειδές [70A7–D6] but is not its seat), and suggests that had Plato wished to indicate a connection between tongue and soul, he would have made the connection explicit. In whatever way we interpret this passage, we can, I think, say that it helps point up the difficulty of handling a scientific or biological faculty of sensation within the framework of a bipartite version of tripartition.

[26] For the navel as a boundary of the ἐπιθυμητικόν see 70E1, 77B4. See also Taylor (above, note 24) 476: "Since at 70E1 the navel is mentioned as the boundary of the tenement devised for the ἐπιθυμητικόν, the result is that smells affect the whole 'seat of the soul' from one end to the other."

[27] The liver is located in the region of the ἐπιθυμητικόν (71A7–B1).

tures, the *Timaeus* first introduces plants, which are said to possess the ἐπιθυμητικόν and αἴσθησις (77B3–6),[28] and then considers veins, which not only water the body but also divide in the region of the head and so seem to serve the brain and λογιστικόν in regard to sense perception (77D6–E6).[29] Whether or not we think that each of these passages presents a difficulty for the location of sensation within a bipartite version of tripartition, we can, I think, agree that collectively these passages do indicate a problem. We can agree[30] that in the *Timaeus* Plato has not altered sufficiently his psychic framework to house the scientific (i.e. biological) faculty of sensation. And we may suspect that when Aristotle criticizes bipartition for its inability to handle sensation, he is thinking of bipartition much as it appears in the *Timaeus*.[31] He is thinking of certain members of the Academy who collapsed the spirited and appetitive faculties into one and so formed a bipartite version of tripartition.

This suspicion seems to be confirmed when we reflect again on Aristotle's charge that bipartition splits up ὄρεξις (432b4–6). Addressed

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[28] At 77A4–5 Timaios says that plants are endowed with αἰσθήσεις different from those possessed by men. Hence when Timaios subsequently says that plants possess the third kind of soul, which concerns pleasant and painful αἴσθησις in conjunction with ἐπιθυμίαι (77B5–6), he would seem to be connecting the ἐπιθυμητικόν with αἰσθήσεις different from those possessed by man. This portion of the *Timaeus* would seem to have been partly responsible for Aristotle's insistence that there is no sixth sense (*De An.* 424b22–425b11). See Solmsen (above, note 25) 153.

[29] See Taylor (above, note 24) 546–547.

[30] With Solmsen (above, note 25) 154–155.

[31] It is not surprising that the *De Anima*'s criticism of bipartition can be referred for elucidation to a literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*. We may compare how in Book 1 of the *De Anima* (406b26–407b11) Aristotle construes (too) literally the myth of the *Timaeus* and so can fault Timaios' account of the world soul. (See Ross, *op.cit.* [above, note 11] 189: "He (Ar.) may well be criticized as having taken the myth as if it were sober prose.") Certainly the objection to spatially separated parts (432a20) is directed most naturally against a version of bipartition (or tripartition) like that advanced in the *Timaeus*. For taken literally, the *Timaeus* has a different bodily seat for each psychic part. Still, it would be a mistake to think that Aristotle's criticism is directed only (or perhaps even primarily) against the *Timaeus*. (We might expect Aristotle to name Timaios as at 406b26.) Most probably Aristotle is criticizing a group (οἱ δέ 432a26) within the Academy who followed the lead of Plato's *Timaeus* and endeavored to handle biological soul functions within a particular bipartite framework. We may compare the ἀπορίαι considered by Aristotle toward the beginning of his discussion of moral weakness in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. First Aristotle introduces some men (τινες *EN* 1145b22) who deny the possibility of doing wrong knowingly. Here Aristotle mentions Socrates and is quite certainly referring to Plato's *Protagoras* (352B). After remarking that this view goes against the phenomena and needs further clarification, Aristotle turns to another group (τινες *EN* 1145b31) that tries to explain moral weakness by making a psychological distinction

to his own version of bipartition, the charge is very odd. For Aristotle frequently refers to ὄρεξις as a mark of the alogical soul.[32] He never refers it to the logical soul. Further (and this is the important point), βούλησις cannot be located in Aristotle's logical soul.[33] This is not just a matter of textual evidence, though the evidence of the *Politics* (1334b22–23) is important. It is also and primarily a matter of how Aristotle conceives of the dichotomy of bipartition. For Aristotle the dichotomy of bipartition is primarily a dichotomy between reasoned deliberation and emotional response. Practical wisdom, which is the virtue of the logical soul, is a perfection of deliberation. Moral virtue, which is the virtue of the alogical soul, is a perfected disposition in regard to emotion (*EN* 1105b19–1106a13). All emotion is located in the alogical soul. This is not true of tripartition and (we may add) the bipartite version of tripartition. For these Academic psychologies assign βούλησις, αἰσχύνη and possibly other emotions to the λογιστικόν.[34] Each psychic part including the λογιστικόν has its own peculiar drives and desires.[35] In contrast Aristotle's own moral psychology groups together all desires

between knowledge, which is strong, and opinion, which is weak. Here Aristotle seems to have in mind certain members of the Academy who may have been influenced by a passage like *Timaeus* 51DE. See Dirlmeier, *Nikomachische Ethik* (above, note 14) 478.

32 See, for example, *EN* 1102b30, 1139a17-b5; *Pol.* 1334b20. I say "a mark of the alogical soul" because I want to avoid the suggestion that the alogical soul is to be identified with the ὀρεκτικόν (together with the αἰσθητικόν and φανταστικόν). I have argued already (above with note 16) that the alogical soul is the capacity for emotional response and so includes not only motive force (ὄρεξις) but also cognition. This is clearly implied at *EN* 1098a3–5. Still, for the purposes of refuting the suggestion that Aristotle's criticism of bipartition is a self-criticism, it does not matter whether the alogical soul is restricted to non-cognitive functions like ὄρεξις or includes certain cognitive functions. In either case all ὄρεξις belongs on the alogical side, so that Aristotle's charge of splitting up the faculty of locomotion cannot be leveled against his own brand of bipartition.

33 Cf. Gauthier and Jolif (above, note 14) 2.193.

34 For βούλησις and αἰσχύνη in the λογιστικόν see *Topics* 126a8, 13. Von Arnim (above, note 14) 74–76, suggests that φιλία and μίσος should be assigned to the λογιστικόν and that φιλία is a kind of βούλησις. Whether or not we follow v. Arnim in his interpretation of 126a12–13 (I do not think he adequately explains 113b2), we must agree that φιλία is closely related to βούλησις and that in his account of emotions Aristotle defines φιλεῖν as a particular kind of βούλεσθαι (*Rhet.* 1380b36–37).

35 The *Republic* states that each of the three psychic parts has its own ἐπιθυμίαι (580D). The λογιστικόν is said not to care about wealth and reputation but to be directed wholly toward knowledge (581A5–7). See, for example, Raphael Demos, *The Philosophy of Plato* (New York 1939) 317–318, who points out that each of Plato's three psychic parts "is really a complete soul, in the sense that it includes all the characteristic psychical functions" (318). Each enjoys not only a cognitive aspect but also a desiderative and emotional aspect. This is not true for Aristotle's bipartite psychology.

and emotions in the alogical soul. The logical soul is no longer the seat of desires and emotions like βούλησις and αἰσχύνη. It is the seat of means-end deliberation and reasoned reflection concerning emotional response. Of course, reasoning can direct or alter desires and emotions, but it is distinct. In terms of Aristotle's own bipartite psychology, there can be no question of splitting up ὄρεξις and locating βούλησις in the logical part. That question arises only when bipartition is conceived of as a simple variant of tripartition.

My conclusion, then, is that there are different kinds of bipartition and that a failure to note the difference has misled some commentators into supposing that Aristotle's criticism of bipartition is in part a self-criticism. Aristotle is not criticizing his own moral psychology but rather an Academic version of bipartition that arose from tripartition by collapsing together the θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν. Aristotle did not identify his own moral psychology with this variant on tripartition and would have objected to the (unqualified) suggestion that his own bipartite psychology developed out of tripartition.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE ACCOUNT OF THE SOUL IN *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS* 1.13

In a recently published issue of this journal,[1] Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp has discussed the twofold division of the soul in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.13 and criticized the interpretations of Franz Dirlmeier[2] and René Antoine Gauthier.[3] Ingenkamp's concern is how one should understand the lines 1102b13–1103a3. Do we have here one continuous account of the soul or two different accounts? Ingenkamp answers this question by selecting the latter alternative: "The account itself is not continuous but antithetical" (128). First Aristotle divides the ἄλογον into a nutritive part and a passionate part that partakes of the λόγον ἔχον, in so far as it can obey that part. Then it occurs to Aristotle that perhaps the ἄλογον does not partake of the λόγον ἔχον but rather is contained therein. "This remains a hypothesis; certainty is of little concern to Aristotle. For ethical theory, it is important only that the desiderative part be connected to reason" (129).

Ingenkamp is correct that the account in question divides in two: 1102b13–1103a1 and 1103a1–3. I question only whether his explanation has gone far enough. I.e., a fuller explanation can be given if we recall the work of Jacob Bernays[4] and the way in which the bipartite psychology of ethical theory relates to the biological psychology that Aristotle sets forth in his *De anima*.

More than a century ago, Bernays recognized that lines 1103a1–3 are a supplement. His explanation is instructive: Earlier in 1.7 1098a4,[*] the obedient element in the soul was attributed to the λόγον ἔχον. Therefore at the end of 1.13, Aristotle's thinks himself constrained to add that this attribution is also permissible (158). The reference to 1098a4 is important, for here too the passionate part of the soul is brought within the λόγον ἔχον, and here too the inclusion is unexpected, so that

[1] "Die Seele nach Aristoteles, *EN* I, 13," *Philolologus* 112 (1968) 126–129.

[2] *Nikomachische Ethik*[3] (Berlin-Darmstadt 1964) 274–275.

[3] *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, Tome 2 (Paris 1959) 97.

[4] *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles* (Berlin 1863) 157–158.

[*] Bernays (above, note 4) 158 wrote "im sechsten Capitel p. 1098a4." He adopts the division of chapters found in Bekker's edition. I refer to chapter 7, following the OCT and the practice of most English speaking scholars, myself included.

a gloss has been suspected.[5] As I see it, neither in 1.7 nor in 1.13 is a gloss to be suspected. Rather, Aristotle has written both passages with a definite purpose in mind. He wants to make clear how the bipartite psychology of ethical theory relates to the biological psychology of the *De anima*. In the early passage, clarification is certainly helpful and perhaps necessary. For Aristotle has used the psychology of the *De anima* to determine the function of man. This use of the psychology of the *De anima* could be misleading, so that a listener (or reader) might confuse bipatition with the biological psychology. I.e., he might believe that the divisions of the two psychologies coincide and that the obedient part of the bipartite soul is identical with the biological faculty of sensation. For that reason, Aristotle has added a note, making clear that the division of bipartition runs within the biological faculty of thought; that the obedient part of the bipartite soul and the biological faculty of sensation are not identical.[6] This is intelligible, for bipartition is a contrast between emotions like fear and anger on the one hand and deliberation on the other. Emotions involve belief (e.g., fear is *inter alia* the belief that danger threatens [*EN* 3.6 1115a9, *Rhet.* 2.5 1382a21–22] and anger involves the assessment that one has been unjustly insulted [*Rhet.* 2.2 1378a30–33, cf. 1380b17–18]), and beliefs belong to the biological faculty of thought.[7]

Later in 1.13, a note is again helpful. Aristotle has given an account of his own dichotomy using Platonic vocabulary,[8] and as earlier in 1.7 (10997b33–1098a1), so in 1.13 (1102a32-b12) he has taken notice of the nutritive faculty. As a result a listener (or reader) might believe that the three parts of the soul under consideration (the nutritive part, the ἄλογον and the λόγον ἔχον) correspond to the three most important psychic levels set forth in the *De anima* (those of nutrition, sensation and thought). In order to prevent such a misunderstanding, Aristotle adds that one might include the alogical or obedient part in the λόγον ἔχον. This short note recalls the earlier note (in this regard Bernays is correct)

[5] See, e.g., Gauthier (above, note 3) 56–57.

[6] Plutarch, *On Moral Virtue* 442B is correct when he says that the passionate part of the soul differs from the faculty of sensation in that it is not entirely ἄλογον.

[7] On the relationship between emotion and judgment, see my article "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions," *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970) 53–70 = Chapter, 1 pages 21–37 in this volume, and for the relationship between the ethical dichotomy and the biological psychology of the *De anima*, see my article "Aristotle: Emotion and Moral Virtue," *Arethusa* 2 (1969) 173–177 = Chapter 7, pages 122-130 in this volume.

[8] Bernays (above, note 4) 157–158 and Ingenkamp (above, note 1) 127 n. 3.

and prevents a listener (or reader) from identifying the obedient part of the bipartite soul with the middle level of the soul[9] as presented in the *De anima*. For this middle level is that of sensation. It is not a faculty of thought and therefore cannot find its home within the λόγον ἔχον.

We may conclude that the lines 1102b13–1103a3 are not continuous. The lines 1103a1–3 were added by Aristotle, but not as a mere possibility. Rather, the three lines recall 1098a4–5 and help the listener to distinguish between the dichotomy of ethical theory and the biological psychology of the *De anima*.

[9] I.e., the level of sensation, which is common to all animals, as in 1098a2–3.

CHAPTER FIVE

BIPARTITION OF THE SOUL IN *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS* 1.7 AND 1.13

In a recent issue of this journal, Andreas Graeser has discussed bipartition of the soul in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7 (1098a3–7) and 1.13 (1102b13–1103a3)[1] and criticized the interpretations that Heinz Gerd Ingenkamp and I set forth in earlier communications.[2] I do not want to discuss again the subject in its entirety—persons who are interested can read the three communications and make up their own minds—but there is one misunderstanding by Graeser that so affects our understanding of bipartition, that a brief correction is called for. This misunderstanding concerns the difference between the rational part of the bipartite soul in ethical theory and the faculty of thought in the biological psychology of the *De anima*. Graeser believes that Ingenkamp and I have recognized a division of the rational part, the λόγον ἔχον, of the bipartite soul in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7 and 1.13,[*] and on the basis of this belief, Graeser asserts, "If one follows the interpreters, then one must allow that Aristotle has transferred the seat of the moral virtues, which are moderated by practical wisdom, (at least hypothetically) to the level of the rational part of the soul."[3] This consequence is, as Graerer says, "absurd,"[4] but I doubt that it can be drawn either from Ingenkamp's argument[5] or from my handling of the issue. What I said was that the

[1] "Zu Aristoteles EN I 13 und I 7," *Philologus* 118 (1974) 218–223.

[2] Ingenkamp, "Die Seele nach Aristoteles, EN I 13," *Philologus* 112 (1968) 126–129. Fortenbaugh, "Zu der der Darstellung der Seele in der Nicomachischen Ethik I 13," *Philologus* 114 (1970) 289–291.

[*] Such a division does occur later at 6.1 1139a5–6.

[3] Graeser (above, note 1) 219.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] It is true that Ingenkamp speaks of the possibility of bringing the ὀρεκτικόν within the rational part (129), but it is also true that Ingenkamp see two different proposals or hypotheses in 1.13. According to the first proposal, the ὀρεκτικόν is outside the λόγον ἔχον (i.e., outside the rational part of 1139a5), and according to the second proposal, the ὀρεκτικόν is within the (now altered) λόγον ἔχον. In the second case, we have "an entirely new possibility" (128) and a new enlarged λόγον ἔχον. The first λόγον ἔχον (the rational part of the soul) is not divided, but a new λόγον ἔχον that contains the first as a part (τὸ κυρίως λόγον ἔχον) next to the ὀρεκτικόν (ἀκουστικόν) (1103a2–3). It follows that the sphere of moral virtue (τὸ ὀρεκτικόν) remains different from the sphere of practical wisdom (the first λόγον ἔχον), and there is no absurdity.

dividing line of the bipartite psychology of ethics runs within the biological faculty of thought.[6] This implies that the rational part of the bipartite soul does not correspond to the biological faculty of thought. The two are not identical and cannot be confused without a string of absurdities arising. Aristotle understands this, and in 1.7 and 1.13 he tries *inter alia* to prevent this confusion of the rational part with the faculty of thought.

In his discussion of *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7, Graeser is correct to call attention to the phrase τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος at 1098a3–4.[7] But he offers an unacceptable explanation of this text, because he does not clearly differentiate between the biological faculty of thought and the rational part of the bipartite soul. In 1.7 Aristotle is discussing the function of man, and in this context he makes use of his biological psychology. He rejects the θρεπτικὴ ζωή, the nutritive life of plants, and the αἰσθητικὴ ζωή, the sensitive life of animals. Only a πρακτικὴ ζωὴ τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος remains (1097b33–1098a4). Whether the phrase τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος refers to a part of the soul that has λόγος or a living being that has λόγος, is relatively unimportant. Graeser prefers the second possibility; I follow the majority of interpreters and prefer the first possibility.[8] Either way, we should think in terms of the biological psychology and not in terms of bipartition. I.e., we should think of the biological faculty of thought and not the rational part of the bipartite soul. We may compare *De anima* 3.3 427b11–14, where Aristotle distinguishes between the biological faculty of sensation and the biological faculty of thought, partly on the grounds that sensation is present in all animals, while thought belongs to no being that lacks λόγος.[9] What interests us here is that Aristotle regards λόγος as a distinguishing mark of cognitive beings. I.e., of human beings, which are atop the *scala naturae*. So too in *Nicomachean Ethics* 1098a3, λόγος is recognized as a distinguishing mark of the highest level of the *scala naturae*. But this time Aristotle speaks of τὸ λόγον ἔχον, and in doing so, he uses a phrase that is ambiguous. In an ethical context, it most often refers to the rational part of the bipartite

[6] Fortenbaugh (above, note 2) 290.

[7] Graeser (above, note 1) 220–221. The sentence containing the phrase runs: λείπεται δὴ πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ, τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον.

[8] See, e.g., B.A. Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London 1885) vol. 1, 449, J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London 1900) 35, and F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik*[3] (Berlin-Darmstadt 1964) 14.

[9] See R. Hicks, *Aristotle, De Anima* (London 1907) 456.

soul, but at 1098a3–4, in connection with the discussion of man's function, it is clear that Aristotle is thinking within the framework of his biological psychology and that τὸ λόγον ἔχον signifies either the biological faculty of thought or a being that has this capacity. The two uses of this phrase can be misleading, and when Graeser explains τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος as "what has reason-is rational" (*was Vernunft hat-vernunftig ist*),[10] he himself is being misleading or at least unclear, for "reason" (*Vernunft*) seems to refer to the rational part of the bipartite soul. In order to avoid such a lack of clarity, Aristotle adds a note (1098a4–5) that makes clear how the rational part of the bipartite soul relates to the biological faculty of thought.

Regarding *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.13, I shall say only a few words. Graeser sees no contradiction in saying that the highest level of the ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς not only is ἄλογον but also has λόγος (λόγον ἔχειν 1103a1). I agree, but Graeser's rejection of the alleged division of the rational part of the bipartite soul does not touch Ingenkamp and me,[11] and it obscures what is important for the coming discussion of virtue. Aristotle's brief remarks at the end of 1.13 help us understand that the obedient part of the bipartite soul is cognitive and therefore has a place within the biological faculty of thought. The division of the ἄλογον into a φυτικόν or θρεπτικόν (1102a32–33, b11, 29) and an ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν (1102b30) could be misleading, for someone might believe that the second or higher part of the ἄλογον is identical with the middle or animal level of the biological psychology. The consequences of such a belief would be absurd. The sphere of moral virtue would be the biological faculties of desire and sensation, and the habituation that brings moral virtue to perfection (cf. 1103a26) would be a habituation of sensations and mindless reactions. Virtue and habituation are Aristotle's next topics (2.1–3), so that at the end of Book 1 he mentions the possibility that the λόγον ἔχον has a twofold character (1103a2). He wants to make clear that the sphere of moral virtue is cognitive and therefore overlaps the biological faculty of thought.

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[10] Graeser (above, note 1) 220.

[11] Graeser (above, note 1) 223 with note 10.

CHAPTER SIX

ARISTOTLE AND THEOPHRASTUS ON THE EMOTIONS

The emotions have long been a subject of great interest. Indeed, fascination with the subject can be traced back to the very beginnings of western literature: more precisely, to Homer's *Iliad*, whose opening line makes reference to the anger of Achilles. In Lattimore's translation, we read: "Sing, goddess, the anger of Peleus' son Achilleus." In the original Greek, the word translated by "anger," *mênis*, enjoys pride of place. Homer will tell a tale of angry passion, whose terrible consequences almost overwhelm the Achaean host. He will also tell how warriors become frightened when confronted by danger, how they respond to appeals for pity, and how they are overcome by laughter.[1] This interest in emotional behavior is not peculiar to Homer. It is also clear in the writings of the lyric poets, tragedians, writers of comedy, historians, rhetoricians and philosophers.[2] My concern will be with the last named, the philosophers, and in particular the early Peripatetics, who not only recognized the importance of emotional response but also subjected it to intense philosophic analysis. I plan to discuss this analysis, beginning with the late Platonic Academy, in which Aristotle played an active part. I shall move on to his independent views and take note of those of Theophrastus, Aristotle's pupil and successor as head of the Peripatos. I shall not hesitate to restate matters discussed on earlier

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[1] For fright see, e.g., 3.30–37 and 22.136–137 (Paris is frightened of Menelaus, and Hector flees as Achilles approaches); for pity 22.59 and 24.516 (Priam's calls [vainly] on Hector for pity, and Achilles feels pity for the gray haired Priam); for laughter 2.270, cf 1.599 (the Achaeans laugh at Thyrsites; cf. the gods laughing at Hephaestus).

[2] There are innumerable examples; each person will have his own favorites. Here are some of mine: lyric, Anacreon 395/60 PMG (the poet laments old age and expresses fear of death); tragedy, Euripides' *Medea*, *passim* (the eponymous heroine is so consumed by anger, that she ultimately kills her own children); comedy, Aristophanes' *Clouds* 1481–1509 (Strepsiades is so upset that he rejects a lawsuit in favor of burning down the Thinkery); history, Herodotus' *Histories* 7.35 (when Xerxes learned that a storm had broken up the bridge across the Hellespont, he had the Hellespont scourged with three hundred lashes); rhetoricians, Gorgias' *Helen* 15–19 (love is an excuse for bad behavior); philosophers, Plato's *Republic* 4.14 439E–440A (disgust fails to keep Leontius from running to view corpses lying beside the road).

occasions,[3] for I want to offer an inclusive paper: one that both introduces a topic of great interest and at the same time takes note of its many aspects. However, I shall also be modifying earlier views, adding new analyses as well as illustrative material and replying to recent criticism.[4]

I. *Emotions Distinguished from Other Passions*

In Plato's *Philebus*, a late dialogue concerned with pleasure, wisdom and human happiness,[5] Socrates is made to draw a distinction between three kinds of mixed pleasures and pains. One kind is said to concern the body and to be found in the body itself. By way of illustration, Socrates cites the man who experiences a painful itch and finds pleasant relief in scratching (46A8–47C3). A second kind is said to involve body and soul. Socrates' example concerns replenishment. When a man is hungry and expects to be fed, then he feels the pain of an empty stomach and takes pleasure in the thought of being fed (47C3–D4). A third kind is assigned to the soul independent of the body. It is illustrated by a list including anger, fear, longing, lament, love, emulation and envy, and by a lengthy discussion of the mixed feelings of envious individuals (47D5–50A9). Each of these three kinds of mixed pleasures and pains can be described as a passion—in Greek *pathos*[6]—but as Socrates makes clear, they are very different. Bodily disturbances, scabies and other physiological abnormalities are fundamental to the first kind; normal bodily drives, hunger and thirst, are the basis of the

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[3] See the monograph *Aristotle on Emotion*, London: Duckworth and New York 1975 (reprint with epilogue 2002) and the articles cited in the notes to this chapter.

[4] I shall be modifying my view of the relation between Aristotle's rhetorical definition of emotion and his discussion of individual emotions (Sections II and III). In addition, I shall distinguish between different kinds of laughter (Section VI) and offer analyses in terms of similarity (Section VII) and difference in degree (Section VIII). Finally, I shall deal with recent criticism concerning good character and the goal of action (Section IX).

[5] The *Philebus* is Plato's penultimate dialogue. Since his last work, the *Laws*, was left unfinished, we can say that the *Philebus* was Plato's last completed dialogue. Stylistic studies establish a close connection between the *Philebus* and the middle books of the *Laws*. That suggests contemporaneous compostion. See L. Billig, "Clausulae and Platonic Chronology," *The Journal of Philology* 35 (1919) pp. 233–234 and L. Brandwood, *The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues* (Cambridge: University Press 1990) p. 184, 206.

[6] See *Philebus* 46A10 and 47C2. In the first passage, *pathê* occurs; in the second, *pathêmata*. In both cases, the first kind of *pathos* is under discussion.

second; and what we call emotions are the stuff of the third. For our purposes, the important point is that Socrates recognizes that emotions like anger and fear are neither diseased conditions of the body nor natural drives for replenishment. They are, of course, pleasant as well as painful,[7] and for this reason they may be said to resemble the other two kinds of mixed pleasures and pains; but they are significantly different. As Socrates is made to say, they are "that mix which the soul alone often takes to itself" (47D8).

What Socrates finds difficult to explain is the relationship between thought and emotion; and as a consequence, he is unable to convince his interlocutor that pleasures and pains, fear and expectation can be correctly called true and false (36C6–D2). To be sure, Socrates is able to point out similarities between opinion on the one hand and pleasure and pain on the other, but he runs into trouble when he observes that pleasures often occur together "with" (*meta*) false opinion (37E10). The interlocutor construes the preposition "with" as simple concurrence and thinks of opinion as something external to pleasure: the opinion may be false, but no one would call the pleasure false (37E12–38A2). Socrates does not give up; he speaks of pleasure and pain "following" (*hepesthai*) true and false opinion (38B9) and then argues that pleasures and pains, including emotions like fear and anger, are sometimes based on (*epi*) reality and sometimes not (40D8–E4). When no objection is raised, Socrates asserts that true and false opinions "fill up" (*anapimplanai*) pleasures and pains with their own affection (42A7–9). To speak of "filling up" is to introduce metaphor. It expresses Socrates' belief that opinion and pleasures and pains are intimately connected, but it leaves unclear the precise nature of the connection.

In the *Philebus*, Socrates' difficulty is not resolved, but discussion was continued in Plato's Academy. The young Aristotle was a participant, and his early work, the *Topics*,[8] provides some evidence concerning his contribution. I cite three passages. In Book 4, Aristotle discusses ways to attack an assigned genus. He recommends showing that a more or equally likely candidate is not the genus and illustrates his recommendation by reference to anger. Pain and the thought of being

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[7] See *Philebus* 47D8, where Socrates quotes Homer's *Iliad* 18.108–109: "sweeter by far than dripping honey". Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.2 1378b5–7, where Homer's *Iliad* 18.109–110 is quoted.

[8] On the date(s) of the *Topics*, see J. Brunschwig, *Aristote*, Topiques (Paris: Budé 1967) lxiii–civ and J. Rist, *The Mind of Aristotle: A Study in Philosophical Growth* (Toronto: University of Toronto 1989) 283–285.

slighted are both parts of the essence of anger; but if the more likely candidate, pain, is not the genus, neither is the thought of being slighted (4.6 127b26–32).[9] In Book 6, Aristotle takes up definitions in which the preposition "with" occurs. He recommends making clear how the preposition is used and illustrates the recommendation by reference to anger. When anger is defined as "pain with the thought of being slighted," the preposition means "on account of" (*dia*). It does not mean "and" or "made up out of" or "in the same receptacle" or "in the same place" or "in the same time" (6.13 150b27–151a19). As in the preceding example, the thought of being slighted is recognized as essential to anger, but now it is also explained as the cause of that emotion. Finally in Book 8, which is generally regarded as later than Books 4 and 6, a causal analysis appears to be accepted without question.[10] Aristotle is discussing the use of coordinate terms in order to establish a premise; and by way of illustration, he introduces anger. If we want to establish that an angry man desires revenge on account of (*dia*) an apparent slight, then we should first win agreement concerning the definition of anger: i.e., that anger is a desire for revenge on account of (*dia*) an apparent slight (8.1 156a30–33).

Examples advanced in the *Topics*, need not represent a view endorsed by Aristotle; but in the case of anger, there seems little reason to doubt that the definition found in Book 8 represents Aristotle's considered opinion. It is in line with his remarks in Book 6 and exhibits striking similarities to the definition of anger set forth in the *Rhetoric*. There in Book 2, Aristotle defines anger as "a desire for revenge accompanied by pain on account of (*dia*) an apparent slight to oneself or to one's own, the slight being unjustified" (1378a30–32). This definition includes more than the definition of *Topics* 8—it includes a mention of pain and the qualifier "unjustified"[11]—but in regard to anger being a desire for

[9] I do not follow Brunschwig (above, note 8) 109 in deleting *oligôrias* at 127b31. See Fortenbaugh, "On the Composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*: Arguing the Issue, Emotional Appeal, Persuasion through Character, and Characters Tied to Age and Fortune," in *ΛΗΝΑΙΚΑ. Festschrift für Carl Werner Müller*, ed. Chr. Mueller-Goldingen and K. Sier = Beiträge zur Altertumskunde (Stuttgart: Teubner 1997) 174 n. 30 = Chapter 23, page 397 in this volume.

[10] Book 8 may date to 343–340 B.C., when Aristotle was in Macedonia. See Rist (above, note 8) p. 285. But whatever its precise date, it is probably a later part of the *Topics*, and the straightforward way in which the definition of anger is advanced may well reflect acceptance of the definition.

[11] The qualifier "unjustified" emphasizes the evaluation involved in anger. See Section IX *ad init.*

revenge on account of an apparent slight, it agrees fully with *Topics* 8. Aristotle, it seems, is now entirely clear about the involvement of thought in an emotion like anger. It is the cause of the emotional response; and as such, it is mentioned in the essential definition of the emotion in question.

Clarity concerning the involvement of thought in emotional response will have been achieved not only through a close examination of individual emotions but also through a general consideration of definition in the context of demonstrative science. I am thinking especially of the *Posterior Analytics*, in which Aristotle tells us that questions of essence (*ti esti*) and questions of cause (*dia ti*) are one and the same (2.2 90a15). His stock example is that of the lunar eclipse. The essential definition is one that not only speaks of a deprivation of light but also states the efficient cause: namely obstruction by the earth (90a16). Diminution of the moon's light resulting from any other cause may have the same appearance, but it is essentially different, for the lunar eclipse is by definition attributable to the interposition of the earth.[12] The application to emotions is obvious, and Aristotle will not have missed it. He recognized the importance of thought as the cause of emotional response, and in the case of anger he offers a definition that mentions not only a final cause, revenge, but also an efficient cause, the appearance of being slighted (*Rhetoric* 2.2 1377a31–33).

In my preceding remarks, I have found it helpful to emphasize Aristotle's use of the preposition "on account of" (*dia*). To avoid any misunderstanding, I want to state clearly that Aristotle does not always use this preposition when referring to the efficient cause; and that is true both of the *Posterior Analytics* and of the *Rhetoric*. In the former work, we find him substituting "by" (*hypo*): e.g., to the question what is an eclipse, he replies "a deprivation of light from the moon by the obstruction of the earth" (2.2 90a15–16).[13] In the latter, prepositions like "resulting from" (*ek*) or "concerning" (*peri*) are found: e.g., fear is defined as "a pain or disturbance resulting from the appearance of a future evil which is destructive or painful" (2.5 1382a21–22), and shame as "a pain or disturbance concerning those evils which appear

[12] See *Post. Anal.* 2.8 93b5–6 where rotation of the moon and extinction are mentioned as possible causes that are ruled out by an essential definition that includes the cause.

[13] In *On Soul* 1.1 403a27, *hypo* occurs in the definition of anger. See Section V, where the definition is quoted.

to contribute to bad reputation" (2.6 1383b12–13). There is no confusion here. In the early stages of an investigation, it is often useful to avoid variation in terminology; but once clarity is achieved, consistency in the use of single words and phrases becomes unimportant and perhaps misleading. For the student may fail to appreciate the many different ways in which the same notion is expressed in every day language.

II. *A Rhetorical Definition of Emotion*

In *Rhetoric* 2, prior to the discussion of individual emotions like anger and fear, Aristotle offers a general definition of the emotions. It runs as follows: "The emotions are all those feelings on account of which men so change as to differ in judgment, and which are followed by pain and pleasure" (2.1 1378a20–22). By way of clarification, Aristotle adds a short list of emotions: "for example, anger, pity, fear and all other such emotions and their opposites" (1378a22–23). The reference to opposites is clear enough. Aristotle is looking forward to the subsequent treatment of individual emotions, in which opposites are discussed together: e.g., anger is paired with calmness (2.2–3), pity with indignation (2.8–9) and fear with confidence (2.5). More important is the list of particular emotions. For without this list, the definition might be taken inclusively, so that it covers diseases and bodily drives. For these passions, at least in some forms, not only involve pain and pleasure but also affect a man's judgment.

A different way to eliminate diseases and bodily drives from consideration would be to include within the definition a reference to thought as the efficient cause. If the argument of the preceding section is correct, Aristotle was capable of giving such a definition, but he chose not to do so. Instead he refers to change of judgment as a consequence of emotions like anger, pity and fear. That almost certainly reflects Aristotle's concern with rhetoric and more precisely his interest in the power of emotional appeal. The orator who cannot persuade his listeners by arguing the issue may try to effect a change in judgment by working on their emotions. In another context, that effect might be ignored or dismissed as a consequence of emotional response and not an essential feature. But in the context of rhetoric, Aristotle makes it a defining mark, for he is interested in a particular group of emotions: namely those strong emotions which orators arouse when argument fails. Weak

emotions which do not affect the critical capacity of the audience are of no use and therefore excluded by defining emotions in terms of altered judgment.

So much is clear. But there are problems with the definition of emotion within the context of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. One problem concerns altered judgment. Introducing the discussion of emotional appeal and prior to the general definition of emotion, Aristotle speaks of preparing a judge by putting him into an emotional condition. For things do not appear the same to persons who feel friendly and feel hate, and to persons who are angered and are calm. They appear either altogether different or different in degree (2.1 1377b24, 28–29, 31–1378a1). Aristotle's words are clear enough, and they explain the inclusion of friendliness and hate (*philia* and *misos*) within a discussion of emotional appeal (2.4). Nevertheless, it is not clear that persons who feel friendly and hate are always affected in regard to judgment. It may be that emotions like anger and pity normally (though perhaps not always) distort a person's critical faculty, so that it is no better than a warped straight stick (cf. 1.1 1354a24–26), but friendliness and hate are much less closely tied to distorted judgment. Hate, which is said to be free of pain (2.4 1382a12–13), seems the appropriate emotion for a juror who votes on the basis of the evidence to condemn a hardened criminal. And friendliness in the sense of goodwill (*eunoia*) may be thought desirable in a juror, providing it is exhibited equally in regard to both plaintiff and defendant.[14] In addition, the orator seeks to present himself as a man of goodwill: a friend of the city (*philopolis*)[15] and someone well disposed toward his audience (2.1 1377b26–27, 1378a8). Aristotle tells us that goodwill and feelings of friendship will be discussed among the emotions (2.1 1378a18–19), but he certainly does not want to say that manifesting goodwill is tantamount to an announcement of biased judgment. That may explain in part why there is no account of goodwill in the subsequent discussion of individual emotions, but I doubt that it is the whole story or even the most important factor. My guess is that the account of individual emotions (2.2–11) was transferred to the *Rhetoric* from a different context, probably from a lost work like

[14] Cf. Isocrates, *Antidosis* 22, where the Athenians are criticized for not exhibiting common goodwill to competing parties. Earlier in section 21, Isocrates refers to the oath that bound jurors to listen "equally." Apparently common goodwill is thought of as a guarantee of impartiality.

[15] Cf. Thucydides, *Histories* 2.60.5 (Pericles on himself) and Plato, *Apology* 24B (Socrates ironically of Meletus).

Divisions or *On Emotions, Anger*;[16] and that the account never included a discussion of goodwill distinct from that of feelings of friendship. But whatever the truth concerning the origin of the account of individual emotions, it seems clear that Aristotle's introductory remarks on preparing a judge emotionally so that things appear to him in a certain way (1377b24, 30–1378a6) are in line with the subsequent definition of emotions as feelings that cause a change in judgment (1378a6). Together they rule out those cases of friendliness and hate which are not relevant to emotional appeal: i.e., those which are of no help when the orator seeks to make the weaker argument appear the stronger.

III. *"Which Are Followed by Pain and Pleasure"*

Another problem with the definition of the emotions concerns the phrase "which are followed by pain and pleasure" (1378a21–22). Should we understand this phrase to mean that whatever counts as an emotion is necessarily both painful and pleasant?[17] A positive answer is encouraged by Plato's *Philebus*, for there Socrates is made to speak of three kinds of mixed pleasures and pains. The third kind is illustrated by a list of standard emotions—anger, fear, yearning, mourning, love, emulation and envy (47E1–2)—and then elucidated by a brief discussion of anger, lament, yearning, weeping at tragedies and the mixed feelings of envious individuals (47E5–50B6). Since Aristotle's thoughts on emotion almost certainly take their start from the *Philebus*, we might expect him to make the involvement of both pain and pleasure a defining mark of emotional response. But this expectation runs into difficulties in Aristotle's treatment of the individual emotions. None of the definitions mentions pleasure, and one emotion, namely hate (*misos*), is explicitly dissociated from pain. Introducing a contrast with anger, Aristotle tells

[16] See G. Kennedy, *Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (Oxford: University Press 1991) 122 and Fortenbaugh, "On the Composition" (above, note 9) 173–180.

[17] In the phrase οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, "which are followed by pain and pleasure," it seems natural to consture ἕπεται as a logical term indicating an essential connection. Not only is nothing said to suggest otherwise, but also the deductive method that characterizes Aristotle's treatment of the individual emotions suggests such an interpretation. For ἕπεσθαι as a logical term, see *Prior Analytics* 1.27 43b1–38, and for Aristotle's deductive method in analyzing the emotions, see Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions", *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970) 51–53 and *Aristotle on Emotion* (above, note 3) 16.

us that the angry man feels pain, but the man who hates does not (2.4 1382a12–13). The contrast is intelligible. Angry men are responding to personal insult and as a result feel pain. Men who hate are not so affected, for they are not responding to a personal attack. Rather, their emotion is aroused by the odious qualities of persons with whom they may have no contact whatsoever. But if such a contrast is intelligible, it fits poorly with the idea that emotions are accompanied by both pain and pleasure. Should we, then, construe the phrase "which are followed by pain and pleasure" in terms of "and/or"? Aristotle is not requiring that both pain and pleasure be involved in emotional response; it is sufficient that one or the other be present. That may well be correct, but it should be noted that the discussion of hate makes no reference to pleasure, so that we may wonder whether hate qualifies as an emotion on the "and/or" interpretation.[18] We can, of course, introduce pleasure: i.e., we can say that the man who feels hate takes pleasure whenever he thinks of the hated person ceasing to exist (cf. 1382a15), but the idea is not spelled out or even clearly suggested in Aristotle's discussion of hate.[19]

The definition and discussion of kindness (*charis*) in *Rhetoric* 2.7 raise similar worries. Aristotle defines kindness as altruistic service to someone in need (1385a18–19),[20] and in the discussion that follows, he focuses on the needs of the person served (1385a20–34) and the fact that the service must be rendered freely and without consideration of personal gain (1385a34-b10). What is missing is any reference to the pain or pleasure felt by the person rendering kindness. There is, of course, mention of the pain felt by the person in need (1358a23, 25, 33), but that only serves to emphasize Aristotle's silence concerning any painful or pleasurable feelings felt by the person who does good service. Silence here

[18] There is no definition of hate, so that we cannot say with certainty whether an Aristotelian definition of hate would have mentioned pleasure. However, since none of the definitions put forth in the *Rhetoric* mention pleasure, it seems unlikely that pleasure would have been mentioned in a definition of hate, were it included in the *Rhetoric*.

[19] See 2.4 1382a15: the man who hates wishes that the object of his hate cease to exist. But since the man who hates is not pained by the object of his hate, will he be pleased by the object's non-existence? We cannot apply the general principle that anyone who is pained by the existence of a thing is necessarily pleased by its non-existence (2.9 1387a1–3), for the man who hates is not pained.

[20] Kindness is defined as "service to one in need, not in return for something, nor in order that something may be gained by the person rendering the service, but rather by that person (who is in need)."

may exhibit good judgment, for it is not at all clear that meeting the needs of another (i.e., acts of kindness) must be accompanied by any feelings whatsoever. A man may simply think it right and proper to be helpful and therefore stand by others who are in need.[21] But having said that, I want to suggest that such a view of kindness may not be Aristotle's view. For in *Rhetoric* 1.11, Aristotle discusses pleasure and states clearly that conferring a benefit (*eu poiein*) is pleasant. It implies possession and superiority, both of which people desire (1371a34-b4). The pleasure here is one of self-satisfaction and not dissimilar to that felt by the man who laughs because he thinks himself superior to another.[22] It may also be compared with Malcom Heath's explanation of Aristotelian tragic pleasure. The virtuous spectator is pleased with himself, knowing that he responds correctly to the action of the tragedy.[23] Only in the case of kindness, as presented in *Rhetoric* 2.7, virtue is not a requirement. All men desire possessions and superiority, and when acts of kindness make them conscious of possession and superiority, they feel pleasure. Perhaps, then, kindness can be viewed as a pleasant emotion: a man becomes aware of someone in need, responds by providing assistance and takes pleasure in doing so. That kindness also involves pain is no where stated, but the idea is not foolish. Aristotle tells us that acts of kindness are directed toward someone in need (1385a18), and that such acts are not motivated by selfish interests (1385a18–19, 1385b1). That suggests concern for the person in distress—a concern that is likely to be painful in varying degrees. This is, of course, speculation, but it may not be unreasonable speculation.

There is a further difficulty with *Rhetoric* 2.7 that should not be passed over without at least brief mention. I am thinking of the opening lines of the chapter, for here Aristotle asks three questions about being grateful (*charin echein*) and not about kindness. He asks, "Toward whom do men feel grateful and on what grounds and how are they disposed?" (1385a16–17). And later in the chapter, he says that the opening ques-

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[21] It may be significant that the account of kindness emphasizes action. The emotion is defined as a service (*hypourgia* 1385a18) and the subsequent discussion refers to people who render service (1385a19), stand by (*paristasthai* 1385a26) and help (*hypêretein* 1385a26–27). For Aristotle, it seems, action is central to kindness, and feelings of pain and pleasure are either irrelevant or of lesser importance. As the immediately following remarks make clear, I prefer the latter alternative.

[22] I return to laughter in Sections IV, V and VI.

[23] M. Heath, "Aristotle and the Pleasures of Tragedy," in *Making Sense of Aristotle: Essays in Poetics* (London: Duckworth 2001) 16–20.

tions have been answered and that it is now clear what sources must be drawn upon (1385a29–31). That suggests that the primary focus of the chapter is gratitude, and that kindness is defined only because it is important as the grounds that underlie feelings of gratitude.[24] But if that is correct and Aristotle's primary concern in *Rhetoric* 2.7 is gratitude, then we are left wondering why he fails to offer a definition of feeling grateful and to argue deductively on the basis of this definition.[25] This is how he treats other emotions like anger and fear (which I discuss next) and we might expect him to discuss gratitude in the same way. Furthermore, when he concludes his discussion and turns to pity, he says that he has now spoken about doing a kindness and not being kind, i.e., obliging and disobliging (*charizesthai kai acharistein*, 2.8 1385b10–11).[26] He does not say that he has spoken about being grateful. I leave the matter undecided and observe only that the chapter is less than perspicuous, perhaps because something has fallen out, or the chapter was not originally written for the *Rhetoric*, or both.

Whatever the truth concerning kindness and gratitude, I want to suggest that several of the emotions discussed by Aristotle may be said confidently to involve both pain and pleasure. One such emotion is anger, which comes first in Plato's list of mixed pleasures and pains (*Philebus* 47E1). Although the Aristotelian definition of the emotion mentions only pain (1378a31), the analysis that follows immediately introduces pleasure. We are told that all cases of anger are accompanied by the pleasure that derives from the expectation of revenge (1378b1–2). Just as Socrates had done in the *Philebus* (47E9), so Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* cites Homer's *Iliad* 18.109, where anger is said to be sweeter than honey (1378b5–7), and in connection with this Homeric passage, Aristotle tells us that no one feels anger when there is no prospect of taking revenge (1.11 1370b10–13, cf. 2.1 1378b3–5). Anger, then, is a practical emotion,[27] and as such it involves a goal (i.e., revenge) that provides pleasure to the extent that it appears obtainable.

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24 See the epilogue in *Aristotle on Emotion* (above, note 3) 107–108.

25 On Aristotle's deductive method in the *Rhetoric*, see the literature cited above in note 17.

26 *Charizesthai* at 2.7 1385b10 is the middle infinitive. It may be compared with *kecharismenoi* at 1385a27–28 and *chariountai* at 1.6 1363a33 Cf. also *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.5 1133a5, *Politics* 2.5 1263b5 and other passages cited by Bonitz *s.v. charizesthai*. For *charizesthai* and *acharistein* together, see Plato's *Symposium* 186C3–4.

27 On "practical" emotions, see *Aristotle on Emotion* (above, note 3) 79–83.

Another practical emotion is fear, which is mentioned second in the *Philebus* (47E1).[28] In this case, we may be tempted to rule out an analysis comparable to that of anger.[29] For not only does the definition of fear fail to mention pleasure (it mentions only pain, 2.5 1382a21), but also the subsequent discussion of fear makes no mention of pleasure. The absence of any mention of pleasure in the definition is relatively unimportant, for the same is true of the definition of anger and all the other definitions given in the *Rhetoric*. More impressive is the subsequent discussion. For unlike the discussion of anger, which almost immediately makes reference to pleasure (some three or four lines after the definition, 2.2 1378b2), the discussion of fear is silent concerning pleasure. At first reading, that may seem decisive, but there are grounds for hesitation. In particular, the discussions of individual emotions are in some cases incomplete (kindness may be an example; emulation will be discussed in the next paragraph), and in the case of fear, it is easy to supply what is needed to develop an analysis comparable to that of anger. For in the chapter on fear, Aristotle tells us that some hope or expectation (*elpis* 1383a5) of safety must be present. A sign of this, he suggests, is the fact that fear makes men deliberate, and no one deliberates about what is hopeless (1383a5–8). Unless I misunderstand Aristotle, the expectation of safety is pleasant in the same way that the expectation (*elpis* 1378b2) of revenge is pleasant to an angry individual. We may turn again to the discussion of pleasure in *Rhetoric* 1.11. There Aristotle tells us that it is pleasant to expect things that are pleasant when present, i.e., to expect things that bring delight or great benefit. Aristotle asserts this as a general rule (1370b7–11) and then illustrates the rule by reference to anger. He cites Homer (anger is sweeter than honey) and tells us that we do not feel anger toward someone on whom revenge is thought to be impossible (1370b10–14).[30] In *Rhetoric* 1.11, Aristotle does not apply the general rule to fear, but we can do the work for him. Fear is pleasant to the extent that there is present some expectation or hope of safety—a great benefit (1370b8)—for which a frightened man deliberates (1383a5–8). When there is no hope of safety, there is no pleasure, no deliberation and in fact no fear.[31] The case of anger is compara-

[28] At *Philebus* 50C11-D1, the mixture of pain and pleasure in fear is reaffirmed.

[29] See Heath (above, note 23) 8, 17, who denies that the accounts of anger and fear are comparable.

[30] I do not apologize for rendering *phainomenôi* (1370b13) with "is thought to be." See *Aristotle on Emotion* (above, note 3) epilogue pp. 96–103.

[31] For fear to occur there must be some hope of safety (see *Rhetoric* 2.5 1383a5–6

ble: the expectation or hope of revenge is not only pleasant but also necessary to the occurrence of the emotion.

Still another practical emotion is emulation (*zêlos*). Aristotle defines this emotion as a pain caused by the presence, in persons like ourselves, of good things that are highly valued and that we ourselves can obtain (2.11 1388a30–33). Here there is mention of pain but not of pleasure. Similarly the subsequent discussion considers the goods and persons who arouse emulation but has nothing to say about the pleasure that may be involved in emulation. We are, however, told that the person who experiences emulation take steps to acquire the goods that arouse his emotion (1388a35), that the goods are considered obtainable (1388b1–2) and that the goods include virtue and all those things that benefit other people (1388b10–12). Perhaps, then, we can say that the emulous person does feel pleasure to the extent that he expects to obtain certain kinds of goods. While taking steps to acquire virtue, he enjoys the prospect of being honored for his virtue (1388b10–11, 13), and while pursuing goods that are useful and serviceable to others he is pleased not only by the prospect of being honored (1388b11–12) but also by thoughts of possession and superiority (1.11 1371a34-b4).[32] All this is, of course, speculation, but it seems to me sound speculation that Aristotle would accept. What he would not accept is criticism for failing to offer complete accounts of the several individual emotions. Like a good orator, a good lecturer leaves unsaid things that the listener can supply for himself.[33]

IV. *Dispositional Emotions and Other Dispositions*

In the preceding section, I discussed the fact that Aristotle withholds pain from hate (*misos*) and nowhere mentions pleasure within the discussion of that emotion. That was seen to create a difficulty in regard to the general definition of the emotions, for that definition mentions both pain and pleasure (2.1 1378a20–22). To explain the difficulty, it might be suggested that Aristotle thinks of hate as a dispositional emotion. The idea is not foolish, for lacking pain and pleasure is a mark of dispo-

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already mentioned above). Hence, where there is no hope of safety, there is no fear. There may be some other emotion like feeling dejected, but that would not be fear.

[32] See above, this section, on kindness.

[33] Cf. Demetrius Rhetor, *On Style* 222 citing Theophrastus = no. 696 FHS&G.

sitional emotions: when an occurrent emotion becomes dispositional, feelings of pain and pleasure typically subside and remain latent until they resurface in a new episode. Moreover, the relevant chapter of the *Rhetoric* contains no definition of hate, so that we seem free to conceive of hate in whatever way best fits Aristotle's discussion of the emotion.[34] Nevertheless, interpreting hate as a dispositional emotion introduces a new difficulty. The discussion of the emotions in *Rhetoric* 2 is presented as a discussion of occurrent emotions—what an orator arouses in the course of and especially at the end of a speech—and hate is nowhere referred to as an exception.[35] Rather, it is mentioned at the very start of the discussion of emotions as if it were paradeigmatic (2.1 1377b32), and it is presented as the opposite of feeling friendly (*philia*), which is associated with both pleasure and pain (2.4 1381a4–8). Unless we embrace the idea that the discussion of the individual emotions was not written for the place it now occupies in *Rhetoric* 2 (as I am inclined to do[36]), then, we have little choice but to view hate as an occurrent emotion.

We should, however, be clear that Aristotle does connect hate with a disposition of a different kind. In a political-ethical context, he follows Plato (*Laws* 2 653B1–C4, 660A3) and explains moral education in terms

[34] Failure to define hate (see the preceding section with note 18) does not make the discussion of this emotion unique, for lack of a definition is also true of being unkind (*acharistein* 2.8 1385b11) and feeling contempt (*kataphronein* 2.11 1388b22–28). Moreover, hate is discussed second in its pair: it comes after feeling friendly and can be understood as the opposite of that emotion. Indeed, Aristotle recommends studying hate from its opposite (2.4 1382a1), so that formulating a proper definition may have been passed over as unnecessary (cf. *phaneron* 1382a1). The same may be said of feeling contempt. It is said to be the opposite of emulation (2.11 1388b22–24), so that a full discussion with definition will have seemed unnecessary. Not very different is the treatment of shamelessness (*anaischuntia*), which is conceived of as the opposite of shame. Although the beginning of the account of shame includes what may count as a definition of shamelessness (2.6 1383b15–17), there is no proper treatment of shamelessness. Once the discussion of shame is completed, Aristotle dismisses shamelessness, telling us that we shall have all we need from its opposites (1385a14–15).

[35] Cf. S. Leighton, "Aristotle and the Emotions," *Phronesis* 27 (1982) 170 note14.

[36] Nothing is said within the discussion of hate (2.4 1381b37–1382a15) that proves or disproves that the discussion was written for its present position within the *Rhetoric*. However, the concluding remarks concerning friendliness as well as hate (1382a16–19) are tied to rhetoric (demonstrating that certain people are enemies or friends, refuting claims to be one or the other, attributing a disputed action to either anger or hate) and might be thought to establish a close connection with the *Rhetoric*. Nevertheless, these concluding remarks, occurring as they do at the end of the discussion, may be late additions. Cf. the concluding remarks to the discussions of anger (2.2 1380a2–4) and envy (2.10 1388a25–28). Indeed, such appended remarks may be thought to tell in favor of an original context different from the present position within the *Rhetoric*.

of liking and hating. Young people are habituated to be delighted and to hate correctly (*chairein* and *misein*, *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.9 1179b25–26; *chairein-philein* and *misein*, *Politics* 8.5 1340a15). They acquire virtuous dispositions that Aristotle speaks of as *êthê*. To be sure, these *êthê* or kinds of character are related to emotional response, but in themselves they are neither occurrent nor dispositional emotions. Occurrent emotions are responses to particular situations and as such are directed toward individuals or a particular group of individuals.[37] Similarly, dispositional emotions have individuals or particular groups as their object. That is not true of the dispositions that are instilled during moral education. A young person is habituated to view unjustified slights as wrong and to evaluate negatively all forms of vice. Confronted by someone who is insulting or vicious, he will experience anger or hate, but until such a circumstance occurs, his condition is not that of an occurrent emotion or one that has become dispositional. Rather he is properly disposed in regard to anger and hate.[38] I return to this topic in Section IX.

It may be helpful to call attention to two other ways in which men are disposed to emotional response. First, emotions are natural to human beings, so that men are likely to experience, e.g., anger when slighted and fear when threatened. Such a natural disposition does not guarantee a morally correct response or indeed any response at all. Some people have a weak capacity for emotional response, so that they occasionally, perhaps often, fail to respond to situations that normally excite a response. Second, (and this is what interests me) an occurrent emotion of one kind may predispose a man to experience an emotion of a different kind. For example, if a man is feeling anxious about some future situation and another person treats his anxiety as unimportant, he is likely to become angry and to lash out at that person. An Aristotelian example is the man involved in war. He is anxious concerning his safety, feels frightened and is easily angered by another who regards the war as unimportant (2.2 1379a18–20). As Aristotle puts it, the emo-

[37] Here I use "individuals" inclusively to cover things as well as people. An approaching rocket as well as an enemy soldier may cause fear. Aristotle aside, I do not rule out that a person may respond emotionally to a general idea (e.g., the thought of sin or moral goodness), but such a response is not under consideration in *Rhetoric* 2.

[38] For completeness' sake, I add that occurrent emotional response may be part of moral training. Young people are exposed to particular situations and rewarded or praised when they respond in a way that is morally correct. Over time they become habituated to respond correctly on all occasions. I.e., they acquire a disposition that relates directly to emotional response but is not in itself an occurrent emotional response.

tion that presently controls him prepares the way (*proodopoieisthai*) for anger (1379a21–22). That does not mean that fear and anger become a single emotion. They are two different emotions, though the one predisposes a person to experience the other. Moreover, the anxiety or fear that comes with being at war does no more than open the door to anger. It is not sufficient in itself to cause anger. Indeed, it also opens the door to other emotions. Confronted by dangers and feeling frightened, a man feels gratitude, not anger, toward another who stands beside him and joins the fray on his behalf (2.7 1385a24–25).

That may be obvious, but it may be overlooked when one speaks of the pleasures and pains involved in emotional response. As an example, I choose envy (*phthonos*), which is listed last in the *Philebus* (47E2, cf. 50C1). It is said to be full of pleasures (47E5) and discussed at some length. First Socrates describes envy as pain of the soul (48B8–9), after which he speaks of the man who experiences envy and takes pleasure in the misfortunes of his neighbor (48B11–12). Finally he describes envy as a mix (*meixis*) of pleasure and pain (49A8–9) and says that envy is a kind of unjust pleasure and pain (49D1). The grounds that underlie the mixture are clear: the goods possessed by a neighbor cause pain,[39] and the misfortunes of the same neighbor arouse pleasure. What gives pause is the notion of mixture. Are both pain and pleasure essentially involved in envy? What Socrates goes on to say fails to answer the question clearly. First, he speaks of envy effecting (*apergazesthai*) pleasure in the evils that befall friends (50A2–3). That may be compatible with viewing envy as a predisposition to certain feelings of pleasure. Much as anxiety makes a man prone to anger and yet is not to be confused with anger, so envy might be regarded as a condition that makes a man liable to feel certain pleasures but remains distinct from those pleasures. Nevertheless, Socrates continues to speak of a mix and says that the pleasure is felt at the same time (*hama*) as the pain (50A6–8, B4). Without some comment to the contrary, Socrates seems to be saying that both pleasure and pain are essential ingredients in envy.

Aristotle does not address the problem directly, but his treatment of envy in the *Rhetoric* is instructive. He defines the emotion as a certain pain based on the apparent successes of people like ourselves (2.10 1387b22–23). He explains that the envious man is not motivated to obtain something for himself; rather, he is pained by what others have

[39] The grounds for experiencing the pain of envy are not stated explicitly, but they are clearly the opposite of what excites pleasure in the envious individual.

(1387b23–24). Various kinds of people who experience the pain of envy are listed: e.g., ambitious people, those who profess wisdom, rivals in sport, old men in relation to young men (1387b25–1388a23). In conclusion, Aristotle tells us that envious people take pleasure in things opposite to those that cause pain (1388a23–25). He does not offer examples, but it is clear that he means failures and generally whatever humbles people like ourselves. Aristotle's use of *chairein*, "to be delighted" (1388a23) may recall similar usage in the *Philebus* (49D7). In any case, the problem remains the same. Are these pleasures part of envy or are they distinct from envy? If we read on in the *Rhetoric*, we find within the discussion of emulation a helpful comparison. Aristotle tells us that the man moved by emulation takes steps to obtain good things, while the man moved by envy takes steps to prevent his neighbor from having them (2.11 1387b23–24). If I understand Aristotle correctly, he is suggesting that not only emulation but also envy may be viewed as a practical emotion. Both involve goals that lead to action. That is not my conception of envy: I am prepared to speak of envy when a man does nothing but sulk.[40] But if it is Aristotle's, then the pleasures of envy can be divided in two. Like the angry man who is pleased when he expects to obtain revenge (1.11 1370b32), the envious man may experience pleasure when he imagines his neighbor falling on hard times. Such pleasure can be viewed as an ingredient in envy. However, the pleasure that occurs when the neighbor actually falls on hard times is a different matter. That pleasure replaces the pain of envy and is likely to manifest itself in an overt response like laughter. In the *Philebus*, laughter (*gelan*, 49E9, 50A5, 8) and the ludicrous (*geloion*, 48C4, 49B8, C4, E2) are tied to envy (48C4), and in the *Poetics*, Aristotle connects comedy with inferior character (2 1448a17–18, 5 1449a32–33). He seems to endorse a superiority theory of laughter.[41] But whatever the truth concerning comedy, laughter is not tied to envy, except in so far as envy predisposes a man to laugh at a neighbor's failure.[42] It is similar to anxiety, which predisposes a man to become angry if slighted, but is not in itself essential to anger.

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[40] In fairness to Aristotle, it should be noted that he never says explicitly that envy is incompatible with inaction. But the parallel treatment with emulation (2.11 1387b23–24) combined with the statement that envy is not felt toward people who are greatly superior (2.10 1388a11–12) suggests that envy is conceived of as a practical emotion.

[41] See *Aristotle on Emotion* (above, note 3) 20 and below Section VI.

[42] Laughter has a variety of causes (see Section VI). Indeed, envy is not necessary for the occurrence of laughter even when the fundamental cause of laughter is a

V. *Emotions and the Body*

Before going any further, I should take notice of Aristotle's remarks in *On Soul* 1.1, for there we are told that emotions like anger and fright do not occur apart from bodily changes and that a complete scientific definition of such emotions is complex. It includes mention of some bodily change as well as a judgment and a desired goal. For example, being angry is by definition "a certain movement of a body of such and such a kind, or a part or capacity of it, (caused) by this thing for the sake of that" (403a26–27). Here we have mention not only of the efficient cause ("by[43] this thing": i.e., on account of an apparent slight) and the final cause ("for the sake of that": i.e., for revenge) but also the material cause. In the case of anger, this third kind of cause is a certain movement of a body or more precisely, "a boiling of the blood and hot stuff around the heart" (403a31-b1).[44] Beginning as we have from the *Philebus*, this emphasis on bodily factors is important. For in the Platonic dialogue, Socrates assigns emotions like anger and fright to the class of pains and pleasures that belong to the soul itself. In the context of the dialogue, the assignation is useful, for it helps to mark off these passions from others whose primary cause is bodily: a diseased state of the body or a depletion needing replenishment. But it can also give a misleading impression of emotional response. For when people become angry or frightened, the body too plays a role: it must be predisposed to the emotion, and the bodily changes that occur during the emotion have effects that are both public and private.

Concerning predisposition to emotional response, I offer two observations. First, Aristotle is careful to point out that the condition of the body may be a factor in explaining both strong and weak responses to a particular situation. He tells us that when the body is aroused, men are angered by trivia; but when the body is not aroused, they fail to exhibit exasperation. Similarly with fear, a man may be so disposed by his body that he has the experience of fright even though nothing frightening is occurring; or he may fail to be frightened despite the presence of dan-

recognition of one's own superiority. Aristotle tells us that we do not envy people who are far superior (*Rhetoric* 2.10 1388a11–12), but should such a person suddenly be humbled, we might be delighted and express our feeling in laughter.

43 Here the preposition "by" translates *hypo*. See Section I *ad fin*.

44 The Aristotelian definition of anger is accepted by Theophrastus. See *On Sweat* 36.230–231 F. The reference is to my edition of *On Sweat* (Leiden: Brill 2003) 46.

gers which are severe and clear (403a19–24). Second, the fact that men may be predisposed to extreme emotional response raises the question whether the predisposition can be altered in order to avoid unwanted responses. My suspicion is that Aristotle's answer would be bipartite. He would say that a temporary condition can be altered. An invasive medical procedure might remove accumulated blood or bile from a particular part of the body, or (less dangerously) a visit to the theater might result in an intense fright or a good laugh, so that the offending fluids are burned off and the person returned to a desirable condition.[45] But Aristotle would also say that a long standing condition, whether innate or acquired, is not easily removed. Indeed, there may be no permanent cure. For an example I turn to his pupil Theophrastus, who in *On Comedy* told how the people of Tiryns tried to remedy their propensity to laughter. They asked the oracle at Delphi how they might be released from their condition and were told that they would be released if they performed a sacrifice without laughing. Fearing that a child might laugh, they attempted to remove all the children from the place of sacrifice; but one escaped notice and made an absurd remark that resulted in laughter.[46] In this way the people of Tiryns learned that their long standing habit was incurable (*ap.* Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 6.79 261D–E = 709.1–10 FHS&G). What role this story played in the Theophrastean treatise *On Comedy* is uncertain. It may have been introduced to illustrate verbal humor or perhaps the possibilities of a comic plot revolving around a fixed disposition. But equally it could have served to underline the need for homeopathic therapy. Like the Tirynthians, many of us are given to excessive laughter; and since there

[45] For intense fright, see Aristotle, *Poetics* 14 1453b5: the plot of a tragedy should produce shuddering in one who hears a tragedy read. By using the verb "to shudder" (*phrittein*), Aristotle indicates that the listener feels fear intensely and in doing so undergoes bodily change. See R. Janko, *Aristotle, Poetics I, with the Tractatus Coislinianus, a Hypothetical Reconstruction of* Poetics *II, and the Fragments of the On Poets* (Indianapolis: Hackett 1987) 105. For purgation through laughter, see the *Tractatus Coislinianus* 10–11 p. 64 Koster = IV p. 24 Janko (*Aristotle on Comedy: Towards a Reconstruction of Poetics II* [Berkeley: University of California 1984]), where the definition of comedy ends with the following words: "through pleasure and laughter accomplishing the catharsis of such emotions."

[46] The child confused two cognate Greek words: *sphageion* = "sacrificial bowl" and *sphagion* = "sacrificial victim." The child wanted to ask the adults whether they were frightened that he would overturn a bowl; but he mixed up the cognate words and asked whether they were worried that he would overturn the victim, which in this case is a bull.

is no permanent cure, we would do well to attend the comic theater and to obtain short term relief through laughter.

I have said that the bodily changes occurring during emotional response have effects that are both public and private. In speaking of "public" effects, I am thinking of superficial changes of the body like change in color and the appearance of sweat. For change in color, I cite Aristotle, who tells us that turning red is typical of shame, whereas turning pale is a mark of fright (*Nicomachean Ethics* 4.9 1128b13–14). For sweat, I turn to Theophrastus, who observes that sweat appears on the feet of men who are nervous, and does so because of an increase in bodily heat (*On Sweat* 36.226–230 F).[47] By "private" effects, I mean painful and pleasurable sensations. When an angry man says that he feels pain, he may be referring to a special mental feeling; but equally and in my judgment more probably, he may be referring to bodily discomfort, whose proximate cause is a change in the body, like the boiling of blood around the heart. In any case, there is no contradiction in saying that the painful sensations of anger are caused by bodily change and that anger is caused by the thought of being unfairly slighted. The latter comes first and causes a change in the body, which in turn produces an unpleasant sensation.

VI. *Different Kinds of Laughter*

In the preceding section, I touched on laughter (*gelôs*) and mentioned the Tirynthians, who were unable to control their laughter. Now I want to focus on laughter, for its status as an emotion may be questioned. It may seem to be all noise and to lack the complexity of emotional response. In particular, there may be no necessary tie to judgment or belief conceived of as the cause of laughter. To be sure, we can always explain why a person laughs, but there are clear cases in which the cause is not a judgment. Laughter brought on by tickling is an example. Here the person who laughs is not responding to some situation that he assesses positively (or negatively); rather, the person laughs because he is being subjected to a particular kind of physical stimulus. A more dramatic case, which interested the Hippocratic doctors, is the laughter that follows upon a blow to the midriff. When the blow is caused by

[47] The reference is to my edition of *On Sweat* (above, note 44) 46. Cf. pseudo-Aristotle, *Problems* 2.26.

an enemy spear there is nothing funny in the situation, but the victim laughs before he dies (*Epidemics* 5.95, 7.121). Still a different case is the person whose conversation is marked by laughter. I am thinking of the person who laughs between sentences and does so repeatedly in quite diverse circumstances. This is a puzzle case, for laughter can be a way of dealing with an uncomfortable situation. We can imagine someone who is thoroughly unsure of himself and expresses as well as hides his timidity (mild fear) by laughing. But there are other people who, for whatever reason, habitually laugh while engaged in conversation. They have acquired a mannerism that has no direct tie to what is normally thought of as emotional response.

Given the above cases, we may want to recognize different uses of the word "laughter." It may be used to refer to vocal noises that have the same or similar qualities but have quite different causes. It may also refer to finding something funny, i.e., to vocal responses that are caused by judgements (the person who laughs thinks that something is the case; he finds something funny) and are regularly accompanied by pleasant feelings. In this usage, "laughter" refers to a pleasant emotional response and not to a vocal noise (also called "laughter") that results from tickling or a blow to the midriff. Nor does it refer to an acquired mannerism that manifests itself in conversation and other verbal behavior.[48] If there is a difficulty here, it is that in classical Greek the word *gelan* is used not only with regard to laughing aloud, but also for cases of smiling that involve no noise whatsoever.[49] Such double duty can, of course, be explained as ambiguous usage, but it is worth noting that some of the problems that arise when one considers diverse cases of laughter also arise when one considers

[48] When a man finds something funny and laughs, his judgment or more generally his thought is a central ingredient in his response. It is the efficient cause that is mentioned in the essential definition. (On essence and cause, see Section I.) While the involvement of thought as the efficient cause serves to mark off the laughter of finding something funny from laughter that has a physiological cause or is a mannerism, thought itself is a determinable (see Section VII *ad fin.*), so that it is possible to divide cases of finding something funny into several different kinds. See below on the division of the laughable into men, speech and deeds.

[49] To be sure there is the verb *meidian*, which is used in regard to smiling (already in Homer, e.g., *Iliad* 1.595), but the word was used less frequently in the classical period, when *gelan* served for both laughing and smiling. See D. Arnould, *Le rire et les larmes dans la littérature grecque d'Homère à Platon* (Paris: les Belles Lettres 1990) pp. 138–142. Uses of the compound *prosgelan* are especially striking: Medea smiles at her children and Jason's new bride smiles at her reflection in a mirror (Euripides, *Medea* 1041, 1162). In Aristotle, fr. 183 Rose, *prosgelan* is used with reference to smiling at slaves.

smiling. Sometimes a smile signifies approval and is accompanied by feelings of pleasure. In such cases, we may want to speak of an emotion. But when a smile is a mannerism, it need not express approval and need not be accompanied by any feelings of pleasure. Indeed, the smile may be exhibited in most unpleasant situations, or all the time (like the smile on an archaic statue).

None of the above is likely to have caused problems for Aristotle. Whatever the ambiguities of the verb *gelan*, he, like all Greeks, will not have confused smiling with laughing aloud. Moreover, his interest in physiology and medical matters will have led him to isolate cases like the laughter that results from tickling or a blow to the midriff. Indeed, in the *Parts of Animals*, both tickling and a blow to the midriff are discussed (3.10 673a2–12), and the same is true of the *Physical Problems* (35.2 964b30–32, 35.6 965a14–17, 35.8 965a23–32). The latter work is, of course, post-Aristotelian, but nevertheless of some interest, for it makes clear that the physiological causes of laughter were part of a continuing discussion within the Peripatos.

What needs to be added, I think, is that Aristotle's remarks on comic laughter in the *Poetics* (as we now have it) are not a full expression of his understanding of laughter conceived of as a certain sort of noise that is caused by judgment and accompanied by pleasure. For in the *Poetics*, comedy is associated with worthless people, and the laughable is restricted to mistakes and deformities that are neither painful nor destructive (5 1449a32–35). That suggests a Hobbesian view of laughter ("sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves by comparison with the inferiority of others, or with our own formerly"[50]), and while Aristotle certainly thinks that laughter can be occasioned by a recognition of one's own superiority, he does not think that all laughter has such a cause. Here a passage in the *Rhetoric* is instructive. I am thinking of 1.11 1371b35–1372a2, where Aristotle first divides the laughable into men, speech and deeds, and then refers to the *Poetics*, in which this division is said to have been set forth. The reference is to the lost second book of the *Poetics*, where Aristotle will have developed more fully his thoughts on comic laughter. He will have discussed laughter aroused by the presentation of men, i.e., the characterization of stage figures. Here he will have developed the idea of worthless people, or as he puts it elsewhere, men who are worse

[50] *Human Nature* in *The English works of Thomas Hobbes*, ed. W. Molesworth (London 1840) vol. 4 p. 46.

than those of the present day (2 1448a17–18). But he will also have taken account of laughter aroused by speech and deeds, e.g., word play and unexpected actions (cf. *Tractatus Coislinianus* 3 p. 51 Kaibel = V–VI pp. 26–36 Janko, which may be closely related to the lost second book of the *Poetics*). Sometimes a connection will have been made with worthless people. For example, confusing two similar sounding words may be a mark of inferior intelligence, and the running slave through his action may exhibit a cowardly character. But Aristotle will not have insisted that every instance of word play and all forms of bizarre action are tied to inferiority even though they may arouse laughter when presented on the comic stage. Indeed, he will have recognized that word play can be enjoyed in itself (hence the anthology of clever remarks) and that the person who engages in, e.g., punning (on or off the stage) is exhibiting intelligence. In fact, it is partly the connection with intelligence that makes word play such an effective means of humiliating someone else. I cite Theophrastus who tells us that the cithara player Stratonicus used the proverb "No rotten fish is large" to insult the actor Simycas. By speaking the words separately, he indicated that the actor was a nobody, a rotten performer and a fish because of his lack of voice (Athenaeus, *The Sophists at Dinner* 8.40 348A = 710 FHS&G). In this way, Stratonicus exhibited his own command of language, put down Simycas and, we may be sure, aroused laughter in his audience.

In Section III, I called attention to the fact that some emotions are tied to particular goals, while others are not. Anger, for example, is goal directed in that an angry man seeks revenge. In contrast, pity is not closely tied to goal directed behavior, for when a person feels pity, there may be no way to remedy the situation. This difference means that laughter *qua* finding something funny (as against being struck by a spear *etc*.) is like pity and unlike anger in that there is no necessary connection with goal directed behavior. A person experiencing pity may break down in tears and sob aloud, but take no action, for the situation that has brought on the emotion cannot be remedied. Similarly the person who finds something funny may break down laughing and do nothing. He has no further goal that calls for planning or immediate action. Nevertheless, there is a difference between pity and laughter. When there is something that can be done to rectify a pitiful situation and a person is not moved to action, then we are apt to doubt that the person in question really feels pity. We may deem his tears insincere. In the case of laughter, there seems to be no parallel test of sincerity.

A good laugh is compatible with leaving the situation as it is. And that is true even if it is possible to continue the merriment by telling a new joke or acting out some piece of bizarre behavior. Of course, there are people who guffaw loudly and do have a goal in mind, but their goal is not conceptually tied to laughter. I think especially of the flatter who is motivated by self-interest. In Theophrastus' *Characters*, flattery is defined as shameful interaction that is beneficial to the flatterer (2.1). The sketch that follows depicts the flatterer laughing at frigid jokes. He guffaws and stuffs his coat in his mouth as if he is trying to control himself (2.4). But of course, he is in no danger of losing control. Moreover, he may not be enjoying himself except in so far as he imagines himself acquiring some advantage through his obsequious behavior. His laughter, then, is not laughter *simpliciter*. It is feigned laughter and as such it is not to be confused with finding something funny.

VII. *An Analysis Emphasizing Similarity*

The definition of emotions given in *Rhetoric* 2 is oriented toward emotional appeal and therefore not intended as a general definition covering all the emotions felt by human beings. In a rhetorical context, that is understandable and even commendable, but we are left wondering whether Aristotle ever offered a truly general definition of emotional response. He may have done so in one or both of the lost works mentioned in Section II, but if he did, the definition is lost along with those works. My suspicion, however, is that Aristotle would have rejected a general definition in favor of an inclusive analysis that emphasizes similarity, for the phenomena in question have almost no common core and to the extent that they have one, it is determinable rather than determinate.[51]

In developing this idea, it may be helpful to begin by looking at Book 8 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, for here we have a rather clear example of the kind of analysis Aristotle could have offered in the case of emotion.

[51] In his *Commentary on Aristotle's* Nicomachean Ethics, Aspasius tells us the he was unable to find a definition of emotion among the older Peripatetics (*CAG* vol. 19.1 p. 44.20–21 Heylbut). His search may have been faulty, but more likely there was none to be found. See Fortenbaugh, "A Note on Aspasius, In *EN* 44.20–21," *Proceedings of the World Conference on Aristotle*, vol. 1 (Athens: Ministry of Culture and Sciences 1981) 175–178 = Chapter 2 in this volume.

I am thinking of the discussion of friendship.[52] Aristotle recognizes three types: the friendship of virtuous men, that of pleasure seekers and that of men associated for the sake of utility. He is not in doubt that each of these types is properly called friendship, but he never offers a general definition applicable to all three. Instead, he focuses on the several ways in which the friendships resemble each other. He tells us that the three types exhibit common features: reciprocal affection, wishing well and awareness (8.1 1155b27–1156a5). These are the necessary marks of friendship, such that the absence of any one of them is sufficient to rule out friendship. But these features are not all there is to friendship. Each of the three types has its own goal: what is good, pleasant and useful (8.1 1155b18–21); and these goals serve not only to mark off the types but also to relate them through similarity based on analogy. For as the good is to virtuous friends, so the pleasant is to friends of pleasure and the useful to persons associated for the sake of utility. Finally, there are features shared by two of the types but not by all three. These features are the qualities of being pleasant and being useful. The friendship of virtuous men has both, while the friendship of pleasure seekers is pleasant but not useful, and vice versa for the friendship of men associated for utility. Accordingly, the friendships based on pleasure and utility resemble friendship based on virtue; and through that type of friendship, they are related indirectly to each other.[53] In sum, friendship based on virtue is complete in that it has all the qualities looked for in a friendship; and for that reason, it is a kind of perfect or paradigm case. In comparison, the other types are incomplete; but they are still friendships, for they not only possess the necessary qualities but also exhibit similarity based on analogy and a relationship which is mediated through the perfect or complete friendship of virtuous men.

Returning now to the emotions, my suggestion is that Aristotle will have offered—or more cautiously, was capable of offering—a similar analysis. He could have pointed out that all emotions resemble each other in that they have thought as their efficient cause. As such, thought is not just a common feature; it is a necessary one, so that any passion resulting from a different cause is not an emotion. Aristotle could also

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[52] Aristotle's word for friendship is *philia*, the same word used in the *Rhetoric* for friendly feelings.

[53] See Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's Analysis of Friendship: Function and Analogy, Resemblance, and Focal Meaning," *Phronesis* 20 (1975) 56 = Chapter 12, page 216 in this volume.

take note of the goals that not only differentiate between emotions like anger and fright but also relate them through similarity based on analogy. For as the angry man has revenge as the goal for which acts, so too the frightened man has safety as his goal. In addition, Aristotle could observe that some emotions lack features which others have. Feelings of pain and pleasure come immediately to mind. Although anger and (on my interpretation) fear are tied to both pleasure and pain, hate is said to lack pain, and perhaps we should add pleasure. Similarly kindness, on one interpretation, may be thought to lack both pain and pleasure.[54] Something similar can be said of goals. Anger and fright necessarily involve goals that lead to action. Angry men strive for revenge and frightened individuals seek safety. Hence, Aristotle tells us that anger is absent when revenge appears impossible (1.11 1370b13), and that fear requires some hope of safety, for fear makes men deliberate and no one deliberates concerning things considered hopeless (2.5 1383a5–8). In contrast, there are other emotions that do not exhibit a necessary connection with goal directed behavior. Pity and shame are examples. Men can and often do feel pity when they perceive others suffering an evil for which there is no remedy; and they experience shame when they realize that they themselves have committed wrongs which are impossible to reverse.[55] For our purposes the important point is that here, as with different types of friendship, we have the possibility of mediating a relationship. Kindness involves goal directed action, but it lacks, again on one interpretation, a close connection with feelings of pleasure or pain. In contrast, pity is marked by feelings of pain, but there is no necessary tie to goal directed

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[54] See above, Section III. A further example is laughter *qua* finding something funny. Here we have a response involving pleasure, but there is no necessary tie to pain. When a person laughs at, e.g., word play, there may be no feelings of pain. Of course, someone who envied the actor Simycas and heard Stratonicus humiliate him with the proverb "No rotten fish is large" (see Section VI) will have experienced the pain of envy before experiencing the pleasure of laughter. But the pain is not part of finding something funny. Rather, it is part of the envy, which "prepares the way" (cf. *Rhetoric* 2.2 1379a21–22) for laughter, while remaining a distinct emotion. See Above, Section IV.

[55] Aristotle recognizes that pity is aroused by death, old age and ugliness (*Rhet.* 2.8 1386a8, 11), all of which are irremediable. In defining shame, he mentions painful sensations but omits any reference to action (*Rhet.* 2.6 1383b12–14), for no action is necessarily involved in experiencing the emotion. We may call these emotions "non-practical" in contrast to "practical" emotions like anger and fear. For fuller discussion, see Fortenbaugh (above, note 3) 79–83. A further example of a non-practical emotion is the laughter of finding something funny. We often laugh with no goal in mind. See Section VI.

behavior. Nevertheless, both emotions resemble central cases like anger and fright; and through these central cases, they are related to each other.

A difference between the analysis of types of friendship and the proposed analysis of emotions is the number of common characteristics. In the case of friendship, there are four characteristics possessed by each of the three types: namely, being goal oriented (a similarity established by analogy), reciprocal affection, wishing well and awareness (all necessary if friendship is to exist). In the case of emotions, the number is less. Goal directed behavior is characteristic of many but not all emotions, and the same is true of pain and pleasure. What is characteristic of all emotions is a single feature: namely, thought as the efficient cause. But having said that, let me emphasize that thought here is a determinable, much like wishing well in the case of friendships. When pleasure seekers and persons associated on the basis of utility wish each other well, the wish is self-interested and dependent upon the attainment of some pleasure or advantage. In the case of virtuous men, wishing well is very different; instead of self-interest, there is concern for the moral goodness of the parties involved.[56] Similarly in regard to emotions, no one thought is the efficient cause. In the case of anger, it is the thought of an unjustified slight; and in the case of fear, it is the thought of imminent danger. That suffices to mark a distinction between the two emotions, but these thoughts are not sufficient for the occurrence of anger and fright. There must also be action directed toward the appropriate goal and feelings of pain and pleasure. In the case of other emotions like pity and kindness, one or the other of these additional features may be missing, but there is always thought in a determinate form.[57]

VIII. *Difference in Degree*

In Sections V and VI, I had occasion to mention Theophrastus. I now want to call attention to his treatment of anger (*orgê*) and two closely related emotions: namely, faultfinding and rage (*mempsis* and *thymos*). I begin with anger, which Theophrastus, following Aristotle, regarded as a complex phenomenon. A fragment preserved by Stobaeus and

[56] Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.3 1156a9–14.

[57] On the thought involved in finding something funny (it is determinable), see above, Section VI with note 48.

another translated into Latin by Seneca make clear that Theophrastus viewed anger as a desire for revenge on account of injustice (Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.532.6 Hense = 526.4 FHS&G and Seneca, *On Anger* 1.12.3 = 446.1 FHS&G). A report by Marcus Aurelius tells us that Theophrastus recognized the involvement of pain in anger (*Meditations* 2.10 = 441.3–4); this same text and another found in Simplicius inform us that Theophrastus did not ignore the bodily changes which accompany anger (*On Aristotle's* Physics 965.1 Diels = 271.3 FHS&G). In sum, Theophrastus analyzed anger in terms of thought, goal directed behavior, feelings and bodily change.

What is new in Theophrastus is the introduction of difference in degree in order to distinguish between closely related emotions. Our source is Simplicius, who cites the Theophrastean work *On Emotions* and tells us that according to Theophrastus faultfinding, anger and rage differ in respect to the more and less (*to mallon kai hêtton*) and are not identical in kind (*On Aristotle's* Categories 253.7–8 = 438.6–8 FHS&G). To this report, Simplicius adds a short list of other closely related emotions—friendliness and goodwill, savagery, bestiality and anger, appetite and lust—and then observes that in general the more shameful emotions, when intensified, change into another kind (253.8–13 = 438.8–12). It is not entirely clear whether the additional list of related emotions is taken from Theophrastus. Nor is it clear whether Theophrastus regarded difference of degree as merely compatible with or actually determinant of difference in kind. My inclination is to believe that the list is Theophrastean in origin and that Theophrastus did introduce the more and less in order to establish difference in kind. I offer three reasons in support of my belief. First, the list follows on faultfinding, anger and rage without noticeable interruption. Second, the mention of appetite and lust (*epithymia* and *erôs*) within the list invites comparison with Theophrastus' definition of lust. That definition is preserved by Stobaeus and runs as follows: "Lust is an excess of an unreasoning appetite, whose coming is swift and parting slow" (*Anthology* 4.468.4–7 = 557.1–2 FHS&G). The definition fits neatly with Simplicius' observation concerning the more shameful emotions which, when intensified, become different in kind. It also supports the idea that difference in degree—here represented by excess, swift and slow—may be determinant of difference in kind and therefore mentioned in the essential definition. Third, there are parallels in Theophrastus' botanical works. I cite *Research on Plants*: in the introduction, Theophrastus makes special mention of the more and the less (1.1.6); and in the subsequent discus-

sion of related kinds of plants, e.g. the date palm and doum-palm, he introduces difference in degree in order to distinguish between kinds.[58]

No text reports the details of Theophrastus' analysis of faultfinding, anger and rage; but if the preceding remarks are correct, it seems likely that he applied difference in degree to one or more of the features involved in anger. He may have said that anger is caused by a greater injustice than faultfinding, involves a stronger desire for revenge, greater bodily disturbance and more pain. In contrast, anger falls short of rage in regard to the perceived injustice, desire for revenge, disturbance and pain. That is the simplest case: difference of degree applied to all features. But it is not the only possibility. At least in regard to faultfinding, it is easy to imagine an analysis in which a feature is said to be absent, either occasionally or always. Some faultfinders may have a weak desire for revenge, but do they all have such a desire? To be sure they all voice a complaint, but it is not clear that they always aim to hurt another person. Similarly with pain, many or most faultfinders may feel some minor discomfort, but it seems reasonable to believe that some faultfinders simply express annoyance without feeling anything that can reasonably be called pain. In this regard, a passage in Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* may be instructive. I am thinking of the second book, where Aristotle calls emotions "such things as rage, fright, shame, appetite and generally things that are in themselves accompanied for the most part by sensory pleasure and pain" (2.2 1220b12–14). If I understand Aristotle, he introduces the qualifier "sensory" (*aisthêtikê*), because he is referring to pleasant and painful sensations that are caused by bodily changes; and he says "for the most part" (*hôs epi to polu*) because he thinks that these sensations are not always present. On one interpretation, he means that there are whole kinds of emotion that are marked by an absence of sensation.[59] Hate is a case in point and faultfinding might be another. On a different interpretation, one that I find more plausible,[60] Aristotle is taking account of individual occurrences in which sensations are not expe-

[58] See *Research on Plants* 2.6.6–11; and for more detailed discussion, see Fortenbaugh, "Theophrastus on Emotion", in *Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life and Work*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh, P. Huby and A. Long = *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 2 (New Brunswick: Transaction 1985) 213–214, reprinted in Theophrastean Studies (Stuttgart: Steiner 2003) 76–77.

[59] S. Leighton, "*Eudemian Ethics* 1220b11–13," *Classical Quarterly* 34 (1984) 135–138.

[60] Fortenbaugh (above, n. 58) 217–219, in agreement with M. Woods, *Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics; Books I, II, and VIII* (Oxford: Clarendon 1982) 110.

rienced. Faultfinding, for example, is normally accompanied by pain, but occasionally the bodily disturbance is so weak that no painful sensation is experienced. Here again it may be helpful to cite the introduction to *Research on Plants*. For Theophrastus states clearly that a part that belongs to the nature of a plant can be absent in a particular specimen; and when it is absent, there is always an explanation like disease or old age or mutilation (1.1.2). Similarly with emotions, Theophrastus may well have said that pain is a normal feature which in particular cases and for a particular reason may fail to be present. And if he did say that, he may have gone on to cite faultfinding as an example. But whatever the truth concerning this emotion, it does seem likely that Theophrastus would recognize that an adequate analysis of related kinds will consider absences and well as differences in degree.

IX. *Emotion, Good Character and Moral Virtue*

In Section I of this paper, I discussed Aristotle's explanation of the involvement of thought in emotional response, and in Section VII, I pointed out that the thought involved in emotion is determinable, i.e., thought in a determinate form. I now want to emphasize that for many emotions the thought in question has both a factual and an evaluative component. Take anger as an example. When a man is angry, he believes that someone has done something, perhaps made a hand gesture or passed by in silence, and he deems this behavior unjustified. Here there is not only factual apprehension, seeing a gesture or noticing silence, but also evaluation. The angry man assesses another person's action negatively and expresses this assessment in seeking revenge. Aristotle understands that; and in defining anger, he chooses to emphasize evaluation. He first mentions an apparent "slight" (*oligôria*) as the cause of anger and then adds "the slight being unjustified" (*tou oligôrein mê prosêkontos*, *Rhet.* 2.2 1378a32–33, cf. 2.2 1379b11–12).[61] Without that assessment, i.e., without deeming the slight unjustified, there would be

[61] I have translated *oligôria* with "slight" not only because it is close to the root meaning of *oligôria*, but also because one can easily speak of a justified as well as an unjustified (deserved as well as undeserved) slight. That would not be true if *oligôria* were translated with, e.g., "outrage" as I have occasionally done elsewhere (e.g. *Aristotle on Emotion* [above, note 3] 11).

no anger. For example, when a man thinks that he himself has done wrong and is being punished justly, a painful emotion is possible, but it will not be anger (cf. 2.3 1380b16–18).

Similarly in regard to fear, it is not enough to observe that bodily harm is imminent. The frightened man must also assess the harm negatively and manifest this assessment in seeking safety. As Aristotle puts it, the frightened man is necessarily in preparation (2.5 1382b3–4). The involvement of evaluation in other emotions is, I think, clear enough.[62] It may, however, be helpful to add two qualifying remarks. First, although the frightened man, like the angry man, expresses his negative assessment in goal directed behavior, there are emotions in which evaluation need not lead to action. Indignation and pity are examples. Both emotions involve a negative evaluation—"The good fortune of that person is unmerited"; "The suffering of another is unmerited" (2.8 1385b13–14, 2.9 1386b9–14)—but neither need be expressed in action. Rectification may be quite impossible, so that any action would be no more than an expression of displeasure. Second, not all emotions involve evaluation. A clear example is finding something funny.[63] The cause is always a thought, but there need not be an assessment of the situation as merited or unmerited, just or unjust. Rather people often laugh at, e.g., the unexpected or word play such as a pun or clever repetition.[64] That will have been recognized by Aristotle, Theophrastus and other Peripatetics, who discussed the matter in works on comedy and more generally on the ridiculous.[65]

The involvement of evaluation in emotions like anger, fright, indignation and pity means that these emotions can express character. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle makes the point explicitly when he says that both pity

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[62] For fuller remarks on evaluation and its application to Aristotle's analysis of emotions, see Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle: Emotion and Moral Virtue", *Arethusa* 2 (1969) 164–167 = Chapter 7, pages 109–113 in this volume. In the recent literature, see, e.g., A. Nehamas, "Pity and Fear in the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*," in *Aristotle's* Rhetoric: *Philosophical Essays*, ed. by D. Furley and A Nehamas (Princeton: University Press 1994) 264.

[63] I speak of "finding something funny" instead of "laughter," because the former seems to me more restrictive, suggesting a response caused by thought and therefore ruling out cases of laughter caused by tickling and the like. But most of the time laughter is caused by thought and therefore part of an emotional response. See above, Section VI.

[64] See Section VI and note 45 in Section V.

[65] See the *Tractatus Coislinianus* 13–30 pp. 63–64 Koster = V–VI pp. 24–36 Janko (1984 [above n. 45]), where the causes of laughter are divided into language and situations (*lexis* and *pragmata*).

and indignation belong to good character (*êthos chrêston*), for men ought to feel pity for those whose suffering is unmerited, and to feel indignation when success is unmerited (2.9 1386b12–14). Aristotle goes on to say that indignation is attributed to the gods (1386b15–16), but he never refers indignation or pity to moral virtue (*êthikê aretê*). That is because he thinks of moral virtue as a disposition to act and therefore as a disposition tied to emotions that regularly manifest themselves in action.[66] Good temper (*praotês*) is the moral virtue related to anger, and the man of good temper is one who both assesses the situation correctly—he is not mistaken in perceiving an unjustified slight—and seeks revenge in an appropriate manner. Similarly, courage (*andreia*) is the moral virtue related to fear, and the courageous man is one who assesses danger correctly and confronts it as the situation demands.[67]

These appropriate responses are made possible by moral training during youth (*EN* 2.3 1104b11–13). For example, a young man is taught to respect other people according to their merit. He learns that respectful treatment is a fine thing and disrespectful treatment something bad. In this way, he acquires moral principles that are action guiding. When disrespectful treatment occurs, he recognizes an unjustified slight; and should the slight be directed toward himself or those close to him, he exhibits his virtue by becoming angry and seeking appropriate revenge. As Aristotle says, "Virtue when outraged always chooses to act" (*Rhet.* 2.5 1382a35-b2); and as Theophrastus puts it, "Good men are angered on account of wrongs done to their own (close friends and relatives). … It cannot happen that a good man is not angered by evil." (*ap.* Seneca, *On Anger* 1.12.3, 14.1 = 446.1,6–7 FHS&G).

Similarly with fear, a young man is taught to despise danger and to express this evaluation in action (*EN* 2.2 1104b1–3). He learns to remain steadfast, because doing so is fine or noble (1115b12, 23, 11116a11, b31). Here, too, education has conveyed principles that govern action.[68] This

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[66] Moral virtue is repeatedly said to be a disposition concerning emotions and actions (*EN* 2.3 1104b13–14, 2.6 1106b24–25, 3.1 1109b30).

[67] I shall soon introduce a qualification. Although the good tempered man and the courageous man normally assess the situation correctly, there are occasions when the situation is not what it appears to be. In such cases, reflection may lead one to alter or to abandon an initial emotional response.

[68] While principles may be learned from parents and tutors who give general directives concerning virtuous action, they may also be acquired through song and poetry and literature in general. For example, to teach a youth the importance of facing danger bravely, he might be asked to read or listen to an elegy of Tyrtaeus, in which the poet describes the death of a young soldier as something fine or noble (fr. 10.30). See

education is not an eradication of fear. On the contrary, the courageous man will feel fear, but his fear will be moderate and appropriate to the occasion. Generally he is not frightened out of his senses (3.7 1115b11); and as a result, he is able to reflect on his situation and to deliberate about means to meet the danger confronting him.[69] If reflection shows that the situation is not what it appeared to be, his response will be altered; and if deliberation shows that one way to meet the danger is better than another, the better way will be chosen.

These reflections and deliberations are not in themselves emotional responses. Rather they are acts of reasoning that follow on emotional response. In the absence of moral virtue, they might not occur, for strong emotions interfere with reasoning;[70] but it is not moral virtue that guarantees the correctness of the reasoning itself. That is the work of practical wisdom (*phronêsis*). What moral virtue does do is guarantee the appropriateness of emotional response. Of course, an initial response may turn out to be second best or worse. The facts of the situation are sometimes different from what they appear to be. Nevertheless, the morally virtuous man will always respond in accordance with his principles, choosing, e.g., to remain at his post rather than flee, for courageous action is something noble and a good in itself. Aristotle makes the point in regard to sudden dangers (3.8 1117a17–20). When the situation allows time for deliberation, a person lacking courage may remain in his post, because he has considered his options and come to realize that the apparent danger can be safely met. But when the immediacy of the situation rules out deliberation,[71] character is revealed

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Fortenbaugh, "Un modo di affrontare la distinzione fra virtù etica e saggezza in Aristotele", *Museum Patavinum* 5 (1987) p. 251; reprinted in English as "Aristotle's Distinction Between Moral Virtue and Practical Wisdom", in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy IV, Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. by J. Anton and A. Preus (Albany: State University of NY Press 1991) 103 = Chapter 10, page 196 in this volume.

[69] I use two different verbs, "to reflect" and "to deliberate," in order to emphasize that a man may ponder both the appropriateness of his response to a particular situation (Is there a real danger here? Is my response too weak or too strong?) and the means to realize a desired goal (Is this or that the better way to achieve safety?). Nevertheless, I want to be clear that my usage is arbitrary: "to deliberate" can be used for both cases, as can *bouleuein* in Greek.

[70] Cf. Theophrastus, *ap.* Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.532.3–6 = 526.2–4 FHS&G, where we are told that strong anger prevents a man from acting with forethought; in a rage, he is, as it were, drunken with contentiousness and subject to impulse.

[71] In offering a résumé of my earlier work, Smith p. 62 attributes to me the following view: "In many situations, indeed in all where action is immediately required, wisdom is superfluous." This statement seems to me misleading, for to say that "wisdom is

in emotional response. The coward flees, and the courageous man stands his ground, because he believes it noble to do so.

If the above is clear, it should also be clear why Aristotle connects moral virtue with the goal of action and practical wisdom with the means to accomplish the goal (6.13 1145a4–6). He is thinking in terms of emotion and reasoning: i.e., goal directed emotional responses like anger and fright, and the deliberations that are occasioned by these emotions and determine how best to realize the goals involved in them. Aristotle's statement only becomes difficult when we dissociate emotion from thought or so emphasize the connection of emotion with pleasure and pain, that we obscure other elements: namely, the evaluations and goals that are part of emotions like anger and fright.[72] We need to keep in mind that emotional responses are not locked into the present: revenge and safety are typically goals that can only be realized at some future time. And we need to remember that the moral education of young people conveys principles concerning what is fine or noble: general directives which not only provide an orientation for one's life but also determine how one responds to particular situations.

In conclusion, I want to be clear that the early Peripatetics recognized the limitations of moral education. Acquiring principles and being trained to respond in accordance with these principles are, of course, important first steps toward moral perfection, but real excellence involves an independence that is not conveyed by training during youth. That training produces obedience to one's superiors: parents, rulers and the laws of the state. What is needed for perfection is an understanding of why these authorities offer certain directives and not others, and how the directives relate to each other and to human happiness. Such understanding is not easy to come by. It requires sound training in youth, considerable experience over many years and careful reflection on law and custom. Few will complete the process, but those who do will be transformed into autonomous moral agents. Aristotle makes the point in the *Politics*, when he describes the virtue of the good man—one who has acquired practical wisdom as well as moral

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superfluous" suggests that wisdom might be present: i.e., the deliberations of practical wisdom, might occur. But the sudden situation rules out any exercise of wisdom; there is only emotional response.

[72] I am responding here to A. Smith "Character and Intellect in Aristotle's *Ethics*," *Phronesis* 41 (1996) pp. 70–73, who contrasts being motivated by pleasure and pain with following reason. In many contexts, the contrast is unobjectionable; but it distorts the framework within which Aristotle sets out his view of moral virtue.

virtue—as "fit to rule" (3.4 1277a28) and "different in kind" (1277b17). So too Theophrastus tells us that practical wisdom gives the just man "his special form" (*ap*. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.142.10 = 449A.35). For both Peripatetics, the addition of wisdom to moral virtue works the same effect. The individual is freed from strict obedience to the directives of authority, because he can appreciate the limitations of such directives and recognize situations that call for exceptional behavior.[73]

[73] For fuller discussion see Fortenbaugh, "Theophrastus, fr. 534 FHS&G: On Assisting a Friend Contrary to the Law," *Synthesis Philosophica* 10 (1990) 463–465, reprinted in *Theophrastean Studies* (above, note 58) 156–158. Smith (above note 72) 64 misrepresents my view when he describes it as one which "implies that wisdom is ethically wholly otiose."

II

ETHICS

CHAPTER SEVEN

ARISTOTLE: EMOTION AND MORAL VIRTUE[1]

For Aristotle there is a sharp distinction between the role of moral virtue (*êthikê aretê*) and the role of practical wisdom (*phronêsis)* in guaranteeing good actions. Moral virtue, we are told, makes correct the goal, and practical wisdom makes correct the means to the goal (*EN* 1144a7–9). Moral virtue makes (the agent) do the end and practical wisdom makes (the agent) do the means to the end (*EN* 1145a5–6). Moral virtue guarantees the goal and so is distinguished from practical wisdom, which guarantees the means to achieve the goal. The goal of action is in some important way the peculiar concern of moral virtue and not of practical wisdom. In this paper I wish to make precise in what way the goal of action is the peculiar concern of moral virtue; I want to consider Aristotle's conception of moral virtue and to elucidate the distinct role of moral virtue in guaranteeing good action.

It should be noted straightway that many scholars[2] deny that the goal is the peculiar concern of moral virtue. According to these scholars, Aristotle does not restrict the role of practical wisdom to the determi-

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[1] A shorter version of this paper was read before the Director and Junior Fellows of the Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington, D.C in April, 1968. I am grateful to both the Director and to the Junior Fellows (especially Herwig Görgemanns) for their suggestions not only at the time the paper was read but also throughout the academic year 1967–1968.

[2] Scholarly debate concerning the roles of moral virtue and practical wisdom in guaranteeing a correct goal is not new. In the nineteenth century the debate was quite lively. Most influential among the champions of moral virtue was J. Walter, *Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft in der griechischen Philosophie* (Jena 1874). Walter won the assent of E. Zeller (*Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* 3, [Leipzig 1879] 2.2.653 with n. 3, 657) and through him had strong influence upon English as well as German scholars. At the beginning of this century, R. Loening, *Die Zurechnungslehre* (Jena 1903) opposed the view of Walter and emphasized the role of practical wisdom. Loening has had significant influence upon present day scholars, primarily through the work of D.J. Allan. See Allan, "Aristotle's Account of the Origin of Moral Principles," *Proceedings* of *the Eleventh International Congress* of *Philosophy* 12 (1953) 120–127, *The Philosophy of Aristotle* (London 1952) 180–182; R. Gauthier and J. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque* (Louvain 1959) 2.560, 577–578; R. Gauthier, *La Morale D'Aristote* (Paris 1963) 84–86, 93–95; T. Ando, *Aristotle's Theory of Practical Cognition* (Kyoto 1958) 284–300; I. Düring, *Aristotles* (Heidelberg 1966) 459–463; J.D. Monan, *Moral Knowledge and its Methodology in Aristotle* (Oxford 1968) 49–51. For an idea of how lively the debate remains see the exchange between P. Aubenque (*La Prudence chez Aristote* [Paris 1963] 118 n. 5; "La prudence aristotélicienne porte-t-elle sur la fin ou sur les moyens?" *REG* 58

nation of means. While Aristotle does say that practical wisdom makes correct the means to achieve the goal, he never says that practical wisdom is concerned exclusively with the means. For practical wisdom is also concerned with the goal; it guarantees that the goal be correctly apprehended. Moral virtue, these scholars argue, does not determine what the goal is, but merely guarantees that the agent desires the goal once it has been correctly apprehended by practical wisdom. Inasmuch as we desire something because we think it to be good, the goal must first be thought of as something good and then desired. Practical wisdom guarantees the correctness of thought and moral virtue guarantees that desire follow upon thought. In making a man desire the goal already apprehended by practical wisdom, moral virtue renders the goal effective. It converts the goal from a simple object of thought to an object of intention and action. Moral virtue, then, is important for human action, but it does not determine the goal of action.

There is much to be said for this interpretation. A man desires a goal because he has in some way thought of it. Desire presupposes some kind of cognition. But even if this is admitted, it does not follow that the operation of moral virtue always presupposes the operation of practical wisdom. Such a consequence would follow only if cognition is always the concern of practical wisdom and never the concern of moral virtue. But, as I hope to show, this is not the case. Moral virtue is concerned with certain kinds of cognition and so may be concerned with the apprehension of the goal. What scholars must do is to consider carefully the area of control assigned by Aristotle to moral virtue. For Aristotle (*EN* 1105b19–1106a13), moral virtue is a perfection according to which man is well disposed with regard to emotions (*pathê*);[3] moral virtue is concerned with emotions and actions (*EN* 1104b13–14, 1106b24–

[1965] 40–51) and Gauthier (in his review of Aubenque, *La Prudence* in *REG* 56 [1963] 266–267). For a rather thorough survey of the scholarly debate see Gauthier and Jolif, *L'Éthique* 2.563–578. It is primarily the view of Loening, as championed by Allan, that concerns me in this paper and that I hope to correct or supplement by pointing out an important way in which moral virtue is especially responsible for a correct assessment of the particular situation and a correct goal of action.

[3] There is, of course, a general usage of *pathos* such that all psychic phenomenon may come under the label of *pathos*. See *De An.* 430a3, 409b15 and R.D. Hicks, *Aristotle,* De Anima (Cambridge 1907) 177, 198, 474. It is not with *pathê* in this wide sense that moral virtue is concerned but rather with that class of psychic phenomena which Plato had distinguished from itches and tickles, hungers and thirsts (*Phil.* 47E1–2) and which Aristotle distinguished from *dynameis* and *hexeis* and explained by means of an illustrative enumeration (*EN* 1105b21–23).

25, 1109b30). It would seem, then, that an adequate understanding of moral virtue and its role in guaranteeing morally good action demands an inspection of Aristotle's conception of emotion. If Aristotle held that emotions are simply sensations (bodily or mental) or impulses in conjunction with sensations, then it would seem that moral virtue has a very limited role in guaranteeing good conduct. But if Aristotle conceived of emotion as a complex phenomenon involving factual and evaluative judgment, then the role of moral virtue may be diverse and important. It may be moral virtue that guarantees a correct perception of the particular situation and a correct apprehension of the goal of action.

In the following pages I hope to show that the second possibility is correct: moral virtue does play an important role in guaranteeing morally good action. My argument will fall into three parts. In the first part, I shall investigate emotional response (that is, the province of moral virtue) and argue that Aristotle included both cognition and goal-directed behavior within his conception of emotions such as anger and fear. In the second part, I shall argue that since the sphere of moral virtue is not restricted to sensations and impulses, there is an intelligible way in which Aristotle can refer the goal to moral virtue and the means to practical wisdom. Finally, in the third part I shall suggest that an important reason for scholarly confusion has been a failure to distinguish adequately between the bipartite or moral psychology employed in ethical discussion and the scientific psychology set forth in the *De Anima*. The former psychology is based upon a dichotomy between emotional response and reasoned consideration and it is this dichotomy that governs the relationship of moral virtue to practical wisdom.

I

Let us begin by turning to the *Rhetoric* and Aristotle's account of anger.[4] Consider the opening statement (1378a30-b2) concerning anger:

[4] The account of emotion given in the *Rhetoric* should not be passed off as a superficial treatment lacking in philosophical interest. It is not only helpful in reaching an understanding of Aristotle's conception of moral virtue, but also significant in that it provides an answer to Academic debate concerning the relation of cognition and emotional response. On the Academic debate and the *Rhetoric*'s position in regard to this debate, see my article "Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions," *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970) 40–70; reprinted in *Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric*, ed.

> Let anger be a desire for revenge accompanied by pain on account of an apparent slight to oneself or to one's own, the slight being unjustified. If this is anger, it is necessary that the angry man always be angry at some individual, like Cleon, but not man in general, and that he be angry because the individual has done or was going to do something to him or his own, and that all anger be accompanied by some pleasure, namely that pleasure which stems from hope of revenge.

The necessity (1378a33) involved here is logical necessity. Aristotle so conceives of anger that it necessarily is directed toward an individual, necessarily involves the belief that one has been wronged by an individual, and necessarily involves the pleasure that attends expectation of revenge. Aristotle's conception of anger is such that it makes no sense to talk of being angry at no one in particular. Anger is always (1378a33) directed toward an individual. This is an essential mark of anger and so is used by Aristotle to distinguish anger from enmity and hatred. "Anger is always concerned with individuals like Callias and Socrates, but hatred is also directed against classes" (1382a5–6). The distinction between anger and hatred is logical and illustrates the fact that Aristotle's conception of anger involves an individual as object. This is an important point. For if anger is conceived of merely as a feeling or sensation, it is difficult to understand how anger can be directed at an individual. Thoughts and beliefs have objects; sensations do not. We may suspect that Aristotle's conception of anger includes thoughts and beliefs about some individual, cognitions that give the emotion direction.

This suspicion seems to be justified. If Aristotle's conception of anger is such that it makes no sense to speak of being angry at no one in particular, it is also such that it makes no sense to talk of being angry about nothing. It is logically necessary that an angry man be angry because some individual has done or was going to do him or his own some unjustified outrage or insult. He must apprehend (see, hear, believe, imagine) some harm and he must evaluate it negatively, deem it an unjustified insult (1378a31-b1; 1379b11–12). He must be prepared to explain and defend his angry behavior by stating that some individual has treated him in an unjustified manner. There is, then, no anger that does not involve belief in the occurrence of unjustified harm or

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by K. Erickson, Metuchen: Scaredrow 1974, 205–234; and in *Articles on Aristotle*, ed. by J. Barnes *et al.*, London: Duckworth 1976, 4.133–153 = Chapter 1 in this volume. On the *Rhetoric*'s treatment of anger see P. Aubenque, "La définition aristotélicienne de la colère," *Revue Philosophique* 147 (1957) 300–317.

outrage. Aristotle makes this point when he argues that so long as men think that they suffer justly, there is no anger. "For they do not think that they suffer in an unjustified manner; and anger, as we have seen, is this" (1380b17–18). In other words, an essential part of being angry is apprehending some harm and negatively evaluating it, deeming it unjustified.[5]

According to Aristotle, an angered man always thinks himself treated unjustly. But this is not all there is to being angry. An angered man also has a goal for which he acts. When a man becomes angry, he does not remain idly absorbed in thoughts of outrage. Rather he manifests his negative assessment in seeking revenge. Aristotle includes revenge in his definition of anger (1378a30, cf. *De An.* 403a25-b2)[6] and even asserts that where there appears to be no possibility of revenge, there is no anger (1370b13–15, 1378b3–4). For Aristotle, then, being angry involves having revenge for a goal; anger regularly involves a specific kind of goal-directed behavior that expresses the agent's evaluation of the particular situation.

The preceding emphasis upon factual apprehension, evaluation, and goal-directed behavior is not intended to rule out that for Aristotle some sort of feeling or sensation may be a regular feature of anger. The occurrence of pain is mentioned in the definition of anger (1378a30) and is one of the marks by which anger is distinguished from hatred

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[5] In arguing that factual apprehension and evaluation are essential characteristics of anger as conceived of by Aristotle, I do not want to suggest that Aristotle looked upon these characteristics as separate acts. It would be false to suggest that Aristotle thought an angered man must first make a factual judgment ("Something has happened." "I'm harmed in some way."), and subsequently make an evaluative judgment ("What has happened is wrong." "I'm outraged."). Aristotle's account seems to recognize that a man may judge all at once that he has been unjustifiedly harmed. There is one judgment, though it can be analyzed into a factual and an evaluative component. For the distinction between fact and evaluation, see *EN* 1135b27–1136a1 where Aristotle points out that in acts due to anger the issue is not whether some act took place or did not take place, but whether or not it was just. For anger occurs on account of apparent injustice. (Cf. *Rhet.* 1417a8–12). When a man perceives something that he takes to be an unjustified insult, his factual perception frequently goes unchallenged. It is his assessment that is picked out and disputed. Cf. G. Teichmüller, *Aristotelische Forschungen* (Halle 1867; reprinted by Scientia Verlag: Aalen, 1964) 1.93, commented on below, n. 11.

[6] *Topics* 152a34-b3 entertains a possible objection to the definition of the angry man as one who strives for revenge on account of a conspicuous insult. The objection is that we are angry with our parents but do not strive for revenge. Although this objection is said to be persuasive, it is rejected because revenge need not be bodily harm but may be simply anguish or repentance.

(1382a12–13, cf. 1380a36–b1). Moreover, anger is connected by Aristotle with bodily changes and these changes may be the physiological cause of certain painful feelings or sensations.[7] But if Aristotle's conception of anger involves some sort of feeling, it also involves apprehension, evaluation, and goal-directed behavior, which for the purposes of this paper are the important elements in Aristotle's conception of anger and emotion in general.

Consider the emotion of fear. Aristotle begins his discussion with a definition: "Let fear be a pain or disturbance on account of an appearance (*ek phantasias*) of future evil which is destructive or painful" (1382a21–22). According to this definition, fear involves some kind of appearance or apprehension, which is an essential part of being frightened and so mentioned in the definition. This involvement of apprehension in the definition of fear enables Aristotle to argue: "if this is fear, it is necessary that the fearsome be such as appears (*phainetai*) to possess great power to destroy or harm" (1382a27–29). The necessity is logical. For according to Aristotle (*Topics* 153b25–35, 136a27–34), if you know the definition of something, you also know the definition of related paronyms. In the case of inflexions and coordinates, definition necessarily (*Topics* 153b25) follows definition. If the definition of fear involves the apprehension or appearance of harm, it follows logically that the fearsome is that which appears harmful. And this interpretation seems to be supported by Aristotle's later assertion: "if fear is associated with the expectation of something destructive happening, clearly no one fears who thinks nothing can happen to him" (1382b29–31). Apparently Aristotle's conception of fear is such that a man cannot be afraid without thinking of some imminent danger; it simply makes no sense to speak of a man being afraid, but afraid of no particular danger. "It is (logically) necessary," says Aristotle (1382b33), "that those who fear think that something can happen to them."[8]

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[7] For Aristotle anger may regularly involve some kind of bodily sensation. At least Aristotle associates anger with a boiling of blood around the heart (*De An.* 403a31, cf. 408b8) and speaks of bodily tensions appropriate to anger (*De An.* 403a21–22). But the sensation of a throbbing or swollen chest is not all there is to being angry. Indeed, from an ethical standpoint, it is the least important part of being angry. What primarily concerns the student of ethics is the involvement of apprehension, assessment, and goal-directed behavior in anger and other emotional responses.

[8] In the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1115a9) Aristotle notes that "men define fear as expectation of evil" (*prosdokian kakou*). According to this definition, fear is essentially the apprehension (opinion, belief) that some evil will happen.

If a particular kind of factual judgment is an essential feature of fear as conceived of by Aristotle, so also is evaluation. A frightened man not only thinks his situation dangerous, but also assesses it negatively. And as in the case of anger so in the case of fear this negative evaluation is manifested in goal-directed behavior. A frightened man has safety for his goal. He sees personal danger and in seeking safety through flight or preparation expresses his negative evaluation. A man who does not desire safety and so is not disposed to act for safety is simply not afraid. According to Aristotle (1382b3–4), a fearful man is necessarily engaged in some kind of preparation leading to safety. And if there is no hope of safety, and so no preparation, there can be no fear. "For fear makes men deliberate, but no one deliberates concerning the hopeless" (*Rhet.* 1383a6–8). Fear, then, involves safety as a goal and is the occasion for some kind of goal-directed behavior, either flight or preparation to meet the danger.

Once again it must be noted that this emphasis upon factual apprehension, evaluation, and goal-directed behavior is not intended to deny that Aristotle attached some importance to feeling or sensation. Aristotle's definition of fear states that fear is a pain or disturbance (*tarachê*) (1382a21), so that some kind of feeling may be a mark of fear.[9] Still, Aristotle makes no attempt to differentiate fear from anger by distinguishing between different kinds of painful sensations. His analysis suggests that the frightened man may experience some disturbing sensation but is not regularly aware of a specific kind of sensation that would be sufficient to differentiate fear from anger and other emotions. Fear, then, is not simply a feeling. It also involves a particular kind of cognition and a particular kind of goal-directed behavior, which serve to mark off this emotion from other kinds of emotional response.

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[9] Just as anger may regularly involve some kind of bodily sensation (see above, n. 7), so fear may involve bodily sensations. For when a man becomes frightened, the region around his heart becomes turbulent (*De An.* 408b8, 432b31–433a1), his temperature drops (*Rhet.* 1389b32), and his complexion becomes pale (*EN* 1128b13–14). Such physiological disturbances may give rise to painful sensations and so explain in part why Aristotle defines fear as a pain or disturbance (*Rhet.* 1382a21). But such bodily feelings are not the whole story. When a man is frightened, he is not only disturbed by a turbulence around the heart but also disturbed *that* danger is imminent. He perceives or imagines some imminent evil that is either destructive or painful (*Rhet.* 1382a22) and is prepared to explain his fear by reference to this danger.

II

I have been arguing that Aristotle conceived of emotions such as anger and fear as complex phenomena involving factual apprehension, evaluation, and goal-directed behavior. Emotional response (that is, the sphere of moral virtue) is not exhausted by sensation and impulse but includes cognition and goal-directed behavior. It would seem, then, that moral virtue cannot be restricted to sensations and impulses. This is, I think, confirmed by the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Consider the moral virtue, courage. This virtue is a mean disposition in respect to fear (1115a6–7), which men define as an expectation of evil (1115a9). In connection with courage, this popular definition does not altogether satisfy Aristotle. It is too wide for Aristotle, who proceeds to restrict the evil to imminent death in war (1115a34–35). What Aristotle does not find fault with is the popular definition's mention of expectation. Whether in the wide, popular sense or in the restricted sense appropriate to courage, fear involves expectation and expectation is the apprehension (belief, opinion, imagination) that something will happen. Courage, then, involves thought, a correct judgment about imminent danger or death. When correct judgment is lacking, so too is courage. The man who faces danger but does not foresee (1116b35) the danger, who endures in ignorance (1117a23) of the situation, is not a courageous man. To be courageous danger must be properly apprehended, so that the courageous man is among other things the man who properly sees the situation.[10]

Not only must the courageous man apprehend the situation correctly, he must evaluate it correctly. For if a man correctly apprehends personal danger but misevaluates the danger, he is not courageous. Indeed, correct apprehension is important primarily insofar as it enables the courageous man to evaluate correctly. If a man does not correctly see the magnitude of an imminent danger, then he cannot correctly evaluate the danger. But it is possible and quite common for a man to see clearly the danger and to misevaluate it. Proper evaluation is all-important. It is guaranteed by moral virtue and acquired by moral training. Men become courageous, we are told, by habitual training to

[10] On this point, the *Eudemian Ethics* is also clear. The moral virtue courage is said to make a man judge correctly, so that the courageous man does not act through ignorance (1230a29–32). In contrast, cowards and rash men are mistaken on account of their disposition. To the coward things not fearsome seem fearsome, while to the rash man fearsome things seem safe (1229b22–25).

despise and to endure the fearsome (1104b1–2). Men learn to despise, which is to evaluate negatively, and to endure, which is to express their evaluation in behavior. The learning process is a matter of habituation and leads to the acquisition of courage, which once acquired enables a man to endure fearsome situations (1104b2–3). Courage is a habituated perfection in respect to fear, which, like all emotions, involves evaluation. Because of the moral virtue courage, a man despises and endures death in battle; he expresses in his behavior a proper evaluation of the situation.

The courageous man, Aristotle tells us (1115b11–20), will fear, but he will fear and endure what he ought and as he ought. He will not make any one of a number of mistakes: fearing what he ought not to fear, as he ought not, when he ought not, and the like (1115b15–16). The courageous man is a good judge of the situation and his fear is reasonable because his apprehensions and evaluations are correct. He does not mistake something safe for something dangerous. He does not make a factual mistake and so fear what he ought not to fear, when it should be perfectly obvious to anyone in his position that his situation is not dangerous. Nor does he misevaluate the situation, correctly perceiving danger but becoming excessively afraid. He does not flee when he ought to endure. His behavior is always as it ought to be. It is reasonable because it is explained and justified by the situation that has been correctly apprehended.

The good-tempered man is like the courageous man in being able to apprehend and to evaluate correctly. Good temper is a perfected disposition in respect to anger; and anger involves the apprehension and evaluation that some unjustified insult has occurred (1135b27–1136a1). The good-tempered man, then, is the man that apprehends and evaluates correctly and so becomes angry on the grounds he ought, at whom he ought, as he ought, when and for as long as he ought (1125b31–32, 1126b5–6). In contrast, men that lack a perfected disposition make mistakes in apprehension and evaluation. Apathetic men who do not become angry on grounds that ought to arouse anger are considered fools (1261a4–5). For they do not seem to perceive[11] nor to be pained,

[11] It may be that the usage of *aisthanesthai* at 1126a6 is ambiguous. Since this verb can be used to signify both making a judgment and having sensations, and since both judgment and bodily sensation (see above, n. 7) are part of being angry, it may be thought that the precise meaning of *aisthanesthai* at 1126a6 is open to doubt. Still, I agree with Teichmüller (above, n. 5) 1.93 who comments on this passage and says that the man may have perfectly good eyesight. What he lacks is a *moralische Empfindung*. He

and not being angry they do not seem to defend themselves (1126a6–7). Apathetic men fail on proper occasions to retaliate and so fail to engage in that kind of goal-directed behavior that would express a correct apprehension and evaluation of the situation. By their inaction they appear foolish.

I have been arguing that moral virtue guarantees the whole emotion and in particular guarantees correct apprehension and evaluation. It guarantees that a man be afraid or angry when he ought, on the grounds that he ought, and toward whom he ought (1106b21–23). I want now to consider a passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which, I think, not only supports my general thesis but also, when related to certain passages in the *Rhetoric*, goes a long way toward explaining Aristotle's distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom. This passage (1117a17–22) comes in the Nicomachean discussion of courage and runs as follows:

> Wherefore it is the mark of an even more courageous man to be fearless and undisturbed in sudden alarm than in foreseen dangers. For his response was more the result of an established disposition, since it was less on account of preparation. For a man might choose foreseen dangers on account of calculation and reason, but sudden dangers in accordance with his disposition.

In this passage Aristotle distinguishes between actions that result from an established disposition (*hexis*) and actions that result from calculation (*logismos*) and reason (*logos*). Many persons of no virtue will perform a courageous action, if calculation indicates success and safety. But when confronted with sudden danger, a man must act without the advantage of calculation and reason. He does not have time to deliberate and so must act in accordance with his disposition. If he is a courageous man, his action will be courageous action. If he is a coward, his action will be cowardly.

This distinction between actions resulting from an established disposition and actions resulting from calculation is, I think, important

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perceives the word or action directed towards him but does not judge that the word or action constitutes an insult. Here a word of caution may be in order. This failure to assess properly the particular situation and so to respond angrily is a moral failure common among persons lacking in moral virtue. It should not be connected with a *phronetische Wahrnehmung* whose virtue is *phronêsis* or practical wisdom (cf. Teichmüller, *Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe* [Gotha 1879] 3.247–248). Anger is an emotion and so the province of moral virtue. At times of emotional response correct assessment is ensured by moral virtue and not by practical wisdom.

and a distinction which greatly impressed Aristotle. In the *Rhetoric*, it is introduced to help mark the difference between the character of youth and the character of old age. Young men, we are told, prefer noble acts to advantageous acts. "For they live more by character (*êthos*) than by calculation (*logismos*). And calculation concerns the advantageous, but virtuous character concerns the noble" (1389a33–35).[12] When young men are properly educated (1389a29), they acquire a virtuous character in accordance with which they act. In contrast, old men live for the advantageous and not for the noble (1389b36–37); "they live more according to calculation than according to character. For whereas calculation concerns the advantageous, character concerns virtue" (1390a15–17). Having seen much that is evil and having been frustrated in numerous ambitions, the older man has abandoned the life of noble action and lives by calculating his own advantage.

There is, then, a distinction between actions resulting from disposition or character and actions resulting from calculation. But it would be false to assume that character and calculation must always lead to quite different kinds of actions. According to the *Rhetoric* (1390a28-b1), men in the prime of life enjoy a character midway between the character of youths and the character of old men. They live neither for the noble alone nor for the advantageous alone. Rather they guide their lives by both the noble and the advantageous and so avoid the extremes of youth and old age. In their actions, the noble and the advantageous find a proper balance.

We have here, I think, an important model for understanding the morally perfect man. Noble character and calculative ability are for Aristotle distinct. Yet in the man who has been properly educated and who is in the prime of life, character and calculation strike a balance and complement one another. So also in the morally perfect man, moral virtue and practical wisdom are distinct and yet complementary. Both are necessary but neither sufficient to guarantee at all times proper action. A man of character lacking calculative ability is not perfect. Like a strong body without eyesight, he stumbles and fails to achieve his noble goal (1144b10–13). He has a kind of natural virtue

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[12] Cope (*Aristotle's* Rhetoric [Cambridge 1877] 2.147) notes the way in which 1389a33–35 distinguishes sharply between calculation and virtue and argues that this passage "is in direct contradiction to the doctrines of the *Ethics*." Cope is, I think, wrong. The distinction between calculation and moral virtue or between calculation perfected by practical wisdom and emotion perfected by moral virtue is a fundamental doctrine of the *Ethics*.

(1144b3, 16) but lacks the perfection brought about by a union of good character and calculative ability. Similarly, a man of ability in calculation but lacking in good character is not perfect. His calculations are misdirected and so mere exhibitions of cleverness (1144a23–27). But when a man enjoys both good character and calculative ability, then he is perfect and is said to possess both moral virtue and practical wisdom. Confronted by personal danger he endures because he possesses good character or moral virtue. If the situation permits calculation concerning preparations to meet the danger, he deliberates well because he possesses practical wisdom. But if the danger is sudden so that there is no time for calculation and the exercise of practical wisdom, then he acts from character (*apo hexeôs* 1117a19–20) and endures because he is courageous.

My point may be further developed by recalling the account of fear given in the *Rhetoric*. Fear, as we have seen, involves the thought of danger and a negative evaluation regularly expressed in a certain kind of goal-directed behavior. The man who is afraid seeks safety so that part of being afraid is to have safety as a goal. The emotion of fear involves a goal and so, according to the *Rhetoric* (1383a7), "makes men deliberate," makes them engage in preparation to meet the danger (1382b3–4). By involving a goal the emotion of fear is the occasion for deliberation or calculation. And this point can be extended to other emotions.[13] Anger, for example, has revenge as a goal. It is the occasion for deliberation concerning the means to revenge oneself. Part of being angry is to want revenge and this is the occasion for calculation and deliberation concerning the way to achieve revenge.

Emotions, then, involve goals and occasion deliberation concerning the realization of the goal. And since emotions depend upon character, it would seem to follow that the goals involved in emotions depend upon character. A man's emotional response to a particular situation is determined by his character, so that his goal is ultimately determined by his character. A man with good character or moral virtue will

[13] I am not saying "all" other emotions. Some emotions such as shame and indignation may not have a characteristic goal. But emotions like fear and anger do involve goals and it is these emotions which, I think, influenced Aristotle's thought concerning character and calculation, moral virtue and practical wisdom. On emotions such as shame and indignation that do not necessarily involve goal-directed behavior and on dispositions that are not primarily concerned with goal-directed behavior see my article, "Aristotle and the Questionable Mean-Dispositions," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 99 (1968) 203–231 = Chapter 8 in this volume.

properly apprehend and evaluate a situation and so have a proper goal. A man with bad character will misapprehend or misevaluate a situation and so fail to have a proper goal. This is precisely Aristotle's point when he asserts in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1144a8, 1145a5) that moral virtue makes the goal correct. Moral virtue guarantees the goal, because it guarantees emotional response. A good-tempered man will want revenge on the right occasion, but not on the wrong occasion. He will properly evaluate the situation and so have a goal that is justified by the situation. What moral virtue does not do is guarantee the correctness of calculations occasioned by emotion. Rather, it is practical wisdom that guarantees calculations concerning the means to realize the goal (1144a8–9, 1145a5–6). Without practical wisdom, virtuous men would be like imprudent youths acting without calculation for noble ends. They would lack the perfection that results from the union of moral virtue with practical wisdom.

I have argued that emotions involve goals that occasion calculation, and that moral virtue guarantees the correctness of the goal involved in emotion and practical wisdom guarantees the correctness of the calculation occasioned by emotion. This argument may be developed and clarified by focusing upon the difference between a man of established character who becomes, say, angry and so desires revenge and a man lacking established character who likewise becomes angry and desires revenge. The man of established character is responding as he always does. Any time he finds himself in a similar situation, he responds the same way, he becomes angry and seeks revenge. In contrast, the man who lacks an established character does not respond in the same manner to similar situations. On one occasion he becomes angry and seeks revenge, but on another occasion he submits to indignity. His emotional responses are not consistent. Aristotle marks this difference by saying that the man of established character chooses (*proaireisthai*) revenge, while the man lacking established character does not choose revenge. Both have revenge as their goal, but only the man of established character is said to choose revenge. He has an established preference to become angry and to seek revenge in all situations of the same kind.

Moral virtue is one kind of established character. The morally virtuous man has an established disposition and so is said not only to become angry and to desire revenge but also to choose revenge. Whenever outraged, he always chooses (*Rhet.* 1382b1–2, cf. 1367b24–27) revenge and if asked to explain his emotional response, he will say that in all such situations revenge is good, noble, what one ought to do.

His many similar responses on this and other occasions testify to the fact that he regards revenge in such situations as something good or noble in itself. He is said to choose revenge and to choose it for its own sake (1105a32, 1144a18–20). And this involvement of choice in this emotional response distinguishes the virtuous man from the man that lacks an established disposition. This latter man becomes angry without choice (1106a2). He lacks a preference always to seek revenge on such occasions and so cannot be said to regard revenge in such situations as something noble or good in itself.

Moral virtue makes for choice (*proairetikê* 1106b36). It is choice or, more cautiously, not without choice (1106a3–4). Moral virtue guarantees the correctness of a man's choice—not the choice of means to achieve some previously determined goal, but the choice of this particular goal as an instance of a general goal. It is in this sense that choice is associated with moral virtue and contrasted with calculation and practical wisdom. This point can be substantiated by considering a passage from the *Rhetoric* (1417a24–28) in which Aristotle advises the appearance of speaking from character and choice.

> Do not seem to speak from thought (*dianoias*) as men now do, but from choice (*proaireseôs*). Say, for example, "I wished this. Indeed, I *chose* this. But if I gained nothing, still this is better." For the one way of speaking is the mark of a practically wise man (*phronimou*), the other way is the mark of a good man (*agathou*). The practically wise man is involved in pursuing the advantageous, but the good man in pursuing the noble.

Here Aristotle draws a distinction between the good man and the man of practical wisdom. The good man chooses and chooses noble action without considering his own advantage. His choice reveals his character, his established preference for certain kinds of action (cf. 1417a17–19). He is typified by the courageous man who chooses to face danger whether or not time permits reflection concerning the best means to meet the danger. Confronted by sudden alarms he chooses[14] to endure on account of his established disposition. It is his character to prefer endurance on all such occasions, so that he chooses this act of endurance as an instance of noble action. In contrast, the man of practical wisdom excels in calculation. He considers whether or not he has

[14] *Proeloito* is understood in 1117a22. See the translations of Gauthier and Jolif [above, n. 2] 1.81 and of A.E. Wardman (*The Philosophy of Aristotle*, ed. R. Bambrough [New York 1963] 331). Being courageous involves choosing endurance for its own sake. Hence Aristotle's remark at 1117a4–5: "acquiring choice and purpose, spirit becomes courage."

the necessary equipment to meet successfully the danger. And if his deliberations reveal more than one means to achieve his end, he considers which means is best. He is, then, a deliberator, a man who endures danger after calculation.

Good character and excellence in calculation are not, of course, incompatible attributes. Morally perfect men enjoy both good character and deliberative ability. In the *Ethics* (1144a23-b17) Aristotle is even prepared to argue that moral virtue and practical wisdom cannot be acquired independently of each other. Yet the two attributes remain distinct. Moral virtue ensures the correctness of emotional response; it ensures, for example, that a man responds angrily and seeks revenge on the proper occasions. Practical wisdom ensures the correctness of deliberation. When revenge is not immediately obtainable and means are sought to achieve revenge, then practical wisdom comes into play. Instead of attempting revenge in a foolish manner, the practically wise man considers the alternative means and decides upon the best and most advantageous means. These means-end deliberations are dependent upon the emotion of anger insofar as they presuppose the goal involved in being angry. But if they are in this way dependent upon and related to emotional response, they should not be confused with emotional response. Emotion and deliberation are for Aristotle distinct, and so are their perfections. At times of emotional response moral virtue makes correct the goal; practical wisdom makes correct subsequent means-end deliberation (1144a7–9, 1145a5–6, cf. 1144a31–36).[15]

[15] A caveat is in order. While the calculations of practical wisdom leading to action are for the most part technical deliberations concerning means and so lacking in independent moral significance, it would be wrong to assume that practical wisdom is altogether void of independent moral significance. When there are several means to achieve a goal, practical wisdom may have to decide between the means on moral grounds. It may have to determine not only the easiest way but also the morally best way (1112b16–17). Moreover, it is practical wisdom that enables philosophers and politicians to reflect on the good for man and to legislate correctly. Philosophical and political debate concerning goals is not emotional response and so does not fall within the sphere of moral virtue. Whenever an individual establishes a goal by induction or by dialectical examination he is engaged in a kind of reasoned deliberation whose virtue is practical wisdom. Similarly, when a man reflects upon his emotional responses, when he "steps back" and asks whether or not he should be angry and should be seeking revenge, he is engaging in a kind of reasoned reflection whose virtue is practical wisdom. He reasons with himself and may decide that his emotional response is unreasonable and his goal unjustified. But the majority of emotional responses are not attended by this kind of reasoned reflection. A man simply sees his situation in a particular way and responds. He acts intelligently (in accordance with his perception and assessment of the situation) but not deliberately (as a result of reasoned reflection

III

In the preceding section I have argued that Aristotle makes a clear distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom, and that he makes this distinction because he recognizes a fundamental difference between emotion and calculation. Moral virtue is a perfection in regard to emotional response including the cognitions and goal-directed behavior that are parts of emotional response. Practical wisdom is a perfection in regard to calculation and in general practical deliberation. Its province is large and important, but it does not include emotional response. To support this thesis I want to show now where I think scholarly debate has in the past run into trouble. I want to make clearer why I do not follow Loening, Allan, Gauthier and Ando in assigning all evaluation to practical wisdom, in saying that whenever a morally perfect man acts in a virtuous manner his practical wisdom is in play. My reason for not accepting this thesis is that it assumes too great a correspondence between the scientific psychology presented in the *De Anima* and the bipartite or moral psychology employed in the ethical and political treatises. Loening believed that the scientific distinction between intellect (*nous*), which only humans possess, and the lower faculties that all animals possess coincides with the ethical distinction between a logical and an alogical soul and therefore used the scientific distinction to establish the roles of moral virtue and practical wisdom. Intellect or, more exactly, practical intellect is, according to Loening, the sphere of practical wisdom, while impulse or motive force (*orexis*) together with sensation (*aisthêsis*) and imagination (*phantasia*) is the sphere of moral virtue. Since all judgment rests with intellect, apprehension of the goal and assessment of the situation must belong to practical wisdom. Cognition is not within the province of moral virtue, so that moral virtue alone can never be responsible for an intelligent and virtuous action.[16]

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and deliberation). In this case, correct action is guaranteed by moral virtue and not by practical wisdom. For the man's action is an emotional response, which is the province of moral virtue.

[16] Loening (above, n. 2) was, of course, fully conscious of his own method. He states that he cannot simply assume agreement between scientific psychology and moral psychology; he must show that the ethical distinction between practical wisdom and moral virtue coincides with distinctions drawn by the scientific psychology (38). See further the programmatic remarks on pages 67–68 and note how he twice (18, 28) begins an account of the role of practical reason (*die praktische Vernunft*) by considering passages in the *De Anima*.

Loening's use of the scientific psychology has not gone unnoticed. It has been commented upon and approved of by Allan,[17] who subsequently advanced a similar thesis in his own book on Aristotle.[18] Walsh, in turn, has observed and approved of Allan's use of the scientific psychology,[19] while Ando[20] has argued at length that the bipartite theory of the soul is compatible with the multipartite theory of the *De Anima*. Tacitly following Loening, Ando divides the faculties of the *De Anima* into three groups: first, nutrition and reproduction; second, sensation, imagination, desire and movement; third, reason. Nutrition and reproduction are not related to reason and are of little interest to ethics. Sensation, imagination, desire and movement are of interest to ethics and are said to be the domain of moral virtue. Reason is said to be the thinking part of the soul and practical reason the domain of practical wisdom. Since all thought and judgment are assigned by the scientific psychology to reason, it would seem to follow that correct judgment and assessment must be guaranteed by a perfection of reason, namely practical wisdom.

If Loening and other scholars are correct in grouping together sensation, imagination, and motive force as the sphere of moral virtue, then these scholars are correct in withholding judgment from moral virtue. But are they correct? I think not. In the first place, there is one passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that seems to tell against a neat correspondence between the scientific and moral psychologies. This passage is 1097b33–1098a5. Here Aristotle introduces the divisions of the scientific psychology in an effort to pin down the peculiar function of man. First he rules out the nutritive life and then the sensitive life (1097b33–1098a3). He is left with an active life of the rational element. At this point he introduces the dichotomy of moral psychology. Within the intellectual faculty of the scientific psychology, he distinguishes between that which is obedient to *logos* and that which has *logos* and engages

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17 "Aristotle's Account" (above, n. 2) 122–123.

18 *The Philosophy* (above, n. 2) 75–78, 180–182.

19 *Aristotle's Conception of Moral Weakness* (New York 1963) 132, cf. 83.

20 *Aristotle's Structure* (above, n. 2) 91–92, 99–101, 137–138. It should be noted that the view advanced by these scholars including Loening was in a way anticipated by Burnet (*The Ethics of Aristotle* [London 1900] 63–65). According to Burnet, Aristotle used his dialectical method to bring out the existence of the higher part of the irrational soul, what in his own scientific psychology is called the sentient and appetitive soul. For Burnet the irrational soul of ethical theory may be identified with the sentient soul of scientific psychology.

in reasoning (1098a4–5). Loening[21] was troubled by this passage and called it a contradiction. According to Loening, the sphere of *êthos* and the obedient element of the soul is *aisthêsis* together with *phantasia* and *orexis*. In other words, the dichotomy of bipartition is thought to coincide with the scientific division between sensation, imagination, and motive force on the one hand and intellect on the other. But in this passage of the *Ethics* the dichotomy of bipartition clearly does not coincide with the scientific division. The dichotomy of bipartition recognizes a division within the intellectual faculty of scientific psychology; the alogical soul of moral psychology overlaps upon the intellectual faculty. This is quite intelligible once it is recognized that emotion belongs to the alogical soul and emotion involves cognition. The alogical soul involves certain kinds of cognitions and so cannot be wholly separated from the scientific faculty of intellect. The joints of the moral and scientific psychologies (that is, the dividing points between the logical and alogical soul and between the intellect and other faculties possessed by all animals) cannot be neatly aligned, and to force alignment is to encourage confusions.[22]

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[21] *Zurechnungslehre* 92, n. 17.

[22] It should be noted that *EN* 1098a4–5 has been called (most recently by Gauthier and Jolif, *L'Éthique* 2.56–57) a gloss based upon *EN* 1103a1–3. The usage of *epipeithes*, a *hapax*, may lend some strength to this judgment, but it is not a sufficient reason for doubting the genuineness of the passage. The suggestion (Gauthier and Jolif 2.57) that an interpolator wanted to insert a reference to the distinction in Book 10 between a life of contemplation and a life of virtuous activity seems unacceptable. For the distinction drawn in 1098a4–5 is not a distinction between *phronêsis* and *sophia* (that is, a distinction within the logical soul) but rather a distinction between the obedient or alogical soul and the logical soul. Better is the remark of H.H. Joachim (*Aristotle*, The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. D.A. Rees [Oxford 1955] 51): "If the words of 1098a4–5 are genuine, they must be read as a note to show that impulse (*orexis, to orektikon*) is not forgotten. That, too, is a *logon echon*, a rational power, though in a different sense from the power in the soul which itself actually thinks." Joachim is certainly correct that the passage is intended (by Aristotle or by an interpolator) to introduce and so not to forget that part of the soul that may be considered either logical or alogical (1102b13–1103a10). But Joachim errs, I think, when he dissociates this alogical faculty from actual thinking. For in dissociating the alogical soul from actual thinking, Joachim is tacitly following Loening. He is making the dichotomy of bipartition fit the divisions of the scientific psychology. This endeavor is, I think, misguided. Loening saw quite clearly that the scientific psychology grouped together sensation, imagination, and impulse (*De An.* 413b22–23, 414b1–2, 433b28–29). They occur together in animals (concerning the possession of imagination by all animals Aristotle is hesitant. See *De An.* 414b16, 415a10–11, 428a8–10, 21–24, 413a11–12, 433b31–434a7 and D.W. Hamlyn, *Aristotle's* De Anima [Oxford 1968] 89, 93, 130–132, 153) and so are together distinguished from thought and intellect, which belong only to man, and anything else that is similar or superior to man (414b18). Aware of this scientific division of faculties and convinced that the scientific

Once this is understood we can understand more clearly why Aristotle largely ignores emotion[23] and *êthos*[24] in the psychological writings. The sphere of *êthos* and moral virtue (*êthikê aretê*) is emotional response including assessment. It, therefore, cuts across the division of faculties advanced in the psychological writings. While the *De Anima* distinguishes thought and reasoning from sensation, imagination and

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division conforms with the dichotomy of bipartition, Loening understandably grouped together sensation, imagination, and desire as the province of *êthos* and the alogical soul. But this leaves unexplained why the alogical soul is distinguished from the sensitive soul of the scientific psychology (1098a2–3) and included within *to logon echon* (1098a3–5). Of course, we can postulate a careless interpolator and so avoid the problem by declaring corruption. But such a move is not necessary. The passage may be accepted as genuine and given its proper weight, once it is recognized that bipartition does not coincide with the scientific psychology. Aristotle has been concerned with the function of man and in an effort to pin down this function he has introduced three different kinds of life: the nutritive life, the sensitive life, the active life of reason (1097b22–1098a4). These three lives quite clearly relate to the scientific psychology. Yet in the *Ethics* as a whole Aristotle operates with a bipartite psychology. The reader or listener may reasonably expect some indication of how bipartition relates to the scientific psychology. This is especially true, if there is no simple coincidence between the two psychologies, if the dichotomy of bipartition does not coincide with a division in the scientific psychology. We have here, then, a brief indication (two lines, 1098a4–5, which might be a footnote in a modern work) how the dichotomy of bipartition is to be related to the scientific psychology. The relationship is not simple. The dichotomy of bipartition falls within the scientific psychology's faculty of reason.

23 Hamlyn (above, n. 22) xii–xiii correctly observes that the *De Anima* all but ignores the subject of emotions and that for Aristotle's treatment of emotion one must turn to the second book of the *Rhetoric*. I would suggest that part of the reason why the *De Anima* generally ignores emotion is that emotion cannot be assigned to a particular faculty of the scientific psychology. Emotion is a complex phenomenon involving sensation and feeling, desire, and cognition. Its components cannot be confined to the sensitive and motive faculties. Emotions like anger and fear involve cognition and so involve the scientific psychology's faculty of thought or intellect. When a man is frightened he necessarily thinks that danger threatens. For example, he thinks or judges that the enemy approaches (*De An.* 431b6). As Hicks (*Aristotle*, De Anima [Cambridge 1907] 539, following Simplicius 274.10) correctly points out, such a judgment belongs to *nous praktikos*. Of course, Aristotle does allow that a kind of quasi (*hoion, De An.* 431a9) assertion may be attributed to the sense faculty. (The feminine participle at 431a9 makes clear that the subject is *aisthêsis.)* But the *aisthêtikon* does not really formulate a proposition. It is *nous* alone that can formulate a proposition, make an assertion that can be true or false. (See *De An.* 430a26-b6 and Hicks 527–528.) Whenever a man thinks himself threatened and is prepared to say whether rightly or wrongly that danger is imminent, then his intellectual faculty is in play. For a man to be frightened he must think that he can suffer something (*Rhet.* 1382b33) and so be exercising the scientific psychology's faculty of intellect.

24 It seems to me that Loening came close to giving away his case when he argued that *êthos* is not an ethical but rather a purely psychological concept, even though the psychological writings make no mention of it (*Zurechnungslehre* 104). Loening explained

impulse, the bipartite psychology of ethics distinguishes deliberation and reflection from emotional response. This ethical dichotomy does not group together all thought and judgment. Deliberation and calculation quite clearly involve judgment and assessment, but so also does emotional response. For this reason Aristotle can say in a straightforward manner that moral virtue makes a man critical, a good judge of the particular situation. Loening[25] and Ando[26] are wrong to suggest that the mere occurrence of the verb *krinein* introduces practical wisdom.

A word of caution may be necessary. Although the dichotomy of bipartition is different from the scientific psychology, it does not follow that this dichotomy is incompatible with the scientific psychology.[27] The bipartite psychology and the scientific psychology can coexist and can be translated into one another. Consider, for example, the more courageous man who responds to sudden danger more on account of his character (*hexis*) than on account of preparation. His action is attributed to an established disposition in respect to the emotion of fear and contrasts with action resulting from calculation (*logismos*) and reason (*logos*). Employing the dichotomy of bipartition, Aristotle describes the more courageous man as one who acts out of character, not out of calculation (1117a17–22). This description can easily be translated into the scientific psychology. When the more courageous man is confronted with danger, intellect correctly sees the situation as a danger to be endured. Impulse is aroused and the man is moved straightway to endure (cf. *MA* 701a28–32). Employing the scientific psychology, Aristotle would

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this silence of the psychological writings by arguing that *êthos* is always an individual disposition in respect to sensation and the motive force and is therefore not introduced into the psychological writings which consider only the general and not the particular (106–107).

[25] *Die Zurechnungslehre* 54.

[26] *Aristotle's Theory* 288.

[27] I certainly do not want to suggest that bipartition is an early psychology which Aristotle employed when writing his ethical treatises and subsequently abandoned when he wrote the *De Anima* and developed his own scientific psychology. In particular, I would not follow F. Nuyens (*L'Évolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote* [Louvain: Éditions de l'Institut Superieur de Philosophie, 1948]) who claimed to have discovered three chronological stages in Aristotle's psychology and assigned bipartition to the second stage and the *De Anima* to the third. In general, I agree with D. Rees ("Theories of the Soul in the Early Aristotle," in *Aristotle and Plato in The Mid-Fourth Century* [Goteborg 1960] 191–200), who argues against a chronological explanation of different theories of the soul and suggests that bipartition should be viewed as a moral psychology that is never replaced in ethical theory. For a survey of the literature see my "Recent Scholarship on the Psychology of Aristotle," *Classical World* 60 (1967) 318–320.

say that intellect judges the situation while impulse moves the man to action. In the case of a morally virtuous man, the judgment is right and so is the impulse that moves the man to act upon his judgment. Following the account of locomotion given in the *De Anima* 3.9–11, we shall say that the more courageous man is correct in both thought and impulse.[28]

The dichotomy of bipartition and the scientific psychology are compatible. Aristotle could accept both and move back and forth from one to the other without contradiction. Still it is important to understand that bipartition is different from the scientific psychology. The latter is a faculty psychology that is tied to a scale of life. The former is not a faculty psychology[29] and is not well suited to deal with all forms of life. It is primarily a human psychology[30] based upon the fact that we describe

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[28] We may consider one more example. In the *Ethics* Aristotle says that moral virtue makes the goal correct and practical wisdom makes the means correct (1144a7–9, 1145a5–6). Within the framework of bipartite psychology this assertion is readily intelligible. Persons with good character (that is, persons who enjoy a perfection of the alogical soul) respond properly to particular situations: they become angry and desire revenge on the right occasions or they become frightened and desire safety on the right occasions. Their emotional responses are correct, so that Aristotle can speak of moral virtue making correct the goal. What moral virtue does not make correct is the deliberations occasioned by emotions such as anger and fear (cf. *Rhet.* 1383a6–7). These deliberations belong to the logical soul of moral psychology and are said to be made correct by practical wisdom. There is no difficulty in converting these remarks into the scientific psychology. All action involves both practical intellect and motive force (433a18). A man acts for a goal because he has thought of or imagined it (433b12). His thought takes the form of a rational mental image (433b29, 434a7) which arouses the motive force and so moves a man to act for the goal. When a man is virtuous, practical intellect conceives of a correct goal and the motive force is properly aroused by the rational mental image. If immediate action is not called for, the virtuous man may deliberate about means to achieve the goal. Practical intellect comes back into play. Again employing rational images, intellect considers and decides between alternative courses of action (434a7–10). And when one means has been selected by intellect, impulse moves the agent to take the means selected. In terms of the scientific psychology, all action involves both intellect and motive force, and good action requires perfection of both these faculties.

[29] At least it is not a faculty psychology in the same sense that the scientific psychology is a faculty psychology. In the scientific psychology each faculty is defined by its performance and the performance by its correlative object. For the performance is logically prior to the faculty and the object to the performance (413b29–32, 415a16–22, cf. Plato, *Rep.* 477C6–D5). This method of distinguishing faculties is inapplicable to bipartition. The moral dichotomy between an alogical and logical soul does not depend upon a difference in objects but rather upon a difference in kinds of human behavior—namely, the difference between emotional response and reasoned deliberation.

[30] Cf. P. Moraux, *Le Dialogue "Sur la Justice,"* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1957) 44, 47. Failure to keep in mind that bipartition is a *human* psychology has

and classify human behavior in terms of emotional response and reasoned deliberation. The dichotomy of bipartition was not a philosopher's invention. Rather it was a kind of popular distinction present in the speech of ordinary men and in the writings of tragedy.[31] It remained for Plato's Academy to focus upon this dichotomy and to introduce it into ethical and political discussion. We can see it guiding the discus-

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created, I think, unnecessary difficulties. See, for example, O. Gigon ("Die Sklaverei bei Aristoteles," in *La Politique d' Aristote* [Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1965] 247–283) who queries how slaves can be classified as men and finds Aristotle's remark at *Politics* 1260a10–13 "altogether puzzling." What does it mean, he asks (266), that a slave possesses the *logikon* but in no way the *bouleutikon?* It seems to me that there is no real difficulty, if the scientific psychology is distinguished adequately from the moral psychology. A slave has speech, can form propositions and so make judgments and assessments. He meets the minimum standard required by the scientific psychology of any creature that is to be classified as a man. (See 1253a9–18.) Nevertheless, the cognitive abilities of a slave have very definite limits. He lacks altogether the ability to deliberate (1260a12). Here the moral psychology is in play. Like every man a slave has emotions—that is, he makes assessments upon which he acts (*to alogon*). But unlike other men he cannot deliberate (*to logon echon*) and so is well advised to remain in the service of a more gifted master who can plan ahead and determine an effective course of action (1252a30–34).

[31] For bipartition as a popular psychology, see Hicks (above, n. 23) 300, 550; Ross, *Aristotle,* De Anima (Oxford 1961) 312; Hamlyn, (above, n. 22) 151; Walsh (above, n. 19) 74; Burnet (above, n. 20) 63–65; M. Pohlenz, *Griechische Freiheit* (Heidelberg 1955) 69–77; H. Görgemanns, *Beiträge zur Interpretation von Platons Nomoi = Zetemata* 25 (München 1960) 122–123, 142, 155. By "popular" I wish only to emphasize that the dichotomy of bipartition was not a philosophical discovery, except in so far as philosophical theory gave formal recognition to a distinction already present in ordinary discourse. There can be no doubt that bipartition as a theory was encouraged by a general awareness of moral conflict and weakness. Pohlenz, for example, emphasized conflict between emotion and reason and says that Euripides (*Medea, Hippolytus*) was not alone in his view of psychic conflicts; *er befindet sich in vollem Einklang mit dem Volksempfinden* (73). Medea's monologue and the contrast drawn between *thymos* (1056, 1079) and *bouleumata* (1044, 1048, 1079) are well known and much discussed in the literature. Less discussed and of equal interest for our purposes are the early portions of the *Medea.* Throughout these portions the fact of Medea's emotional condition is distinguished from the question of how she can revenge herself. At the play's opening the nurse tells us that Medea perceives herself dishonored (26, cf. 20) and so is filled with hate and grief (16, 24–35). Neither Medea's emotional state nor the grounds for the emotional state are in doubt. It is Medea's plans or deliberations (*bouleuein* 37) that are in doubt and that especially worry the nurse. Here, I think, we have the dichotomy or moral psychology. Medea hates Jason because she has been treated unjustly (311, 314). Thinking herself wronged she is angered and desires revenge (163–165). But her angry desire for revenge cannot be fulfilled straightway. She must deliberate (37, 317, 372) about how to achieve revenge; she must find some way and means (260) to carry out her angry intention. Here anger is the occasion for deliberation, which is an intelligent (cognitive) activity. But it must be emphasized that the anger preceding and occasioning deliberation is also intelligent, for it involves the perception (26) of injustice. A fuller discussion of

sion in Plato's *Laws*[32] and fully formulated in Aristotle's own writings. At no time was this dichotomy drawing a distinction between cognition on the one hand and sensation, imagination, and impulse or the other. Rather the dichotomy was in origin and remained primarily a distinction between kinds of human action—that is, two kinds of intelligent (or cognitive) behavior. Of course, emotional responses may be unreasonable, but this does not mean that they lack a cognitive component. It only means that the cognitions involved are erroneous or unjustified.

The dichotomy of moral psychology enables us to classify behavior in two fundamental ways: emotional and deliberate. These two ways admit further analysis, which is the task of the scientific psychology. But without further analysis, the dichotomy between emotion and deliberation is useful for describing human actions. Indeed, it is useful just because it does not involve excessive division; it does not oppose cognition and thought to motive force, sensation, and imagination. Excluding blind impulses and reactions to stimuli, all human action involves some cognition, so that no division between different kinds of actions

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the *Medea* in relation to Aristotle's bipartitie psychology will be found in "On the Antecedents of Aristotle's Bipartite Psychology," *GRBS* 11 (1970) 233–241 = Part I of Chapter 7 in this volume.

[32] On the development of bipartition within Plato's Academy—especially the transition from tripartion to bipartition—see my article referred to above, n. 4 = Chapter 1 in this volume, pp. 32–37. In the *Laws* as a whole (with qualification concerning 863b1–4), Plato seems to have dropped his tripartite psychology in favor of dichotomy or bipartition. See D. Rees, "Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy," *JHS* 77(1957) 115–116. It may be helpful to single out *Laws* 644C–645C for comment. Here the Athenian stranger undertakes a brief discussion of human motivation. This discussion offers a kind of bipartite psychology. On the one hand we have pleasure and pain and also the expectation of pleasure and pain or more specifically rashness and fear (644C6–D1). On the other hand we have *logismos* or reasoned deliberation (644D1–3). This dichotomy is illustrated by means of a puppet image. Pleasure and pain, rashness and fear are likened to hard iron strings and contrast with reasoning which is likened to a golden string (644D7–645C6). How are we to construe this passage of the *Laws?* One way (Görgemanns [above, n. 31] 119–129, cf. 137–142) is to explain pleasure and pain, rashness and fear as impulses and to oppose these impulses to thought. This way we get a dichotomy between thrusts (*Triebe* 120, 122, 127, 137, 155) and cognition—all judgment and opinion being assigned to the latter member of the dichotomy. Such an explanation is, I think, misleading. The iron strings do not represent blind impulses lacking a cognitive component. In the lines immediately preceding the puppet image, Plato makes this clear by calling fear and rashness beliefs (*doxas* 644C9, cf. *EN* 1115a9) about what will happen. Fear and rashness, two central or paradigm cases of emotional response, are here identified with beliefs. To be sure, fear, rashness, and similar emotions involve more than belief, but it is well to emphasize that these emotions involve belief, lest we think of them as mere impulses and so misconstrue the dichotomy of moral psychology.

will coincide with a division between cognition and motive force. For all action, including emotional response, involves cognition. In fact, it is the judgments and assessments involved in different emotional responses that are frequently decisive in distinguishing one kind of emotion from another.[33] To describe human behavior we want a dichotomy between kinds of intelligent behavior, and it is this dichotomy which is found in popular speech when men distinguish between emotional and deliberate action and which is given formal recognition in the bipartite psychology of Aristotle's moral and political treatises. It is this dichotomy which underlies Aristotle's distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom and which renders intelligible those passages in which moral virtue is assigned a cognitive role and connected with the goal of action.

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33 Indignation, envy, and fear are all connected by Aristotle with painful disturbance or agitation (*lupê tarachôdês, tarachê* 1386b18, 23). But Aristotle does not try to distinguish between these emotions by picking out some difference in sense impression. Instead he distinguishes between these emotions in terms of different kinds of cognition. The pain of envy is marked by the thought of a successful peer, the pain of indignation by the thought of unmerited success, and the pain of fear by the thought of imminent danger. As far as sensations are concerned there may be no discernible difference between these three emotions. As Aristotle points out, the pain of envy or indignation becomes the pain of fear whenever a man comes to realize that another man's success constitutes a threat to his safety (1386b16–24). It is a change in thought or belief, not a change in sense experience, which determines a change in emotion.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ARISTOTLE AND THE QUESTIONABLE MEAN-DISPOSITIONS

It is well known that the *Eudemian Ethics*, the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and the *Magna Moralia* differ in their treatment of the so-called questionable or controversial[1] mean-dispositions. While the *Eudemian Ethics* groups together righteous indignation, shame or modesty, friendliness, dignity, truthfulness, and wittiness as emotional mean-dispositions (*pathêtikai mesotêtes*), which are without choice (*proairesis*) and so are not moral virtues (1233b16–18, 1234a23–25), the *Nicomachean Ethics* does not withhold choice from friendliness, truthfulness, and wittiness, but rather treats these dispositions as moral virtues concerned with human relations in speech and action (1108a11, 1126b11–12, 1127a20, 24, 1128b5–6). The *Magna Moralia* differs from both the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* in leaving the issue open. It affirms that these controversial dispositions are praiseworthy mean-dispositions but postpones decision concerning whether or not they are moral virtues (1193a36–38).[2] The three ethical treatises, therefore, differ from one another in their treatment of the questionable mean-dispositions. This difference in treatment has already been the subject of considerable comment[3] and has already been related to various views concerning the chronologi-

[1] N.B. Bibliographical abbreviations are given below, n. 3. H. v. Arnim (*Topik* 89) speaks of the *sechs fragliche* mean-dispositions. F. Dirlmeier (*Eudemische* 350) refers to the *kontroverse Mitten*.

[2] R. Walzer (198) thinks that *MM* 1193a36–37, "whether these are virtues or not virtues," concerns all the mean-dispositions as far back as *praotês* and not just the nearest six mean-dispositions. I agree with F. Dirlmeier (*Magna* 299) in so far as he opposes Walzer's view and argues that the expressed hesitation of the *Magna Moralia* concerns mean-dispositions only as far back as *nemesis* (1192b18). H. v. Arnim (*Die drei* 130–132) thinks that the transitional sentence at *MM* 1190b7 is genuine and that after this transitional sentence a section has fallen out which may have distinguished between the different kinds of mean-dispositions. Such a previous distinction would render intelligible the vague reference of 1193a36, even though the transition from moral virtues to praiseworthy dispositions at 1192b18 occurs without comment. For my own part, I think the *Magna Moralia* is later than the *Eudemian Ethics* (in this I differ from Arnim and Dirlmeier) and that the brevity of 1193a36–38 is possible because the author of the *Magna Moralia* assumes a knowledge of the Eudemian distinction between moral virtues and praiseworthy mean-dispositions.

[3] The following constitutes a selection and not all the literature on the questionable mean-dispositions. These works are cited in abbreviated form.

cal order of the ethical treatises.[4] There remains, however, a conceptual problem which is largely independent of chronological considerations and which has not, I think, received the attention it deserves.[5] This problem may be expressed in the form of a question: Does any one of the ethical treatises have the conceptual framework necessary for a sat-

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E. Zeller, *Aristotle and the Early Peripatetics* (New York 1962) 428–429, n. 1.
Sir Alexander Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London 1866) 2.84–94.
J.A. Stewart, *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford 1892) 1.352–372.
J. Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London 1900) 191–201.
H. v. Arnim, *Die drei aristotelischen Ethiken* (Wien 1924) 124–141; *Das Ethische in Aristoteles' Topik = SB Wien* 205.4 (1927) 76–94.
R. Walzer, *Magna Moralia und Aristotelische Ethik* (Berlin 1929) esp. 198, 211.
P. Wilpert, "Die Wahrhaftigkeit in der aristotelischen Ethik," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Gorresgesellschaft* 53 (1940) 324–338.
F. Dirlmeier, *Eudemische Ethik* (Berlin 1962) 349–365, esp. 349–351; *Aristoteles, Magna Moralia* (Berlin 1958) 298–310, esp. 298–302; *Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik* (Berlin 1960) 385–396; *Die Oikeiosis-Lehre Theophrasts* (Leipzig 1937) 40.
R. Gauthier and J. Jolif, *Aristote, L'Éthique à Nicomaque* (Louvain 1959) 2.304–324.
H.J. Kramer, *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles* (Heidelberg 1959) 173–177.

[4] The following scholars are representative of the different chronological views. Burnet (191) holds that both the *Eudemian Ethics* and the *Magna Moralia* are later than the *Nicomachean Ethics* and therefore speaks of the notion of moral virtue being narrowed and starved in the later treatises. Arnim and Dirlmeier hold that both the *Magna Moralia* and the *Eudemian Ethics* are earlier than the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Arnim and Dirlmeier differ in the following way. Arnim (*Topik* 90–94) thinks that the *Magna Moralia* expresses real doubt concerning the status of the six questionable mean-dispositions and that it is the *Eudemian Ethics* alone which decisively excludes them from the class of moral virtues. Dirlmeier (*Magna* 300–301) differs in thinking that *MM* 1193a36–38 expresses only apparent doubt and that the *Magna Moralia* and *Eudemian Ethics* agree in not classifying the questionable mean-dispositions as moral virtues. Walzer (210–211) thinks that the *Eudemian Ethics* is earlier and the *Magna Moralia* later than the *Nicomachean Ethics*. He sees the Nicomachean account as a refinement and deepening of the Eudemian position, while the *Magna Moralia* introduces a new emphasis in that moral virtue is based upon natural instinct. The six mean-dispositions which the *Eudemian Ethics* had labeled praiseworthy mean-dispositions become *aretê* simply by being joined to *logos*.

[5] This is not to say that the problem—whether or not Aristotle has a satisfactory conceptual framework for handling the questionable mean-dispositions—has been altogether ignored. It has not. In particular, I would refer to Dirlmeier (*Magna* 299–302, *Eudemische* 349–351), whose comments are penetrating and suggestive. Dirlmeier points out the difficulty in classifying indignation as a moral virtue (it does not seem to involve *proairesis*, which is the mark of moral virtue), and asks whether truthfulness and wittiness are plausibly said to be *pathê*. According to Dirlmeier, it is at present impossible to show why, when, and in what steps Aristotle came to doubt whether or not his conception of moral virtue was applicable to the questionable mean-dispositions. What we need first of all is an analysis of the Aristotelian *Pathos-Lehre*. Here I agree with Dirlmeier. In the course of this paper I will follow his lead and draw upon the *Rhetoric*'s account of emotion to elucidate Aristotle's conception of moral virtue and its relation to the questionable mean-dispositions.

isfactory treatment of the controversial mean-dispositions? More precisely, can friendliness, dignity, truthfulness, and wittiness be classified comfortably either as moral virtues involving choice—this is the position of the *Nichomachean Ethics*[6]—or as emotional mean-dispositions like righteous indignation and modesty—this is the position of the *Eudemian Ethics*. I suggest that neither alternative is altogether happy and that the hesitation of the *Magna Moralia* may be due in part at least to an awareness that neither classification is satisfactory. What is needed, I think, is a third classification, a recognition of "character-traits"[7] that do not involve choice and so are not moral virtues, and that are not directly related to emotions and so are not plausibly classified as emotional mean-dispositions.

Consider first the position of the *Eudemian Ethics*. Friendliness, dignity, truthfulness, and wittiness are grouped together with righteous indignation and modesty as emotional mean-dispositions (*pathêtikai mesotêtes*). Modesty and righteous indignation are clearly associated with emotion. A modest man feels embarrassed or ashamed (*aischynesthai*, *EN* 1128b13, 27, 30) if he does something wrong. Similarly a righteously indignant man feels indignation and is said to be pained (*lupeisthai, EE* 1233b24, *MM* 1192b22–23) at unmerited success and misfortune. The *Rhetoric*'s treatment of individual emotions includes discussions of both shame (*Rhet.* 1383b11–1385a15) and indignation (*Rhet.* 1386b8–1387b15) and even relates indignation to morally good character (*Rhet.* 1386b11–12). It is, therefore, not surprising to find the *Nichomachean Ethics* classifying modesty and righteous indignation as "mean-dispositions in the

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[6] The *Nicomachean Ethics* does not treat dignity; but with this qualification it is true to say that the *Nicomachean Ethics* classifies these questionable mean-dispositions as moral virtues involving choice.

[7] I have borrowed the label "traits of character" or "character-traits" from R.S. Peters, *The Concept of Motivation* (London 1958) 5, 32; "More About Motives," *Mind* 76 (1967) 92, 95; and N. Rescher, "Value and the Explanation of Behavior," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 17 (1967) 133. In an earlier article ("Motives and Causes," *Aristotelian Society* Suppl. Vol. 26 [1952] 156) Peters uses the label "personality-traits." Whatever the label, we are concerned with dispositions that are exercised in pursuing a number of different goals in a particular sort of way. Character-traits, as these dispositions may be called, are not manifested in aiming at and choosing actions which either lead to or are instances of a particular goal, but rather in pursuing a variety of chosen goals in a particular way or manner. In the remainder of this paper I shall use the label "character-traits" to pick out this special class of dispositions. I shall speak of character-traits in the special sense pinned down by Peters and approved of by Rescher, not in the general sense in which G. Ryle (*The Concept of Mind* [New York 1961] 92) speaks of a motive as "a trait in someone's character." See below, n. 37.

emotions and concerned with the emotions" (*EN* 1108a31) and the *Eudemian Ethics* speaking of modesty and righteous indignation as emotional mean-dispositions (*EE* 1233b18). What is surprising is to find the *Eudemian Ethics* grouping the other four questionable mean-dispositions together with modesty and righteous indignation as emotional mean-dispositions. For friendliness, dignity, truthfulness, and wittiness do not seem to be directly associated with emotions in the same way that modesty and righteous indignation are related to emotions. They do not seem to be coordinated with particular *pathê* and so do not seem to fit the classification of *pathêtikai mesotêtes*.

There is, of course, a wide usage of *pathos* such that dispositions (*EN* 1145b5, *EE* 1221a13), and in general all psychic phenomena (*De An.* 430a3, 409b15), may be called *pathê*.[8] Construing *pathos* in this broad sense, we might argue that there is no real difficulty involved in grouping the four mean-dispositions—friendliness, dignity, truthfulness, and wittiness—together with modesty and righteous indignation. *Pathos*, we might argue, has a wide usage, so that there is no serious difficulty involved in referring to all six mean-dispositions as *pathêtikai mesotêtes* (*EE* 1233b18) and in speaking of each as a *pathos (EE* 1234a27). This argument has a certain philological appeal and it may rescue the *Eudemian Ethics* from linguistic difficulties. But it does not meet the primary difficulty involved in the Eudemian treatment of the six questionable mean-dispositions; it does nothing to remedy the fact that the *Eudemian Ethics* has obscured an important difference between kinds of mean-dispositions. By grouping friendliness, dignity, truthfulness, and wittiness together with modesty and righteous indignation, the *Eudemian Ethics* has failed to distinguish between dispositions which are and dispositions which are not directly related to an emotion. It has failed to pick out that class of mean-dispositions that are called *pathêtikai* not only because they are psychic phenomena but also and primarily because they are coordinated with particular emotions like shame and indignation.

It might be objected that I am assuming without justification a narrow and precise sense of *pathos* which the *Eudemian Ethics* could be expected to recognize and employ wherever relevant. My reply to this objection would be to point out that all three ethical treatises do employ *pathos* in a fairly well defined sense. All three ethical treatises agree

[8] On this wide usage of *pathos*, see Burnet 291; R.D. Hicks, *Aristotle*, De Anima (Cambridge 1907) 177, 198, 474.

in picking out three classes of psychic phenomena, *pathê*, *dynameis*, and *hexeis*, and in explaining *pathê* by an illustrative enumeration: appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly affection, hate, longing, emulation, pity, and generally that which is attended by pleasure or pain (*EN* 1105b21–23); anger, fear, hate, longing, emulation, pity, and such as is accustomed to be followed by pleasure or pain (*MM* 1186a12–14); spirit, fear, shame, desire, and generally that which in itself is usually accompanied by sensory pleasure or pain (*EE* 1220b12–14). While enumeration is not equivalent to precise definition, it must, I think, be admitted that all three treatises have a fairly clear idea of what belongs to this class of *pathê*. For the treatises are not setting forth some new classification of *pathê*, but rather employing a classification already developed in Plato's *Philebus* and refined in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.[9] The *Philebus*

[9] It is likely that Aristotle first developed his views on *pathê* in his *Diaireseis* and then incorporated these views, perhaps with revision and expansion, in the *Rhetoric*'s analysis of *pathê*. The treatment of *pathê* in the *Diaireseis* was probably not confined to a simple enumeration or table as given in *EE* 1220b38–1221a12, but was full enough to include short descriptions as given in *EE* 1221a15-b3 and *EN* 1107a28–1108b10. On the *Diaireseis* see Arnim, *Topik* 91–94, and Dirlmeier, *Eudemische* 242, 259, 356–357; *Magna* 300–302. That the *Rhetoric* contains a lengthy treatment of *pathê* is not surprising. By including an analysis of *pathê* within his rhetorical treatise, Aristotle is not only recognizing the importance of emotional appeal in actual rhetorical practice, but also following the lead of Plato (*Phaedrus* 271), who called upon the rhetorician to study the soul and its affections. See E.M. Cope, *Introduction to Aristotle's* Rhetoric (London 1867) 6; F. Solmsen, "Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings," CP 33 (1938) 394, 402–404; *Aristotle, Rhetoric and Poetics, The Modern Library* (New York 1954) xv–xvi; G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1963) 18, 79, 85, 95; I. Düring, *Aristoteles, Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens* (Heidelberg 1966) 141. It might be objected that the *Rhetoric* disclaims precision and does not offer rigorous definitions, that the analyses and definitions of individual *pathê* given in the *Rhetoric* cannot be pressed and cannot be used except with great caution to elucidate material in the ethical treatises. (See Cope 11–14, Düring 139–140, 144–145, 148–149). It is certainly true that the *Rhetoric* explicitly disclaims exactitude in analysis and definition (1359b2–8, 1360b7–8, 1366a32, b24, 1369b31–32). Moreover, in one important case (*hêdonê*, 1369b33–35) the *Rhetoric* offers a definition that is rejected by the *Nicomachean Ethics*. But it is, I think, unreasonable to conclude that all analyses and definitions given in the *Rhetoric* are simply popular and do not represent Aristotle's own (or mature) view. (See G. Lieberg, *Die Lehre von der Lust in der Ethiken des Aristoteles* = *Zetemata* 19 [München 1958] 23–27.) Rather we should pay attention to the *Rhetoric*'s assertion that its analyses and definitions are sufficient (1366b24, 1369b31) and appropriate to the occasion (1359b5, 1366b24). In the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, we should treat particular analyses as if they were seriously advanced by Aristotle and should use them (with caution, of course) to help elucidate material in the ethical treatises. Toward this end we are encouraged by the fact that the *Rhetoric* describes itself as an offshoot of ethics (1356a20–27, 1359b8–12) and agrees with the *Ethics* in seeking truth roughly and in outline (*EN* 1094b20). In respect to the treatment of individual *pathê*,

distinguishes three classes of mixed pleasures and pains: those which are altogether bodily such as itches and tickles (46D–E); those which belong to both body and soul such as the feelings of a hungry or thirsty man who expects satisfaction (47C–D); and those which belong entirely to the soul such as "anger and fear and longing and grief and desire and emulation and envy and the like" (47E1–2). Here *pathê* such as anger and fear are clearly distinguished from the pleasures and pains of bodily affection. Itches and tickles, hungers and thirsts are *pathê*, but they are quite distinct from *pathê* like anger and fear. For itches and tickles, hungers and thirsts are bodily; they have a physiological cause.[10] In contrast, anger and fear are not bodily but mental. They do not depend upon bodily afflictions but upon an assessment of the situation.

This last point concerning assessment may be made clearer by a consideration of the *Rhetoric*'s discussion of *pathê* "such as anger, pity, fear, and the like" (*Rhet.* 1378a21). "Concerning each emotion," Aristotle tells us (1378a22–24), "it is necessary to make a threefold division.

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the following points may be made: (1) When Aristotle describes rhetoric as an offshoot of ethics, he is thinking explicitly of his analysis of individual *pathê* (1356a23–27). (2) Far from thinking his treatment of *pathê* popular and generally inaccurate, Aristotle thinks it accurate enough to permit practical success (1378a24–26). (3) There is no reason to think Aristotle ever shelved this treatment of *pathê*. While Book 2 may have been written during Aristotle's residence in the Academy, the mention of Deiopeithes (1386a14) indicates that Aristotle was still using and adding to this section of the *Rhetoric* at least as late as 341 B.C. (Düring 120, 124). (4) The *De Anima* does not reject the *Rhetoric*'s analysis of anger. It merely (and predictably) suggests that this analysis does not go far enough. For after contrasting the natural philosopher's definition of anger with the dialectician's definition—and this latter definition may be identified with the *Rhetoric*'s definition (Cope 13, D.W. Hamlyn, *Aristotle's* De Anima [Oxford 1968] 80)—the *De Anima* goes on to suggest that neither definition is sufficient. A real *physikos* will construct his definition from both (403a24-b9). The definitions of individual *pathê* advanced in the *Rhetoric* are not, it seems, rejected. They are accepted and important, but need supplementing. We may, I think, quite properly use the *Rhetoric*'s analysis of *pathê* to get at Aristotle's conception of pathos and ultimately to elucidate Aristotle's ethical treatises. For a lengthy argument in favor of taking the *Rhetoric*'s analysis of *pathê* as a serious treatment that made important contributions to philosophical psychology, rhetorical theory, and ethical theory, see my article, "Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions," *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970) 40–70; reprinted in *Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric*, ed. by K. Erickson (Metuchen: Scarecrow 1974) 205–234; and in *Articles on Aristotle*, ed. by J. Barnes et al. (London: Duckworth 1976) 4.133–153 = Chapter 1 in this volume.

[10] The mixed pleasures and pains experienced by a hungry or thirsty man are, of course, not only bodily but also psychic or mental. Such a man expects to be filled, he thinks that he will be replenished, and therefore is pleased. Nevertheless, his condition necessarily involves bodily sensation, pangs of hunger or parched feelings of thirst, that have a physiological cause.

Take, for example, anger; it is necessary to distinguish how angry men are disposed, at whom they are accustomed to be angry, and on what sort of grounds." Using anger as an example, Aristotle announces that his discussion of individual *pathê* will consider the condition of emotional men, the object of their emotion, and the grounds or reasons for their emotion. This programmatic statement is important because it indicates that Aristotle does not look upon this group of *pathê* as mere sensations, bodily or mental. For sensations do not have objects and do not have grounds which explain and justify them. Like Plato, Aristotle sees an important difference between *pathê* such as tickles and itches, hungers and thirsts on the one hand, and *pathê* such as anger and fear on the other. We do not normally ask at whom a tickle or pang of hunger is directed. Similarly, we do not normally inquire about the grounds for a tickle or pang of hunger. Sensations such as tickles and pangs of hunger have causes[11] and are immediately experienced, but they are not directed at anything and are not explained and justified by grounds. With *pathê* such as anger and fear the case is different. They have objects and grounds, because they involve cognition. It is thoughts and beliefs, not sensations, which have objects and which provide grounds explaining and justifying *pathê* such as anger and fear.

Consider Aristotle's account of anger (*orgê*). This *pathos* is defined as "a desire for revenge accompanied by pain on account of an apparent slight to oneself or to one's own, the slight being unjustified" (*Rhet.* 1378a30–32). Having laid down this definition, Aristotle proceeds to draw certain necessary conclusions. "If this is anger," he says (*Rhet.* 1378a32-b1), "it is necessary that the angry man always be angry at some individual like Cleon but not man in general, and that he be angry because the individual has done or was going to do something to him or his own." Anger is necessarily (*Rhet.* 1378a33) directed toward an individual. Aristotle so conceives of anger that it is always (*Rhet.* 1378a33) directed toward a particular individual: being angry always involves being angry at someone. This insistence upon an object is unintelligible if anger is thought of as some kind of immediate sense experience similar to a tickling sensation or pang of hunger. It is intelligible if anger is so conceived that it involves cognition, the thought or belief that someone has committed an outrage. For Aristotle anger is by definition a desire for revenge on account of apparent insult (*Rhet.*

[11] For the causes of tickling sensations and pangs of hunger, see *PA* 673a7–10, *Pr.* 949b26–36, 965a18–32.

1378a31). An angry man necessarily thinks that some individual has done something to him (*Rhet.* 1378a32-b1) and has done it unjustly (*Rhet.* 1378a32,1379b11–12). He must believe that something has happened and deem it an unjustified outrage. Anger, therefore, involves both the factual perception of some event and the negative assessment of this event. And whenever such perception and assessment are absent, then anger cannot be present. Aristotle makes this point in respect to retribution. As long as men think that their own actions are unjust and that their suffering is just, then they do not become angry. "For they no longer think their suffering unmerited; and anger, as we have seen, is this" (*Rhet.* 1380b17–18). An essential part of anger is thinking oneself mistreated, so that anytime this thought is not present, anger cannot be present. By definition being angry involves the appearance of insult (1378a31), the judgment that outrage has occurred (cf. *Topics* 127b30–32).

Aristotle gives a similar account of the other individual *pathê*. They involve thoughts and beliefs which give them direction. Fear (*phobos*) involves by definition the appearance or thought of imminent danger (*Rhet.* 1382a21–22), so that a frightened man is always afraid of something. If a man does not think himself threatened by imminent danger, if he does not assess his situation negatively, then he is not frightened. On this point Aristotle is quite clear: "if fear is associated with the expectation of suffering something destructive, it is obvious that fear is not felt by persons who do not think anything can befall them. … It is, therefore, necessary that fear is felt by persons who think that they can suffer something, and that they fear those persons on account of whom and those things which and at those times when they think they can suffer" (*Rhet.* 1382b29–35). The obviousness (*Rhet.* 1382b30) and the necessity (*Rhet.* 1382b33) are logical. Aristotle so conceives of fear that it necessarily involves certain thoughts or beliefs, which give the emotion direction. Similarly, Aristotle conceives of shame (*aischynê*) in such a way that it involves both thought and object. Shame is defined as a pain or disturbance concerning present, past, or future evils which appear to bring discredit (*Rhet.* 1383b12–14). From this definition it is said to follow necessarily that a man is ashamed of those evils which are thought disgraceful either to oneself or to those for whom one cares (*Rhet.* 1383b16–18). Here again the necessity (*Rhet.* 1383b16) is logical. Aristotle conceives of shame in such a way that an ashamed person necessarily thinks of or imagines the occurrence of some evil. So much is shame the thought or imagination of something disgraceful that on one occasion Aristotle says simply that shame is *phantasia*

concerning disgrace (*Rhet.* 1384a22). Shame, then, always involves the thought or imagination of disgrace. And this thought or imagination gives shame direction, makes it intelligible why an ashamed man is said to be ashamed of something.

This regular involvement of cognition and objects serves to mark off *pathê* like anger, fear, and shame from *pathê* like tickles and pangs of hunger. It also serves to mark off these *pathê* from *pathê* like depression and other non-directed moods.[12] For a man can be and frequently is depressed without being depressed at anyone or anything and without having any grounds which serve to explain and justify his depression. He may simply have eaten or drunk too much the previous night and so feel low and depressed. His depression can be explained by reference to his intemperance, but such an explanation does not give grounds for, but rather the cause of, his depression. Indeed, the man need not remember that he ate or drank too much the previous night. He may have no idea why he feels depressed and yet be absolutely certain that he is depressed. Of course, sometimes a man can say why he is depressed. He may say that he is depressed because of a personal or business failure. Here his depression does involve thought and assessment and is explained by grounds. But this case of depression is no more central or standard than cases of depression that lack such cognitions and grounds. Depression and other similar *pathê* are not primarily distinguished by such cognitions and grounds and so are distinct from *pathê* like anger, fear, and shame that always have grounds and objects because they always involve an assessment of the situation.

After emphasizing the involvement of perception and assessment in anger, fear, shame, and other similar *pathê*, we should, I think, remind ourselves that these *pathê* are not simply forms of judgment. Aristotle

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[12] In addition to being in a depressed mood, men can be in a variety of other moods, such as a jovial mood, a frivolous mood, a sullen mood, or a bored mood. On moods in general see G. Ryle (above, n. 7) 98–104. Not every modern philosopher thinks that a mood like depression is non-directed or without an object. A. Kenny (*Action, Emotion and Will* [London 1963] 60–61) argues that cases of pointless depression are not without objects. When a man is depressed and things seem black for no particular reason, then the things that seem black are the object of depression. Kenny's argument is criticized by J. Gosling, "Emotion and Object," *The Philosophical Review* 74 (1965) 491–498. See also I. Thalberg, "Emotion and Thought," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 1 (1964) 46–47, 50, reprinted in *Philosophy of Mind*, ed. S. Hampshire (New York 1966) 204–206, 214, and J. Benson, "Emotion and Expression," *The Philosophical Review* 76 (1967) 350. For a humorous illustration of just how pointless depression can be, see *Peanuts*, October 7, 1968.

recognizes that fear and anger have a cognitive core, but he does not reduce them to this cognitive core. When men become emotional, they not only make judgments (*krinein*) but also are affected (*paschein*). Frequently this affection takes the form of bodily disturbance. Fear, for example, is defined as a pain or disturbance (*tarachê*) resulting from the appearance of imminent danger (*Rhet.* 1382a21–22). When a man perceives or imagines danger and becomes frightened, he is affected in various ways: the region around his heart becomes turbulent (*De An.* 432b31–433a1), there occurs a drop in the temperature of his body (*Rhet.* 1389b32), his complexion becomes pale (*EN* 1128b13–14). Similarly shame, indignation, and envy are all said to be some kind of disturbance (*tarachê*, *Rhet.* 1383b13, 1386b19, 23). When men become ashamed they not only think that they have done something disgraceful but also turn red (*EN* 1128b13). And when men become angry, they not only imagine themselves insulted but also suffer bodily disturbance such as a boiling of blood around the heart (*De An.* 403a31-b1, cf. 403a21–22). Moreover, emotions affect a man's reason and judgment. Angry men, for example, find it difficult to deliberate (*Pol.* 1312b25–34). They are overcome by the thought of outrage and become so angry that they cannot reflect or deliberate further. Indeed, it is for Aristotle a general principle that emotion affects judgment, that on account of emotion men so change as to differ in judgment (*Rhet.* 1378a19–20). The perceptions and assessments involved in emotion act on a man so as to disturb (further) judgment. A juror who sees the defendant as an outrageous individual will be angry at the defendant and will fail to see evidence relevant to a fair verdict. Likewise, a juror who deems the defendant an unworthy sufferer and feels pity for him will have his mind closed to damaging evidence. In general, the appraisal of an individual or situation as agreeable or disagreeable (that is, the assessment involved in emotion) clouds a man's mind so that he will overlook features relevant to a particular decision.

Our investigation has succeeded in picking out several features which characterize those *pathê* that are listed in the ethical treatises and discussed in the *Rhetoric*. There are, of course, differences between the members of this class of *pathê*. One of these differences, the involvement of intentional action, will be considered later. But we have, I think, discovered enough common features to form a fairly clear idea of what kind of *pathos* belongs to this class. It is the kind of *pathos* that involves a perception and assessment of the situation and so is characterized by an object and by grounds, and that affects a man both by bodily

disturbance and by clouding his judgment. Roughly speaking, it is the kind of pathos that in English we frequently call an emotion.[13] Tickles and pangs of hunger and also depression do not qualify as members of this class of *pathê*. Anger, fear, and shame do qualify. Pity, indignation, and emulation also belong to this class. But does the class include any *pathê* which can be plausibly assigned to the four controversial mean-dispositions: friendliness, dignity, truthfulness, and wittiness? For three of the four mean-dispositions I think the answer is negative.

Consider truthfulness (*alêtheia*).[14] Is there any emotion similar to anger or fear that can be plausibly assigned to this mean-disposition?[15] Apparently not. While we speak of good-tempered men "feeling" anger on the right occasions and courageous men "feeling" frightened when they ought to feel frightened, we do not normally speak of truthful men "feeling" anything at all. We do not correlate truthfulness with veracious feelings. We do not normally speak of veracious men as emotional, and we do not normally say that truthful men respond veraciously on the right occasions. Truthful men speak and act in a

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[13] The English word "emotion" has, of course, a variety of usages. Ryle ([above, n. 7] 83–115) has used emotion as an inclusive term to cover inclinations (motives), moods, agitations (commotions), and feelings. In contrast, E. Bedford ("Emotions," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 57 [1956–1957] 281–304, reprinted in *Essays in Philosophical Psychology*, ed. D. Gustafson [Garden City, N.Y. 1964] 77–98) has used "emotion" quite narrowly, emphasizing the cognitive core and largely disregarding the passive side. R.S. Peters ("Emotions and the Category of Passivity," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 62 [1961–1962] 117–134) has opposed Bedford's analysis and argued that we use "emotion" primarily to describe something which happens to man, an affection which comes over and (frequently) disturbs a man. For my own part, I think it quite natural to use "emotion" to signify the complex phenomenon of perception and assessment conjoined with bodily and mental affection. It is in this sense that I will continue to use "emotion" in the rest of the paper, and it is in this sense that I think the English term "emotion" is an adequate label for the class of *pathê* that is discussed in the *Rhetoric* and associated with moral virtue in the ethical treatises.

[14] The *Nicomachean Ethics* 1126b14 (1108a16–19) says that this mean-disposition lacks a name. But *EN* 1108a20 employs the label *alêtheia*. See also *EE* 1221a6, *MM* 1193a28, and P. Wilpert (325–326), who notes that the second book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* introduces names, including *alêtheia*, which are not known to the fourth book. Wilpert asks whether chronological conclusions can be drawn from this difference. He suggests that since the table in the *Eudemian Ethics* mentions *alêtheia* (1221a6), this label was already used by the Academy to signify the virtue of truthfulness. Dirlmeier (*Eudemische* 350, 357) thinks that *EN* 2.7 represents a middle period between the *Eudemian* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

[15] See Dirlmeier, *Eudemische* 351, and also Bedford ([above, n. 13] 294, reprint 90) who is probably influenced by the Nicomachean analysis when he says that the overlap between virtues and emotions is not complete and that veracity is not connected with an emotion.

particular way. While the boaster claims to possess more than he really does possess and the dissembler pretends to possess less, the truthful man will do (*poiêsei*, *MM* 1193a34)[16] neither of these things. He will claim neither more nor less than he really possesses. He will speak the truth, owning up to what he possesses and revealing what he knows. He is disposed to act and speak in an honest and straightforward manner; he is not disposed to respond emotionally, to feel veracious on the proper occasions.

Similarly, friendliness and dignity do not seem to be related to particular emotions. Friendliness (*philia*)[17] seems to be an especially clear case. None of the ethical treatises mentions a particular emotion.[18] The *Magna Moralia* connects friendliness with action and discourse (*MM* 1193a21) and the *Nicomachean Ethics* says that friendliness differs from friendship in that it involves no emotion or affection (*pathos*) for those with whom one associates. It is not because he loves or hates that a friendly man takes everything as he ought, but because he is the kind of

[16] Truthfulness is connected with action (*poiein*, *prattein*) and not with affection (*paschein*). Cf. EN 1126b24, 27, where truthfulness is related to life and discourse, speaking and acting. The failure of the *Magna Moralia* to mention an emotion in connection with truthfulness is, I think, especially indicative of the difficulty involved in finding a plausible emotion. The *Magna Moralia* shows a special interest in emotions. It criticizes Socrates for doing away with emotion and moral character (1182a22–23), explains virtue as a mean-disposition in respect to emotion (1186a33–34), and introduces the discussion of individual virtues with the statement that for each virtue the relevant emotion must be specified (1190b7–8 [This introductory remark may, of course, be the work of a later hand attempting to fill a lacuna. See above, n. 2]). But when the *Magna Moralia* comes to treat truthfulness it does not name an emotion. Even more striking is the failure to name an emotion at 1186a24–27. After explaining dispositions by reference to emotions and explaining a good or mean-disposition by reference to the particular emotion of anger (1186a16–24), the *Magna Moralia* introduces truthfulness to illustrate further the idea of a mean-disposition. But now no emotion is mentioned, unless pretending to possess more or less than one has is to be considered an emotion. But such pretensions do not seem to be emotions like anger and fear. They do not seem to depend on an assessment of the situation and do not seem to involve affection (*paschein*). Apparently the author of the *Magna Moralia* has lapsed. In a section which is concerned with moral virtue as a mean-disposition in respect to emotion (*MM* 1186a16–17, 33), he introduces truthfulness to illustrate the idea of a mean-disposition, overlooking or ignoring the fact that truthfulness is not tied to an emotion.

[17] The *Nicomachean Ethics* (1126b19–20) says that this mean-disposition has never been given a name, but it is especially like *philia*. Earlier, at 1107b28, the term *philia* is used after a warning that many of the social virtues lack a name (1107b17). See above, n. 14.

[18] The *Eudemian Ethics* 1233b31 mentions *epithymia*. But the *epithymia* belongs to the befriended party, not to the friendly man. Moreover, here *epithymia* does not denote a particular emotion. It is used quite generally for the desires and wishes of another man with whom one interacts socially.

man he is (*EN* 11226b19–25). Friendliness, then, is not connected with a particular emotion but is a mean-disposition according to which men act in a particular way, men put up with and refuse to put up with the right things in the right manner (*EN* 1126b18–19). Similarly, dignity (*semnotês*) does not appear to be associated with a particular emotion. The dignified man does, it is true, make conscious or unconscious assessments. Unlike the self-willed man who despises (*kataphronêtikos*, *EE* 1233b36) everyone, the dignified man treats people according to their merit. His behavior, therefore, involves assessment, which is one of the components of emotional response. But he does not seem to be affected in any particular way. When he acts he does not normally feel or suffer (*paschein*) anything. Rather he acts in a particular manner. In contrast with the obsequious man who consorts with everyone in every way and under every circumstance (*MM* 1192b34–35), the dignified man consorts with worthy persons in a dignified manner.[19]

While truthfulness, friendliness, and dignity do not seem to be closely related to particular emotions, wittiness (*eutrapelia*) does seem to be related to an emotion, namely the emotion of finding something funny. We may mark off this emotion from emotions such as fear and anger by calling it an aesthetic emotion,[20] and we may mark off the mean-

[19] It might be suggested that *semnotês* is to be connected with pluming and priding (*semnynesthai*, *MM* 1195b19) oneself on something. In English such persons are said to feel pride and sometimes are said to be blinded by pride. Feeling proud can affect a man's judgment. We might, therefore, postulate an emotion of feeling pride (*semnynesthai*). It would be like indignation and envy and unlike anger and fear in that it is not especially characterized by vigorous and goal-directed action. Still, this postulated emotion does not seem to be directly related to the mean-disposition of *semnotês*. The *semnos* does not so much feel pride properly as speak and act in a dignified manner. Obviously a man can speak and act in a dignified manner on a variety of occasions when it would be very odd to speak of feeling pride in the proper way. See *Rhetoric* 1408a10–19, where Aristotle distinguishes between language which is appropriate because it corresponds to its subject and language which is appropriate because it expresses emotion. Speaking in a dignified manner (*semnôs*, Rhet. 1408a13) belongs to the former category and is clearly distinguished from the language of anger, pity, and similar emotions.

[20] On finding something laughable as an aesthetic emotion, see D.H. Munro's article on "Humor" in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. P. Edwards (New York 1967) 90–93. Munro gives a brief but clear historical survey of the principal theories of humor. One of these theories, namely Hobbes' theory that we laugh because we feel superior (Hobbes defines the passion of laughter as "*sudden glory* arising from some sudden *conception* of some *eminency* in ourselves, by *comparison* with the *infirmity* of others, or with our own formerly," *Human Nature in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, ed. W. Molesworth [London 1840] 4.46), seems closely related to the emotion of a witty man. For, as we shall see, wittiness is educated insolence and insolence involves being

disposition of wittiness from mean-dispositions such as courage and good temper by calling it a social virtue,[21] but we can, nevertheless, relate wittiness to enjoying a joke in much the same way that we relate courage to fear and good temper to anger. Being witty is having a proper disposition toward the laughable (*geloion*) and in particular toward jeering abuse (*skômma* and its cognates, *EN* 1128a7, 14, 25, 30; *MM* 1193a12, 13, 14, 16, 18; *EE* 1234a16, 22). The witty man is characterized both by a readiness to enjoy a good joke, even when the joke is directed toward himself, and also by the ability to make a good joke (*EN* 1128a1, 18, b1; *MM* 1193a17–19; *EE* 1234a14–17). Insofar as the witty man responds properly to the laughable, wittiness is certainly to be connected with a particular emotion.[22] For in responding to the laughable, the witty man perceives a joke and is affected with laughter; he assesses positively a witty thrust and is more or less overcome with good humor.[23] But the relationship of wittiness to emotion is not confined to taking a joke. It also includes making seemly jokes. For Aristotle is primarily concerned with ordinary persons who enjoy poking fun at other people. He is especially concerned with people who find themselves funny, who assess their own remarks in a positive way and are affected by laughter at their own jokes. He is not

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pleased by the thought of one's own superiority (*Rhet.* 1389b11–12, 1378b23–28). We may also compare Alexander Bain, *The Emotions and the Will* (London 1859), who devotes a chapter to the "emotions of power" (145–162) and argues that feelings of superiority tend to involve outbursts of laughter (153, cf. 282). See further Plato (*Philebus* 48A–50B), who points out that men laugh at the ridiculous qualities of their friends, that men take malicious joy in the harmless defects of another. For general remarks on Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, and the comic, see J.W.H. Atkins (*Literary Criticism in Antiquity* [Cambridge 1934] 1.57, 101–102).

[21] Wittiness is frequently grouped together with truthfulness and friendliness as a social virtue concerned with one's deportment in society. See Grant 84, 86; Stewart 1.352–353; Dirlmeier, *Nikomachische* 385, *Eudemische* 350; Gauthier and Jolif 2.304; E.M. Cope, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle* (Cambridge 1877) 2.150; M.A. Grant, *The Ancient Rhetorical Theories of the Laughable* (Madison 1924) 26.

[22] In everyday English, it may or may not be odd to speak of laughing, and in general finding something funny, as an emotion—I leave the matter open—but philosophers do speak of laughter as an aesthetic emotion. Moreover, the issue with which we are concerned is whether finding something laughable enjoys the marks of emotional response and so qualifies as a *pathos* in the sense already explained. See now my remarks in the epilogue to the second edition of *Aristotle on Emotion* (London 2002) 120–126.

[23] Just as anger, fear, and similar emotions can affect a man against his "better judgment," so laughter can "get the better of" a man. See *EN* 1150b10–12 for the example of Xenophantus who tried to hold back his laughter but finally succumbed to loud guffaws.

concerned with professional comedians who can go through their act without being affected.[24] On the contrary, he is interested in ordinary men who enjoy both making and hearing jokes and who are apt to make the same kind of jokes that they enjoy hearing (*EN* 1128a28–29).[25]

A brief look at the *Rhetoric* will help to make more precise what kind of emotion may be associated with wittiness. At the end of the chapter on youthful character, the *Rhetoric* (1389b11–12) tells us that young persons are lovers of laughter and so lovers of wit (*phileutrapeloi*). For wittiness (*eutrapelia*) is educated insolence (*hybris*). This reference to educated insolence is important. It recalls the statement of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that the jesting of an educated man differs from that of an uneducated man (*EN* 1128a21–22)[26] and provides a clue for better understanding the kind of cognition which is especially involved in the emotion of a witty individual. Insolence, we have already been told (*Rhet.* 1378b14–15), is a kind of slighting. It is doing and saying things that cause shame to some other person, not in order that anything may happen to oneself or because anything has happened, but rather for the pleasure involved in doing and saying such things. And the cause of pleasure to insolent men is that they think themselves superior to others when they

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[24] Aristotle does recognize a class of *eutrapeloi* who are well versed in pleasant pastimes and so find favor with tyrants (*EN* 1176b13–16). Some of these *eutrapeloi* may come close to being professionals, but it seems likely that they remain ordinary persons insofar as they enjoy and laugh at their own jokes. Still, these "semi-pros" are not the persons with whom Aristotle is primarily concerned when he discusses the mean-disposition of wittiness. He is concerned with educated gentlemen who enjoy good-humored pokes and thrusts at one another. See *Rhet.* 1419b7–9, where it is said that irony better suits the gentleman than buffoonery, for the ironical man makes jokes to amuse himself in contrast with the buffoon who tries to please another. While the ethical treatises do not explicitly associate wittiness with irony and so do not draw this same distinction, the ethical treatises are in general agreement with the *Rhetoric* concerning a gentleman's independence. If wittiness is to be the virtue of an Athenian gentleman, it cannot be the disposition of a flunky at court whose position depends upon the favor of a superior. On *Rhet.* 1419b7–9 see M.A. Grant (above, n. 21) 28–29.

[25] Dirlmeier (*Eudemische* 351) asks: "Und wem wäre sofort plausibel, das die Aufrichtigkeit ein pathos ist oder gar die Gewandtheit, wo doch die Intelligenzleistung im Vordergrund zu stehen scheint?" Dirlmeier is certainly correct to emphasize the intellectual or cognitive side of wittiness (*Gewandtheit*), but this does not show that wittiness is not a *pathos*, or more precisely a mean-disposition in respect to a *pathos*. On the contrary we have seen that the *pathê* in question all involve cognition as well as affection or disturbance. Finding something funny seems to satisfy both criteria, and therefore qualifies as a *pathos* to which wittiness can be related.

[26] Gauthier and Jolif 2.317.

treat them poorly (*Rhet.* 1378b23–28).[27] In other words, insolent men are delighted because they deem their position to be one of superiority, and witty men enjoy themselves because they are insolent. Of course their insolence is not crude; it is educated so that they do not abuse and make fun of other persons in an unseemly way. But with this qualification concerning seemliness, it is correct to say that the witty man delights in superiority. Poking fun at another person, he sees himself as a superior individual and expresses his delight in smiles and laughter. He also laughs at the thrusts and jabs of another person because he is educated. He has learned to appreciate the one-upmanship of other gentlemen. Instead of feeling ashamed or angry when he is the victim of a clever barb, he laughs out of sympathy with the triumphant party. Unlike the boor who becomes angered whenever he is the object of a jest (*MM* 1193a13–15), the witty individual appreciates the success of the other party and smiles or laughs or in some other way expresses his delight.

Wittiness, it seems, can be associated with an emotion. So long as wittiness is primarily associated with jeering abuse, it seems that wittiness, like modesty and righteous indignation, is properly described as an emotional mean-disposition (*EE* 1233b18). But it should be noticed that this is a considerable restriction upon the sphere of *eutrapelia*. Thucydides (2.41.1) conceived of *eutrapelia* very widely when he made Pericles say that each Athenian could with grace and versatility (*eutrapelôs)* show himself self-sufficient in the most varied kinds of activity. Isocrates (*Antidosis* 296), restricted *eutrapelia* to the sphere of discourse, but still conceived of it quite generally when he argued that Athens had become the school of able orators for a number of reasons, including Athenian versatility (*eutrapelia*) and love of letters. Construed quite generally, *eutrapelia* is a kind of versatility or dexterity (*epidexiotês, EN* 1128a17, cf. 33) that includes, but is not restricted to, jeers and jests. It is necessary wherever people interact. The physician needs it in talking to his patients,[28] and so do a variety of other persons in many situations

[27] The insolent man's pleasure in thinking himself superior is only a particular case of what is a general phenomenon. See *Rhet.* 1371a32–34, where we are told that victory is pleasant, not only for persons who love to win but for everyone. For there arises an idea of superiority which all persons more or less desire. Cf. *Rhet.* 1389a12–13. See the notes of Cope (above, n. 21) 1.210, 2.18–19, 143.

[28] The Hippocratic treatise on *Decorum* states that a doctor must possess ready wit (*eutrapelia*), for a dour manner (*austêron*) is repulsive both to the healthy and to the sick (Chap. 7). Unfortunately the date of this little treatise is disputed. It may be as early as

that do not seem to involve emotional response. Construed generally *eutrapelia* is a kind of social tact which manifests itself in emotional and in non-emotional situations; construed narrowly, it is a kind of wittiness which manifests itself whenever people are amused and laugh at clever barbs and jests.

Construed narrowly, *eutrapelia* or wittiness can be associated with an emotion in much the same way that modesty and righteous indignation are associated with emotions. It can be called an emotional mean-disposition in the same sense as modesty and indignation. But construed widely, *eutrapelia* is not tied to a particular emotion and so joins truthfulness, friendliness, and dignity in forming a class of mean-dispositions that are not closely related to emotions and that cannot be called *pathêtikai mesotêtes* in the same way that modesty and righteous indignation are called by this label. It would seem, then, that the *Eudemian Ethics* has joined together some unlikely bed-fellows, and that the *Nicomachean Ethics* has done well to draw a distinction between mean-dispositions that are concerned with human relations in speech and action (*EN* 1108a11) and mean-dispositions in emotions and concerning emotions (*EN* 1108a31). By including wittiness together with truthfulness and friendliness in the class of mean-dispositions concerned with human relations, the *Nicomachean Ethics* may be said to recognize tacitly the wider usage of *eutrapelia* without denying that it is frequently related to an emotion. The Nicomachean analysis, it may be argued, recognizes both similarity and difference between *eutrapelia* on the one hand and truthfulness and friendliness on the other. By grouping together the three mean-dispositions, it allows that *eutrapelia* is like truthfulness and friendliness in that it may be manifested in a variety of situations apart from emotional response. By emphasizing the role of *eutrapelia* in ensuring a proper enjoyment of jeering abuse, it allows that *eutrapelia* is different from truthfulness and friendliness in that it is closely associated with a particular emotional response.

In some respects, therefore, the Nicomachean analysis is more satisfactory than the Eudemian analysis, and in these respects the *Nicomachean Ethics* may be said to represent an advance over the *Eudemian Ethics*. But that is not the end of the matter. There is one respect in

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350 B.C., but more likely it is after 300 B.C. See W.H.S. Jones, *Hippocrates*, Loeb edition (London 1923) 2.269–271.

which the *Eudemian Ethics* might be plausibly argued to represent an advance over the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This is the way in which the *Eudemian Ethics* groups the four mean-dispositions of truthfulness, friendliness, dignity, and wittiness together with the two mean-dispositions of modesty and righteous indignation, and withholds *proairesis* from all six mean-dispositions. The *Nicomachean Ethics* differs in that it treats three of the four mean-dispositions as if they were moral virtues quite similar to the virtues of courage, good temper, and the like. For just as courage and good temper are characterized by *proairesis* and goal-directed action, so according to the *Nicomachean Ethics* the mean-dispositions of truthfulness, friendliness, and wittiness are marked by *proairesis* and goal-directed action. Here, I think, the Nicomachean analysis cannot be called an advance. It has the merit of economy in that it brings all moral virtues under one pattern: it explains all moral virtues as goal-directed dispositions.[29] But this merit is also a fault. By subsuming all virtuous mean-dispositions under this general pattern, it obscures the fact that truthfulness, friendliness, and wittiness (we may add dignity) are not exclusively or even primarily concerned with a man's goals. They are not primarily concerned with what a man chooses to do but rather with the manner in which he pursues his chosen goals.

Let me develop this point first by contrasting briefly mean-dispositions like good temper and courage with mean-dispositions like mod-

[29] Aristotle analyzes moral virtue according to the general principle that each thing is defined by its goal (*EN* 1115b22). Moral virtue is an established disposition to aim at (*stochastikê*, *EN* 1106b15–16, 28) and to choose (*proairetikê*, *EN* 1106b36) noble action. Moral virtue is said to make correct the goal (*EN* 1144a8, 1145a5), to make choice correct (*EN* 1144a20). The courageous man, for example, chooses (*EN* 1117a5, 21) endurance as a noble goal. Like every virtuous man he chooses virtuous action for its own sake (*EN* 1105a31–32, 1144a13–20). This is not to imply that Aristotle's conception of *proairesis* is altogether clear. Sometimes Aristotle seems to restrict choice to means to the goal (*EN* 1111b4–1113a14), while at other times he seems to associate choice directly with the goal (*EN* 1105a31–32, 1115a7, 1152a17, and see Sir David Ross, *Aristotle* [London 1923] 200; Gauthier and Jolif 2.130, 195). It seems probable that Aristotle does not want to restrict choice to means that are conducive to or productive of the goal. He would also recognize a choice of component means (L.H.G. Greenwood, *Aristotle*, Nicomachean Ethics, *Book Six* [Cambridge 1909] 46–48, 53–55; D. J Allan "The Practical Syllogism," in *Autour d'Aristote* [Louvain 1955] 325–340), so that a courageous man not only chooses means that are conducive to endurance but also chooses this act of endurance as an instance of noble action. But in either case his action is goal-directed. Courage, good temper, and the other moral virtues are conceived of as goal-directed dispositions that explain a man's actions by reference to the sorts of things at which he regularly aims and for which he regularly acts.

esty and righteous indignation, and then by considering whether or not the four mean-dispositions of truthfulness, friendliness, dignity, and wittiness are naturally grouped together with good temper, courage, and other mean-dispositions that are marked by goal-directed behavior. We may begin with good temper, which is a mean-disposition in respect to the emotion of anger. This emotion, as we have already seen, is a complex phenomenon involving perception and assessment as well as some kind of bodily or mental disturbance. It also involves revenge as a goal. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle mentions revenge in the definition of anger (*Rhet.* 1378a30) and states that when revenge appears impossible, anger is absent (*Rhet.* 1370b13). No one, we are told, aims at what appears to be impossible. The angry man is no exception; he aims at possible revenge (*Rhet.* 1378b2–4). Anger, then, is not an idle emotion indulged in by day-dreamers. It is, so to speak, practical. When a man becomes angry, he thinks revenge possible and aims at or intends[30] to seek revenge. He has a specific goal for which he acts. Should it develop that revenge no longer appears possible, he abandons his intention to seek revenge and gives up his anger. The intention to take revenge is part of being angry, so that a man cannot think revenge impossible and at the same time be angry. His emotion is practical and involves goal-directed action.

Good temper is a mean-disposition in respect to this practical emotion.[31] It is easy for a man to become angry (*EN* 1109a26–27) and it is natural for men to seek revenge (*EN* 1126a30). What distinguishes the

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[30] In introducing the notion of intention, I am aware that there is disagreement among modern philosophers concerning the precise nature of this concept. Still there is one important analysis of this concept, which seems to me to be closely related to Aristotle's analysis of anger and fear and which is helpful in elucidating Aristotle's thought. This analysis of intention is that of Stuart Hampshire. According to Hampshire, intending to do something is logically incompatible with believing that the action in question is impossible. "If I can be said to intend to achieve X, it must be true that I at least believe that there is some chance of my not failing in the attempt" (*Thought and Action* [NewYork 1960] 112). A soldier, for example, may try against all odds to breakthrough the enemy line. But if his action is to count as a serious attempt, as an intentional act, he must think that there is some possibility of achieving his goal (*Freedom of the Individual* [New York 1965] 61–62). For an alternative view of intention see G.E.M. Anscombe, *Intention* (Oxford 1958) 93, and I. Thalberg, "Intending the Impossible," *Australian Journal of Philosophy* 40 (1962) 49–56.

[31] Aristotle's concern with moral virtues related to practical emotions is reflected in his repeated assertion that moral virtue concerns emotion and action (*EN* 1104b13–14; 1106b16–17, 24; 1107a4–5; 1108b18–19; 1109a23, b30). In saying that moral virtue concerns emotion and action, Aristotle is not thinking of emotion and action as two distinct things. On the contrary, he is thinking primarily of practical emotions like anger

good-tempered man from other men is that he becomes angry on the right occasions (*EN* 1125b31–32) and seeks revenge when he ought to. Compared with ordinary men he is forgiving and not vindictive (*EN* 1126a1–3). He does not have an indiscriminate preference for revenge. But he does have an established disposition or preference to revenge outrageous insult and so is said to choose (*Rhet.* 1382b2) revenge when insulted. Such a choice is not an idle wish. No one aims at a goal that he thinks is impossible (*Rhet.* 1378b3–4). The good-tempered man is no exception. He does not aim at or choose revenge when there seems to be no possibility of attaining revenge. For no one chooses (*proaire-itai*) the impossible (*EN* 1111b25, cf. 1139b5–9). Choice (*proairesis*) is not of the impossible (*EN* 1111b20–21) but of that which is within a man's power (*EN* 1111b30). Morally virtuous men are characterized by choice because their disposition is practical. They are disposed to act for possible goals and not to collapse in futile dreams. Good-tempered men are not absorbed in impossible wishes. On the contrary, they are well disposed toward a practical emotion that involves goal-directed action. Confronted with outrageous insult, they choose revenge and manifest their choice in goal-directed action.

The courageous man is like the good-tempered man in being well disposed toward a practical emotion. In the case of the courageous man, this emotion is fear, which, as we have seen, involves the perception of imminent danger as well as some kind of bodily disturbance. Fear also involves goal-directed behavior. When men are frightened they desire safety and intend to attain this goal. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle makes this clear when he says that there must be some expectation of safety. For fear makes men deliberate and no one deliberates concerning the hopeless (*Rhet.* 1383a5–8, cf. *EN* 1112a33–34). Fear, like anger, involves a possible goal. Frightened men not only are disturbed by the appearance of danger but also intend to secure safety. What marks off the courageous man from other men is that the courageous man correctly assesses the situation and so seeks safety only on the proper occasions. Courage is a virtue on account of which men do (*praktikoi, Rhet.* 1366b11) noble deeds in dangerous situations. When the situation demands it, courageous men choose to endure. They prefer endurance as something noble or good in itself (*EN* 1115b12, 23; 1116a11, b31).

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and fear, which involve goal-directed action and which are related to good temper and courage, two paradigm cases of moral virtue.

Courage and good temper are alike in that they are both associated with practical emotions and are both characterized by certain kinds of goal-directed action. They differ from modesty and indignation which are not associated with practical emotions. Modesty is associated with the emotion of shame. This emotion is like all emotions in that it involves assessment and some kind of disturbance or affection. It is by definition a pain or disturbance concerning apparent disgrace (*Rhet.* 1383b12–13). Shame, however, differs from practical emotions such as anger and fear in that it does not necessarily involve action. There is no class of actions with which shame is always connected; there is no goal for which ashamed men regularly act. Indeed, when a man is ashamed of some past deed, there may be no way to undo what has become an accomplished fact. The ashamed man may simply suffer some kind of disturbance (*tarachê, Rhet.* 1383b13) and perhaps turn red (*EN* 1128b13). Shame, therefore, is not a practical emotion, and modesty is not related to an emotion that regularly involves goal-directed action. Modest men do not choose to turn red on the right occasion. They do not choose at all. Rather they are overcome or suffer or are disturbed as the situation demands.

Righteous indignation is like modesty in that it is not connected with a practical emotion. The emotion of indignation involves the thought of unmerited good fortune (*Rhet.* 1386b11, 1387a9). A man feels indignant when he deems another's success unmerited. But he need not act to be indignant. He may, for example, be disturbed because a newly rich person has attained high office (*Rhet.* 1387a22–23). He feels indignant at an accomplished fact that cannot be undone. He wishes that things were otherwise, but he does not act for an impossible goal. So the man that has the mean-disposition of righteous indignation feels indignant on the right occasions. But when unmerited success is irreversible, he does not engage in futile actions. He does not intend or choose (cf. *EN* 1139b5–9) to do anything. His emotional response is appropriate and may be said to manifest good character (*Rhet.* 1386b11–12), but it is not the response of moral virtue. For moral virtue involves choice and goal-directed action. Righteous indignation is not characterized by choice and action but by feeling disturbed at the sight of unmerited success.[32]

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[32] Dirlmeier (*Magna* 301) contrasts the emotional response of a courageous man with the emotional response of indignation, and points out that feeling indignation cannot be construed as a *praxis*.

Modesty and righteous indignation differ from courage and good temper in that they are not regularly associated with choice and goal-directed action. What about the four mean-dispositions of truthfulness, friendliness, dignity, and wittiness? They, too, I think, differ from courage, good temper, and similar mean-dispositions in lacking a close connection with choice and goal-directed action. Consider the mean-disposition of truthfulness. To call a man truthful is not primarily to indicate the sort of goal he regularly pursues. Rather it is to indicate the manner in which he does whatever he does.[33] Truthful men are "simple" (*haplous, EE* 1233b38) or straightforward; they exhibit their good character in pursuing a variety of goals. Hence a high-minded man may also be a truthful man (*EN* 1124b30). When we call a man high-minded, we indicate the sort of goal he pursues. We characterize him as one who aims at (*EN* 1123b19) or pursues exceptional honors (*EN* 1123b18–24, 1124a4–12). If we further characterize this high-minded man as a truthful individual, we do not indicate another goal but rather the manner in which he pursues honor. We suggest that he goes about his business openly, neither exaggerating nor understating his own qualities. Only in the presence of common people will he engage in understatement (*EN* 1124b30–31). It would be unseemly for him to assert his true character before these people. But in general, his manner is open and honest when he pursues honor, which is the goal of every high-minded individual.[34]

Truthfulness, it seems, characterizes the way in which a man pursues his various goals. The same would seem to be true of friendliness and dignity. Friendliness is an agreeable manner. The friendly

[33] Truthfulness is a character-trait, a disposition to act in a particular manner whatever the goal. Peters (*The Concept of Motivation* [above, n. 7] 5) has pointed out that in explaining behavior we consider not only goals, but also norms or standards of social appropriateness. When men act, they not only aim at goals but also follow rules. They conform to standards or conventions. And when we call a man punctual or honest, we do not indicate the sorts of goals he is disposed to pursue but rather the type of regulation he imposes on his behavior. Of course, there are occasions when character-traits may account for a man's particular goal. When a rule or convention is likely to be broken, then a character-trait may explain the point of a man's behavior. If he is likely to be late, a punctual man runs in order that he may be on time. The point of his running is given by a reference to the man's punctuality. But most of the time character-traits do not indicate goals. They indicate the manner in which a man pursues a variety of goals, the rules he imposes upon his conduct in the pursuit of various ends.

[34] On the high-minded man as a truthful man, see Wilpert 328, 331, 336.

man goes about his business putting up with the right things in the right manner (*EN* 1126b18). He takes everything in the right way (*EN* 1126b24). Whatever a friendly man is doing, he does in an agreeable manner. He is said to be friendly not because he aims at a particular goal but because he pursues his several goals in a particular sort of way. Similarly a dignified person is marked not by a particular goal which he regularly chooses to attain but rather by a particular manner. Dignity is a manner compatible with a variety of intended goals. In pursuing honor high-minded men conduct themselves with dignity in the presence of eminent men (*EN* 1124b21). Their goal is honor; their manner is dignified. Men in power, the *Rhetoric* (1391a20–29) tells us, are ambitious and aim at great deeds. In addition, they are dignified rather than burdensome (*Rhet.* 1391a26). They pursue their goals in a manner which is not overbearing. Their behavior exhibits moderation and dignity—dignity being a mild and becoming form of gravity (*Rhet.* 1391a27–28).[35]

Dignity, therefore, is a character-trait like friendliness. Both are manifested in the way in which a man pursues his various goals. The same may be true of wittiness. We have already noticed how *eutrapelia* can be used quite generally to signify versatility, so that wittiness can be construed as a kind of dexterity (*EN* 1128a17) which is manifested not only in humorous jest but also in the most varied kinds of activity. Wittiness is the opposite of harshness (*EE* 1240a2). It is a pleasing manner that finds expression in good-natured abuse, in speech (Isoc. 4.296), in a doctor's bedside manner (Hp. *Decent.* 7), and in general

[35] Consider *authadeia*, which both the *Eudemian Ethics* (1233b34) and the *Magna Moralia* (1192b30) treat as a vice co-ordinate with the virtue of dignity. *Authadeia* is not marked so much by a particular goal as by a contemptuous and inconsiderate manner. This is brought out quite clearly in Theophrastus' *Characters*, which defines *authadeia* as a kind of roughness (*apêneia* 15.1) and goes on to depict the *authadês* as a man of coarse manners. (The genuineness of the definition need not concern us, for in this particular character sketch the definition agrees with the description that follows.) The *authadês* answers questions in a rough and abrupt manner (15.2). His business manner is blunt (15.4). When he makes a contribution he does so ungraciously (15.7). He is impatient (15.9) and uncooperative (15.10). He is distinguished not by a particular goal but by a crude and inconsiderate manner. *Authadeia*, it seems, is a kind of rough or harsh manner and so can be construed as a vice co-ordinate with dignity. Both are primarily character-traits, not goal-directed dispositions. See P. Steinmetz (*Theophrast*, Charaktere [München 1962] 2.172–174), who points out that Theophrastus' characterization has greater affinities with the *Magna Moralia* than with the *Eudemian Ethics*; for both the Characters and the *Magna Moralia* construe authadeia rather narrowly as *Schroffheit in Worten*.

whenever people act and speak with charming dexterity. Wittiness, then, would seem to be like friendliness, dignity, and truthfulness. All are character-traits concerned with the manner in which men act. When we characterize a man as truthful, friendly, dignified, or witty we do not indicate the sorts of goals that he tends to choose. Rather, we indicate the way in which he acts, the type of regulation he tends to impose upon his behavior.

At this point we can imagine a threefold objection. First, there is a narrow sense of *eutrapelia* which is concerned with goals and which Aristotle was free to introduce into the *Nicomachean Ethics*. This is the sense of *eutrapelia* that Isocrates seems to recognize in the *Areopagiticus* (49) when he complains about persons that are witty and capable of abuse, whom Athenians used to consider unfortunate but now call naturally talented. Here, it seems, Isocrates grudgingly recognizes that specific sense of wittiness which Aristotle was soon to employ in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[36] He recognizes that class of witty men whom the *Rhetoric* seems to have in mind when it speaks of men that are dexterous (*Rhet.* 1381a33, cf. *EN* 1128a17, 33) in giving and taking a joke, men that have the same object in view as their neighbor and are capable of making and taking jokes in good taste (*Rhet.* 1381a33–35). These witty men have a goal. They aim at pleasing one another by clever barbs and thrusts. The *Nicomachean Ethics*, it seems, does not invent a goal-directed disposition of wittiness. It simply focuses upon a particular, if narrow, sense of *eutrapelia*. Further—and this is the second objection—dignity cannot be introduced to criticize the Nicomachean analysis. For this disposition is not discussed in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, so that it is quite unfair to use this mean-disposition in adversely criticizing the Nicomachean analysis. Finally and thirdly, the *Nicomachean Ethics* does manage to treat truthfulness, friendliness, and wittiness as goal-directed dispositions. This is especially clear in the case of friendliness. For the friendly man is said to aim at avoiding pain and contributing pleasure (*EN* 1126b29–30, cf. 1127a7–8). He is said to be concerned with pleasures and pains in social relationships, to be the kind of person that will provide pleasure where proper but will choose to give pain when he ought to (*EN* 1126b30–33). Friendliness, therefore, is conceived of as a goal-directed disposition. Friendly men aim at giving pleasure and choose to do so whenever the situation permits. Similarly, it may

[36] See Dirlmeier, *Nikomachische* 392; Gauthier and Jolif 2.136.

seem, truthful men aim at and choose (cf. *EN* 1127b14) plain talk, while witty men aim at (cf. *EN* 1128a6) and choose raising a laugh on proper occasions.

We may, I think, admit the truth of all three points: the *Nicomachean Ethics* focuses on a particular sense of *eutrapelia*, it does not treat dignity, and it does manage to analyze all three mean-dispositions as goal-directed dispositions. But these points do not add up to a serious objection. For I am not claiming that truthfulness, friendliness, dignity, and wittiness, cannot possibly be analyzed as goal-directed dispositions. Such a claim would show too little respect for human ingenuity. My claim is that these mean-dispositions cannot be analyzed adequately as goal-directed dispositions. They are not primarily goal-directed dispositions, but character-traits that govern the manner in which goals are pursued. To treat them as if they were simply or primarily goal-directed dispositions is to overlook their very core and to confuse one kind of mean-disposition with another kind.[37]

The *Nicomachean Ethics* emphasizes goal-directed action. It treats (correctly, I think) goal-directed behavior as the central or paradigm case of human action. Moreover, it recognizes that goal-directed behavior is frequently explained by reference to dispositions such as courage, good temper, liberality, and high-mindedness. When we explain a man's behavior by reference to his courageous disposition, we indicate that

[37] For an interesting modern parallel see Ryle ([above, n. 7] Chap. 4, 83–115) who includes a variety of different dispositions: e.g., vanity, avarice, patriotism, indolence, kindliness, laziness, punctuality (85), interest in symbolic logic (87), philanthropy (93), ambition, loyalty to one's party, interest in entomology (99), affection, and sense of justice (110), all together under the general heading of motive or inclination. Ryle explains an inclination as "a proneness or readiness to do certain sorts of things on purpose" (106), as a tendency to aim at or try to do certain sorts of things (112). Ryle, it seems, construes inclinations or motives as goal-directed dispositions (avarice is "directed towards" [94] self-enrichment), so that the exercise of a particular motive will fit the pattern "he did X in order to Y" (91). This analysis is, I think, suitable for dispositions such as avarice and ambition, which do imply a goal. But it seems to be inadequate for dispositions such as punctuality and vanity. As Peters (*The Concept of Motivation* [above, n. 7] 5) points out, punctual men are not marked by the pursuit of a particular goal but by pursuing various goals in a particular way. Ryle, it seems, is like Aristotle in construing character-traits as goal-directed dispositions, so that it comes as no surprise when Ryle connects his own analysis with that of Aristotle (112). Both philosophers (Ryle apparently following Aristotle) focus upon goal-directed dispositions and fail to distinguish character-traits which are not tied to any particular goal. On Ryle's analysis, see Peters, "Motives and Causes" (above, n. 7) 146–147, 156, and *The Concept of Motivation* (above, n. 7) 32–33.

he has a preference for endurance, that his action is a particular manifestation of his general tendency to choose endurance as a noble goal. Similarly with high-mindedness. When we explain a man's action by calling the man high-minded (or ambitious), we indicate that he has an established disposition to pursue honor and that the action in question is a particular manifestation of this goal-directed disposition. Many dispositions are goal-directed and are useful in describing goal-directed behavior. But this does not mean that all dispositions are goal-directed, that all dispositions should be made to conform to this pattern. To think so is an error and to analyze all dispositions as goal-directed dispositions is, if not a complete confusion, at least an impoverishment of our conceptual framework. For not all dispositions are conceived of as goal-directed. We often describe behavior by reference to character-traits, and in so doing we do not refer to a man's goals but rather to the manner in which a man pursues his goals. Character-traits are in this way significantly different from goal-directed dispositions. Yet the *Nicomachean Ethics* obscures this difference by treating truthfulness, friendliness, and wittiness as if they were goal-directed dispositions like courage and good temper.[38] In this respect the Eudemian analysis may seem to represent an advance over the Nicomachean analysis. For the *Eudemian Ethics* groups truthfulness, friendliness, dignity, and wittiness together with modesty and righteous indignation. It groups together those mean-dispositions that are not connected with a particular goal or a particular kind of goal-directed action and that are in this way different from mean-dispositions such as courage and good temper. That is not to say that the Eudemian analysis is satisfactory. We have already seen that it fails to distinguish between mean-dispositions that are connected with a particular emotion and mean-dispositions that are not. But it is to say that the Eudemian analysis is not in every respect

[38] It may be that the *Nicomachean Ethics* ignores dignity largely because this disposition cannot be grouped together plausibly with dispositions that are goal-directed. Dignity is too clearly a way of "carrying oneself" whatever the goal. Arnim (*Die drei* 129) says that in the *Nicomachean Ethics* dignity totally disappears because one of the coordinate vices, *areskeia* (EE 1233b34–35) is grouped together with *kolakeia* as a vice opposed to the mean-disposition of friendliness (*EN* 1126b12). Arnim's remark is an observation about shifting terminology. But it is not adequate as an explanation of why the *Nicomachean Ethics* completely passed over the mean-disposition of dignity. Without ruling out other explanations, we can, I think, say that the considerable difficulties involved in construing dignity as a goal-directed disposition may have encouraged Aristotle to pass over this mean-disposition in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

inferior to and immature by comparison with the Nicomachean analysis. Neither analysis is satisfactory, so that the indecision[39] of the *Magna Moralia* may be due in part at least to an awareness that neither mode of analysis is altogether happy.[40]

[39] Walzer (211) thinks that the *Magna Moralia* is not so much hesitant as indifferent, for the position of the *Magna Moralia* is that all the praiseworthy mean-dispositions mentioned by the *Eudemian Ethics* become moral virtues simply by being connected with *logos*. Walzer may be correct. But if he is correct, then the *Magna Moralia* is open to the same criticism as the *Nicomachean Ethics*. For like the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Magna Moralia* conceives of moral virtue as a goal-directed disposition whereby men choose to do something either as an efficient means or as a component means to the goal (*MM* 1189a7–12, 25–26; 1190a8–33). If all praiseworthy mean-dispositions become moral virtues just like courage and good temper, then all praiseworthy mean-dispositions including truthfulness, friendliness, dignity, and wittiness become goal-directed dispositions and the difference between character-traits and goal-directed dispositions is obscured.

[40] In conclusion, I want to acknowledge my indebtedness to the National Endowment for the Humanities and to the Center for Hellenic Studies, whose support enabled me to work upon this paper. I am also grateful to the Director of the Center, Professor Bernard Knox, and to the Junior Fellows (1967–1968) for discussing with me many of the ideas presented here.

CHAPTER NINE

ARISTOTLE: ANIMALS, EMOTION, AND MORAL VIRTUE

In a series of articles,[1] I have argued that we can understand Aristotle's conception of moral virtue only if we understand his conception of emotional response[2] and therefore the alogical side of his bipartite psychology. My thesis has been that emotions such as anger and fear are cognitive in that they involve necessarily certain kinds of judgments. Part of being angry is thinking oneself outraged and part of being frightened is thinking danger imminent. Since moral virtue is a disposition in regard to emotions such as anger and fear, it is concerned in part at least with the judgments that are essentially involved in these emotions. A good-tempered individual is one who, among other things, assesses correctly apparent insults, and a courageous individual is one who assesses correctly threatening dangers.

This thesis has a consequence which I have not discussed and which merits consideration. It is that animals cannot be virtuous, because they cannot be emotional. In the *De Anima* Aristotle is quite clear in restricting cognition to human beings. Animals are marked by sensation and impulse; they do not have a share in the biological faculty of intelligence and therefore cannot judge that an insult has occurred or that

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[1] "Aristotle and the Questionable Mean-Dispositions," *TAPA* 99 (1968) 203–231 = Chapter 8 in this volume; "Aristotle: Emotion and Moral Virtue," *Arethusa 2* (1969) 163–185 = Chapter 7 in this volume; "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions," *AGPh* 52 (1970) 40–70 = Chapter 1 in this volume; "On the Antecedents of Aristotle's Bipartite Psychology," *GRBS* 11 (1970) 233–250 = Chapter 3 in this volume.

[2] Throughout this paper I shall use the terms "emotion" and "emotional response" to refer to that kind of *pathos* with which moral virtue is concerned. I avoid deliberately the term "passion," because this term suggests something that entirely happens to us. On my view, Aristotle does not associate moral virtue with mere sufferings or even reactions to pleasant and painful sensations. Rather Aristotle is concerned with a particular kind of human behavior that is often goal-directed (see below, n. 33, together with my "Questionable Mean-Dispositions" [above, n. 1] 222–224) and is regularly grounded upon some judgment, which appears as an ingredient in the essential definitions of the several *pathê* (see my "Aristotle's *Rhetoric*" [above, n. 1] 59–61). There is perhaps no English word which is used regularly and unambiguously to refer to this mode of human behavior. The terms "emotion" and "emotional response" have a variety of usages but are not, I think, poor choices for referring to the complex phenomenon with which Aristotle is concerned (see my "Questionable Mean-Dispositions" 213–214, n. 13).

a particular danger is imminent. It would seem, then, that not only moral virtue but also emotional response must be refused to animals. Yet well-known passages in the *Corpus Aristotelicum* do associate animals with courage and cowardice, confidence and fear. They attribute moral character and emotional response to animals, although such an attribution seems inconsistent with the thesis that moral virtue is an established disposition in regard to emotional response which is essentially cognitive and so peculiarly human behavior.

In the following sections of this paper I want to consider this inconsistency and hopefully to show that it is more apparent than real. My argument will proceed by three steps. 1) I shall point out certain well-known antecedents for the view that animals are different from men, especially in the area of moral virtue. Aristotle's contribution will be said to lie in the formulation of a *scala naturae* which refuses all cognition to animals and so has as a consequence the refusal not only of moral virtue but also of emotional response. 2) Several important passages in the *Ethics* connecting animals with emotion and moral virtue will be shown to exhibit Platonic influence. I shall argue that Aristotle's interest in Platonic problems and approaches is genuine and is reflected in certain passages introducing animals, but that this interest did not prevent Aristotle from developing his own ethical framework which excluded animals from emotional response and moral virtue. 3) Finally, it will be argued that the zoological treatises make use of a different framework according to which animals can be said to partake of emotion and moral virtue. This framework involves a change in the conception of emotion and moral virtue, is not especially useful for elucidating human behavior, and is not fundamental to Aristotle's ethical thought.

I

The view of animals, which the *De Anima* sets forth and which I find fundamental to Aristotle's ethical thought, is not without well-known antecedents. In the *Works and Days*, Hesiod exhorts his brother Perses to pay attention to *dikê*, justice, and to cease from violence. Then Hesiod goes on to tell how Zeus laid it down as law that fish and beasts and birds eat one another, since there is no *dikê* among them (276–278), how Zeus gave to men *dikê* which became their greatest asset (279–280) and how Zeus rewards men who knowingly argue for

ta dikaia (280–281). Here men are marked off neatly from animals by the possession of *dikê*.[3] The same idea is set forth by Protagoras in the Platonic dialogue bearing his name. Beginning his long speech with a myth, Protagoras relates how Epimetheus provided defenses for animals but neglected man. Prometheus noted this and secured for man technical wisdom (321D1). Since this kind of wisdom was insufficient to ensure man's survival, Zeus sent Hermes to distribute *dikê* and *aidôs*, justice and shame, (322C4) to all men and to lay down as law that whoever is unable (*ton mê dynamenon* 322D4) to partake of *aidôs* and *dikê* should be put to death. Protagoras, then, distinguishes men by reference to *dikê* and *aidôs*. He seems to be following Hesiod both in the general idea and in the particular use of *aidôs* and *dikê*.[4] Protagoras also seems to be setting himself in opposition to the brutal morality of a person like Callicles who claimed that justice is by nature the advantage of the stronger and who supported this claim by reference to animals as well as men (Plato *Gorg.* 483C8–D7).[5] For our purposes it is perhaps most important to observe that Protagoras seems to mark off men from animals by a natural capacity for *dikê* and *aidôs* and moral virtue in general.[6] This point is independent of whether the gift of

[3] While the Hesiodic passage is explicit only in stating that justice exists between men and does not exist between animals, it may be said to imply the non-existence of justice between men and animals. This implication was not lost on later generations. See Plutarch *Mor.* 964B = Porphyrius *De abst.* 1.5, 88.20–22 N^2, where the passage is cited in conjunction with the argument that since animals lack intelligence and so are fundamentally different from men, animals may be used and eaten by men without injustice.

[4] Although Hesiod speaks only of *dikê* when distinguishing men from animal (*WD* 278, 279), he does conjoin *dikê* and *aidôs* earlier when describing the corrupt state of the fifth generation of men (*WD* 190–201, esp. 192). While most commentators refer to Hesiod as the source for Protagoras (e.g., J. Adam and A. Adam, *Platonis Protagoras* [Cambridge 1893, repr. 1962] 113; W. Nestle, *Platon ausgewählte Schriften IV, Protagoras*[7] [Leipzig 1931] 97; G. Vlastos, *Plato, Protagoras* [Indianapolis 1956] xxiii), W. Jaeger (*Paedeia*, transl. by G. Highet [New York 1939] 296) leaves it open whether the borrowing is from Hesiod or the last part of Aeschylus' *Prometheus* trilogy.

[5] See Vlastos (above, n. 4) xxiii.

[6] That man has a natural capacity for moral virtue seems to be implied by 322D4, 327B8, 351B2. Cf. DK 80B3. It is tempting to construe 323C1–2 as follows: an individual must partake of justice in some way or not belong to the class of men (ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἐν ἀνθρώποις), that is to say, not be classified as a man, because he lacks a defining mark of being human. This interpretation may lie behind the translations of Lamb (Loeb ed.) "or else not be of human kind" and of Guthrie (Penguin ed.) "or he would not be human." But it seems more likely that Protagoras' words mean only that a person lacking justice must be put to death or at least leave the city which is the community of men (322D4–5, 325B1). So Jowett-Ostwald (Liberal Arts ed.) translate: "and that if

Zeus is construed as a feeling for justice or as political virtue itself.[7] Protagoras is clear that man has a moral capacity that needs to be developed through instruction and practice (323C6, D6–7, 324A2–3, 351B1–2). This capacity is not concerned with sensations and is not characteristic of animals. It is a cognitive capacity that invites training once the age of comprehension is reached. As soon as a child is able to understand what is being said to him, he is taught that this is just and this unjust, that this is noble and this shameful (325C6–D5). Through proper training his capacity for moral virtue is developed into a peculiarly human excellence (325A2). Protagoras, it seems, would agree with Aristotle in picking out man as a political creature and attributing to him in contrast with animals a perception of the good and the evil, the just and the unjust (*Pol.* 1253a2–3, 15–18)

A particularly instructive antecedent of Aristotle's view is to be found in the *Laches* of Plato. In this dialogue Nicias defines courage as knowledge of what is to be dreaded and what is to be dared (194E11–195A1). This definition, it is objected, has the effect of making doctors, farmers, and all other skilled workers courageous, because they know what is to be dreaded and dared within their particular spheres of competence. Nicias parries by drawing a distinction between knowing when someone is healthy and knowing when it is a dreadful thing to be healthy. The former is said to be characteristic of a doctor, the latter of a courageous man (195B2–D9). Socrates then points out that on Nicias' view it is necessary either to refuse courage to all animals or to concede that some animal is wise in a way that few human beings are (196E3–5). Laches is delighted by Socrates' observation and asks Nicias whether he attributes a superior wisdom to those animals that everyone agrees to

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he has none at all he ought not be in human society." In regard to the general idea that men lacking a capacity for virtue should be removed and especially in regard to 322D4–5 τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετέχειν κτείνειν, see *Politicus* 308E8–309A2 τοὺς μὲν μὴ δυναμένους κοινωνεῖν ἤθους ἀνδρείου καὶ σώφρονος … θανάτοις τε ἐκβάλλει.

[7] Nestle (above, n. 4) 99 translates *aidôs* and *dikê* in 322D5 with "Sittlichkeits und Rechtsgefühl." O. Apelt (*Platon, Protagoras* [Hamburg, 1956] 17) translates 322C2 with "das Gefühl für Rücksichtsnahme und Gerechtigkeit." Apelt offers a similar translation for 322C4, 7, D5. These translations may suggest that Zeus gave man a feeling of respect and feeling for justice and injustice—that is, basic emotional responses that call for instruction and training (323C6). A different view is adopted by G.B. Kerferd, ("Protagoras' Doctrine of Justice and Virtue in the *Protagoras* of Plato," *JHS* 73 [1953] 42–45) who construes *aidôs* and *dikê* as political virtue and argues that "what Hermes brings to man is not the rudiments or materials for political virtue, but political virtue itself" (43).

be courageous or he opposes everyone in boldly refusing to call those animals courageous (197A4–5). Nicias opts for the second alternative, asserting that he would not call anything courageous that is fearless on account of thoughtlessness. Fearlessness and courage, he says, are not the same. Courage and forethought are enjoyed by a few; recklessness and boldness and fearlessness together with lack of forethought by many men, women, children, and beasts. What the many call courageous Nicias labels reckless. He calls courageous only those who are wise in the relevant respect (197A6–C1).

Nicias' refusal to call animals courageous is important in that it seems to be grounded on a particular view of animals. He thinks that animals, like children (197A8), do not fear because they are thoughtless—that is, they do not exercise forethought in reacting to their environment. Nicias does not say so explicitly, but it seems fair to assume that he would distinguish between the thoughtlessness of children and animals. He would say that children develop forethought as they grow older, which animals never do. Lacking forethought, all animals are by nature disposed similarly toward courage (196E7–9); they cannot acquire this particular moral virtue.

So far we might see in Nicias' brief remarks a striking anticipation of what I take to be Aristotle's view of animals and its ethical consequences. However, the picture is complicated by Nicias' willingness to attribute not only a lack of forethought but also recklessness (*thrasytês* 197B3–4, cf. C1) to animals. For recklessness seems to be associated closely with the emotion of feeling confident and with sanguine thoughts about the future. This may be illustrated by reference to Plato's *Laws* where being rash is connected with feeling confident (649C8–9, cf. Arist. *EN* 1115b28), and confidence is said to be a kind of expectation (*elpis*) or opinion (*doxa*) about the future (644C9–D1, 649A4–B3, cf. Arist. *EN* 1116a4, *Rhet.* 1383a18). But if recklessness is conceived of as a disposition in regard to feeling confident, and so as a disposition to think certain kinds of thoughts, would Nicias want to say that animals are reckless? There is no way of gaining a firm answer, but it should be noted that all Nicias refuses to animals is forethought. He does not say that animals lack every kind of thought, and so leaves the door ajar to saying that animals have expectations or opinions about the future and are reckless in the same way as men. Indeed his manner of expression (197B3–6) seems to imply this.

Our purpose is not to hang Nicias, but rather to observe that Nicias does refuse courage to animals on psychological grounds (i.e. the ab-

sence of forethought) but does not go so far as to base this refusal on a *scala naturae* which refuses all cognition to animals. It is, of course, this total refusal which characterizes Aristotle's biological psychology and which has as a consequence that animals are not only without moral virtue but also without emotions in the sense of responses involving some sort of judgment or assessment. The *De Anima* distinguishes between plants that possess a nutritive faculty, animals that possess not only a nutritive but also a sensitive faculty, and human beings that are alone endowed with a capacity for thought (414b18–19, 415a7–9, 427b6–14). This means that not only calculation and reflection including forethought but also simple judgment and opinion (*doxa*) are peculiar to human beings. Opining is not sensing and is not to be referred to the sensitive faculty but rather to the capacity for thought (413b29–31, 427b8–11, 25). An animal lacks this capacity and so cannot hold an opinion (427b8–14, 428a18–24, 434a5–11)[8] and cannot respond emotionally. For emotion involves cognition. Fear, for example, involves thinking (*doxazein* 427b21) something terrible; it is an expectation (*pros-*

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[8] D.W. Hamlyn (*Aristotle's* De Anima [Oxford 1968] 132, 153) acknowledges that 428a19ff. seems to rule out *doxa* for animals but says that 434a10–11 attributes to animals "beliefs about the end to be pursued although they cannot deliberate" (153). I find this view unacceptable. The *De Anima* is quite explicit in classifying *doxa* together with *epistêmê* and *phronêsis* as a kind of *hypolêpsis* (427b24–26) and in restricting *doxa* together with these other forms of cognition to creatures endowed with *logos* (427b8–14). The text at 434a10–11 is notoriously difficult and has been subjected to alteration and deletion. Without attempting a full investigation perhaps I may indicate my agreement with Hett's text and translation in the Loeb edition (London 1957) 192–193. These lines do not speak about animals. This would involve understanding a subject for *echein* (434a11) from five lines back (434a6). Such a distance is not impossible but certainly difficult. It seems to me more natural to construe the passage in the following manner. Aristotle explains the locomotion of imperfect animals possessing only touch by saying that these animals possess imagination (*phantasia*) in an indeterminate way (433b31–434a5). Since there are two varieties of imagination, Aristotle adds by way of clarification that sensitive (*aisthêtikê*) imagination is found in animals (including imperfect ones), while deliberative (*bouleutikê*) imagination is found only in creatures that are capable of reasoning (434a5–7). Aristotle tucks in an example of practical reasoning involving deliberative imagination (434a7–10) and then states that imagination is thought not to imply *doxa*, for it does not imply the *doxa* involved in reasoning, though this *doxa* implies imagination (434a10–11). This interpretation leaves the text unaltered, involves relatively smooth transitions and prepares for the immediately following assertion that impulse does not imply the capacity for deliberation (434a11–12). Both impulse and imagination occur on the animal level of the *scala naturae*. Even imperfect animals may possess these two faculties in an indefinite way (434a4–6). But animals do not think and do not deliberate. It follows that imagination does not imply *doxa* and that impulse does not imply the capacity for deliberation (434a10–12).—See now the epilogue to the second edition of *Aristotle on Emotion* (London 2002) 102–103.

dokia EN 1115a9, *Rhet.* 1382b29, cf. Plato *Laches* 198B9, *Prot.* 358D6) of imminent evil and so is possible only for creatures that can think. When a man sees a lighted beacon and recognizes that it is the enemy (431b5–6), he is exercising his capacity to think.[9] And if he responds emotionally, his behavior is not the reaction of an animal to painful sensation but rather the behavior of a thinking man. Of course, such a response may be unreasonable in that it is not justified by the actual situation. It may be, for example, that the enemy is not near and that the man has judged the situation incorrectly. But false or not, his judgment is propositional and an exercise of intellect (430b1–6, 26–30, 432a10–12). His emotional response involves cognition and so is human action and not animal behavior.

The implications of his *scala naturae* for ethical theory were not lost on Aristotle. In the sixth book of the *Ethics* (1139a17–20) Aristotle tells us that sensation, intellect, and impulse are authoritative in regard to action and truth, and then goes on to say that, of these three, sensation does not initiate any action, as is clear from the case of animals which do possess sensation but do not share in action (*praxis* 1139a20). This dissociation of animals from action is hardly surprising. In ethical theory, Aristotle is concerned primarily with intelligent behavior—that is, behavior based upon judgment and assessment and so peculiar to creatures endowed with intellect. Animals lack intellect, reacting only to pleasant and painful sensations. These reactions can, of course, be likened to judgments. Pursuit can be said to be a *quasi*-affirmation and flight a *quasi*-denial (*De an.* 431a9–10). Still, the reactions of animals are only analogous to the assessments of human beings and the emotional responses based upon these assessments. For assessment is the work of intellect (*De an.* 431a14–16) and this is lacking in animals. As Aristotle makes clear early on in the *Politics*, the nature of animals extends only to the point of experiencing pleasant and painful sensations and uttering sounds as signs of such sensations. In contrast man discriminates between good and evil, justice and injustice and communicates such judgments through speech (*Pol.* 1253a10–18).

This fundamental difference between animals and men is recognized also in the first book of the Ethics where Aristotle attempts to elucidate happiness by pinning down the peculiar function of man. He marks off

[9] R.D. Hicks, *Aristotle*, De Anima (Cambridge 1907) 539 follows Simplicius 274.10 and points out that recognizing the presence of the enemy is an exercise of intellect. Cf. Hamlyn (above, n. 8) 148.

the vegetative life of plants and the sensitive life of animals and finds himself left with the active (*praktikê*) life of that which possesses *logos*. He then adds a kind of footnote, pointing out that the rational element has two parts: one which is obedient to *logos* and another which possesses *logos* and reflects (*EN* 1098a1–5).[10] Here as in the sixth book (1139a19–20) Aristotle marks off the sensitive life of animals from the active (*praktikê* 1098a3) life of thinking human beings. He also relates the biological psychology to the bipartite psychology employed in ethical and political writings. The alogical half of bipartition is associated with the intellectual faculty of the biological psychology and is said to be obedient to *logos*. This association and description is easily understood. The alogical half is primarily the sphere of emotional response. And emotions, as we have seen, involve *doxai* which belong only to creatures possessing *logos* (*De an.* 427b8–14), that is to say only to human beings endowed with the biological faculty of intellect. Further, *doxai* are opinions that are or can be held with conviction and so are open to the persuasive argumentation of *logos* (*De an.* 428a22–24).[11] It is characteristic of human beings that they hold opinions and respond appropriately. For example, they may be of the opinion that something is terrible and feel frightened or they may be of the opposite opinion and respond accordingly (*De an.* 427b21–23). In both cases they are responding according to opinions that are in principle at least open to reasoned reflection. This is not true of animals (*De an.* 428a23–24). Their reactions are not based upon opinion and are not altered in accordance with reasoned reflection. It is only the emotional responses of human beings, their alogical half, that can be described as obedient to *logos*.

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[10] *EN* 1098a3–5 is a controversial passage. I have discussed its significance and genuineness in my "Emotion and Moral Virtue" (above, n. 1) 174–175, 181–182, n. 22, and its relationship to *EN* 1103a1–3 in my "Zu der Darstellung der Seele in der *Nikomachischen Ethik* I 13" forthcoming in *Philologus*. In addition to points made in the text of this paper, I would note here only that I agree with R. Gauthier and J. Jolif (*L'Éthique à Nicomàque* [Louvain 1959] 1.15), F. Dirlmeier (*Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik*³ [Berlin 1964] 14) and M. Ostwald (*Aristotle*, Nicomachean Ethics, Library of Liberal Arts edition [Indianapolis 1962] 16) in taking *tou logon echontos* as the antecedent of *toutou* and that Hicks (above, n. 9) 456 was correct in connecting this portion of the *Ethics* with *De an.* 427b14. If *EN* 1098a3–5 is related to *De an.* 427b8–14 and 428a18–24, its meaning becomes considerably clearer.

[11] I agree with Hicks (above, n. 9) 464 and Hamlyn (above, n. 8) 132 that *De an.* 428a22–24 makes a new point and should not be bracketed as a repetition of the point made in the immediately preceding lines 428a20–22.

Human beings, therefore, are unique in holding opinions upon which they act. They alone have the capacity to think themselves threatened and so to become angry. And because human beings alone hold such opinions, they alone can subject them to the scrutiny of *logos* and act in obedience to reasoned reflection. Most men, of course, fail to realize this potentiality as fully as possible. They do not reflect and do not act in a reasonable manner. In contrast, the morally virtuous man does reflect regularly and does alter his opinions and emotional responses accordingly. He is obedient to *logos*. But even for the virtuous man there are occasions on which action is not guided by reflection. In sudden dangers, for example, there is no time for *logos* and *logismos*. A man must act simply according to his character (1117a21–22). And if he is virtuous, he will assess his situation properly and respond courageously. He cannot reflect, but he will judge and respond correctly, which is the mark of a "more courageous" man (1117a18).

It seems clear that human beings alone can be morally virtuous, because they alone are endowed with a capacity for judgment and emotional response. Animals lack this capacity and so cannot be virtuous or even vicious in the sense that human beings are. Their dispositions are concerned with reactions to pleasant and painful sensations, not with assessment and emotional response. The *Ethics* is explicit that the dispositions of animals differ in kind from the virtues and vices of human beings (*EN* 1145a25–27). It is only metaphorically that animals can be called, for example, temperate and intemperate (*EN* 1149b31–32).

II

Turning now to passages which may be thought to create difficulties for the view set out in the preceding section, we may begin with a procedural point. Our investigation will not concern itself with every passage in which animals seem to be accorded some form of cognition or intelligent behavior. Consider, for example, *Ethics* 1141a26–28: "Wherefore even those animals are said to be wise (*phronima*), which seem to possess a capacity for forethought concerning their own life." Clearly only a superficial reading of this text would lead one to question Aristotle's refusal of cognition to animals. Here Aristotle is concerned to distinguish between *phronêsis* and *sophia* and finds it useful to mention an everyday view expressed in what ordinary men say (*phasin, EN* 1141a27). Aristotle no more commits himself concerning the cognitive

capacity of animals than does Plato in the *Statesman* when he has the Eleatic Stranger introduce a wise (*phronimon* 263D4) crane to make a point about division.[12] In both cases animals come in incidentally, so that nothing follows concerning animal psychology.

Something similar can be said concerning certain passages in which some emotion- or virtue-word is used in connection with animals. As indicated in the last section, the usage of such words may be metaphorical and explained by analogy, so that only an uncritical reading will generate difficulties concerning animals and intelligent behavior. In the *De Anima*, for example, Aristotle says that animals with hard eyes are able to sense color, but they are not gifted in distinguishing between varieties of color except insofar as the varieties inspire fear or do not inspire fear (*De an.* 421a13–15). It would be perverse to grab hold of this passage and to argue that it is inconsistent with other passages in the *De Anima* that connect fear with *doxa* and so with intellect and human beings. Everyday language sanctions the usage of emotion-words to describe animal behavior and Aristotle sees no need to avoid rigorously the metaphors of everyday language. Aristotle's point in this passage of the *De Anima* is quite clear. Animals with hard eyes do not have acute eyesight, but they are able to sense the approach of something destructive. They are able to sense at a distance (*De an.* 434b27) and so in advance (*Sens.* 436b20–21) thereby avoiding harm or destruction. The passage does not claim or imply that animals can be frightened in the way human beings are and does not support charges of inconsistency.

The association of animals with *thymos* and *epithymia is* not altogether different. Aristotle can group together *thymos* and *epithymia* as representative *orexeis* and can attribute them to animals (*Sens.* 436a8–11) without suggesting that animals respond emotionally. In the case of *epithymia* this is obvious enough. All animals can be said without contradiction to have a sense of touch and so to have pleasant and painful sensations and also *epithymiai* like hunger and thirst (*De an.* 414b3–5, 11–12). Such *epithymiai* are not emotions but bodily drives. The behavior of a hungry or thirsty animal is not grounded upon an assessment of the particular situation. It is caused by a particular bodily condition and cannot be classified as an emotional response. Similarly the wiggles of a severed earthworm are not expressions of emotion. The several sections of such

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[12] Dirlmeier (above, n. 10) 454 associates *EN* 1141a26–28 with Plato's *Statesman* 263D and points out that in regard to the crane Plato is "certainly half ironic."

a worm can be said to have sensation and so necessarily *epithymia* (*De an.* 413b20–24), but they cannot be said to respond emotionally, for they lack the capacity to judge and assess.

The case of *thymos* is perhaps more complicated. The angry behavior of human beings is often referred to *thymos*. A classic example from Greek literature is Euripides' Medea, who is so outraged by Jason's slight that she acts against her own reasoned reflections, seeking revenge in accordance with her *thymos* (*Med.* 1056, 1079).[13] Even in the *De Anima, thymos* may be used for a kind of emotional response and listed together with typical emotions like fear and pity (*De an.* 403a17). But *thymos* is not always associated with emotional response and need not be withheld from animals whose psychic capabilities rise no higher than the level of sensation (436a8–9).[14] In other words, *thymos* is an equivocal that may be used in reference to both the angry responses of men and the spirited reactions of animals. There is, of course, a similarity between the two kinds of behavior which explains using *thymos* in both cases and encourages comparing one with the other. Dogs, for example, are spirited (*thymika, HA* 488b21) and their instinctive reactions to certain sounds may be compared with the emotional responses of outraged men (*EN* 1149a25–34). But there is an important difference between the two kinds of behavior and this difference does not seem to have escaped Aristotle. Men seek revenge because they think themselves outraged (*EN* 1149a32–33), while dogs bark upon hearing noises (*EN* 1149a29). The responses of men are cognitive, those of dogs are not.[15]

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[13] On Medea's emotional condition and its relation to reflection and deliberation see my "The Antecedents" (above, n. 1) 233–241 = Chapter 3 in this volume, pp. 43–51.

[14] For an interesting defense of attributing *thymos* to animals, see Galen, who cites Tyrtaeus: "possessing in his breast the *thymos* of a fiery lion" and then adds that even before hearing Tyrtaeus we all know the lion possesses *thymos* (*Hipp. et Plat.* 309 K), that Tyrtaeus and also Homer and Hesiod and in short all poets say lions possess *thymos* and so liken the most spirited (*thymoeidestatos*) of men to the lion (*Hipp. et Plat.* 309–310 K).

[15] Dirlmeier (above, n. 10) 486 calls the canine example at *EN* 1149a28–29 an adaptation of Plato's spirited and philosophic dog as described in *Rep.* 376A2–8. This may be correct, but as Dirlmeier points out the snapping and barking of dogs is used illustratively also at *Rep.* 469E1–2 (cited by Aristotle *Rhet.* 1406b32–34) and *Laws* 967C8–D1, so that we may think canine examples commonplace and find it difficult to be certain that *EN* 1149a28–29 is a (conscious) adaptation of Plato's philosophic dog. The mere use of *philos* (a29) is hardly compelling evidence. Perhaps we can say cautiously that the *EN* passage may be an adaptation and if so may be important. For as I shall suggest Plato treats the temperament of his spirited and "philosophic" dog as if it were in all significant respects identical to the temperament of a guardian. In contrast,

Sometimes *thymos* is conjoined with *epithymia* and *boulêsis* (e.g., *De an.* 414b2, *MA* 700b22) and together these three may be thought to reflect the continuing influence of Plato's tripartite psychology. This psychology is used for illustrative purposes in the *Topics*[16] and criticized in the *De Anima* (432a22-b7). But its influence is present elsewhere and helps to explain passages that seem to generate difficulties. For example, in the third book of the *Ethics*, after establishing that involuntary action is done under constraint or through ignorance and that the initiative for voluntary action lies with an agent who knows (*eidoti*, 1111a23, cf. 1135a24) the particular circumstances, Aristotle adds that things done on account of *thymos* and *epithymia* should not be called involuntary. For if they are so labeled, then neither animals nor children will act (*praxei*) voluntarily (1111a24–26). And a few lines later at the beginning of the discussion of choice, Aristotle continues in the same vein, arguing that choice can be identified neither with the voluntary nor with *thymos* or *epithymia*. For children and animals have a share in the voluntary but not in choice; animals have a share in *thymos* and *epithymia* but not in choice (1111b6–13). These lines may be thought to create considerable difficulties, for animals are associated not only with *thymos* and *epithymia* but also with voluntary action, and this seems to conflict with Aristotle's assertion in the sixth book of the *Ethics* that animals possess *aisthêsis* but do not share in *praxis* or action (1139a20). If we focus upon the sixth book of the *Ethics* and upon the biological psychology as set forth in the *De Anima*, we shall find ourselves going against the third book of the *Ethics* and concluding that animals do not act either voluntarily or involuntarily, because they cannot know the particular situation,[17] and that while animals may

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Aristotle adopts the Platonic model and in so doing seems to recognize the difference between a man's response based upon the thought of outrage and an animal's reaction to certain sensations of noise. Such an adaptation is perhaps not unexpected. For but a few lines above (*EN* 1149a10) Aristotle seems to take note of his *scala naturae* while indicating that sensation is the mark of animal life.

[16] See H. v. Arnim, *Das Ethische in Aristoteles* Topik = *Sb. Ak. Wien* 205.4 (1927).

[17] For an interesting try at rescuing Aristotle and explaining how animals can be said to act voluntarily, see St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I^{a} II^{ae} q. 6 a.2. Gauthier and Jolif (above, n. 10) 2.188–189 point out correctly that St. Thomas is concerned with knowing the end for which one acts and that this concern distinguishes his account from Aristotle's. However, I do not agree with Gauthier and Jolif when they suggest that since the account of Aristotle is concerned only with knowledge of the particular, nothing prevents an animal from acting *de son plein gré* in the same sense that a human being does. The difficulty involved in Aristotle's account is not to be avoided by shifting knowledge from the end sought to the particular situation. For the difficulty lies in the

be said to manifest *thymos* and *epithymia*, they cannot be said to do this in the way that human beings manifest anger and desire, when they think or believe themselves insulted or confronted with something pleasant.

There is a real difficulty here, but it can be mitigated, I think, if we recognize that in the passages cited from the third book of the *Ethics* Aristotle has slipped into a Platonic framework[18]—in this case tripartition—that associates *epithymia* and *thymos* indiscriminately with both human beings and animals. The case of *epithymia* is fairly simple. In the *Republic* Plato calls hunger and thirst the most conspicuous members of the class of *epithymiai* (437D3–4) and uses thirst as an example in establishing the existence of the *epithymêtikon*, that faculty whereby the soul feels sexual passion, hungers, and thirsts (439D6–7). Plato, therefore, construes *epithymia* primarily in terms of bodily drives. Such appetites, as has been pointed out, differ from emotions in not being grounded upon a judgment. They are caused by bodily conditions (585A8–B1) including diseases (439D2) and are common to both men and animals.[19] The case of *thymos* is perhaps more interesting. For in pinning down the temperament necessary for a guardian Plato introduces a well-bred hound (375A2–E2), and while Plato is clear that this hound is a model (375D5), he does suggest that there is no significant difference between the spirited nature of a noble youth and a well-

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very suggestion that animals have knowledge of any sort. A human being can know (1111b23, 1135a24) or think (1111a11) that something is the case, but an animal cannot, for he is endowed only with *aisthêsis*. St. Thomas seems to recognize this, when he credits animals with an *imperfecta cognitio finis* and then adds *per sensum et aestimationem naturalem*.

[18] That Aristotle "shifts gears" at *EN* 1111a24 encourages Gauthier and Jolif (above, n. 10) 1.57, 2.176–179 to transpose the entire section 1111a24-b3 to 1110b1. While the transposition does not seem to me justified, there is certainly a shift of some sort at this point in the text. Gauthier and Jolif depart from the majority of commentators in refusing to see *Laws* 863–864 behind Aristotle's remarks. Instead they refer to Euripides and especially the famous monologues of Medea and Phaedra. I doubt that there need be any conflict here. For the problem which Euripides sets forth dramatically is the same problem which exercised Socrates and later Plato. Our concern is not with whose problem is being resolved or whose answer is being rejected but rather with what framework Aristotle approaches the problem. That Aristotle is thinking in Platonic terms is indicated by the collocation of *thymos* and *epithymia* (1111a25) and the subsequent addition of *boulêsis* (1111b1). This triad suggests tripartition which significantly surfaces in the related discussion at *Laws* 863B and also in the discussion of actions due to the agent at *Rhet.* 1368b37–1369a7 (Arnim [above, n. 16] 73).

[19] Cf. *Rep.* 586A7–B3, where satisfying bodily desires is likened to the behavior of cattle, and 588C7–10, where the *epithymêtikon* is likened to a many-headed beast.

bred hound (375A2–3).[20] The presence of *thymos* is said to make every soul (human and animal alike) fearless and unconquerable (375B1–2). And later when Plato turns to establish the separate existence of the *thymoeides*, he does this in part by pointing out that animals, like children, are full of *thymos* (441A7–B3).[21] Plato, it seems, was prepared to identify the spirited as well as the appetitive behavior of animals and human beings and to assert in this regard a similarity between children and animals. So Aristotle, thinking for the moment in Platonic terms, associates animals with children (*EN* 1111a26; b8–9) and expresses himself in a manner inconsistent with other portions of the *Ethics*. This does not necessarily mean that certain passages are earlier than others and that some redactor has combined passages from different periods in an unfortunate way. It means only that Aristotle does shift frameworks, that certain passages exhibit a Platonic influence and so do not harmonize well with Aristotle's own ethical and biological views. This will become even clearer, if we consider another portion of the third book of the *Ethics*, where animals are again introduced into the argument and where Platonic influence is also more or less clearly present.

Arguing that the pleasures of temperance and intemperance are not the pleasures of seeing, hearing, and smelling but rather the pleasures men share with animals, that is to say the pleasures of touch and taste, Aristotle introduces several examples of animal behavior (*EN* 1118a18–23). Dogs, we are told, do not rejoice at the smell of hares but in eating them. The odor is to be credited merely with having produced an awareness (*aisthêsin, EN* 1118a19) of the hares' presence. Similarly a lion is said to take pleasure in eating an ox, not in the lowing of an ox. The lowing is responsible only for the lion's having sensed (*êistheto, EN* 1118a21) that the ox is near. Finally Aristotle tells

[20] Plato's well-bred hound has antecedents as old as Homer. See, for example, the famous passage from the *Odyssey* in which the heart of Odysseus is said to have growled in the way that a bitch with whelps growls when she does not recognize someone (*Od.* 20.14–15). Whether Plato had this Homeric passage in mind is doubtful. But *Rep.* 375E4, 376A5 may suggest *Od.* 20.15, and in the fourth book of the *Republic* Plato does quote from this portion of the *Odyssey* (20.17) when establishing the existence of the *thymoeides* (*Rep.* 441B6). Certainly it can be said that Plato is drawing on a long tradition of likening human behavior to animal behavior (cf. G.E.R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy* [Cambridge 1966] 184–185, 188) and that this tradition had an influence upon Aristotle both directly and indirectly through Plato.

[21] On *Rep.* 441A7–B3 see Galen, *Hipp. et Plat.* 500 K. For the *thymoeides* as a lion see *Rep.* 588D3.

us that a lion is pleased not because he has seen (*idôn, EN* 1118a22) a stag or wild goat, but because he will have meat. The three examples vary in regard to the humanization of animals and so in adherence to the schema of the biological psychology. The first example treats dogs simply as animals. Odor is said to have produced *aisthêsis*. We might say that the odor causes dogs to *sense* the presence of hares. The second example is more difficult in that it involves a *hoti*-clause. Does Aristotle want to say that the lion sensed the presence of an ox or that the lion perceived that an ox is near? The final example suggests more clearly a humanization of animals in that it seems to credit animals with some kind of forethought. At least the lion is said to be pleased not because he sees a stag or goat but because he will have a meal. In other words the lion is depicted as reacting not to visual sensations but to the prospect (i.e. thought) of a good meal.

Such a depiction is very human and not an altogether unfair development of the Homeric passage, which Aristotle recalls by quoting *Iliad* 3.24. In the Homeric passage, Menelaos sees Paris advancing for single combat and is delighted, for he thinks that he can take vengeance upon the sinner (3.21–22, 27–29). This joyful response is likened by Homer to the joy of a hungry lion that comes upon a carcass and devours it (3.23–26). Of course, a Homeric simile involving animals does not necessarily imply any particular view about animal behavior. It certainly does not commit one to the view that animals respond and act intelligently like men. But it is an easy slide from such similes to a humanizing view of animals, so that it is not surprising to find such a humanization more or less implicit in Aristotle's examples of animal pleasure (*EN* 1118a18–23). However, the question properly before us is whether these examples commit Aristotle to anything, whether they can be said to create difficulties for a philosopher who on other occasions draws a hard line between animal and human behavior. Here, I think, we must use a little common sense and admit that Aristotle is not always concerned with the neat divisions of his *scala naturae*. In this particular portion of the *Ethics*, Aristotle is interested primarily in picking out which of the five senses provides the pleasures of intemperance. He sees a relationship between the pleasures of intemperate men and animals and so emphasizes this without worrying about biological and ethical distinctions between men and animals. Further, the account of temperance and intemperance seems to be written with more than a casual glance at Plato. At the outset and in conclusion (*EN* 1117b24, 1119b14–16) the account reflects quite clearly the influence of Plato and his tripartite

psychology,[22] and along the way (*EN* 1119a23–24) it makes use of a view of pleasure and pain that is familiar from Plato's *Philebus* (31D, 42C–D, 46C) and *Timaeus* (64A–65B)[23] and that is criticized later in the *Ethics* (1152b33–1153a15). When Aristotle thinks in terms of tripartition and especially in terms of the *epithymêtikon (EN* 1119b14–15), he need not restrict his remarks to men and to peculiarly human modes of behavior. For the *epithymêtikon* is the seat of bodily drives such as hunger and thirst, which are common to men and animals.[24] But the *epithymêtikon* is also connected with emotional response. It is, for example, connected with greed and is called money-loving and gain-loving (*Rep.* 553C5, 581A6–7). To think in terms of the *epithymêtikon* of tripartition is not to commit oneself to bodily drives in distinction from emotional responses. It is rather to make room for a certain ambiguity that may or may not constitute a confusion. In this portion of the *Ethics* there does not seem to be any serious confusion. Temperance and intemperance are said to be concerned with the pleasures of touch and taste and so with pleasures common to both men and animals (*EN* 1118a23–26). But it is not said that the behavior of a temperate or intemperate man is simply animal behavior or conversely that the behavior of animals is intelligent behavior. Nothing contradicts the assertion that animals are only temperate and intemperate in a metaphorical sense (*EN* 1149b31–32). Some animals exhibit little food-motivated behavior and so may be called temperate, but this does not mean that their behavior is grounded upon assessment, that these so-called temperate animals are disgusted by excess in the way that temperate men are disgusted (*EN* 1119a13).

Another passage that calls for comment occurs in the Nicomachean discussion of dispositions similar to courage. Aristotle points out that *thymos* is sometimes reckoned as courage, for men who act on account of *thymos* are like wild beasts attacking those who have wounded them, and are thought to be courageous because courageous men are *thymoeideis* (*EN* 1116b23–25). Animals are said to be motivated by pain (*EN* 1116b32) and are refused courage because they are driven by pain and *thymos* without foreseeing any of the dangers into which they rush. If being driven in this manner were enough for courage, hungry asses,

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[22] Loening, *Die Zurechnungslehre des Aristoteles* (Jena 1903) 103 n. 20, Gauthier and Jolif (above, n. 10) 2.238–239, F. Dirlmeier (above, n. 10) 350, 353.

[23] Gauthier and Jolif (above, n. 10) 2.248.

[24] On the *epithymêtikon* and bodily drives, see my "Aristotle's *Rhetoric*" (above, n. 1) 64–70 = Chapter 1 pp. 32–37 in this volume. For animals and hunger and thirst, see *De an.* 414b11–12.

we are told, would be courageous and even adulterers (*EN* 1116b33–1117a2). Were this all Aristotle said, there would be no particular problem. Aristotle would be describing that kind of animal behavior which resembles without being identical to the courageous behavior of human beings. But Aristotle connects the spirited behavior of animals with being frightened (*EN* 1116b32–33) and says that animals do not foresee (*EN* 1116b35) the terrible things before them. This seems to be Aristotle's major reason for refusing courage to animals. It is not that animals lack cognition altogether and so cannot logically be either frightened or courageous, but rather that animals are deficient in regard to a particular kind of cognition—namely, judgment about what the future holds. This does seem to generate a difficulty. For if animals are frightened they would seem to have expectations (*EN* 1115a9). And if they have expectations, they have not only a share in some kind of cognition but also a share in judgment about the future. Apparently animals are refused courage not because they lack judgment or even judgment about the future, but because they do not see the consequences of their spirited behavior.

The difficulty here is generated, I think, by Platonic influence and especially by the *Laches* whose influence may be suspected in the opening sections on courage where the popular definition of fear is given (*EN* 1115a9, *Laches* 198B, cf. *Protag.* 358D, *Laws* 646E) and the relationship of courage to poverty, disease and dangers at sea is discussed (*EN* 1115a17, 29, 35-b5, *Laches* 191D). In a general way the *Laches* seems to be behind the discussions of experience (*EN* 1116b3–23) and confidence (*EN* 1117a9–22) and in a particular way behind the example of the more courageous man (*EN* 1117a17–22, *Laches* 193A).[25] Finally the *Laches*

[25] When Laches defines courage as endurance with wisdom (192C8), Socrates introduces the case of a man who endures, calculating wisely and so knowing that he is superior in number, quality and location. Socrates argues that a man who endures with such wisdom and preparation would not be called more courageous than the man who willingly stands up against him (193A). Laches agrees and soon finds himself saying that courage is unwise endurance (193D), thereby asserting something already rejected (192D). This portion of the *Laches* seems to have been in the front of Aristotle's mind when he wrote *EN* 1117a17–22. There is a striking similarity in vocabulary: ἀνδρειότερον–ἀνδρειοτέρου (*Laches* 193A3, *EN* 1117a18), λογιζόμενον–λογισμοῦ (*Laches* 193A4, *EN* 1117a21) παρασκευῆς–παρασκευῆς (*Laches* 193A7, *EN* 1117a20). More important, however, is the manner in which the Nicomachean passage provides a way out of Laches' dilemma. Aristotle does not contrast a well-prepared man with an opponent who is assumed to be less well prepared in skill and equipment. Rather he contrasts two different situations: foreseen danger and sudden danger. This contrast is well suited, if not designed deliberately, to unravel Laches' dilemma. Clearly endurance resulting from

seems to influence the discussion of *thymos* and especially Aristotle's remarks concerning animals. For as we have already seen in Section I, the *Laches* contains a passage in which Nicias refuses courage to animals on the grounds that they lack forethought (197B4), but attributes recklessness (197B3–4) to animals and so apparently does not withhold emotional response. It seems that when Aristotle withholds courage on the grounds that animals lack foresight (*EN* 1116b35) and attributes to animals the particular emotion of fear (*EN* 1116b32–33) he is reflecting the *Laches* and the view of Nicias. This is not to say that Aristotle has borrowed consciously and directly from the *Laches*. But it is to suggest that the *Laches* has influenced Aristotle's remarks, whether through previous reading or through ongoing discussion in the Academy or both.[26]

Toward the end of the discussion of *thymos*, Aristotle says that the kind of courage that comes from *thymos* appears to be most natural and to become real courage when choice and purpose are added (*EN* 1117a4–5). This brief remark suggests the Platonic idea of a natural, virtuous temperament[27] and seems to look ahead to the sixth book where natural virtue is explicitly mentioned (*EN* 1144b3) and connected with animals (*EN* 1144b8). In this portion of the sixth book Platonic influence is especially strong. There is a reflection of Plato's cardinal virtues (*EN* 1144b5), an apparent reminiscence of *Meno* 88B (*EN* 1144b9) and possibly of *Phaedo* 69B (*EN* 1144b13–17).[28] Further the assertion that

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wise calculation is not a paradigm case of courage. But neither is the foolish endurance of a man lacking in preparation. There must be a case in which endurance is separate from calculation of advantage and yet is not the foolish endurance of an ill-prepared man. Aristotle provides such a case. In sudden situations there is not time for deliberations. The well-prepared man does not have time to calculate his superiority; the less well prepared man cannot stop to reflect upon his inferior position. Both must simply assess the situation and respond. The situation then is a paradigm case for both testing and understanding courage and moral virtue in general. Aristotle recognizes this and using vocabulary reminiscent of the *Laches* seems to offer the example of the more courageous man as his solution to Laches' dilemma.

[26] The discussion of *thymos* also exhibits Platonic influence in the use of θυμοειδεῖς at 1116b25. Obviously this term comes from the vocabulary of tripartition and so from writings and discussion later than the *Laches*. See Dirlmeier (above, n. 10) 343.

[27] While these lines (*EN* 1117a4–5) cannot be said to recall any particular Platonic passage, we may refer to the conclusion of the *Statesman* (305E–311C) where courage is presented as a natural temperament necessary in due measure for a perfect disposition. The earlier occurrence of ἰτητικώτατον (*EN* 1116b26) may recall ἰταμότητος, ἰταμόν at *Statesman* 311A8, B2. Cf. ἴτας *Protag.* 349E3. But Dirlmeier (above, n. 10) 344–345 is probably correct in preferring Aeschylus fr. 282 N^2 as the source common to both Plato and Aristotle.

[28] Gauthier and Jolif (above, n. 10) 2.254–255. The likelihood of Platonic reminis-

we possess the several virtues straightway from birth (*EN* 1144b6) may be related to that passage in the *Laws* where the Athenian Stranger assumes the role of legislator and calls for a city governed by a tyrant who is young, gifted in memory and the ability to learn, courageous and high-minded by nature (709E6–8) and who is endowed with that popular kind of temperance which is present straightway in children and animals (710A5–7). We may mention also a later passage in the *Laws* where the Athenian Stranger refers courage to fear and allows that animals and young children partake of it, for courage arises by nature in the soul without reason (963E3–6). Both passages from the *Laws* agree with the *Ethics* in connecting virtue with nature, youth, and animals, that is to say in putting forward a notion of natural virtue appropriate not only to human beings but also to animals.

The idea of natural virtue or of temperament related and conducive to virtue occurs in Platonic dialogues earlier than the *Laws*. The idea is set forth rather clearly at the end of the *Statesman*[29] and can be found already in the *Republic*,[30] which, as we have observed, associates *thymos* and the *thymoeides* with animals (441A7–B3) connects courage with *thymos* (375A11-B2) and seems to identify the natural endowment or temperament of a guardian with the temperament of a spirited animal (374E6–376C6).[31] For our purposes the important point is that in

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cence is strengthened by the fact that only a few lines above (*EN* 1144a29–30) Aristotle seems to recall *Republic* 533D. See I. Düring, "Aristotle in the *Protrepticus*," *Autour d' Aristote* (Louvain 1955) 94.

[29] H.J. Krämer, *Arete bei Platon und Aristoteles* (Amsterdam 1967) 148–154.

[30] F. Dirlmeier, *Die Oikeiosislehre Theophrasts* = *Philologos Suppl.* 30 (Leipzig 1937) 41–42, H. Görgemanns, *Beiträge zur Interpretation von Platons Nomoi* = *Zetemata* 25 (München 1960) 124–125.

[31] In the fourth book of the *Republic* Socrates argues that a city is courageous if its fighting force possesses as a result of nature and education the power of preserving right opinion concerning the terrible. When Socrates asks Glaucon whether he agrees with this view of courage, Glaucon assents, distinguishing between the courage described by Socrates and that right opinion which is bestial and slavish, not arising through education (430B6–9). If we take Glaucon's remarks literally and hold that he recognizes some kind of right opinion appropriate to animals (J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato*[2] [Cambridge 1963] 1.231, who defends the text against those who would alter it on the grounds that animals cannot have right opinion), and if we interpret this passage by reference to remarks in the second book concerning the natural temperament of guardians (374E6–376C6) and hold that Glaucon wants to mark off natural temperament from the courage of a citizen (Görgemanns [above, n. 30] 125), then it would seem that the natural temperament requisite for courage is in part at least cognitive and that animals share in this temperament because they share in opinion. This interpretation is possible but weakly supported by the text. The idea of a nature suitable for courage

the Nicomachean passage concerning natural virtue Aristotle does not seem to be breaking new ground but rather to be recalling a doctrine already advanced by Plato. The tendency to attribute some kind of moral virtue to animals is Platonic and occurs in Aristotle's *Ethics* (1144b8–9) in a section that shows strong Platonic influence. This is not to say that the occurrence is simply an unfortunate anachronism or expression of piety on the part of Plato's pupil. In the case of natural virtue we can be sure that Aristotle was genuinely interested in the idea and prepared to discuss it from different points of view. But while maintaining Platonic roots, Aristotle was also developing his own peculiar frameworks.[32] In particular he developed a biological psychology and *scala naturae* that denied cognition to animals and so denied to them

does occur in this portion of the fourth book (429D5–6, E8, 430A4). But Glaucon does not say that he is marking off this natural temperament from the courage of a citizen, and in the absence of such a remark there seems to be no compelling reason for interpreting Glaucon's words in this way. Further, to call an opinion bestial is not necessarily to say that beasts hold such opinions. It may be merely a colorful way of denigrating the opinion. Hence, the addition of "slavish" (430B8) which has a similar use in the *Phaedo* 69B7. The simplest explanation is, I think, the best. Glaucon recognizes that a man can hold a right opinion concerning what is and is not terrible, even though he has not been through a formal system of moral education established by law. Such an opinion may be right but it will not be action guiding during moments of crisis. It will, so to speak, fade in the manner of dye that has been applied without proper preparation (429E3–5). Socrates has been quite clear concerning the need to acquire correct belief through an educational system (429C7, 430A1), but in the final definition of courage he omits an explicit mention of *paideia* (430B2–4). Hence, Glaucon adds for the sake of clarity that Socrates does not mean by courage a right opinion arising without *paideia* (430B7). Glaucon is not thinking of the natural temperament of guardians as described in the second book and mentioned cursorily in this section of the fourth. He is reinforcing the connection between courage and an educational system established by law. His remark is simply a negative restatement of 429C7, 430A1–3 and has nothing to do with animals and cognitive capacity. "Bestial" is used as a pejorative label and nothing more.

32 Aristotle seems to have understood clearly how his own bipartite psychology related to tripartition. Arguing in the *Politics* that habituation is employed in education before *logos*, he introduces his own bipartite psychology (1334b18–19) and argues that the alogical half is prior in generation, for *thymos, boulêsis* and *epithymia* are present in children (1334b22–24). Here we have the Platonic triad all grouped together in the alogical half and all attributed to children. This is significant, for according to tripartition *boulêsis* belongs to the *logistikon* (*Topics* 126a13, *De an.* 432b5) whose functions are acquired later, if at all (*Rep.* 441A9–B1). It *is thymos* and (we may add) *epithymia* that are present in children and also in animals (*Rep.* 441A7–B3). Aristotle's reason for grouping *boulêsis* together with *thymos* and *epithymia* in the alogical half is clear enough. *Boulêsis* is an emotion and the alogical half is the seat of emotional response. (See my "Antecedents" [above, n. 1] 249–250 = Chapter 3 pp. 59–60 in this volume). When Aristotle is thinking in terms of his own bipartite or moral psychology he groups together *boulêsis*, *thymos* and *epithymia* and attributes all three to children. But when he

intelligent behavior including emotional response and virtuous action. There are, then, two different views concerning animals: one inherited and Platonic, the other enjoying antecedents but developed and formulated by Aristotle. In general the two views coexist without comment, but on occasion Aristotle seems moved to make explicit his own considered opinion. We have seen how a life of sensation appropriate to animals is distinguished from a human life of intelligence including the alogical as well as the logical halves of bipartition (*EN* 1098a1–5), how animals are granted sensation but refused action (*EN* 1139a20), and how animals are refused moral virtue except metaphorically and of a different kind (*EN* 1145a25–27, 1149b31–32). Aristotle, it seems, recognized the implications of his *scala naturae*. Withholding cognition from animals and looking upon the emotional responses of human beings as essentially cognitive, Aristotle seems to have been prepared to refuse animals a share in intelligent action including emotional response.[33] This is not to say that Aristotle always used emotion-words for cognitive and so peculiarly human behavior. As we shall see, emotion-words are used in the zoological treatises to describe the reactions of animals. That is, however, not so much a confusion as a shifting of frameworks. In the *Ethics*, Aristotle is working primarily within his bipartite framework. He sees how this relates to the biological psychology and is in certain passages clear concerning the consequences for animal behavior.

III

Turning now to the treatment of animals in the zoological treatises, we can find a convenient and interesting starting point by leaping forward in time to Porphyrius, who holds that animals are intelligent in varying degrees and that their voice is intelligent speech resulting from silent reflection in the soul (*De abst.* 3.3; 188.17–189.4 N^2). In view of

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is thinking within a Platonic framework, he picks out *thymos* and *epithymia* and assigns them to children and animals (*EN* 1111a25–26, b12–13).

[33] In the *Ethics* Aristotle says frequently that moral virtue concerns emotion and action (*EN* 1104b13–14, 1106b16–17, 24, 1107a4–5, 1108b18–19, 1109a23, b30). In saying this Aristotle is not thinking of emotion and action as two distinct things. Rather, he is thinking primarily about practical emotions, such as fear and anger, which involve goal-directed action. On practical emotions see my "Questionable Mean-Dispositions" (above, n. 1) 222–224 = Chapter 8 pp. 148–150 in this volume.

Aristotle's rather clear statement in the *Politics* concerning the limitations of an animal's voice (1253a9–14), it is surprising to find Porphyrius citing Aristotle at the end of the very section in which he has been endeavoring to demonstrate the intelligence of animals by a consideration of voice and speech. Yet Porphyrius does name Aristotle (*De abst.* 3.6; 194.14, 195.2 N^2) in support of his thesis. He refers to two different passages in the *Historia Animalium* and subsequently concludes that Aristotle among others recognized that animals partake of *logos* (*De abst.* 3.6; 194.15–18, 195.2–5 N^2). The first Aristotelian passage referred to by Porphyrius is found in the fourth book of the *Historia Animalium* (536b17). It relates how nightingales teach their young to sing and is hardly supporting material for the claims of Porphyrius. The passage occurs within a chapter that distinguishes between *psophos*, *phônê* and *dialektos* (535a27–28) without any clear assertion concerning the relationship of these different kinds of sound to intellect. On one occasion *dialektos* is said to be peculiar to man (536b1–2) and this seems to imply a connection with intellect and to fit well with Aristotle's remarks in the *Politics*. But on the whole the chapter gives a rather mechanical explanation of *dialektos* as articulated *phônê* (535a31, 536a3–4, b11) and accordingly allows animals and especially birds some measure of *dialektos* (536a20–22, b11–19). There is, then, a certain unclarity in this chapter of the *Historia Animalium*. It cannot be said without qualification to attribute intellect to animals and cannot support with any strength Porphyrius' assertion that Aristotle along with others recognized the intellectual capacity of animals.

The other passage cited by Porphyrius (*De abst.* 3.6; 194.18–19 N^2) comes from the ninth book of the *Historia Animalium* (608a17–19).[34] Here we have a rather different case. This book of the *Historia Animalium* is well known for the way in which it seems to humanize animals.[35] Indeed the passage which Porphyrius cites concerning the learning of animals from one another and from human beings occurs at the

[34] Although Nauck does not give an Aristotelian reference in his apparatus, there seems to be no doubt that Porphyrius (*De abst.* 3.6; 194.17–18 N^2) is thinking of *HA* 9.1.608a17–19. For there is a noticeable similarity in wording (πολλὰ μὲν παρ' ἀλλήλων μανθάνει ζῷα, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παρ' ἀνθρώπων [Porphyrius]; ἔνια δὲ κοινωνεῖ τινος ἅμα καὶ μαθήσεως καὶ διδασκαλίας, τὰ μὲν παρ' ἀλλήλων, τὰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων [*HA* 9.1]), and *HA* 9 is cited by Porphyrius elsewhere (*De abst.* 3.9; 199.14 N^2, ref. to *HA* 9.11.614b31–32 and 3.12; 201.27 N^2, ref. to *HA* 9.1 608b30–32).

[35] For example, Dirlmeier (above, n. 30) 56 speaks of "die vermenschlichende Betrachtung der Tierwelt."

opening of the book immediately after the claim that animals appear to possess some natural capacity in regard to not only courage and good temper but also *phronêsis* or wisdom (608a13–16). This association of animals with intellect is characteristic of the ninth book. There are general statements (608a11–21, 610b20–22, 612a1–3, b18–21) and also particular illustrations such as the manner in which a hind brings forth its young (611a15–17), a swallow builds its nest (612b21–27), a crane flies upwards to gain a commanding view (614b18–20), and a cuckoo disposes of her progeny, conscious of her own cowardice and inability to provide security (618a25–28). Porphyrius knew this ninth book well[36] and even cites (*De abst.* 3.9; 199.14–16) the beginning of the eleventh chapter—a chapter which opens by saying that the dwellings of wild birds[37] are fashioned with a regard for their lives and for the safety of their young (614b31–32) and which ends by calling the wren a technician (615a19, cf. 622b23).

It is, however, open to question whether the ninth book of the *Historia Animalium* can support Porphyrius' statement concerning Aristotle's recognition of *logos* in animals. And this is not just a worry about the alleged Theophrastean character of the ninth book.[38] It is also a question of how the various remarks concerning the intelligent activity of animals should be construed. When cranes, for example, are said to be wise and credited with foresight (614b18, 26), we may be tempted to recall the *Ethics* and say that these remarks reflect only what ordinary men say (*EN* 1141a27) and what appears (1141a28) to be the case, so that they do not necessarily commit one to recognizing in cranes a cognitive capacity in addition to a highly developed capacity to sense (614b26) and react to changes in the environment. To be sure, most remarks in the ninth book of the *Historia Animalium* seem straightforward, but on occasion a qualifier seems to be thrown in. For example, when the discussion turns to birds and their *dianoia* (612b20, cf. 616b20, 22, 27, 30), it is said that the lives of animals exhibit many resemblances (*mimê-*

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[36] On three occasions Porphyrius cites passages from *HA* 9. See above, n. 34. But the citations are not always completely accurate. See below, nn. 37 and 40.

[37] Porphyrius' citation is slightly inaccurate in that it escalates Aristotle's assertion from wild birds to all animals. The exaggeration clearly suits Porphyrius' purposes and raises the question of how far we can trust other citations that cannot be checked directly against existing texts. See below, n. 42.

[38] On Theophrastus and *HA* 9, see H. Joachim *De Theophrasti libris* περὶ ζῴων (Bonn 1892); Dirlmeier (above, n. 30) 55–60; Regenbogen *Theophrastos* in *RE Suppl.* VII 1425.57–1426.16, 1432.14–1434.67; I. Düring *Aristoteles* (Heidelberg 1966) 508; D. Balme, *Aristotle*, History of Animals, Books VII–X (London 1991) 1–10.

mata 612b18–19) to the lives of human beings. And when the return of dolphins from deep water is described, it is said that they hold their breath just as if calculating (*hôsper analogisamenoi* 631a27) the length of the return to the surface and air. Whether this "just as if" is a significant qualification is not immediately clear. The ninth book lacks a programmatic statement concerning the logic of such resemblances. However, the opening chapter of the eighth book has a programmatic statement, and since this chapter of the eighth book has an obvious affinity with both the opening and subsequent chapters of the ninth book,[39] it is tempting to call upon this chapter to elucidate the ninth book. If we do this, we shall construe "just as if" in terms of analogy. For despite the claim of Porphyrius (*De abst.* 3.7; 195.6–9 N^2),[40] the eighth book is quite clear that similarities in regard to intelligent understanding (588a23–24) are to be construed analogously: just as in man skill and wisdom and understanding are found, so in certain animals some other such natural capacity is found (588a28–31). If we adopt this framework set forth in the eighth book and return to the ninth book, we can mitigate the humanization of animals found in this book. When we read, for example, that elephants not only learn to do many things like kneeling in the presence of the king but also understand such acts (630b19–20), we shall not construe these words as an assertion that elephants see the point of what they are doing in the same way as human beings do. Rather we shall construe this elephantine understanding (630b19) as something similar or analogous but not identical to human understanding (588a29).

Still, whatever view we adopt concerning animals and intelligence in the ninth book of the *Historia Animalium*, we can say that this book

[39] The metaphorical use of *ichnê* for psychic phenomena occurs in the *Corpus* only at *HA* 8.1.588a19, 33 and 9.1.608b4. Cf. also the use of *physikê dynamis* at *HA* 8.1.588a30–31 and *HA* 9.1.608a14. See Dirlmeier (above, n. 30) 55–57, who is correct in associating *HA* 8.1 with *HA* 9, but who errs in trying too hard to sever the connections between *HA* 8.1 and *HA* 1.1. It is true that the backward-looking reference at *HA* 8.1.588a24 cannot be to *HA* 1.1.488b12–28. But it can be a reference to *HA* 1.1.486a21-b22.

[40] Endeavoring to show that animals possess intelligence or, as he puts it, internal *logos*, Porphyrius refers to Aristotle and argues that the difference between men and animals is not an essential difference but one of degree only (*De abst.* 3.7; 195.5–9 N^2). If we follow Nauck's apparatus (and there seems to be no reasonable way around this) and take the Aristotelian reference as a reference to *HA* 8.1, then we must conclude that Porphyrius has not studied his source very carefully. For similarity in regard to intellect is explained here by means of analogy (*HA* 588a28–31)—a mode of explanation that is appropriate for things differing generically (*HA* 486b17–22; cf. *Topics* 108a7–14, b23–27, *PA* 644a8–22).

belongs to a trend within the Peripatos which ended with the assignation of intellect to animals. According to Diogenes Laertius (5.49)[41] Theophrastus wrote a work *On the Wisdom and Character of Animals* and, if we can trust Porphyrius,[42] attributed *logismoi* to animals, arguing that all psychic principles are possessed by animals as well as men, though in varying degrees of perfection (*De abst.* 3.25; 221.7–20 N²). Strato, the successor of Theophrastus, may be regarded as an "Endpunkt"[43] to the progressive identification of human and animal psychology. Arguing that thinking involves *kinêsis* just as seeing and hearing (fr. 74 Wehrli) and that sense perception depends upon the activity of *nous* (fr. 112 W), Strato seems to have denied any significant difference between intellect and sensation (fr. 109 W) and to have attributed intellect (*nous*) to all animals (fr. 48 = 117 W).[44]

For our interests, however, it is primarily the treatment of emotions and moral virtues in the ninth book of the *Historia Animalium* that demands special consideration. Animals are connected frequently with fear (*phobos*). They are said to cause fright and to be frightened of one another (608b31, 609a34, b17, 622b14, 627a18–19, 629b21, 630b12). Similarly they are said to feel confident (*tharrein* 611b17), to feel compassion (*kateleein* 631a19), to be motivated by jealousy (*phthonos* 608b9, 619b28–30), and to love (*erân* 631a10). Animals are associated also with emotional dispositions and moral virtues. They are said to be rash (*thrasys* 616b29) and fearless (*aphobos* 618b30), to be characterized by good temper (*praotês* 608a16, 610b21, 629b7, 631a9) and by various

[41] In this case, the testimony of Diogenes Laertius is not altogether free from suspicion. See Regenbogen (above, n. 38) 1432.14–20, 1434.33–54.

[42] The references of Porphyrius to Aristotle (above, nn. 37 and 40) do not inspire confidence in Porphyrius' reliability. If *HA* 8.1 is taken to be Theophrastean (Dirlmeier [above, n. 30] 55–60, Regenbogen [above, n. 38] 1432.50–51, 1433.17–18, 28–34), the passage in Porphyrius (*De abst.* 3.25; 220.15–221.20 N²) may seem to involve a typical misrepresentation. For *HA* 8.1 is clear that the difference between men and animals in regard to *technê*, *sophia* and *synesis* is not just a matter of degree. But in this particular case Porphyrius does not seem to be simply naming an author and quoting a few words, perhaps from memory. Rather he seems to be following an extended piece of text. What Theophrastean text is being followed has been the subject of scholarly debate. See now W. Pötscher *Theophrastos, Peri Eusebeias* (Leiden, 1964) 95–99, who summarizes the debate and favors assigning the text to the treatise *On the Wisdom and Character of Animals*.

[43] Dirlmeier (above, n. 30) 90 n. 2. Cf. Regenbogen (above, n. 38) 1432.54–56.

[44] If Wehrli's suggestion concerning fr. 118 is correct, Strato recognized only "bloss graduelle Unterschiede" between men and animals (n. to fr. 118, p. 76). In other words, not only differences in sensation but also in intellect are to be explained quantitatively.

degrees of cowardice (*deilia* 608a15, 618a27, 29, 629b7, 34) and courage (*andreia* 608a15, 31, 35, b15–16, 610a18, b21, 629b6, 35), to be free from jealousy (*aphthonos* 618b30), and to be friends (*philoi* 610a8, 12, b2). In regard to emotional response and emotional dispositions the ninth book seems strongly committed to the humanization of animals. And if we turn to the opening chapter of the eighth book for help in understanding the remarks of the ninth book, we seem compelled to acknowledge that in the sphere of emotion and moral virtue animals are treated like human beings and that this like treatment is not to be explained away by appeals to analogous usage. For the eighth book applies analogy only to attributions of *technê*, *sophia* and *synesis* (588a28–31). Analogy is not applied to emotions and emotional dispositions, the clear implication being that in these areas men and animals differ only in degree (588a25–28).

To explain different kinds of similarities the opening chapter of the eighth book refers to the first book (486a14–22). Since inconsistency has been suspected here,[45] it would be well to pause briefly. Concerned with resemblances between parts of animals, the first book asserts that parts may be identical in kind or differ quantitatively or be the same by analogy. These modes of sameness and difference are associated with sameness and difference in species and genus. Members of the same species have parts identical in kind (486a16–21), members of the same genus have parts that differ by more or less (486a21-b17) and members of different genera have parts that are the same by analogy (486b17–22). Since different kinds of animals not falling within a single species or genus are related by analogy and since human beings cannot be placed under one of the major animal genera such as the genera of fish or birds (486a23, cf. *PA* 644a14), it might be expected that the actions and life according to *êthê* (588a17–18) of human beings will resemble those of animals only by analogy. Yet the eighth book seems to relate human beings and animals not only by analogy but also by more and less. The difficulty here is, I think, more apparent than real. For the first book falls short of saying that when two animals do not belong to the same species or genus, all similarities must be by analogy. Since it allows that animals differing in species may have identical parts as well as parts related by more and less (486b15–16), there is reason to suspect that animals differing in genus may be related in ways other than

[45] A.L. Peck, *Aristotle, Historia Animalium* I, Loeb ed. (London 1965) lxiii.

by analogy. This seems to be recognized in the *De Partibus Animalium* (644a22–23) and is certainly assumed in the eighth book of the *Historia Animalium*: it would not be unreasonable if, as regards men and animals, some characteristics are identical, some similar and some analogous (588b2–3).[46]

The opening chapter of the eighth book does not seem to introduce any inconsistency. Further and more importantly, it can be interpreted in such a way, that it fits the framework of Aristotle's biological psychology. As we have already observed in Section I, plants are distinguished by a nutritive life, animals by a sensitive life and human beings by an intelligent life. But since intelligence is never found apart from sensation, human beings are like animals in possessing the faculty of sensation (*De an.* 414b15–19, 415a1–11). In respect to this faculty men differ from animals (at least those possessing all five senses) only in degree. Men are less perceptive than many animals in the area of smell; they are better off in taste and superlative in touch (*De an.* 421a9–22). If we adopt this biological psychology and if we associate emotion—now construed as a non-cognitive reaction—with the faculty of sensation (as e.g., *De an.* 421a13–15 connects fear with the sensing of colors), we can, I think, understand better the opening chapter of the eighth book of the *Historia Animalium*. Men and animals differ quantitatively in regard to fear and confidence (*HA* 588a22) and in regard to emotional dispositions like gentleness and bad temper and courage and cowardice (*HA* 588a21–22), because emotions and emotional dispositions are associated with the faculty of sensation which is common to both men and animals, differing only by more or less. Intelligence, however, cannot be a matter of degree. For that would violate the *scala naturae* involved in the biological psychology. The cleverness of animals must be something other (*hetera, HA* 588a30), analogous to human skill and wisdom and understanding (*HA* 588a29) but nonetheless different in kind and so not to be explained simply in quantitative terms. This is not to say that the eighth book of the *Historia Animalium* explains what this something other is that animals possess. It seems to be neither sensation nor intelligence but a kind of *meson* (*HA* 588b6) that defies classification.[47]

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[46] To illustrate likeness between things in the same genus, the *Topics* mentions man, horse, and dog and says that they are alike in as far as any attribute they possess is the same (108a14–17). The example is only illustrative and should not be pressed to claim generic identity between men and other animals. It does, however, make clear that men can be related to animals in other ways than by analogy.

[47] To defy classification is, of course, to challenge the *scala naturae* of the biological

To associate emotion with the biological faculty of sensation apart from the faculty of intellect is, of course, to alter radically one's conception of emotion. Instead of being a cognitive and so peculiarly human mode of behavior, emotion becomes a matter of reacting to pleasant and painful sensations. Similarly when moral virtue is referred to the faculty of sensation, it ceases to be conceived of as a disposition to assess correctly the immediate situation and so to respond reasonably. It becomes a disposition to react in certain fixed ways to pleasant and painful sensations. This shift in conceptual framework is apparent not only in the *Historia Animalium* but also in the *De Partibus Animalium*. In the second book the biological psychology is in play. Being an animal is defined by *aisthêsis* or sensation (653b22), so that it is impossible to be an animal and lack sensation (647a21, cf. 651b2–4). This biological faculty of sensation is located in the region of the heart (647a24–31, 656a28, b24), which is the source of blood for the body (647b4–6). Both the power of sensation and the êthos or temperament of an animal are said to depend upon the nature of its blood (651a12–13). Thin and cool blood is said to increase the sensitivity of an animal (648a2–4).[48] Thin and warm blood is said to promote courage (648a9–10), while an excessively watery and so cold mixture predisposes an animal to fear and cowardice (650b27–30). Here in the second book of the *De Partibus Animalium* emotion and temperament are treated in close connection with sensation. They are explained by reference to the composition and temperature of blood and attributed to animals. A similar view seems to be advanced in the third book, which agrees with the second in defining

psychology and so to encourage an extensive humanization of animals as seems to have occurred in the Peripatos after Aristotle.

[48] A proper mixture of blood is said to make an animal not only more sensitive but also wiser (648a3–4, 8, 10, 650b19). This should not be pressed to mean that animals partake of human intelligence. When the *PA* says that some bloodless animals possess a more understanding (*synetôteran* 650b24) soul than some blooded animals, it is no more attributing human understanding to animals than when the eighth book of the *HA* says that some animals are more understanding (*synetôtera* 589a1) than others. Understanding (*synesis*) in the strict sense is a human characteristic, but it can be attributed to animals by analogy (*HA* 8.588a29–31). Similarly when the *PA* says that bees are wiser (*phronimotera* 648a6) than many other animals, it has slipped into the metaphorical usage of everyday men. (Cf. *EN* 1141a26–28 and see the beginning of section II above). The thesis of the *PA* is that a proper bodily constitution makes for acute sensory discrimination. Therefore, the subtler mind (650b19) of a well-constituted animal is explained by reference to a more mobile faculty of sensation (650b22–23) and in the concluding summary of this portion of the *PA* it is *êthos* and *aisthêsis* alone that are said to be explained by the nature of the blood of animals (651a12–13).

animals in terms of sensation (666a34). This biological faculty is located primarily in the heart (666a11–18, 34–35), which is said to be the source of heat (666a3) and blood (666a6–8, 33–34) and sensation (666a11–18, 34–35). Differences in the formation of the heart of animals are said to make for differences not only in sensation (667a9–11, 13–14) but also in emotion and temperament. A large heart, for example, is said to make for cold blood and so to be characteristic of cowardly animals such as deer and hares and mice, for it predisposes these animals to be frightened (667a15–22). Finally the fourth book of the *De Partibus Animalium* agrees with the second and third books in making sensation a mark of animals (681a19–20, 27–28, b4, 686b33–34) and also in attributing emotion to animals. Cephalopods are said to have a cold constitution, which disposes them to become frightened and emit ink (679a4–7, 25–30) and in the case of the octopus to change color (679a12–14). Similarly, the changes in appearance of a chameleon are referred to fright and explained by insufficient heat resulting from a deficiency of blood (692a20–24).[49]

These sections of the *De Partibus Animalium* agree in connecting emotion and virtue and vice with the biological faculty of *aisthêsis* and in attributing them to animals. Together with the opening chapter of the eighth and numerous passages from the ninth book of the *Historia Animalium*, these portions of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* make use of a framework based upon the biological psychology and its *scala naturae*. Emotions and temperaments are associated with the faculty of sensation and so can be attributed to animals and men in varying degrees without any apparent difference in kind. This zoological framework may be looked upon as a continuation and development of Platonic antecedents. For as we have seen in section II above, the idea of virtuous temperaments found not only in children but also in animals has Platonic roots and occurs in the *Ethics* in passages exhibiting Platonic influence.[50] Perhaps

[49] The chameleon differs fundamentally from the cephalopod in that it has blood while the cephalopod is bloodless. But like all bloodless creatures the cephalopod has a counterpart of blood (648a1–2, 5, 20) and an organ which is the counterpart of the heart and the locus of sensation (647a30–31, 678b1–4). Interestingly the apparently Theophrastean (Plut., *De soll. an.* 978E) passage at *HA* 503b2–3 explains the chameleon's changes of color without reference to fear. On these passages concerning the chameleon, see Regenbogen (above, n. 38) 1428.67–1429.33 and Düring (above, n. 38) 508.

[50] There is a line of development from the natural temperament of Plato's guardian (*Rep.* 374E–376C) through the *Laws* (709E–710A, 963E) and the *EN* (1117a4, 1144b3–9) to the *physikê dynamis* of the *HA* (588a30–31, 608a14).

we can say that Platonic antecedents join with Aristotle's own biological psychology to form a view that may be called quite properly Aristotelian. For it occurs not only in passages of the *Historia Animalium* that have been described as Theophrastean* but also in passages of the *De Partibus Animalium* whose Aristotelian character is not under attack. Still, two caveats are in order. First, to label the view Aristotelian is not to say that it harmonizes well with all portions of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* or even that it is internally consistent. Indeed, the view as presented is self-destructive. For it is presented in conjunction with a recognition that there are no clear lines of demarcation between plants and animals and human beings (*HA* 588b4–589a2, *PA* 681a12–15), thereby pointing toward the breakdown of the *scala naturae* as formulated in the *De Anima* and toward a full blown humanization of animals such as that which appears to have occurred in the Peripatos under Strato. Secondly and more importantly, the biological view of the zoological treatises must be distinguished from that view which is formulated in Aristotle's bipartite psychology and is fundamental to Aristotle's ethical theory. For bipartition does not associate emotion and moral virtue exclusively or even primarily with the sensitive faculty of the biological psychology. It associates the alogical half of the dichotomy with the biological faculty of intellect (*EN* 1098a4–5) and so views emotion as a cognitive phenomenon and moral virtue as a perfected disposition to assess one's situation correctly and to respond in a reasonable manner. Both the biological view of the zoological treatises and the bipartite view fundamental to ethical and political treatises are possible ways of viewing the world. But they are different. Bipartition is a peculiarly human framework appropriate for classifying human actions. It is especially useful in a treatise on ethics but may be dropped in treatises that extend the field of inquiry to include animal behavior. Conversely the zoological view which construes emotions and temperaments as noncognitive phenomena is useful for describing animal behavior but poorly suited for elucidating different kinds of intelligent, human action. It was, I suggest, largely a realization of the advantages and disadvantages of these two different frameworks which led Aristotle to opt for bipartition in setting forth his ethical theory and which kept him from attempting an ethical treatise based upon the framework employed in zoological writings.

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* See above, note 38.

[97/98]

CHAPTER TEN

ARISTOTLE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN MORAL VIRTUE AND PRACTICAL WISDOM

Aristotle's ethical theory has at its very core a dichotomy. The human soul is said to be bipartite, and a corresponding distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom shapes the discussion of human excellence. Moral virtue is discussed first in Books 2–5 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, after which practical wisdom is given special treatment in Book 6. But what exactly is this fundamental dichotomy and how do the two parts relate to each other? Apparently human perfection demands the presence of both moral virtue and practical wisdom, but do these excellences have distinct spheres, is there a partial overlap or complete overlap? Does, for example, all courageous action involve both excellences, or are there occasions when they may be exercised independently of each other: e.g., in sudden dangers which leave no time for calculated response (1117a17–22)? And why does Aristotle refer deliberate choice to both moral virtue and practical wisdom? Why does he connect moral virtue with ends and practical wisdom with the means to these ends (1145a4–6)? These are, of course, old questions which can be put in many different ways. There is already a large literature and many of the answers offered are of considerable interest. My intention here is not to sweep the field clean, but to introduce a largely untried approach, which may help us to understand better certain passages in which Aristotle assigns special importance to moral virtue. The approach I have in mind is to investigate discussions of character (*êthos*) and thought (*dianoia*) found outside Aristotle's ethical treatises—i.e., the discussions occurring in the *Poetics*, *Rhetoric*, and *Politics*—and then to apply the results of this investigation to the ethical writings themselves. Such an approach is, of course, greatly encouraged by Aristotle's own remarks in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. For he concludes Book 1 by drawing a distinction between virtues of thought, often called intellectual virtues (*aretai dianoêtikai*), and those of character, or the so-called moral virtues (*aretai êthikai*, 1103a3–10). The same distinction is repeated at the beginning of Book 2 (1103a14–15) and therefore stands as an introduction to the discussion of moral virtue. Similarly, the distinction is repeated at the beginning of Book 6 (*aretai tou êthous, tês dianoias*, 1138b35–1139a1) and so stands at the head

of Aristotle's primary discussion of practical wisdom. I do not pretend that an investigation of the character-thought (*êthos-dianoia*) distinction can answer all possible questions concerning Aristotle's ethical dichotomy, but it can, I think, put some of his more puzzling remarks into a helpful perspective and thereby render them less difficult.

Let me begin with the *Poetics*, for this treatise is often given short shrift in philosophical circles. Certainly as a work on literary theory the *Poetics* has obvious limitations and even faults, but for our purposes it is of considerable interest, for the character-thought distinction plays a prominent role within the work as a whole and especially within the detailed discussion of tragedy. This discussion begins in Chapter 6, where Aristotle first defines tragedy as an imitation of noble action (1449b24) and then turns his attention to the "qualitative" parts of tragedy, i.e., the parts which are said to belong to every tragedy and to determine the quality of a tragedy (1450a8–9). In order of importance, these parts are plot (*mythos*), character (*êthos*), thought (*dianoia*), diction (*lexis*), song (*melopoiia*) and spectacle (*opsis*). The first three, plot, character and thought, are for Aristotle objects of imitation; the fourth and fifth, diction and music, are the means of imitation; and the sixth, spectacle, is the manner of imitation (1450a10–12). Our concern is with the first group, i.e., with the objects of imitation, and in particular with character and thought, both of which are connected closely with action. Tragedy, Aristotle tells us, is an imitation of action and therefore an imitation in which there are actors or agents who necessarily have certain qualities of character and thought (1449b36–38). Moreover it is from character and thought that we ascribe certain qualities to actions; in the nature of things character and thought are two causes of action (1449b38–1450a2). The statement that character and thought are causes of action is problematic. It lacks a connecting particle and appears to disturb the flow of Aristotle's argument. For this reason it is sometimes relocated and sometimes deleted as a gloss that has found its way into the text.[1] My own view is that the statement should be left as is, but whatever we decide, the statement is quite intelligible and in the context of the *Poetics* makes good sense.[2] It tells us that both character and

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[1] See the discussion of G. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: the Argument* (Cambridge 1963) 237–241, and the literature to which Else refers.

[2] The words in question are taken seriously by A.M. Dale, "Ethos and Dianoia" in *Collected Papers* (Cambridge 1969) 141. The entire article merits a careful reading.

thought determine what we do, and the explicit mention of two causes underlines the fact that character and thought can and often do work their effect independently of each other.

The notion of character (*êthos*) which Aristotle develops in the *Poetics* should interest us, because it is clearly not our modern notion of dramatic character. In fact, it is a strikingly narrow notion which focuses on moral aspects and leaves aside many intellectual attributes. In Chapter 6, Aristotle tells us that character is that which manifests choice (*proairesis*), and for this reason speeches in which nothing is chosen or avoided are lacking in character (1450b8–10). In Chapter 15, he makes essentially the same point: character will be present, if what is said or done reveals a certain choice; and good character will be present, if the choice is good (1454a17–19). Aristotle makes special mention of good character, because he thinks that the finest tragedies focus on persons who are better than the men of his own day (1448a18, 1453a16, 1454b9), but he also recognizes that tragedies do on occasion portray vicious character (1454a28–29). What should especially interest us is that Aristotle makes no attempt to unite character and thought, and indeed he does quite the reverse. His primary discussion of character occurs in Chapter 15 and runs from beginning to end without any mention of thought. And later in Chapter 19, when Aristotle finally gets around to thought, there is no mention of character. The treatment of thought is, of course, exceedingly brief—Aristotle refers the reader to the art of rhetoric (1456a34–35)—but it should be noticed that earlier in Chapter 6, Aristotle states that there could be tragedy without character, and that the tragedies of most of the recent playwrights are characterless (*aêtheis*, 1450a25). Whether or not we choose to take this assertion at face value, it seems clear that Aristotle regards character and thought as two distinct "qualitative" parts, which occur here and there throughout a tragedy. This is not to foist on Aristotle the thesis that character and thought always occur independently of each other. It is rather to credit him with the perfectly straightforward and sensible view that sometimes an actor expresses character, sometimes thought, and sometimes both. He expresses character when he manifests choice or avoidance (1450b8–10); he exhibits thought when he demonstrates and more generally argues for something (1450a6–7, b11–12); and he does both when he combines choice with demonstration.[3]

[3] Below I shall add the important qualification that, for Aristotle, offering an explanation is sometimes attributable to character rather than to thought.

Here a difference between the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric* should be mentioned. In *Poetics* 19, Aristotle not only tells us that an investigation of thought belongs properly to the art of rhetoric (1456a35–36), but also connects thought with effects produced by speech (*logos*, 1456a37), and in this context he makes specific mention of demonstration and emotional appeal (1456a8). At first glance Aristotle's words seem unproblematic, for in the *Rhetoric* he treats demonstration and emotional appeal as two modes of persuasion through speech (*logos*, 1356a1). On reflection, however, Aristotle's words may appear problematic, not because of what is actually said, but because of what is not said. In the *Rhetoric*, persuasion through speech includes not only demonstration and emotional appeal but also persuasion through character (*en tôi êthei, dia tou êthous*, 1356a2, 5). Yet in Poetics 19 there is no mention of character, let alone any reference to persuasion through character. The difference is, of course, real, but it constitutes only an apparent difficulty. What we need to do is recognize that Aristotle's focus is different in the *Rhetoric* and in the *Poetics*. The *Rhetoric* is concerned with finding the possible means of persuasion (1355b25–27). Aristotle criticizes earlier writers on rhetoric for ignoring the enthymeme (i.e., rhetorical demonstration, 1354a14, 1455a6), and discusses in some detail three modes of persuasion, including that which works through an effective presentation of the speaker's character. In contrast, the *Poetics* is concerned with certain forms of imitation which differ from each other in regard to means, object and manner (1447a13–18). Character and thought are regarded as distinct objects of imitation, and within the discussion of tragedy the two are kept quite separate. This is, of course, an abstraction, and Aristotle never says that thought and character cannot be present at the same time. In fact, he states in *Poetics* 6 that thought is the capacity to say what is involved in and appropriate to a situation (1450b4–5), and this will on occasion include an expression of character. But he persists in keeping character distinct from thought, because he is interested in a person's or rather a stage figure's fundamental moral character. This character is an abiding aspect of the personality, and for this reason Aristotle thinks that stage figures should exhibit consistency in their characters (1454a26–28, 31–32). No such requirement holds for the character which is presented together with thought, for in this case the character presented may be quite different from the speaker's fundamental moral character: e.g., when a particular situation calls for deception, thought may be the means for presenting a misleading impression

of the speaker's moral character.[4] This is, of course, effective rhetoric, for persuasion through character may be quite impossible if the speaker gives a true impression of himself. But in the *Poetics* Aristotle is primarily concerned with fundamental moral character and not with impressions artfully and sometimes deceptively introduced by clever speakers.

One more difference between the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric* is of some interest. *Poetics* 6 makes reference to the maxim (*gnômê*) only in connection with thought. It is mentioned alongside of demonstration, and both are regarded as typical exhibitions of thought (1450a7, b11–12). In contrast, *Rhetoric* 2.21 connects the maxim with character. Its use is said to manifest choice (*proairesis*) and therefore to make a speech ethical, i.e., to make it expressive of character (1395b12–16). Once again we can say that the difference is real, yet not a contradiction or confusion. For while the *Rhetoric* does connect the maxim with character, it does so within its discussion of different modes of argument. The discussion of example precedes (2.20), and that of the enthymeme follows (2.22). Moreover, the maxim is explicitly connected with the enthymeme. Maxims, Aristotle tells us, are general statements concerned with practical matters, and since the enthymeme is a syllogism concerned with practical matters, the conclusions and beginnings of enthymemes, considered apart from the syllogism, are roughly maxims (1394a21–28). Aristotle's point here is not complicated. Maxims in themselves are neither syllogisms nor parts of syllogisms, but they are useful in rhetorical arguments, where they occur as either premises or conclusions. To illustrate the matter Aristotle quotes verses from several Greek tragedies including the *Medea*, *Hecuba*, and *Troades* of Euripides, and in so doing he indicates the applicability of his discussion to poetics. Both in rhetoric and in poetics the maxim is appropriately mentioned together with demonstration, and in neither case does this rule out a connection with character. In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle makes the connection explicit, and in the *Poetics* he does not. But his silence in the latter work should not surprise us. For here (i.e., in Chapter 19) he begins his discussion of thought by telling us that the subject properly belongs to rhetoric (1456a35–36, cf. 1450b6) and that we should assume what has been set forth in his writings on rhetoric (1456a34–35). This includes his remarks on the use of maxims in *Rhetoric* 2.21.

[4] Cf. Dale (above, note 2) 145.

Moving on to Book 3 of the *Rhetoric* (a book which was originally independent of the first two books), we should take some notice of Chapter 16, for in this chapter Aristotle discusses narration (*diêgêsis*) and recommends making it ethical (*êthikê*, 1417a16), i.e., he tells us that narration should reveal character. Two ways to accomplish this are given by Aristotle: the narration may either manifest choice or describe the behavior that is typical of a certain kind of character. To illustrate the latter method, Aristotle mentions walking while talking, which is considered a sign of rash and boorish character. In regard to the former method, Aristotle tells us that the quality of character presented in narration is determined by the quality of choice, and that the quality of choice is determined by the end pursued (1417a18–19). Here we have not only the familiar connection between character and choice (cf. *Poetics* 1450b8–9, 1454a17–19, and *Rhetoric* 1395b13–14) but also a clear indication that character and choice are especially concerned with the ends men pursue. In what follows, the term "end" (*telos*) does not recur, but we do find an explicit contrast between character and thought. Aristotle tells us that the speaker's words should not appear to derive from thought, as is the current practice, but from choice. The speaker should say, "it was my wish, for I even chose it, but if I gained nothing, it's still better," for the one is the mark of a practically wise man (*phronimos*) and the other of a good man (*agathos*). Being practically wise resides in pursuing the beneficial, while being good resides in pursuing the noble (1417a23–27). The contrast here between what is beneficial (*ôphelimon*) and what is noble (*kalon*) is, of course, important for understanding Aristotle's ethical dichotomy, but of equal and perhaps even greater interest is his subsequent advice concerning incredible claims. If a speaker's claim to have made a noble choice is not immediately believable, then the cause (*aitia*) should be added, i.e., an explanation should be given (1417a27–28). Aristotle illustrates this by citing the famous lines from Sophocles' *Antigone*, in which the eponymous heroine states that she has shown greater concern for her brother than for husband and children, because her brother cannot be replaced, now that her parents are dead (911–912).[5] At first reading one may be tempted to say that Aristotle is involving himself in a

[5] Antigone's explanation is certainly remarkable, perhaps disturbing and in any case derived from Herodotus, *Histories* 3.119.6 (see B. Knox, *Sophocles: the Three Theban Plays* [Harmondsworth 1982] 46), but that does not affect the point being made here—namely, that in giving a reason she is manifesting character.

contradiction or at least violating his earlier warning against words which appear to derive from thought (1417a23). But Aristotle himself would deny any difficulty, for he does not think that explanation must in every case be attributed to thought. When Antigone explains that she values the irreplaceable, she is manifesting character, which is Aristotle's focus throughout this section.[6] Hence, if one is at a loss to offer a particular cause or explanation, Aristotle recommends a vague appeal to character, i.e., acknowledge that one's words are incredible and yet insist that one is by nature such a person (1417a34–35). Here Aristotle's use of nature (*physis*) is significant. It underlines the fact that he is concerned with the fundamental and enduring quality which is moral character.[7]

It may be helpful to compare *Rhetoric* 2.21, for there too Aristotle sees a connection between character and explanation. He tells us that when we wish to exhibit superior character, we should not avoid using maxims which go against conventional wisdom (1395a18–32). For example, we should reject the idea that friends ought to be treated as future enemies and say that it is better to treat our enemies as future friends. And if our mode of expression fails to make clear our choice (*proairesis*), then we should add the cause or explanation (*aitia*): e.g., treating friends as future enemies is characteristic of a traitor, or the true friend treats his friends as if he will always be their friend (1395a24–31). Here Aristotle is only concerned with manifesting character, and it is toward this end that he recommends adding an explanation which reveals choice. So when a person rejects the popular principle "nothing in excess" and explains that it is necessary to hate bad men excessively (1395a31–32), he not only sets himself apart from conventional wisdom but also reveals his character and moral choice through the reason given. It appears, then, that Aristotle's distinction between character and thought does not locate all cases of explanation on the side of thought. This does not mean that Aristotle would want to deny a distinction between general beliefs and reasons for holding them, but he would, I think, object to identifying (or trying to line up) this distinction with his own distinction between character and thought.

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[6] Here I am disagreeing with Dale (above, note 2) 154.

[7] For the use of *physis* which includes learned character see, e.g., *Eth. Nic.* 7.14. 1154a32–34 and my comments in *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts* (Amsterdam 1984) 231, 298.

This point can be developed by a brief consideration of *Politics* 8, where the topic under discussion is education (*paideia*). Aristotle makes explicit mention of the character-thought distinction (1337a38–39) and connects music with moral training. In young people it produces a certain character by habituating them to take pleasure in the right way (1339a21–25). The pleasure in question is not a matter of pleasant sounds (though they do occur during musical education). Rather it is a matter of taking delight (*chairein*, 1339a24–25, 1340a17) in good character and noble action. Young people are habituated to judge correctly (*krinein orthôs*, 1340a17), i.e., to recognize noble actions for what they are and to be pleased by them. The resulting character is not all there is to being a perfect individual,[8] but it is a desirable disposition and one which Aristotle is prepared to call virtue (1339a22, 1340a15). For our purposes the important point is that Aristotle thinks of musical education as a training in values. Didactic compositions like the elegies of Tyrtaeus are obviously intended to instruct. But a mimetic poem like Homer's *Iliad* can have the same effect. In fact, the mimetic poet may actually borrow from the didactic poet, as Homer (or rather a later rhapsode[9]) borrows from Tyrtaeus in describing the death of a young soldier as something fine and noble (*kalon*)—only Homer has Priam make the point (*Il.* 22.71–73), while Tyrtaeus speaks directly to his audience (fr. 10.30). A youth listening to these lines and to many other poems and songs soon acquires a great many values, and among them some will relate to and explain other values. For example, a youth learns not only that it is noble to die while fighting in the front line but also that it is noble to die fighting for one's country (Tyrtaeus, fr. 10.1–2). And when he has learned this, he sees the point of dying and will wish to endure danger, because in so doing he will be acting and possibly dying for his country (cf. Lycurgus, *Leocr.* 107).

The application to Aristotle's ethical theory is, I think, clear enough. Moral virtue is good character acquired through musical education and other forms of moral training (e.g., parental guidance). This training instills values, and when it is successful, men do what they do with a view to the noble. Hence when discussing courage in *Nicomachean Ethics*

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[8] Perfection requires practical wisdom in addition to the virtue acquired through musical education and other forms of childhood training.

[9] The composition of the *Iliad* is a subject of much philological discussion. Here it is sufficient to note that the passage in question is almost certainly a rhapsode's addition inspired by the elegiac lines of Tyrtaeus. See M. Willcock, *A Companion to the Iliad* (Chicago 1976) 241, and the literature cited there.

3.6–9, Aristotle tells us that the courageous man is guided by what is noble (*Eth. Nic.* 1115b12). His end is the noble (1115b12–13, 21–23), and when he stands his ground in the front line, he does so knowing that death in battle is noble (1115b5) and therefore preferable to flight. Moreover, Aristotle says nothing odd, or even complicated, when he tells us that steadfastness in sudden dangers is the mark of a more courageous man (1117a17–22). Dangers which arise suddenly and call for an immediate response leave no time for calculations of advantage. Endurance is entirely a matter of character and therefore the mark of a more courageous individual. And if the individual survives to explain his action, he will say that he wanted to defend his country and chose to endure, and if he had died, his action would still have been better than flight. Such an explanation is a statement of character and exactly the kind of statement Aristotle recommends for rhetorical narration. It proceeds from character and choice, not from thought (*Rhetoric* 1417a24–26).[10]

An apparent difficulty can be quickly set aside. In the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*, Aristotle connects choice with character (1450b8–10, 1454a17–19; 1395b13–14, 1417a17–18). He does the same often in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (e.g., 1105a32–33, 1106a3–4, 1106b36, 1111b5–6), but here in 3.8 he says that a man may choose to endure foreseen dangers as a result of calculation and reason (1117a21). In other words, Aristotle does not reserve choice for the more courageous individual who acts from character. This may seem inconsistent, but in fact there is no real difficulty. The man who faces danger after calculation does indeed make a choice. Only it is not clear what he values. He may want to defend his country, and he may have defense as his goal, but there are other possibilities. For example, he may care little or nothing for his country and decide to remain at his post, because it is the best means to save his own life or to win fame and fortune. Aristotle thinks that sudden situations are likely to exclude such cases. Other men will flee, but the truly courageous man holds his ground, and he does so because he values defending his country quite apart from other considerations of personal advantage. As Aristotle puts it elsewhere in the *Ethics*, he chooses his action and does so for its own sake (1105a32, 1144a18–19).

Sudden situations calling for immediate response are, of course, exceptional. Most often there is time to reflect on one's situation and

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[10] Here I am clarifying or even modifying the view that I advanced in *Aristotle on Emotion* (London 1975) 74.

to plot a prudent course of action. Aristotle is fully aware of this and accordingly tells us that the courageous man is quick when involved in the thick of action but calm beforehand (1116a9). He will become a deliberator and consider how best to confront a danger. In such cases thought comes into play, and when the thought proceeds flawlessly to a sensible choice of means, Aristotle is likely to speak of practical wisdom working out the means to the desired end. Thus in *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.12–13, Aristotle asks why practical wisdom is necessary and argues *inter alia* that practical wisdom enables one to select the means to a given end. The argument is one of common sense. If a man cannot deliberate effectively in regard to means, he is likely to stumble badly (cf. 1144b11) and never achieve his end. But if Aristotle recognizes the importance of practical wisdom, he also takes note of moral virtue, for each has its own role to play. In Chapter 12, Aristotle tells us that moral virtue makes the target (*skopos*) correct, and practical wisdom the means to it (1144a7–9). In Chapter 13, he expresses himself in much the same way: moral virtue determines the end (*telos*), and practical wisdom makes one do the means to the end (1145a5–6). These statements say exactly what they appear to say. Good character, i.e., moral virtue, guarantees proper values or principles, and like the maxims discussed in *Rhetoric* 2.21 (1394a24), these principles are concerned with action. They determine the ends a man pursues, so that, e.g., a man of courage strives to defend his country against enemy attack. But having defense as an end invites deliberation concerning means, and for Aristotle that is not the business of moral virtue but of practical wisdom. We may compare *Rhetoric* 3.16, where Aristotle first associates character with ends and then contrasts the good man with the practically wise man who exercises thought in the pursuit of advantage (1417a17–28). Here in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle uses "practically wise" (*phronimos*, 1417a26) in a popular sense that does not imply a necessary connection with moral virtue. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle recognizes this usage (e.g., 1145b18–19) but prefers to speak of the clever individual (*deinos*, 1144a23-b1). For our purposes, the important point is that *Rhetoric* 3.16 agrees with passages like *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.12–13 in referring ends and value to character. Moral virtue, i.e., a disposition of character, guarantees the end, while practical wisdom deals with means and generally with prudential considerations.[11]

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[11] I want to thank Professor Carlo Natali and others for their interest, comments and questions.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

ΤΑ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟ ΤΕΛΟΣ AND SYLLOGISTIC VOCABULARY IN ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS[1]

In Book 3, Chapter 2 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle differentiates wish (βούλησις) from deliberate choice (προαίρεσις). The former concerns τὸ τέλος while the latter concerns τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος (1111b26–27). In Chapter 3 of the same book Aristotle restricts deliberation (βούλευσις) to τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη (1112b12). Moreover, in Book 6, Chapter 12, the two perfections necessary for correct deliberate choice, namely moral virtue (ἀρετή) and practical wisdom (φρόνησις), are similarly differentiated. Moral virtue makes correct the σκοπός, while practical wisdom makes correct τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον (1144a8–9). It is evident that any attempt to elucidate Aristotle's theory of deliberate choice will fail unless the Greek phrase τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος is adequately studied and understood. Accordingly, I wish to present a new and, I hope, correct interpretation of this phrase, which is so prominent not only in the *Nicomachean Ethics* but also in the *Eudemian Ethics*.

In the Loeb edition of the *Eudemian Ethics*, Rackham translates the phrase τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος by "the means to his End."[2] In their French translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, R. Gauthier and J. Jolif translate simply *"les moyens."*[3] The German translator Franz Dirlmeier renders the phrase by *"die Mittel zum Ziel."*[4] The context may, indeed, involve deliberation about means to an end, but the translations are fundamentally wrong. There is no word in the formula which carries the special meaning of "means." In this particular usage, the Greek word πρός

[1] This paper has benefited from a year's study at the University of Pennsylvania under the guidance of Professor Glenn R. Morrow. I am greatly indebted to him for his careful and helpful criticisms.

[2] *EE* 1226a8; *Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, The Eudemian Ethics, On Virtue and Vices* (London 1952) p. 289.

[3] *NE* 1111b27; *L'Ethique à Nicomaque* (Louvain 1959) vol. 1, p. 62.

[4] *Aristotles, Nikomachische Ethik* (Berlin 1906) p. 49. For the distinction between *Ziel* and *Mittel zum Ziel*, Dirlmeier (p. 328, n. 49.2) refers to Plato's *Laws* 962B6–8, where an end and means toward that end are mentioned. But Plato's terms are σκοπόν and ὅντινα τρόπον. The latter should not be used to interpret τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. Dirlmeier also cites *Laches* 185B9–D7. There is an interesting πρός in line C6 which is, I believe, relational.

simply indicates a relationship and is employed in both *Ethics* according to the technical usage of the *Analytics*.[5] Let us look at the use of πρός as it is employed in the *Analytics*.

In the *Prior Analytics*, Aristotle discusses the third figure of the syllogism and speaks of the two extreme terms being in a relation to the middle term: τῶν ὅρων ὄντων πρὸς τὸ μέσον (1.6 28a17). The similarity between this phrase and the phrase of the *Ethics* τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος is striking. Both phrases indicate that some things (plural) are in a relationship to something else. Later in the *Prior Analytics*, Aristotle states that there will be no syllogism unless there is assumed some middle term which is related in some way by predication to each of the other two terms: μὴ ληφθέντος τινὸς μέσου, ὃ πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἔχει πως ταῖς κατηγορίαις (1.23 41a3–4). This passage from the *Analytics is* entirely applicable to the doctrine of deliberate choice in the *Ethics*. Only in the latter, Aristotle rarely speaks of a middle term but chooses to talk of an end or goal. In an ethical or practical syllogism the middle term is the goal so that the change of terminology is not only understandable but appropriate. Because practical deliberation (and therefore choice) follows the general rules of syllogistic reasoning, deliberation demands not only a middle term or goal but a middle term in relation to two other terms. Allowing 'T' to stand for the τέλος or middle term we obtain the following schema:[6]

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c}\text{AT}\\ \text{TB}\end{array}}{\text{AB}}$$

We conclude or choose 'AB', both of which terms can be said to be in a relationship to 'T'. Indeed this relationship was absolutely necessary for the existence of the syllogism.

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[5] The fact that in the two *Ethics* Aristotle refers to his *Analytics* has never received the attention it deserves: *EE* 1217a17, 1222b38, 1227a11; *NE* 1139b27, 32. The *Eudemian Ethics*, which may reveal Aristotle's earliest effort to formulate a technical vocabulary, has several passages that are strongly influenced by his concern for the syllogism: e.g., 1217a10ff. (In the original version of this paper, I wrote "The *Eudemian Ethics* should reveal Aristotle's earliest effort." I have changed "should" to "may," for the chronological relation of the *Eudemian Ethics* to the *Nicomachean Ethics* is problematic. In fact, I am now inclined to believe that the *Eudemian Ethics* is the later of the two. For the purposes of this paper, the issue may be left undecided).

[6] I follow Aristotle's practice of putting the subject term to the right.

The example of health given by Aristotle at *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.7 1111b27–28 and in fuller form at *Metaphysics* 7(Z).7 1032b6–9 fits the schema:

(necessary)	(to be healthy)
(to be healthy)	(homogeneity)
(necessary)	(homogeneity)
(homogeneity)	(heat)
(necessary)	(heat)

There are two syllogisms here, of which the conclusion of the first has become the major premise in the second: i.e., "homogeneity is necessary" has become the major premise in the second, while "homogeneity" has become a τέλος or middle term. Where practical deliberation requires a series of syllogisms, there will be several τέλη. That may be why Aristotle, at *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3 1112b34, says that deliberation concerns τὰ πρὸς τὰ τέλη. Alternatively and more probably Aristotle may simply recognize that there is a variety of desired ends, which will be reflected in practical deliberation. This seems to be the case at 1112b12–15, where Aristotle illustrates τὰ τέλη by a series of independent goals: health, persuasion, good government. The plural τὰ τέλη may express the plurality of man's goals.

Although I wish to argue that the expression τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος is technical and that the practical syllogism should be studied with the *Analytics* in mind, I do not want to suggest that all expressions must be forced into the technical language of the *Analytics*. Quite the reverse. For it is the very conjunction of two vocabularies, that of the syllogism and that of the means-end relationship, which has occasioned the repeated misinterpretation of the phrase τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. When Aristotle introduces this phrase into the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he supplies the example of health and says that we choose things through which we shall be healthy: δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν (3.2 1111b28). Aristotle has selected an example that is appropriate to the means-end distinction and therefore uses a phrase, δι' ὧν, from the means-end vocabulary to describe the conclusion.[7]

Sometimes Aristotle adds to the formula τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος a word that suggests the means-end relationship. For example, in the *Eudemian Ethics* he speaks of τὸ συμφέρον and τὰ φέροντα πρὸς τὸ τέλος (2.10

[7] In fact, the phrase "through which" is ambiguous and may belong to syllogistic terminology. This is especially true of the singular δι' οὗ. I discuss this use below.

1227a7, 12).[8] On other occasions he drops the preposition πρός and substitutes expressions which are often understood to connote a means-end relationship. For example, Aristotle says that no one deliberates about the end but that this is laid down for everyone. Rather one deliberates concerning the means leading to this end: whether this or this leads to it. Or once a means has been decided upon, how this means will be realized: περὶ δὲ τῶν εἰς τοῦτο τεινόντων, πότερον τόδε ἢ τόδε συντείνει, ἢ δεδογμένον τοῦτο πῶς ἔσται (2.10 1226b11–13). But even here we should not over emphasize the means-end vocabulary. Although the πῶς does suggest means to an end and can be understood to determine the precise meaning of τεινόντων and συντείνει, we must remember that these verbs by themselves are neutral and need not be translated "leading" to an end. An example may be taken from the *Movement of Animals*. Aristotle says that it is worthwhile to stop and consider the statement that motion requires something external at rest. For the reflection involved will be relevant not only to animals but also to the motion and progression of the universe: ἔχει γὰρ τὴν θεωρίαν οὐ μόνον ὅσον ἐπὶ τὰ ζῷα συντείνουσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς κίνησιν καὶ φοράν (2 698b8–12). In this passage συντείνουσαν ἐπί and συντείνουσαν πρός merely express relevance or relationship, and we are not tempted to translate by an expression signifying means. So in the *Ethics* we should not be tempted to translate expressions which are simply relational by a particular relationship, that of means to an end, unless the context clearly demands the means-end translation. It is an understatement to say that translators of the *Ethics* have succumbed to the temptation more often than they have resisted.

The critical reader may suspect that I am creating distinctions where they do not exist. If the phrase δι' ὧν at *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.2 1111b28 belongs to the vocabulary of means-end, and if verbs like συμφέρειν can be readily combined with the preposition πρός to emphasize the means-end relationship, then it is simplest to let πρός belong to this vocabulary. The meaning of a word like πρός can only be determined by context, and context favors the translation "means to."

I shall meet this objection by showing that the vocabulary of the syllogism occurs elsewhere in the *Ethics* and that a refusal to recognize this has led to serious misinterpretation. Two examples, one from the

[8] But φέρειν πρός, ἐπί frequently expresses simple relationship. See E.B. England's note on Plato's *Laws* 670E3, *The Laws of Plato* (Manchester 1921) vol. 1, p. 332.

Nicomachean and one from the *Eudemian Ethics, will* be selected in order that my case can be established for both treatises.

In *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.9, Aristotle investigates the concept of deliberative excellence. He says that it is a form of correctness in judgment and adds that "correctness" is an ambiguous word. Two examples follow in which formally correct deliberation leads to a correct conclusion but in neither case is the label 'deliberative excellence' applicable. In the second example, Aristotle points out that a correct conclusion can be reached by a false syllogism. It is possible to arrive at what one ought to do, yet not through which (one ought), but the middle term can be false:

> ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ τούτου ψευδεῖ συλλογισμῷ τυχεῖν, καὶ ὃ μὲν δεῖ ποιῆσαι τυχεῖν, δι' οὗ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι (*NE* 1142b22–24).

In this section Aristotle is employing the language of the syllogism. By "through which" he refers to the middle term through which the conclusion is reached. This usage can be exemplified in the *Prior Analytics:* τὸ ΑΒ συμπέρασμα διὰ τοῦ Γ (2.1 53a19–20). So in the passage from the *Nicomachean Ethics* τὸν μέσον ὅρον is explanatory of the δι' οὗ. The syllogism is called false not because the reasoning is erroneous but because the middle term is wrong. This is exactly the point that Aristotle makes in *Eudemian Ethics* 1.6 1217a10–17. One must judge independently the conclusion of a demonstration and the statement of the cause: τὸν τῆς αἰτίας λόγον. Often the conclusion is correct but not for the reason that the argument states: οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν δι' ἥν φησιν ὁ λόγος. ἔστι γὰρ διὰ ψεύδους ἀληθὲς δεῖξαι· δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν. By the phrase τὸν τῆς αἰτίας λόγον Aristotle means the two premises of a syllogism whose middle term is the cause of the conclusion.[9] Through a false middle term or cause it is possible to reach a true conclusion. The διὰ ψεύδους in the *Eudemian* passage is simply a concise expression of the *Nicomachean* passage: δι' οὗ δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ ψευδῆ τὸν μέσον ὅρον εἶναι.

Aristotle, therefore, is making the same point which he makes at great length in the *Prior Analytics*.[10] From false premises a true conclusion can be drawn. From AB and BC can be concluded AC, which is correct even though A does not apply to B nor B to C. There is only one alteration in the *Ethics'* version. Instead of calling the premise

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[9] Aristotle defines both the premise and the total syllogism as a λόγος, *Pr. An.* 1.1 24a16, b18. I discuss these definitions later in this paper. For the middle term being called the cause, *Post. An.* 2.11 94a23.

[10] *Pr. An.* 2.2 53b26ff.

false he calls that term which bridges both premises false. Although the predicate "false" is most appropriately applied to the premise, this confusion of premise and term can be exemplified in the *Analytics*.[11] Moreover, in an ethical discussion it is natural to single out the goal which is the middle term and to call it improper or even false. There are two ways in which the middle term of a practical syllogism leading to a correct conclusion can be false. First, it may be false in both premises: "Seek sweets" (the principle is bad), "These are sweet" (but they are non-sweet and healthful). In consequence I seek something healthful. Second, it may be false only in the major premise: "Seek pleasure" (the principle is unworthy), "This will lead to pleasure" (but it is also an act of courage).[12] As a result I do a courageous act. In neither case would Aristotle say that deliberative excellence was present.

Because commentators have not been alive to the introduction of syllogistic terminology into the *Nicomachean Ethics* they have sometimes misinterpreted the passage under discussion (6.9 1142b22–24). They understand "through which" as an expression from the means-end vocabulary and not as a technical term borrowed from the *Analytics*. Allan argues that a particular action is performed because it is a means leading to an announced end. "Such a means is said to be a 'middle term' in the practical syllogism, and it seems to be termed 'false' either because the agent is mistaken in thinking that it will conduce to the end, or because it is morally unworthy, and a good end ought not to be achieved at such a price."[13] Gauthier and Jolif offer an interpretation similar to that of Allan. Some means are morally bad, and the end does not justify the means.[14]

These interpretations are wrong, for it is the goal of deliberate choice which is in question at *Nicomachean Ethics* 1142b24, and it is the goal which is called the middle term. The conclusion to be drawn is that in the *Nicomachean Ethics* there are two vocabularies and that in some contexts it is important to distinguish syllogistic terminology from means-end terminology. Like δι' οὗ, the phrase τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος belongs to the syllogistic vocabulary. πρός merely indicates relationship, so that it

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[11] E.g., *Pr. An.* 1.6 28a38, 1.24 41b6. Cf. A. Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle* (London 1885) vol. 2, p. 175 and J.A. Stewart, *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford 1892) vol. 2, p. 82.

[12] While the first example is mine, the second may be illustrated from the *Eudemian Ethics* 3.1 1229b31–34. If a man endures death because of the pleasure contained in spirit, he is not called courageous.

[13] D.J. Allan, "The Practical Syllogism," *Autour d'Aristote* (Louvain 1955) p. 336.

[14] Gauthier and Jolif (above, note 3) vol. 2 pp. 516–517.

is best to avoid translating πρός by the particular relationship of means leading to an end.

I turn now to the *Eudemian Ethics*, in which the syllogistic vocabulary is present, though frequently not recognized. To make the, point I refer to 2.11 1227b36–39, where the text has been altered and mistranslated by Rackham. Aristotle has just said that on account of moral virtue the goal would be correct but not τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. The text continues:

> τέλος δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα· ἔστι γὰρ πᾶσα προαίρεσις τινὸς καὶ ἕνεκα τινός· οὗ μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα τὸ μέσον ἔστιν, οὗ αἰτία ἡ ἀρετὴ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι οὗ ἕνεκα. ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἕνεκα.

Rackham deletes the οὗ ἕνεκα after προαιρεῖσθαι and translates:

> But the end is the object for which one acts; for every purposive choice is a choice of something and for some object. The End is therefore the object for which the thing chosen is the mean, of which End goodness is the cause by its act of choice—though the choice is not of the End but of the Means adopted for the sake of the End.

Rackham has erred for two reasons. First, he does not see that μέσον in Aristotle never has the meaning of "mean(s)" toward a goal. An inspection of Bonitz' index yields no example of μέσον used to denote that which causes or produces something else. The only possible example is a passage from the *Metaphysics* (2(α).2 994a11–17) which Bonitz labels by the phrase *"de serie causarum."* This passage does indeed say that in a series the middle member is the cause of a subsequent member. But the label μέσον designates this member by its position in the middle of the series. Only accidentally does μέσον designate a cause.[15]

The same point can be illustrated from *Posterior Analytics* 2.12 95a10–21. The cause is always the middle term in a syllogism. To show why water freezes we construct a syllogism in which term C stands for 'water,' term A stands for 'frozen,' and term B—which is both the cause and the middle term—stands for 'the departure of heat': αἴτιον τὸ μέσον ἐφ' οὗ β, ἔκλειψις θερμοῦ παντελής (*Post. An.* 95a17–18). The word μέσον denotes the cause by its middle position in a syllogism and not as a means to an end.

These illustrations are not meant to deny that the goal which is the syllogism's middle term can be correctly called a cause. From a syllo-

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[15] Cf. *De motu animalium* 10 703a5. Desire is called the middle because it is first moved and then moves; i.e., it is in the middle between the unmoved mover and the moved body.

gistic point of view, the middle term *qua* middle term is necessary for drawing a conclusion and is the cause of the two premises joining and yielding a conclusion. From a teleological point of view, the practical syllogism's goal *qua* goal is the cause of whatever will realize the goal.

Moreover, the middle term in a syllogism need not always be the goal or teleological cause. Sometimes, as in the example from the *Posterior Analytics* the middle term represents the efficient cause. But when Aristotle wishes to denote the efficient cause as efficient cause and not accidentally, he does not use the word μέσον. The close of the first book of the *Eudemian Ethics* offers a good example. The goal is the cause of things under it: τῶν ὑφ' αὑτό (1.8 1218b17). By this Aristotle means two things. It is the syllogistic cause of the conclusion: "This is advantageous for health" (*EE* 1218b19). It is also the teleological cause of the 'this' which will help realize the goal health. The efficient cause is 'this' which is called a healthful object and the motive cause of health: τῆς ὑγιείας αἴτιον ὡς κινῆσαν (*EE* 1218b20). To denote means leading to an end Aristotle does not use μέσον but a word like κινῆσαν.

Returning to our original *Eudemian* passage (2.11 1227b36–39), we may note Rackham's second failing, an inability to handle οὗ ἕνεκα (1227b38). He has deleted it after προαιρεῖσθαι, presumably because he thinks one does not choose the end. This idea may be correct, but Aristotle has already used[16] οὗ ἕνεκα with προαιρεῖσθαι, so that in the second passage (1227b38) Rackham cannot delete it for the presumed reason. We must also note that Aristotle sometimes uses οὗ ἕνεκα without the definite article when clarity would call for usage of the article.[17] This same omission of the definite article is, I believe, a feature of the sentence: οὗ μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα τὸ μέσον ἐστίν (1227b37). οὗ ἕνεκα is not a prepositional phrase but rather the subject of the sentence. τὸ μέσον is a predicate nominative. The sentence simply means "the goal of deliberate choice is the syllogism's middle term." Aristotle's subsequent words can be understood in a straightforward manner. οὗ has as its natural antecedent τὸ μέσον. Virtue is the cause of the middle term because it supplies the goal which becomes the middle term in a practical syllogism. Moreover, the τῷ before προαιρεῖσθαι signals a simple dative of interest. Virtue causes or supplies the middle term for deliberate choice, i.e., for the syllogism involved in deliberate choice. Given this middle term, practical wisdom completes a syllogism and

16 *EE* 2.8 1225a14.
17 *EE* 2.8 1225a14, 2.10 1227a15.

chooses the end or οὗ ἕνεκα deleted by Rackham. Aristotle is now in an apparent contradiction because choice is of τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος and not of τὸ τέλος. He realizes this and "corrects" himself: "Nevertheless choice is not of this end but of things done for its sake": ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἕνεκα (1227b38–39). There has been a simple variation in terminology. Instead of writing ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος Aristotle has written ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου (τοῦ οὗ ἕνεκα) ἕνεκα. This variation is natural because he has just explained the τέλος as τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα (1127b36). These two expressions have a single meaning. They denote the goal as a final cause (cf. *Metaph.* 1(A).3 983a31–32, 2(α).15 994b15–16). When Aristotle wishes to express the relationship of certain things to the goal *qua* final cause, he can employ either τὸ τέλος as the object of πρός or the preposition ἕνεκα. The variation in expression does not correspond to a difference in meaning. It makes no difference whether Aristotle says: οὐθεὶς γὰρ τέλος οὐθὲν προαιρεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος (2.10 1226a7–8) or ἔστι μέντοι ἡ προαίρεσις οὐ τούτου, ἀλλὰ τῶν τούτου ἕνεκα (2.11 1227b38–39). The point is the same in both passages. Deliberate choice is not of the goal or of the middle term in isolation. Rather it is of certain things in relation to (πρὸς, ἕνεκα) the goal or of other terms in relation to the middle term.

We may conclude that syllogistic terminology is prominent in the *Eudemian Ethics* and in order to avoid misinterpretation its presence must be recognized. We have already drawn a similar conclusion for the *Nicomachean Ethics*, so that we may generally affirm the presence of syllogistic vocabulary in both *Ethics*.

We can now give a logical explanation of why practical wisdom and deliberate choice are not of the goal but of τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. As stated in the *Prior Analytics* (1.23 41a3–4), there will be no syllogism unless there is assumed some middle term that is related to (πρός) each of two other terms. In other words deliberation only occurs when there are two terms each of which is related to another term which in practical deliberation is the goal. It is, therefore, correct to say that practical deliberation, deliberate choice, and practical wisdom do not concern the τέλος or middle term *un*related to anything else. They only concern themselves with τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. There is no reasoning and no choice until the middle term is in relation to two other terms. It is logically understandable that Aristotle confines φρόνησις and προαίρεσις to τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. Practical wisdom is deliberative excellence (*NE* 6.5 1140a26, 31) and there is no deliberation unless the middle term is related to two other terms.

There is, however, a passage at *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.9 1142b31–34 that seems to associate practical wisdom with the goal unrelated to anything else. The passage runs as follows:

> εἰ δὴ τῶν φρονίμων τὸ εὖ βεβουλεῦσθαι, ἡ εὐβουλία εἴη ἂν ὀρθότης ἡ κατὰ τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οὗ ἡ φρόνησις ἀληθὴς ὑπόληψίς ἐστιν.

If the relative pronoun οὗ has as its natural antecedent τὸ τέλος, then Aristotle seems to say that practical wisdom is a correct judgment about the τέλος.[18] Apparently the role of practical wisdom is not confined to the consideration of two terms in relation to (πρός) a third middle term which is the goal of deliberate choice. Practical wisdom seems also to consider the goal itself unrelated to anything else.

One way to avoid this interpretation has been suggested by J. Walter.[19] The antecedent of the relative pronoun οὗ is not τὸ τέλος but the whole phrase τὸ συμφέρον πρὸς τὸ τέλος. Although this understanding is grammatically awkward, it does allow Walter to maintain that practical wisdom is limited to what is expedient as a means to the goal.

There is a second explanation that seems to me preferable. Instead of puzzling over the relative and its antecedent, we should consider the whole clause. Aristotle says that practical wisdom is a true *judgment* of the goal, and a judgment always consists in something predicated of something else. Practical wisdom is a correct judgment of the goal inasmuch as the goal is the subject term in this judgment. Practical wisdom needs two premises from which it can draw a deliberate conclusion. One of these premises is a universal judgment about the goal and can be called a καθόλου ὑπόληψις (7.3 1147b4–5). This judgment is analogous to the universal judgment of scientific demonstration—for example, that the triangle has two right angles (6.5 1140b14–16, cf. 6.6 1140b31). I suggest, therefore, that at 1142b34, Aristotle has neither said anything contradictory nor anything unclear—providing we emphasize the word ὑπόληψις and do not confine our attention to the relative pronoun.

Our emphasis on the relationship between deliberate choice and syllogistic reasoning and between τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος and the premises of a syllogism can be seen to accord well with the definition of φρόνησις as a ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθὴς περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτική (*NE*

[18] This understanding of the passage is as old as the Greek commentator Eustratius, *On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* = *CAG* vol. 20 (Berlin 1892) p. 364.28–30.

[19] *Die Lehre von der praktischen Vernunft* (Jena 1874) pp. 470–472.

6.5 1140b20–21). As a perfection concerned with deliberation, practical wisdom concerns itself with λόγοι which in combination lead to a practical conclusion. It does not concern itself with an individual term unrelated to another term. This is a direct consequence of the definitions presented at the beginning of the *Prior Analytics*. A premise is a λόγος καταφατικὸς ἢ ἀποφατικός τινος κατά τινος (1.1 24a16–17). A syllogism is a λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερον τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι (24b18). A term is not λόγος but εἰς ὃν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις (24b16). Because Aristotle thinks of deliberate choice as a kind of syllogism (*NE* 6.9 1142b23, 6.12 1144a31, 7.6 1149a33), he will think of deliberate choice as a kind of λόγος. Like the syllogistic λόγος, the λόγος of deliberate choice involves two premises from which a conclusion follows. It is this practical λόγος and its two premises with which φρόνησις concerns itself. Practical wisdom cannot simply be a true judgment concerning the goal (6.10 1142b34). Not only is it concerned with the universal, but it must also know the particular: οὐδ' ἐστὶν ἡ φρόνησις τῶν καθόλου μόνον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα γνωρίζειν (6.7 1141b14–15). Practical wisdom leads to action, so that it must hold both the universal and particular premises, or the latter more than the former: ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική· ὥστε δεῖ ἄμφω ἔχειν, ἢ ταύτην μᾶλλον (6.7 1141b21–22). From a practical point of view, it is correct to say that the particular premise is more important. But it is not sufficient. Practical wisdom must possess both premises before it can perform a practical syllogism.

*Postscript**

In conclusion, I want to emphasize that the argument presented above has been concerned with syllogistic vocabulary—πρός (τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος), δι' οὗ and μέσον—and the misunderstandings that arise when the occurrence of this vocabulary is not recognized. I have not attempted a full discussion of deliberative excellence, and in particular, I have not attempted to explain why Aristotle draws a sharp distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom. For that distinction, I refer to Chapters 7 and 10 in this volume and to Chapter 4.2–3 in my monograph *Aristotle on Emotion*. What needs to be underlined here is the following. It

* I have replaced the final paragraph of the original version of the article with a postscript.

would be a mistake to think that moral virtue differs from practical wisdom in that the latter but not the former is concerned with judgment. On the contrary, moral virtue is a perfection in regard to emotional response, and as such it guarantees the correctness of the judgments involved in emotional response. Moreover, practical emotions like anger and fright involve goals (taking revenge and escaping danger) that are the occasion for deliberation concerning how best to realize the goals in question. As a perfection of emotional response, moral virtue ensures that one's goal is correct, while practical wisdom ensures that the deliberations concerning this goal are correct. Hence, Aristotle can say that moral virtue makes the σκόπος correct and practical wisdom τὰ πρὸς τὸ τοῦτον (*NE* 6.12 1144a7–9, cf. 6.13 114a5–6).*

* To be clear, I note that an angry or frightened man may not only deliberate concerning how to realize his goal (revenge, escape) but also reflect on whether his emotion is reasonable. The latter would not be a case of means-end deliberation, but it would be a form of deliberation, and as such its correctness would be guaranteed by practical wisdom.

[51/52]

CHAPTER TWELVE

ARISTOTLE'S ANALYSIS OF FRIENDSHIP: FUNCTION, ANALOGY, RESEMBLANCE, AND FOCAL MEANING

Both the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Eudemian Ethics* discuss friendship (*philia*) in detail and both recognize several kinds of friendship: the association of morally good men, the association of pleasure seekers and the association of men seeking their own advantage. Furthermore, both ethical treatises are quite clear that this difference in kind is not to be explained in terms of simple, unmitigated equivocity. Friendships are not like capes, which may be quite unrelated items such as garments and points of land extending into the sea. But how are the several kinds of friendship related? The *Eudemian Ethics* answers this question by introducing the focal analysis of *pros hen* equivocals whose application to being is familiar to students of the *Metaphysics*. What the *Nicomachean Ethics* does is not immediately clear. Many scholars, both ancient and modern, have seen focal analysis in the Nicomachean discussion.[1] That seems to me a mistake that merits correction. For properly understood the Nicomachean treatment of friendship is a complex and sophisticated analysis of considerable independent interest. Two distinct modes of analysis are discernible, yet neither is a focal analysis. In Section I of this paper I shall argue that one analysis involves the peculiarly Aristotelian notion of function and endeavors to mitigate ambiguity by means of analogy. In Section II, I shall consider a different analysis in terms of resemblance. It will be seen that Aristotle's idea of resem-

[1] The following scholars see focal analysis in the Nicomachean treatment: Aspasius 164.3–11; Michael of Ephesus 461.12–16; R. Gauthier and J. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque* (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1959) 2.669, 686; G.E.L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works," in *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century* (Göteborg; Almquist and Wiksell, 1960) 169. F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles, Nikomachische Ethik*, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1964) 513 states that *EN* 1156a6–b6 corresponds to *EE* 8.3 1236a15-b1, but he does not make explicit whether some particular portion of the Nicomachean passage corresponds to the focal analysis of *EE* 1236a17–29. The Eudemian treatment has been accepted most recently by Owen (169, 182), Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles, Eudemische Ethik* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1962) 381–382 and E. Berti, "Multiplicité et Unité du Bien selon *EE* I 8," in *Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik = Peripatoi* I (Berlin 1971) 176. See also H. von Arnim, "Zu W. Jaegers Grundlegung der Entwicklungsgeschichte des Aristoteles," *Wiener Studien* 46 (1928) 34–35; "Eudemische Ethik und Metaphysik," *SB Wien* 207.5 (1928) 5–9.

blance makes room both for logical necessity and also for a special kind of priority that is significantly different from the priority of focal anaylsis. Finally, in Section III, I shall argue that in fact friendship does not admit a focal analysis and that the *Eudemian Ethics* errs in suggesting such an analysis. The *Nicomachean Ethics* is correct to prefer other modes of analysis and may be said to show Aristotle at his logical best.

I

In approaching the Nicomachean analysis of friendship we should recall Aristotle's commitment to function. It is an Aristotelian principle that the being of any functional thing consists in its capacity to perform its function (*Meteor.* 4.12 390a10–13). For any purposeful thing, whether a natural object or an organism, whether a man-devised tool or activity or association, its essential nature is determined by its function and is expressed by the *logos* which states its purpose. This is well known in the case of a non-natural object like the saw. This item is a tool designed for a particular purpose—namely, sawing (*PA* 1.5 645b18) or dividing in a particular way (*Phys.* 2.9 200b5–6). Like all functional things the saw is defined by its function (*Meteor.* 4.12 390a10), so that its use or purpose is contained in its *logos* (*Phys.* 2.9 200a14–15). The case of friendship is, I think, similar. Friendships may differ from saws in so far as they seem to arise naturally (*EN* 8.1 1155a16–22, cf. *GA* 3.2 753a7), but they are like saws in being purposeful. They are goal directed and so defined by their goal or purpose. Indeed, it is because friendships are goal oriented that Aristotle begins his discussion of friendship by considering the objects of friendship (*philêta* 8.2 1155b18, 20): the good, pleasant and useful. Friendships have a goal (*telos* 1155b21) or purpose that determines their essential nature. Since there are three kinds of goals, there are three kinds of friendship (8.3 1156a7–8): those directed toward goodness, those directed toward pleasure and those directed toward utility. When virtuous men come together in friendship, they are eager to do good to one another (8.13 1162b7). There is a kind of rivalry directed toward the good (8.13 1162b8), so that Aristotle can say that each man reaches for the good (8.13 1162b12–13), both in giving and receiving what is good. Their friendship, then, is purposeful and so is defined by its purpose. Similarly, friendship based upon pleasure and friendship based upon utility are goal oriented. In the former kind of association, friends reach for pleasure (8.13 1162b14). A friend

is loved in that he provides pleasure and when he no longer provides pleasure, the friendship is dissolved (8.3 1156a18–21, 8.8 1159b10–11). In the latter kind of association, men come together for advantage (8.13 1162b16–17). They are friends for the sake of personal benefits and cease to be friends when such benefits are not forthcoming (8.3 1156a21–24, 8.4 1157a14–16). It seems, then, that both friendship based upon pleasure and friendship based upon utility are purposeful, and that since their purposes are different, these friendships are essentially different from one another and from friendship directed toward goodness.

It should be emphasized that this way of looking at and dividing up friendships is a peculiarly Aristotelian mode of analysis. That is not to say that in a practical way ordinary Greeks failed to distinguish between associations directed toward goodness, pleasure and utility. In their everyday dealings with one another they undoubtedly recognized different kinds of friendship. But they did not have a conceptual framework suitable for elucidating this difference and were content to use the label "friendship" ambiguously to refer to associations directed toward goodness, pleasure and utility. Aristotle was acutely aware of this ambiguity and was prepared to draw a functional distinction between different kinds of friendship. But he did not legislate a verbal distinction, arbitrarily restricting the usage of "friendship" to one favored kind of association. Two reasons may be offered to explain Aristotle's reluctance to make such a linguistic decision. First, Aristotle had a healthy respect for ordinary usage. He says explicitly that since men call friends those who have regard for one another on account of utility and pleasure, perhaps we, too, must call such people friends (8.4 1157a25–30). Ordinary Greek usage was after all intelligible and even useful in so far as employing a single label helped emphasize similarities between different kinds of friendships. Furthermore, and this is the second reason, Aristotle could mitigate the ambiguity of ordinary usage and so explain and justify the usage of a single label. He could point out that the different kinds of friendship can be related by analogy, and then argue that when things are one by analogy, it is just as if they enjoy a single nature (*An. Post.* 2.14 98a22, cf. *Top.* 1.18 108b27–28). The possibility of an analogical relationship is clear when Aristotle says that the pleasant is a good to friends of pleasure (8.4 1157a33). Filling out the analogy, we get: As the good is related to friends of goodness, so the pleasant is related to friends of pleasure (cf. 10.3 1173b33–34). The associations formed by seekers of pleasure are analogous to those formed by morally

good men, so that they enjoy a quasi-common nature. A similar analysis is also possible in the case of friendships directed toward utility. Just as the good is related to friends of goodness and the pleasant is related to friends of pleasure, so also the useful is related to friends of utility. All three kinds of friendship may be related by analogy and therefore called friendships without simple, unmitigated equivocation.

II

Friendship based upon pleasure has a resemblance (*homoiôma*) to the friendship of morally good men, for good men are pleasant to each other (1157a1–2, cf. 1158b6–7). Friendship based upon utility resembles the friendship of morally good men, for good men are also useful to each other (1157a2–3, cf. 1158b6–8). This relationship of resemblance is important. Aristotle recognized that many things share a common label on account of similarity (cf. 1157b33) and in particular that the equivocity of friendship can be explained in terms of resemblance. Here, however, a certain clarification is necessary. Aristotle sometimes speaks of resemblance by analogy (cf. 7.4 1148b10, *PA* 1.4 644b11). This kind of resemblance has concerned us in the preceding section. It differs from simple cases of resemblance in that it regularly involves four terms arranged in a supposedly self-evident scheme of proportion. In contrast, simple cases of resemblance do not involve four terms arranged in the manner of an arithmetic proportion. Rather two terms are related directly on the basis of some similarity or common feature. Clearly friendships can be said to resemble one another in both ways. When Aristotle says that associations based upon pleasure and utility are to be called friendships on account of resemblance and then goes on to say that the pleasant is a good to friends of pleasure (1157a31–33), he seems to be thinking of resemblance by analogy. But when he speaks of resemblance and then explains himself by referring to a common feature such as the pleasure involved in both friendships based upon pleasure and friendships based upon moral goodness (1157a1–2, 1158b6–8), then he seems to be thinking of a direct relationship based upon a similarity or common feature. This is not confusion but rather the mark of a rich analysis. Aristotle recognizes that friendships resemble one another in two ways and offers an appropriately complex account of the relationship existing between friendships based on moral goodness, pleasure and utility.

Aristotle's analysis in terms of simple resemblance is not to be confused with a Wittgensteinian analysis in terms of family resemblance. For Aristotle does not associate resemblance with a denial of properties common to all kinds of friendship. Rather Aristotle actually recognizes common features which are logically necessary for the occurrence of friendship and therefore determine in part at least whether something is to be called friendship. These features are reciprocal affection, wishing well and awareness (1155b27–1156a5). Interestingly, Aristotle's primary reason for enumerating these necessary marks of friendship seems to be a concern with everyday notions of friendship. Men say that it is necessary (*phasi dein* 1155b31) to wish a friend well and for this reason a man's love of wine is not called friendship. Aristotle recognizes that wishing well, reciprocal affection and awareness are all necessary features of friendship as conceived of by ordinary men, and therefore is prepared to ask rhetorically how anyone could speak of friends who are unaware of each other's regard (1156a3).

Concerning necessary features two caveats are in order. First, wishing well may be a necessary feature of friendship, but it also may also be a determinable and not a determinate feature of friendship. Indeed, Aristotle seems to say as much. At least, he argues that friends (1156a9–10) wish each other well in the way in which they are friends. If the friendship is based upon utility or upon pleasure, wishing well is self-interested and dependent upon the attainment of some advantage or pleasure. But if the friendship is based upon moral goodness, wishing well is not self-interested and depends upon the moral goodness of friends.

The second caveat concerns Aristotle's usage of the Greek verb *dei*. Certain uses that might be thought to imply logical necessity need not be so construed. For example, when Aristotle says that the perfect friendship of morally good men includes within itself everything which ought (*dei*) to belong to friends (1156b18–19, cf. 1156b35), he is not saying that the features of perfect friendship are logically necessary for friendship. Such an interpretation is ruled out by the fact that many friendships are lacking in one or more of these features. Instead, the verb *dei* may be construed as an evaluation: friendship ought (it's good) to have these features. And friendships that do are rated best (1156b24). Alternatively, it may be a matter of hypothetical necessity: if friendship is to be lasting (1156b18), then it must have these features. Or perhaps the *dei* may be taken ambiguously in both ways. But there is no logical necessity here. Aristotle is not saying that all these features are part of

the essential nature of friendship, so that it is logically necessary for every friendship to possess the features of perfect friendship.

Whatever the proper interpretation of *dei*, it is certainly true that Aristotle looks upon the friendship of morally good men as a kind of standard or central case which has everything expected of friendship. This has a clear consequence for Aristotle's analysis in terms of simple resemblance. He picks out the friendship of morally good men and says that it is on account of resemblance to this kind of friendship that associations based upon pleasure and utility appear to be friendships (1158b6–7, cf. 1157a1–2).[2] Aristotle's reason for picking out the friendship of morally good men is not obscure. Their association is perfect or complete (*teleia* 1156b34).[3] It involves not only virtue but also pleasure and advantage. This means that the friendship of morally good men can mediate a relationship between friendships based upon pleasure and friendships based upon utility. In regard to pleasure and utility friendships based upon pleasure and utility do not resemble one another. The utility friendships of old men are most often lacking in pleasure and the pleasure friendships of younger people may be quite harmful. But both resemble the friendship of morally good men and so are related indirectly to one another. This is not to suggest that all resemblances must be mediated through the friendship of morally good men. Since all friendships involve wishing well, reciprocal affection and awareness, friendships based upon pleasure and utility may be said to resemble each other directly in these three respects. But in the important areas of pleasure and utility direct resemblance fails. The relationship is established indirectly by reference to friendship based upon moral goodness. Perfect friendship becomes a kind of focus of resemblance. It has the priority of mediator. But this kind of priority is not the priority of focal analysis. It is not the priority of a focal definition mentioned in or implied by dependent definitions.*

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[2] I am indebted to Richard Sorabji for calling these passages to my attention and for suggesting the point developed in the remainder of this section.

[3] A full account of 'complete' friendship would mention many things including the fact that it involves moral goodness (1156b7) and is for the sake of the friend (1156b10), that it endures (1156b11, 18) and is both useful and pleasant (1156b13–17), that it involves likeness (1156b20), both like persons (1156b8) and like benefits (1156b34), and that it is characterized by equality (1158a1) and involves time spent making acquaintance (1156b25–33) and time spent living together (1157b19–22). It is perfect in time and in all other respects (1156b33–34), and so is most especially friendship (1157b24).

* For a similar analysis of emotional response, see "Aristotle and Theophrastus on the Emotions," Section 7 = Chapter 6, pages 92–95 in this volume.

III

The Nicomachean analysis proceeds in terms of similarity and analogy. Focal analysis does not seem to be used. What, then, are we to say concerning the *Eudemian Ethics* and the possibility of focal analysis? Is it really the case that the *Eudemian Ethics* not only illustrates focal analysis by means of a stock example but also goes on to apply this mode of analysis to friendship?[4] To be sure, a stock example is given and the involvement of the focal definition in all other definitions is stated (7.2 1236a20–22). But the *Eudemian Ethics* does not go on to apply this analysis to the different kind of friendship. Having stated that the focal *logos* must appear in the other definitions, the Eudemian version does not show how the definition of perfect or primary friendship is involved in the definitions of other kinds of friendships. I suggest that one reason, the most important reason, for this failure to proceed is that focal analysis does not fit the case of friendship. The author of the *Eudemian Ethics*, whether he be the young Aristotle or a later imitator, may have thought that he could apply focal analysis. But his failure to spell out the application suggests that he found the application difficult; and the silence of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in respect to a focal analysis of different kinds of friendship suggests that such an analysis was or would be ill-conceived.

The remarks of Aspasius are instructive. He introduces the idea of focal analysis, suggests that this analysis applies to the case of friendship, picks out the association of morally good men as primary friendship and says that the other associations are called friendships on account of resemblance (*kath' homoiotêta* CAG 19.1 164.10). There is a certain confusion here. In the preceding section we have observed how an analysis in terms of resemblance makes room for a special kind of priority. As a mediator of resemblance perfect friendship may be described as a focus of resemblance. But resemblance is not an adequate basis for focal analysis as explained in the seventh book of the *Eudemian Ethics*. And if Aspasius and other commentators after him have thought that it is an adequate basis, they are mistaken. This point has already been argued by Professor Owen, who points out Aristotle's consistent refusal to apply focal analysis to artistic imitations.[5] A painted eye resembles a living eye and is called an eye because it resem-

[4] Cf. Owen (above n. 1) 169.
[5] *Ibid.* 187–189.

bles a living eye. Nevertheless for Aristotle this case of ambiguity is not to be mitigated by focal analysis. Aristotle's reason for not applying focal analysis is, according to Owen, clear and unvarying. A living eye "is defined by what it does" and a painted eye cannot see.[6] It in no way shares the function of a living eye and can only be equivocally called an eye. It is like a wooden saw which cannot fulfill the purpose for which saws are designed. Though it resembles a saw, it is not said to be a saw but rather a likeness (*Meteor.* 4.12 390a13).

The general case is clear. Aristotle does not apply focal analysis to things related simply by some resemblance, especially when function or purpose is involved. The particular case of friendship is, I think, also clear. Aristotle does not apply focal analysis to relate several different kinds of human association, each of which is defined by its own goal. Though they resemble perfect friendship, the other friendships are not focally dependent upon perfect friendship. First we may consider the friendship of pleasure seekers. This kind of friendship is essentially an association for the sake of pleasure. It can be defined as an association based upon pleasure and involving reciprocal affection and mutual awareness. The definition neither mentions perfect friendship nor something which implies perfect friendship. The definition does mention pleasure which is a point of similarity between the friendship of pleasure seekers and the friendship of morally good men. But pleasure is not conceptually dependent upon perfect friendship, so that the friendship of pleasure seekers is not conceptually dependent upon perfect friendship and its definition need neither mention perfect friendship nor include the definition of perfect friendship.[7]

The friendship of pleasure seekers does resemble perfect friendship, because both friendships are pleasant. This resemblance is real and quite important for explaining ordinary Greek usage. But this resemblance is not mentioned in the functional definition of the friendship of pleasure seekers. From a functional point of view, friendships based upon pleasure are described, not defined, as similar to perfect friendship. They are not conceptually dependent upon perfect friendship, for it is possible, even common, to understand and engage in friendships based upon pleasure without understanding perfect friendship. Were

[6] *Ibid.* 188.

[7] I discuss below the possibility of establishing a focal connection by relating the objects of friendship directed toward pleasure and of friendship directed toward moral goodness.

friendships based upon pleasure focally dependent upon perfect friendship, this would not be the case.

The case of friendship directed toward utility is more complicated, but it remains true that such a friendship is not focally dependant upon the friendship of morally good men. The complication is that the useful seems to be the means for attaining something good or something pleasant, so that the goals of friendship are reduced to the good and the pleasant (1155b19–21, cf. 1156b19–20, 1157b26–27). This does seem to be a way of establishing a conceptual dependence between kinds of friendship. But two points should be noted. The first is relatively unimportant. It is that this manner of establishing logical connection does not proceed directly from friendship to friendship. It takes a round-about route through objects or goals. The second point is more important. This way of establishing a conceptual dependence does not establish the priority of friendship directed toward goodness. For the useful is the means to *both* the good *and* the pleasant. The posteriority of utility and therefore of utility friendship may be implied in construing the useful as means to the good and the pleasant. But the friendship of pleasure seekers is left on an equal footing with the friendship of goodness. It enjoys an equal claim to priority and is not shown to be focally dependent upon friendship based upon goodness.

Although the priority of perfect friendship does not seem to be established by focal analysis, there is, of course, a limited way in which focal analysis is applicable to each kind of friendship. Beginning as Aristotle does with the *philêton* (1155b18) or object of friendship, at least two independent focal series can be established. There are two *philêta*, each being an independent goal: the morally good and pleasant (1155b20–21). Each of these goals is a focus upon which conceptually depend several paronyms. Upon *philêton* in the sense of the good depend *philia*, meaning an association directed toward the good, and *philein*, meaning to wish someone well because he is good. Upon *philêton* in the sense of the pleasant depend *philia*, meaning an association directed toward the pleasant, and *philein*, meaning to wish someone well because he is pleasant.

These lists of focally related paronyms can be extended by adding other paronyms like *philos*. But can the lists themselves be focally related to each other? Following the *Eudemian Ethics* (1236a17–18) we might try to relate the two lists by relating focally the different friendships or *philiai*. But such an attempt would be futile. Primary friendship is not the focus upon which other friendships conceptually depend. Rather, each

friendship is defined by and logically dependent upon its goal which is the focus of an independent focal series. The only possible way to relate focally these series would seem to be by relating focally the goals that generate the independent series. But concerning this possibility, the *Eudemian Ethics* is silent. To be sure, the *Eudemian Ethics* observes a connection between what is pleasant and what is good for somebody and apparently good (1236a9–10).[8] But it also recognizes a distinction between things pleasant without qualification and things pleasant for somebody. The latter group of pleasant things is coordinated with things good for somebody, while the former group is coordinated with things good without qualification (1235b31–1236a10). If a focal connection between friendships is to be established, it is a focal connection between things pleasant and good without qualification that must be established. But this is never established, and as the *Eudemian Ethics* goes on it seems to recognize that the connection is a matter of simple concomitance, which can break down when something interferes (1236b26–28).

If friendship directed toward pleasure is focally dependent upon friendship directed toward moral goodness, the focal relationship must proceed through the objects. That means that the definition of pleasure must mention or include the definition of moral goodness. Neither the *Eudemian Ethics* nor the *Nicomachean Ethics* gives us such a definition. And that is not surprising, for the problem is not peculiar to the discussion of friendship. It is the old problem of establishing some relationship between the various goals of human activity, the various things desired and loved for their own sake and called good in themselves. The problem is discussed without resolution at the end of the first book of the *Eudemian Ethics*. The goal, we are told (1.8 1218b10–24), is the cause of subordinate goods, and if the goal is first defined, then each of the subordinate goods can be shown to be good. In other words, subordinate goods are conceptually or focally dependent upon the goal; their goodness is not a problem because it can be established logically. It is the goal which is a problem, for there seem to be several goals logically independent of one another, each being the cause of its own focal series. With this in mind, the *Eudemian Ethics* (1218b25–26) states that in regard to the good as goal for man and in regard to the best of the practicables one must consider in how many ways the best of

[8] Cf. Berti (above, n. 1) 176.

all is said. The *Eudemian Ethics* encourages us to pin down the different goals, but it does say that the goals themselves can be focally related. Only analogy is hinted at. It is false, we are told (1.8 1218a30–33), that all existing things aim at some one good, for each thing seeks its own good: the eye sight, the body health, and in the same way another thing another good.[9]

The Nicomachean discussion of things desirable in their own right suggests more clearly an analogical analysis. In respect to being goods desirable in themselves, honor, wisdom and pleasure have different *logoi*. There is no common *logos* stating what it is to be good as a goal. Yet the equivocation involved in calling these different things good is not fortuitous. Aristotle mentions the possibility of a focal or generic relationship,[10] and then seems to come down in favor of analogy: for example, as sight is in the body, intelligence is in the soul, another is in another (1.6 1096b23–29). What the *Eudemian Ethics* hinted at, the *Nicomachean Ethics* suggests with greater clarity: the various goods in themselves are to be related by analogy. Their *logoi* are different and other. In particular, the *logos* of pleasure as a good in itself is different and other (1096b24). It is not focally related to and so is not conceptually dependent upon some other *logos*. As a goal, pleasure is not to be related focally but rather by analogy to other goals.

Similarly at least two *philêta* have *logoi* which are different and other. Pleasure is not focally dependent upon moral goodness so that the paronymous series generated by these different goals cannot be focally related. Neither directly nor indirectly through their objects can the two

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[9] I agree with Berti (above, n. 1) 177–179 and D. Robinson, "Ends and Means and Logical Priority," in Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik = Peripatoi 1 (Berlin 1971) 185–187 that EE 1218b10–24 recognizes the conceptual and focal dependence of means upon end. Furthermore, I find myself in agreement with Robinson that the idea of *prôton philon* as set forth in Plato's *Lysis* (219–220) is to be related to the idea of *prôton agathon* as elucidated in EE 1.8 (187–188). However, without qualification I cannot follow Robinson in his remarks about the uniqueness of the primary good in EE 1.8. It may be that uniqueness is necessary, if the primary good is "to compete with a Platonic idea *tou agathou*" (191), but this uniqueness seems to be called into question by 1218b25–26 and by the suggestion of analogy at 1218a30–33.

[10] Aristotle's first suggestion for mitigating ambiguity is understood by most scholars (including now Berti [above, n. 1] 180, n. 70) to be a focal analysis. In my "Nicomachean Ethics, 11096b26–29," *Phronesis* 11 (1966) 185–194, I have argued that this first suggestion does not introduce a focal relationship but rather a generic relationship. Whatever the correct interpretation, Aristotle seems to prefer analogy and certainly does not tell us how focal analysis might be applied so as to show a focal dependence of pleasure upon moral goodness.

kinds of friendship be related focally. The *Eudemian Ethics* is mistaken in suggesting focal analysis and the *Nicomachean Ethics* is correct in passing it by. The Nicomachean account of friendship reveals Aristotle at his best. He offers both an analysis in terms of resemblance and an analysis in terms of function and analogy, but he does not err in attempting to give a focal analysis. He seems to know not only the powers but also the limitations of his several modes of conceptual analysis.[11]

[11] I must express my gratitude to Fadlou Shehadi and Amelie Rorty who read and commented upon an early version of this paper, to Richard Sorabji who did likewise with later versions, to members of the Kings College seminar on Aristotle for searching criticisms and to the American Council of Learned Societies for support while working on this final version.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

MENANDER'S *PERIKEIROMENE:* MISFORTUNE, VEHEMENCE, AND POLEMON

It is a well-known and well-received view that Menander's *Perikeiromene* revolves around a misfortune (*atychêma*) in the sense spelled out by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.8 1135b16–19.[1] Polemon, we are told, cuts off Glykera's hair in a fit of anger caused by ignorance for which he is not responsible. His action, therefore, falls into Aristotle's first category of harms and is not to be classified as either an error (*hamartêma*) or an injustice (*adikêma*). This view is by no means foolish, but it seems to me at best a half-truth, which can lead to a mistaken or inadequate interpretation of Polemon's character and of the *Perikeiromene* in general. Accordingly, I want to offer here a correction or classification in four steps. First, I want to make clear that there is no necessity to opt for a single Aristotelian classification. Polemon's violent deed admits different descriptions and therefore can be classified both as an injustice and as a misfortune or error. This is not only of some philosophical interest but also of some dramatic importance, for the possibility of various descriptions and classifications helps to create an interesting play. Second, I shall argue that the sole reason for classifying Polemon's act as a misfortune is that Polemon cannot be expected to know of the brother-sister relationship existing between Glykera and Moschion. External causation, natural or divine, is not a reason. The Goddess sets up a situation that arouses Polemon's innate vehemence, but such divine involvement is entirely compatible with full human agency and responsibility. Third, I shall point out that the idea of a misfortune is not in play when Pataikos defends Polemon against the charge of wanton action. For an Aristotelian the proper defense is an appeal to vehement anger. Fourth and last, I want to suggest that while misfortune and vehement temperament are often grounds for forgiveness, they are not the grounds on which Polemon ultimately receives for-

[1] M. Tierney, "Aristotle and Menander," *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy* 43 (1935–1937) C.249, T.B.L. Webster, *Studies in Menander*[2] (Manchester 1960) 7, 204–205, E. Handley, *The Dyskolos of Menander* (London 1965) 186, W.T. MacCary, "Menander's Soldiers: Their Names, Roles and Masks," *American Journal of Philology* 93 (1972) 283.

giveness. It is simply the happy consequence of his violent deed which justifies forgiveness, and in the *Perikeiromene* this is dramatically correct.

I

Actions can be described in more than one way. This is not a new observation, but it is an observation of some importance both for classifying harms and for appreciating the dramatic possibilities of a particular harmful act. What we must be clear about is that under one description an action may be an injustice, while under another it may be a misfortune or mistake.[2] Under one description it may be correct to say that an agent knows (εἰδώς 1135b20) what he is doing and therefore commits an injustice, while under another description it may be correct to say that an agent acts in ignorance (μετ' ἀγνοίας 1135b12) and therefore errs or suffers a misfortune. Consider an Aristotelian example (1135a28–30). I strike a man who is my father, knowing that it is a man but not that it is my father. If I am hauled into court and charged with striking my father (if my action is described as father-striking), I can plead ignorance and my action will not be classified as an injustice. But if I am charged with striking a man (if my action is described as man-striking), I cannot plead ignorance. Assuming that I cannot justify my action as, say, part of my duty as a soldier, the charge will stick and I shall be convicted of an injustice in striking a man.

The same sort of distinction works on the comic stage. Suppose we are dealing with a play of recognition in which a son has been separated from his father since birth. They meet, an altercation develops, son strikes father and a series of events ensues terminating in the mutual recognition of father and son. If we focus on the father-son relationship, we shall say that the son acted in ignorance and therefore did not commit an injustice. We shall also say that the action has special dramatic importance in so far as it begins a process of discovery. But we would be making a serious mistake, were we to confine our attention to the father-son relationship and to think of the son's violent act only under the description of son striking father.

[2] I am especially indebted to Richard Sorabji (Kings College, London) for calling this point to my attention.

The reason is that all or most of the characters in the play may be ignorant of this relationship and therefore apt to think of the violent act under a different description. Indeed, their feelings may be determined entirely by the belief that a man has struck a man and in so doing committed an injustice. Moreover, even a character who is aware of the father-son relationship may be governed primarily by thoughts of injustice. Of course, such a character recognizes that the act is a misfortune or error when it is described as an instance of son striking father. But for one reason or another the character may be interested in the act as an instance of man striking man. He views the act as an injustice and behaves accordingly. All this makes for an interesting play. A single act of violence may be both an injustice inviting censure and a misfortune or error leading to reunion. This is not confusion but rather the sort of complexity that enriches comedy.

The application to Menander's *Perikeiromene* should be obvious. Polemon's violent deed admits more than one correct description and therefore more than one classification. If we describe Polemon's act in such a way that we mention or imply the sibling relationship existing between Glykera and Moschion, then Polemon can plead ignorance and his act is either a misfortune or an error. We shall say that Polemon's act is dramatically important in that it sets in motion a chain of events leading to recognition and reunion, and we shall insist that it is not an injustice because it does not satisfy the knowledge-criterion (1135b20). However, if we describe Polemon's action in another way, if we say, for example, that Polemon treats Glykera in a manner unworthy even of a slave girl (cf. 725 OCT = 318 Teubner), then we shall say that Polemon commits an injustice.[3] We shall also understand why Polemon ends up in tearful repentance (174 = 54) and why Glykera is hostile to the idea of further interaction with Polemon (722–723 = 315–316). Polemon breaks down in tears because he thinks he has committed an act of unjustified violence. He knows nothing of Glykera's relationship to Moschion

[3] The text at 725 = 318 is fragmentary and difficult to restore. I prefer a restoration like that of van Leeuwen (*Menandri Fabularum Reliquiae* [Leiden 1919] 85). Polemon is said to have treated Glykera in a way that no one would treat a slave girl. However, it is possible to restore the text so that Polemon is said to have treated Glykera as though she were a slave girl (F. Allinson, *Menander, The Principal Fragments* = Loeb ed. [London 1921] 256.) Still, neither restoration describes Polemon's deed in such a way that ignorance and misfortune are possible pleas. Glykera knows the extent of Polemon's ignorance and yet can properly call his deed ἀνόσιον (724 = 317).

and so cannot be upset by the thought of having acted against a girl in the embrace of her brother. His tearful regret is grounded entirely upon the correct belief that he has seriously mistreated another person. Glykera, of course, knows that Polemon is ignorant of her relationship to Moschion and therefore should be prepared to say that Polemon erred or experienced misfortune in taking action against a sister in the embrace of her brother. But she is asked to live with Polemon and so is interested in his action under a different description. She sees it as outrageous, even contumelious treatment unworthy of anyone, including slave girls (723–725 = 316–318). She would agree with Doris in speaking of injustice (188 = 68) and understandably refuses reconciliation.

II

In the preceding section, I have said that when Polemon's action is described in such a way as to mention or imply that Glykera is the sister of Moschion, then it is to be classified as a misfortune or error. I have avoided saying outright that it is a misfortune, because that needs to be shown. Aristotle's remarks concerning misfortune are exceedingly brief, but when they are combined with remarks concerning involuntary action (3.1 1109b30–1111b3) a fairly clear picture emerges. Aristotle recognizes two independent reasons for classifying a piece of behavior as a misfortune: (1) it has a consequence beyond reasonable expectation and (2) it has an external cause outside the agent's control. In my opinion, only the first reason can plausibly justify classifying Polemon's deed as a misfortune. Polemon does not know that Glykera is the sister of Moschion, and it may be that he could not be expected to know about this relationship. But here there is a difficulty in that Polemon seems to have responded straightway (988 = 410) without making an effort to learn whether or not Glykera could explain her behavior. We may compare the *Misoumenos* where Krateia is discovered in the embrace of her newly found father. Suspicion is immediate, but punishment is not, so that an adequate excuse can be offered and injustice avoided (222 OCT). It is not altogether certain whether Polemon himself saw Glykera in the arms of Moschion or Polemon learned of the embrace from Sosias. But since Polemon directed his anger entirely against Glykera and did not go after Moschion, it seems most likely that Polemon learned about the embrace from Sosias and did not see

the two together.[4] If this is the case, Polemon should have had at least a moment or two to get under control. He should have asked questions and in so doing should have given Glykera the opportunity to explain her behavior. However, there is little reason to think that Glykera would have revealed the brother-sister relationship. The goddess tells us that prior to Polemon's arrival Glykera had preferred to conceal the relationship for Moschion's sake (147–150 = 27–30) and we know that after Polemon's violent deed Glykera continued to conceal the relationship (160–162 = 40–42). Apparently we must say that Polemon did not make a reasonable effort to find out why Glykera was in the arms of Moschion, but had he done so, he would not have found out that Glykera and Moschion are brother and sister.[5] If we focus on Polemon's failure to investigate Glykera's motives, we may want to speak of his action as a culpable error. But if we focus on the improbability of learning about Glykera's relationship to Moschion, we may want to say that Polemon's action described in terms of this relationship is a misfortune.[6]

Artistotle's second reason for classifying a piece of behavior as a misfortune, external causation, cannot be appealed to in the case of Polemon. Of course, Polemon is confronted with an unexpected situation to which he must respond. To this extent there are external factors in play. But this does not mean that Polemon's agency is in any way diminished. Cutting off Glykera's hair is very much his own response. He assesses the situation and acts upon his assessment, so that from the standpoint of external causation his action seems to be more an error originating in himself than a misfortune originating from outside (1135b18–19).

[4] Prof. E.W. Handley suggested this reading to me. Cf. MacCary (above, n. 1) 282. At 356–357 = 166–167 Sosias considers the possibility of reporting falsely that Glykera is with Moschion. Presumably this would be a second report.

[5] Still Polemon might have learned something. For even if Glykera chose not to reveal the brother-sister relationship, she might well have said something to establish or support her innocence. Cf. 708–719 = 301–312, where she convinces Pataikos that her motives are pure without revealing the sibling relationship. This relationship remains unknown to Pataikos until 827 = 397, where Moschion comes forward to identify himself.

[6] The *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* seems to agree with the *Nicomachean Ethics* in that it marks off a misfortune from an error on the grounds that a misfortune is not due to the agent himself but rather to other persons or to chance. However, it seems to go beyond the *Ethics* in connecting misfortune with failure to accomplish nobly or well conceived plans (4 1427a35–37). This addition makes it even more difficult to think of Polemon's act as a misfortune. He has neither thought up a good plan of action nor been frustrated in its execution.

When Aristotle speaks of external causation he seems to be thinking of force or violence over which a man has no control. We may think of a man whose hand is grabbed and slammed against someone else (1135a27–28). Or again we may think of a man who is picked up and carried along by the wind (1110a3). Such men suffer misfortune due to external causation. But when Polemon flares up and moves against Glykera, he is himself acting and not a victim of external forces. He does not suffer misfortune.

A possible misinterpretation should be anticipated. Early on in the play the goddess Ignorance addresses the audience and claims to have led Polemon into an unnatural display of anger (163–165 = 43–45). These words should not be pressed to mean that Polemon is a victim of external causation. The role of the goddess is quite compatible with Polemon's own agency and responsibility.[7] She does not cause a misfortune but rather sets up a situation in which Polemon's vehement temperament is aroused to extraordinary anger. This is an important point for understanding the *Perikeiromene*. Cutting off Glykera's hair may not be typical of Polemon's behavior. But neither is it something altogether unrelated to Polemon's character. He is *sphodros* (128 = 8), a vehement individual who may be expected to jump up and come running if he hears that Glykera is in the company of another lover

[7] On the general compatibility of divine and human agency see W. Ludwig, "Die plautinische *Cistellaria* und das Verhältnis von Gott und Handlung bei Menander," in *Ménandre* (Geneva 1970) 79–80. On the *Perikeiromene* see 92–93. However, Ludwig may be conceding too much to the divinity, when he says that Polemon's anger does not correspond to his *natürliche Wesensart* (φύσις) and therefore is a work of the divinity (92). Polemon is by nature a *sphodros*. His natural temperament is not at odds with extreme anger and actually predisposes him to such anger. When the goddess says that Polemon is not φύσει (164 = 44) such a person, she is not denying that Polemon is *sphodros* (128 = 8). To be sure the word φύσις is used often in connection with innate temperament, but it can be used also in connection with acquired character. Cf. Aristophanes, *Nubes* 1187, where Solon is said to be *demos*-lover τὴν φύσιν. Such a character is learned and not innate in the way that a temperament may be. (Compare our use of "nature" for learned or moral character: e.g., "It's not his nature to act so shamefully.") Moreover, φύσις may be used primarily to emphasize an attribute. Cf. *Nubes* 537, where Aristophanes' play is decent φύσει. We might say "basically" decent. (Cf. W. Starkie, *Aristophanes, The Clouds* [London 1911] 133.) For a Peripatetic parallel, cf. Aristotle's *Rhet.* 3.16 1417a35, where the phrase φύσει τοιοῦτος is used to underline and support noble intentions arising from good moral character. So in the *Perikeiromene*, when the goddess wishes to make clear that Polemon's moral character is basically sound (this is important, if Polemon is ultimately to be reconciled with and married to Glykera), she uses the phrase οὐ φύσει τοιοῦτον ὄντα (164–165 = 44–45) and thereby underlines the fact that Polemon's deed does not manifest his true (acquired, moral) character.

(356–357 = 166–167). When he responds to correction by shouting (499 = 239), when he repeats himself thereby underlining despair (506–507 = 256–257), when he piles up antecedent clauses (514–516 = 264–266), and when he humorously persists in urging an inspection of Glykera's wardrobe (516–525 = 266–275), Polemon is exhibiting his *sphodrotês*. Similarly, when Doris, the maid servant, tells Polemon that Glykera will return to him, providing he makes a serious effort to reform, Polemon not only promises a full effort but also goes on to promise freedom for Doris (802–803 = 404–405). Such an excessive response is typical of a vehement individual, as is Polemon's eagerness to celebrate Glykera's good fortune in discovering her father and brother by sacrificing a sow without waiting to perform the proper preliminary ritual (996–998 = 418–420). Or again when Polemon hears that not only Glykera but also her father are about to appear, he reacts impetuously and runs off (1002–1004 = 424–426). And finally when Pataikos enjoins Polemon to give up being a soldier so that in the future he may do nothing impulsive (*propetes*, 1017 = 439), Polemon replies in a typically impulsive manner. He calls on Apollo, asks rhetorically whether he who has all but perished will again do anything impulsive and then, depending on how we fill the lacuna, promises that he will never find any fault in Glykera or that he will do nothing rash even in a dream (1018–1020 = 440–442).[8] Either way, the response is humorous and indicative of just how intense a person Polemon is.

Throughout the play Polemon manifests an impulsive vehemence. The goddess is aware of this temperament and describes Polemon as a *sphodros*. When she says subsequently that Polemon is not naturally such a person (164–165 = 44–45), she is not contradicting or in any way modifying her earlier mention of Polemon's vehement temperament. On the contrary, her point is that Polemon's vehemence does not normally express itself in such extraordinary anger and that a particular situation—a chance coincidence of events (151 = 31)—had to be arranged to call forth an unusually violent outburst of anger. Here Ignorance is actually making use of Polemon's vehement temperament to achieve her own goal. The goddess is aiming at a revelation of identities (165–167 = 45–47) and toward this end finds Polemon's temperament useful in that it predisposes him to an excessive act which

[8] The first restoration is that of Wilamowitz and is printed as line 441 in the Teubner text and as line 1019 in the OCT. The second is that of Weil and is printed as line 900 in the Loeb text.

sets in motion the process of discovery.[9] Cutting off Glykera's hair is an exceptional action even for Polemon. He is after all more than an intense individual. As the dialogue with Pataikos makes clear (486–525 = 236–275), Polemon has a certain sense of fair play and also a genuine concern for Glykera's well-being. Insisting that Pataikos view Glykera's wardrobe is a humorous manifestation of *sphodrotês*. But it also helps us realize how well Glykera has been treated.[10] We may say that Polemon is a complex character and that commendable qualities exist side by side with an innate temperament which qualifies all of Polemon's behavior and which makes possible both an act of extraordinary violence and also a subsequent tearful regret (174 = 54). It may be helpful to compare and contrast Polemon with Moschion. The goddess Ignorance describes Moschion as overbold or rash (151 = 31). She also tells us how he saw Glykera and responded straightway by running up and kissing her (154–156 = 34–36). Out of all context we might want to compare this immediate response with that of Polemon. Both men, we might say, act in a similar manner in that they both respond straightway (155 = 35, 988 = 410). But despite this similarity the two actions are very different. Moschion has prepared for his action. The goddess makes this quite clear when she tells us that Moschion took care always to pass by Glykera's house (152–153 = 32–33). In other words, Moschion was seeking an opportunity to approach Glykera and therefore was ready to act straightway. He is a schemer who on occasion sends out a scout, considers how best to flatter his mother, and practises his lines ahead of time (295 = 105, 314 = 124, 550 = 300). In contrast, Polemon is not a schemer and has not prepared for his deed of violence. He is surprised and responds impetuously in accordance with his temperament. Moreover, to be a *sphodros* who is likely to do something *propetes* (128 = 8, 1017 = 439) may be rather different from being *thrasyteros* (151 = 31). A rash or bold man, a *thrasys*, is typically a confi-

[9] Polemon's violent outburst is referred to by the words παροινεῖν and πάροινον (988 = 410, 1022 = 444). This does not mean that Polemon acted when drunk, but that he acted as if he were drunk. (Cf. *Dysk.* 93, *Aspis* 386 and Handley [above, n. 1] 146.) The analogy with drunken behavior is not inappropriate. Just as a drunken man may do something quite unusual, so Polemon, although sober, performs an exceptional act in cutting off Glykera's hair. And just as an alcoholic may be prone to drunkenness and therefore more liable than other people to do something regrettable, so a man of vehement temperament is prone to precipitous and regrettable action.

[10] For gifts of clothing as a mark of genuine concern, cf. Plautus *Cist.* 488, where Alcesimarchus attempts to prove his love for Selenium by citing the jewelry and clothing with which he has fitted her out.

dent individual who thinks himself secure. The disposition of *thrasytês* is closely connected with the emotion of *tharsos* (cf. Arist. *EN* 3.7 1115b28–29), which is a cognitive phenomenon involving sanguine expectations or opinions about the future (cf. *EN* 1116a4, *Rhet.* 2.5 1383a17–18). It is, of course, difficult to be certain that Menander is using *thrasyteros* in such a precise sense. But perhaps we can say that calling Moschion *thrasyteros* suggests or encourages us to think of an overly confident man whose aggressive acts are supported by certain thoughts and beliefs. A very different impression is conveyed by the label *sphodros*. The disposition of *sphodrotês* is or may be thought of as a natural temperament that is not grounded upon certain opinions but rather caused by a physiological condition. We may cite Plato's *Statesman*, where the Eleatic Stranger sets forth a doctrine of temperaments and relates it to the art of statesmanship. Here *sphodrotês* or vehemence is grouped together with swiftness and sharpness and is treated as an innate temperament that manifests itself in many kinds of actions including mental, bodily, and vocal performances (306E3–5). Since such a temperament is a natural endowment passed on genetically and controlled primarily by careful breeding practices (310A7–311A2), it differs fundamentally from excessive confidence and boldness, which are largely acquired or learned and therefore properly subjected to moral training. As a *sphodros* Polemon is naturally vehement and prone to regrettable outbursts. But he is not a *thrasys* and not open to censure in the way that Moschion is.[11]

Shifting to an Aristotelian framework we may say that Polemon has a fair set of values but an over-active *thymos*. He is not a malicious plotter (*EN* 7.6 1149b14) but a man who wants to do the right thing and yet goes wrong in the way that an over-hasty servant makes a botch of things by rushing off to his task without hearing his master out (*EN* 1149a26–28). Such a servant may explain his behavior by reference to a hasty temperament (cf. *EN* 1149a30) but he cannot excuse his miscue as a misfortune due to external causation. Similarly, Polemon may explain his violent response by reference to a vehement temperament, but he cannot claim to have suffered a misfortune attributable to external causes, whether natural or divine in origin. Indeed, we have in Polemon a clear case of human responsibility existing side by side with divine involvement. The goddess desires to bring about recognition and

[11] Cf. A. Körte, "Menandros," *RE* 15.1 (1931) 760.28–30, who describes Polemon as "hitzig und unbesonnen, dabei jedoch ein ehrlicher Kerl, dem eitlen Schürzenjäger Moschion weit uberlegen."

reunion. Her *modus operandi* is not to intervene as an external force that diminishes responsibility and converts culpable action into misfortune. Rather it is to make use of Polemon's *sphodrotês*. This temperament actually invites the workings of Ignorance in that it predisposes Polemon to hasty actions based upon misperceptions. The goddess need only create a situation that arouses Polemon's natural vehemence and so evokes a violent response whose immediate consequences are regrettable but whose ultimate consequences are reunion and happiness.[12]

III

Over 150 lines have been lost between the third and fourth acts of the play. When the text resumes Glykera is endeavoring to persuade Pataikos that her move to the house of Myrrhina involves no amorous intentions toward Moschion. She succeeds and then asks Pataikos to depart, adding that in the future Polemon should act wantonly (ὑβριζέτω) toward someone else (722–723 = 315–316). The clear implication is that Polemon behaved wantonly when he cut off Glykera's hair. Pataikos' response is only partially preserved. He certainly denies the allegation of wanton action, but his word or words are lost at the end of 723 = 316. As a restoration οὐχ ἑκούσιον has been suggested and subsequently justified on the grounds that Polemon's deed is an *atychêma* or misfortune.[13] This justification will not do for the simple reason that at

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[12] The preceding argument should make clear why I find it difficult to follow MacCary (above, n. 1) 282 when he says that "there is a clear distinction made between Moschion's natural violence and Polemon's externally motivated wrath." On my view it is Polemon's violence which is natural in the sense that it is directly attributable to an innate temperament and not to a learned disposition such as characterizes Moschion. Moreover, Polemon's wrath is not externally motivated. Of course, there is an unexpected situation which is outside Polemon's control. But the way in which he responds to the situation is very much a matter of his own choice. He acts in accordance with his vehement temperament and in accordance with his assessment of the situation.

[13] The restoration is that of S. Sudhaus, *Menandri Reliquiae Nuper Repertae* (Bonn 1914) 48. The justification is that of Webster (above, n. 1) 205. Other restorations of 723 = 316 are possible. The suggestion οὐχ ὑβριστικῶς (E. Capps, *Four Plays of Menander* [Boston 1910] 199) is attractive in that it adds nothing which goes beyond the surviving text and at the same time makes Pataikos' speech an emphatic denial of Glykera's charge. But there is no compelling reason why the gap must be filled by a word or words describing Polemon's deed. A phrase referring to Glykera is equally possible: e.g., οὐχ ὥς σοι δοκεῖ. Furthermore, it is by no means certain that an χ ends the negative. (Working with less than clear plates Sudhaus suspected χε on a separate scrap of papyrus.) If it does

this point in the play Pataikos does not know that Glykera and Moschion are siblings, and therefore does not think of Polemon's deed as a misfortune beyond reasonable expectation.[14] This is not to say that Menander could not have written οὐχ ἑκούσιον, or that if he did he was writing something altogether unintelligible. Much as it makes sense to restore οὐ φυγεῖν ἑκούσιον in 326 = 136 to describe an action that seems to be forced on Glykera by her situation and to be motivated by fear (320 = 130, 401 = 211), so it is plausible to restore οὐχ ἑκούσιον in 723 = 316 to describe an action that seems to have been forced on Polemon by unexpected circumstances and uncontrolled anger (163 = 43). But being driven by angry emotion is not the same thing as suffering a misfortune and there is no reason to think that Pataikos confuses the two. In other words, οὐχ ἑκούσιον is a possible restoration, but the idea of misfortune is irrelevant to the textual issue and to the more general issue of how Pataikos defends Polemon against the allegation of wanton behavior.

For our purposes the important point is that ignorance of Glykera's relationship to Moschion does not really meet the allegation. Polemon might have been in error about this relationship and still acted in a manner that manifested *hybris*. Of course, Polemon would have acted very differently, had he realized that Glykera was in the arms of her brother. But actions performed in ignorance may reveal moral character just as much as actions performed with full knowledge.[15] If Pataikos wants to dissociate Polemon from *hybris*, what he ought to do is to show that Polemon is not given to acts of *hybris*. For an Aristotelian this means that Pataikos ought to show that Polemon is not the sort of person who does and says things that bring shame to another per-

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not, then the number of possible emendations is even larger: e.g., προαίρετον (Koerte, Teubner 2nd ed. 1912), and see below, n. 16.

[14] See above, n. 5. A. Gomme and F. Sandbach (*Menander, A Commentary* [Oxford 1973] 517) miss this point when they try to support the reading οὐχ ἑκούσιον by citing Aristotle (*EN* 3.1 1110b18) on acts due to ignorance.

[15] A striking case is Smikrines in the *Aspis*. He believes falsely that Kleostratos is dead and his sister an heiress of considerable wealth. Accordingly, he moves to break up a wedding planned for the sister and to marry her himself, thereby gaining control over her inheritance. Smikrines' action is in no way illegal. He is the girl's older uncle and therefore has the law on his side (186–187, 254–255, 297–298). But despite his legal rights, Smikrines' behavior is morally wrong, and it is wrong whether or not he has the facts straight concerning the condition of Kleostratos. In other words, while ignorance is part of the play and mentioned early on by the goddess Tyche (99), ignorance does not prevent Smikrines from revealing a greedy character. Indeed, it is ignorance which leads Smikrines to reveal himself as a *philargyros* (123, 351, cf. 149) deserving censure.

son, not for the sake of some acquisition but rather for the pleasure that comes with thinking oneself superior (*Rhet.* 2.2 1378b23–29). We do not know whether Pataikos tried such a move. The text fails us at this point. But the move would have been a sensible one and quite in line both with Aristotelian doctrine and with Polemon's character. For as we already observed in the preceding section, Polemon is a vehement individual not unlike Aristotle's hot-tempered man. Both are prone to unreflective, hasty outbursts of anger (356–357 = 166–167, 988 = 410; *EN* 7.6 1149a24–34). And just as Aristotle dissociates his hot-tempered man from wanton behavior, so Pataikos might try to clear Polemon from the allegation made against him by Glykera. The same general principle applies equally well in both cases. When a man acts in anger, he feels pain and therefore does not engage in wanton action accompanied by pleasure (*EN* 7.6 1149b20–21).[16] An angry man is not a wanton man acting without (apparent) provocation (*Rhet.* 1.13 1374a3, 2.24 1402a2) and for the sake of pleasure (*Rhet.* 1.13 1374a14–15). Polemon is no exception. He is angered (163 = 43) by apparent infidelity and therefore acts in pain and for revenge. He is not taking pleasure in superiority and therefore is not acting wantonly.

Such an Aristotelian rebuttal has obvious appeal, but it should be pointed out that without further argumentation this rebuttal cannot convict Glykera of absurdity in speaking of wanton action. For it is not immediately clear how Glykera conceives of *hybris*. She may think of *hybris* in a narrow Aristotelian sense or she may think of it in a wider sense that covers cases of misguided and excessive anger. We may compare Demosthenes' speech *Against Meidias*, in which sudden acts of angry revenge are first marked off from *hybris* and then subsequently

[16] Assuming that χ does not end the negative in 723 = 316 (see above, n. 13) and thinking of a passage like *EN* 1149b21, an overly keen Aristotelian might restore 723 = 316 with οὐ μεθ' ἡδονῆς. Such a restoration may be fanciful, but there is nothing improbable about Menander's having introduced an excuse which agrees with Aristotelian doctrine. We may compare Terence's *Eunuch*. In this play, which is based upon a like-named work by Menander (20), Chaerea rejects the idea of *contumelia* (= *hybris*) by pleading *amor* (877–878). This is a good Aristotelian move. Cf. *Pol.* 1311b19, 1315a22–23. Similarly, in the *Perikeiromene* Pataikos may be thinking in the manner of an Aristotelian who would counter the charge of *hybris* with a plea of anger and impetuosity. However, it must be kept in mind that a distinction between *hybris* and impulsive anger is not unique to Aristotle. Cf. Demosthenes 21.38. Aristotelian frameworks may be useful for elucidating Menander, without proving any direct dependence of Menander upon Aristotle. Cf. K. Gaiser, "Menander und der Peripatos," *Antike und Abendland* 13 (1967) 15.

treated as special cases of *hybris*. Polyzelos, we are told, acted in anger and with impulsiveness of character. He got ahead of his reason and went wrong, but his action was not based upon *hybris* (21.38). This case of impulsive anger reminds us of Polemon's impetuous deed, and its dissociation from *hybris* seems to harmonize with an Aristotelian interpretation of 723 = 316. Later, however, Demosthenes associates angry emotional response with *hybris*. A man, we are told, can act angrily, suddenly, and wantonly (ὑβριστικῶς), and still excuse himself with a plea of anger (21.41). Here again we are reminded of Polemon. The difference is that this time a sudden outburst of anger is not dissociated from *hybris*. Anger is recognized as a mitigating factor, but the behavior is still characterized as wanton. For an appreciation of Glykera's charge this is important. She may be, indeed almost certainly is, thinking of *hybris* in a sense compatible with anger. She knows full well that Polemon was angry and would probably admit that anger is normally a mitigating factor. But Polemon's anger was extraordinary, and as Glykera argues, resulted in an ungodly action out of place even in regard to a slave girl (724–725 = 317–318). Glykera has just been under siege and is likely to be thinking of Polemon as an exceedingly self-willed individual. We may recall how Glykera's maid-servant Doris spoke of her mistress' suffering injustice and then added that Polemon would be delighted to learn of Glykera's tears (188–189 = 68–69). The words are Doris', but the sentiment may be shared by and even derived from her mistress. Certainly at 723–725 = 316–318 Glykera feels outraged and is prepared to suggest that Polemon acted wantonly. Whatever Pataikos may have said in defense of Polemon, it had little practical effect. He is soon in the service of Glykera, assisting in the transference of birth-tokens.

IV

As the *Perikeiromene* comes to a close Polemon receives forgiveness (*syggnome*) on the grounds that his violent act has been a source of blessings (1021–1023 = 443–445). There is no mention of ignorance and no suggestion that forgiveness depends upon classifying Polemon's deed as a misfortune. This is intelligible enough. Polemon is in trouble not because he acted against a sister in the embrace of her brother (under this description Polemon's act may be a misfortune), but rather because he subjected Glykera to treatment unworthy even of a slave girl (under this description the act is an injustice). Polemon's ignorance of the

brother-sister relationship does not excuse his treating Glykera in this manner and therefore is no reason for forgiveness. However, Polemon's vehement temperament is a reason. At least Aristotle is prepared to extend forgiveness to persons who act in anger on account of a hot and swift temperament (*EN* 7.6 1149b4, cf. 1149a30), so that we might imagine Polemon receiving forgiveness on the grounds that his rage is attributable to an innate *sphodrotês*. But no such reason is offered. Rather, forgiveness is justified solely on the grounds that Polemon's act has been a source of blessings (1021–1022 = 443–444). This justification is to be taken at face value. The blessings resulting from Polemon's act simply nullify any possible moral indignation Glykera may have felt and at the same time remove from the spectator any serious concern with fine distinctions between misfortunes, errors, and injustices. Whatever the proper Peripatetic grounds for extending forgiveness, Polemon is forgiven because he has set in motion a process of discovery. Early on, the goddess Ignorance makes clear that the movement of the play is toward a revelation of identities (165–167 = 45–47). When this goal is reached, hair-splitting justifications appropriate to moral philosophers are out of place. The play takes on a carefree air, so that it is dramatically correct to extend forgiveness on grounds that can only seem odd to someone expecting an Aristotelian pardon.[17]

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[17] The forgiveness offered Moschion may have been no less carefree than the forgiveness offered Polemon. Of course, Moschion does act in ignorance when he embraces his sister. This ignorance is sufficient to excuse him from the incestuous act of pursuing a sibling, but it does not excuse his deed thought of as an act of premeditated aggression. The goddess tells us that Moschion took care always to pass by Glykera's house (152–155 = 32–35) and so lets us know that Moschion was prepared for any opportunity that might present itself. His response is like Polemon's in that it is immediate (155 = 35, 988 = 410), but it differs in being premeditated and in failing to qualify for the forgiveness due to hasty expressions of hot temper (*EN* 1149b4). Yet Moschion is forgiven in the gap between 827–976 = 397–398, and his marriage is in preparation when the text fails us at 1024–1026 = 446–448. We do not know what Moschion said to his newly discovered father and sister, but it seems most unlikely that he came up with a satisfactory excuse. It is possible that he did little more than promise to do better in the future (cf. Polemon at 1018–1019 = 440–441) and then received forgiveness because the happiness of reunion wiped out concern with previous misbehavior. Such forgiveness would be extremely carefree but it would be in keeping with the spirit of the play. Alternatively and more probably, Moschion may have done something in addition to promising better deportment. Perhaps (as an anonymous referee has most kindly suggested to me) Moschion was forgiven on the condition that he take a wife. Cf. Terence's *Heauton Timoroumenos* (based on a like-named play of Menander), in which Cleitiphon receives forgiveness because he agrees to the punishment and preventive treatment of marriage (1051–1059).

This carefree pardon harmonizes well with Pataikos' immediately preceding demand that Polemon give up military life and so cease to act impetuously (1016–1017 = 438–439). The demand implies that the impetuosity of Polemon is due to his profession, so that retirement from military life will be sufficient to temper his character. But this is nonsensical if Polemon's *sphodrotês* is a natural temperament. For when men are impetuous by nature, they are impetuous whatever their walk of life. We can imagine that even if Polemon abandons military service, he will remain impetuous and will remain likely to come running whenever Sosias fabricates a story about Glykera and a paramour (356–357 = 166–167). Indeed, the injunction to abandon military life is the occasion for Polemon to make a typically impetuous response. He calls upon Apollo and expresses his good intentions with exaggerated promises (1018–1020 = 440–442). The humour here is subtle, but the intensity of Polemon's reply suggests that Pataikos has things turned round. Polemon is a good soldier because he is impetuous, and not *vice versa*.[18] Still, it would be a mistake to press this point and to claim that Menander has made Pataikos look foolish. We are now at the end of the play and the happiness of reunion has created its own logic. We are not meant to scrutinize Pataikos' injunction in terms of a consistent theory of human personality. Polemon's agreement to abandon military life has an important dramatic value. It paves the way for continued happiness and so helps bring the play to a tidy ending. Polemon's *sphodrotês* has set in motion a process of discovery and has enlivened the play as it moves toward a climactic reunion. To wind up the play it is sufficient that Polemon agree to moderate his behavior, so that the newly won happiness may appear to endure beyond the final curtain.

[18] Polemon may be compared with Thrasonides in the *Misoumenos*. Thrasonides has an intense temperament which is manifested at the very outset of the play when he expresses his passionate love for Krateia (fr.4–5, fr.11–12 OCT) and which is referred to later when he is described by the adjective *itamos* (399). As in the case of Polemon, so here we may suspect that Thrasonides' temperament is not a product of military life but rather the reverse. Thrasonides has been an outstanding soldier in Cyprus (fr. 5), because his impetuous nature suits him to military service. Furthermore, the fragmentary ending of the *Misoumenos* has a teasing similarity to the ending of the *Perikeiromene*. Just as Pataikos in the latter play gives his daughter away by employing a traditional formula, mentioning the dowry and then enjoining Polemon to forget about being a soldier, so Demeas in the *Misoumenos* uses the marriage formula, names a dowery, and then enjoins the bridegroom to give up something (444–447). Assuming that the bridegroom is Thrasonides, it is tempting to ask whether he, too, is being asked to give up the vehement life of a soldier. But this is, of course, pure speculation.

It simply does not matter that Pataikos' injunction is, on some deeper analysis, wishful or even foolish. Of course, the possibility of absurdity may add a humorous touch. Just as the astute spectator smiles at the grounds on which forgiveness is offered, so he smiles at the injunction to abandon impetuous behavior by giving up military life. But he does not object and does not fault the playwright for closing the *Perikeiromene* on a lighthearted note.[19]

[19] I want to express my thanks to Eric Handley and Richard Sorabji for reading earlier versions of this paper, to members of the King's College Aristotle Seminar for criticizing my views, and to the American Council of Learned Societies for financial support.

III

POLITICS

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

ARISTOTLE ON SLAVES AND WOMEN

In an earlier article, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on the Emotions," I discussed Aristotle's investigation of emotional response and pointed out how this investigation had important consequences for rhetorical and ethical theory.[1] In particular, I indicated how analyzing emotions as cognitive phenomena open to reasoned persuasion led Aristotle not only to assign emotional appeal a dignified position within rhetorical theory but also to formulate a new bipartite psychology, which replaced Plato's tripartite psychology within the sphere of political and ethical investigation. However, I did not consider the way in which Aristotle's investigation of emotional response led to a new and more thoughtful explanation of the subordinate position of slaves and women within the Greek city-state. This omission I want now to make good. For properly understood, Aristotle's view of slaves and women is neither the sophistry of a prejudiced Greek male enjoying a privileged position nor simply the product of a misguided biologist who assumes uncritically that nature's way is identical with the *status quo*.[2] Rather, it is also and even primarily a political application of what was unquestionably an important advance in philosophical psychology. Having made clear the relationship between emotion and reason and having built this relationship into a new political and ethical psychology, Aristotle was able to accept the demand of Plato that a difference in role or pursuit be tied to a relevant difference in nature (*Rep.* 5.4 454B4–E4; cf. *Pol.* 1.13 1259b36–38) and at the same time to reassert the claim of Gorgias that the virtues of slaves and women are different from those of free men because their activities or roles are different (*Meno* 71D4–72A5; cf. *Pol.* 1.13 1260a15–17, 27–28). Only this reassertion was not a case of mere retrogression. It was in fact a new development that not only recognized a difference in roles but also explained this difference by reference to recent insights into the relationship between emotion and reason.

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[1] *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970) 40–70, reprinted in vol. IV of *Articles on Aristotle* (1979) 133–153 = Chapter 1 in this volume.

[2] See the recent, polemical remarks of Dorothea Wender ("Plato: misogynist, paedophile, and feminist," *Arethusa* 6 [1973] 88–89) who groups Aristotle with Dr. Spock and faults both for being biologically oriented thinkers. For a more sympathetic statement see J. Randall, *Aristotle* (New York 1960) 243–250.

Aristotle's remarks on slavery are admittedly difficult and controversial. He seems not only to be on the wrong side of a *nomos-phusis* (convention vs. nature) controversy (cf. 1.3 1253b20–22) but also to express himself in a way that threatens the very humanity of slaves. He emphasizes their capacity for bodily labor (1.2 1252a33, 1.5 1254b18, 25, 1.11 1258b38, 1.13 1259b26), compares their utility to that of tame animals (1254b24–26) and says that slaves differ from masters to the same extent that bodies differ from souls and beasts from men (1254b16–17). Such remarks closely relate slaves to animals, so that it is at least understandable why difficulties have been felt as to whether Aristotle regards slaves as human beings.[3] Nevertheless, Aristotle is quite explicit in classifying slaves as men (1254b16, 1259b27–28) and if we understand that Aristotle's idea of the natural slave is based upon his newly developed political and ethical psychology, we can see quite easily how slaves qualify as human beings. Aristotle denies slaves the capacity to deliberate (1260a12), but he never denies them the capacity of emotional response. In more technical language, Aristotle denies them the logical or reasoning half of the bipartite soul but not the alogical or emotional half. This means that slaves can make the judgments involved in emotional responses and therefore have at least a minimum share in the cognitive capacity peculiar to men in relation to other animals (cf. 1.2 1253a16).[4]

In denying slaves the capacity to deliberate (1260a12) Aristotle is not robbing them of their humanity. Rather, he is meeting Plato's demand for relevant differences and so explaining and justifying Gorgias' idea of a peculiarly servile activity and virtue (*Meno* 71E9–72A4). Slaves lack the ability to deliberate, that is to say, the ability to act with forethought (1252a31–32). When this deficiency is combined with bodily strength suitable for necessary tasks (1254b28–29), then a role of obedient service seems proper. And since virtue is related to role or function (1260a16–17), it also seems proper to assign slaves a virtue limited by the demands of their subordinate role. Natural slaves must have a measure of tem-

[3] On this difficulty, see F. Susemihl and R. Hicks, *The Politics of Aristotle* (London 1894) 160–161, E. Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (London 1906) 364–365, O. Gigon, "Die Sklaverei bei Aristoteles," in *La Politique d'Aristote* (Geneva 1964) 247–283 and A.W.H. Adkins, *From the Many to the One* (Ithaca 1970) 211–212.

[4] To deny slaves the logical half of the bipartite soul is not to deny slaves some share in the biological faculty of cognition. At *EN* 1.7 1098a4–5 Aristotle makes clear that the alogical half overlaps with the biological faculty of cognition. See my papers "Aristotle: Emotion and Moral Virtue," Arethusa 2 (1969) 174–175 = Chapter 7, pages 123–124 in this volume, and "Zu der Darstellung der Seele in der *Nikomachischen Ethik* I 13," *Philologus* 114 (1970) 289–291 = in translation, Chapter 4 in this volume.

perance and courage and in general be properly disposed toward their masters (cf. 1260a33–36). But they are not expected to have practical wisdom or in general the virtue demanded of a master.

Aristotle's psychological account of the natural slave does more than provide a way of supporting Gorgias' view of servile virtue. It also provides a reason for criticizing persons including Plato (*Laws* 6.19 777E5–778A1), who would give slaves orders unaccompanied by reason (*logos*) and in particular by reasoned admonition (*nouthetêsis*). This is an important point for it well illustrates how an advance in philosophical psychology can not only affect but also improve political theory. Having thoroughly investigated emotional response, Aristotle is quite clear that while emotions are different from *logos* (reason), they are at least open to *logos* (reasoned explanation). He applies this insight to slaves, denying them reason but allowing that they can perceive it (1254b22–23). Despite certain scholarly grumbles there is nothing inconsistent or precarious in this thesis.[5] Aristotle simply recognizes that while slaves tend to behave emotionally and without reflection, they are like children in being amenable to reasoned admonition (*nouthetêsis*, *EN* 1.13 1102b34). Furthermore, Aristotle not only recognizes the capacity of slaves to perceive reason. He also honors it and protests against withholding reasoned admonition and reason in general (1260b5–7). Of course, one reason for Aristotle's protest is purely pragmatic. Reason influences emotions and makes slaves more tractable. Hence a master should not punish a slave without offering a reason which prevents anger by justifying the punishment inflicted (*Rhet.* 2.3 1380b16–20). But offering a reason may be more than pragmatic and self-serving. It may also be giving a slave his due. For offering a reason involves acknowledging that slaves can follow reasoned admonition and judge for themselves whether or not a particular course of action is appropriate.[6] In other words, to offer slaves reasoned admonition is to invite them to make the sort of decision they are capable of making. Slaves cannot put together reasoned arguments and cannot offer their master reasoned advice. But they can perceive their masters' reasons and can decide to follow them. To this extent they can partake of reason, so that Aristotle is on firm

[5] *Pace* Susemihl-Hicks (above, n. 3) 161, Gigon (above, n. 3) 258, and R.Schlaifer, "Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle," *Havard Studies in Classical Philology* 47 (1936) 192–199.

[6] When we admonish (*nouthêtein*) a man, he decides whether he should obey. Cf. *Rhet.* 2.18 1391b10–11, where the admonished man is described as a judge (*kritês*).

moral as well as psychological ground when he protests against refusing slaves reasoned admonition. To offer reasoned explanation is to respect a slave's cognitive capacity and to allow him to partake of reason as best he can.

We may conclude that Aristotle's view of slavery is neither psychologically foolish nor morally repulsive. Of course, there are no natural slaves in the world, so that the view remains theoretical. But as theory it has the merit of running a middle course between the opposing views recognized by Plato in the *Laws*. It neither allows the possibility of slaves excelling in regard to all virtue (6.19 776D9) nor despises them as if they were animals (777A4). Instead it seems to take a hint from Homer (*Od.* 17.322) or rather Plato's misquotation to the effect that slaves lack half their wits (777A1). They lack the capacity to deliberate but are in other respects cognitive creatures. Such a view may not be altogether novel. At least in the *Laws*, Klinias is prepared to equate an inability to demonstrate by reasoning (*logos*) with the condition of a slave (12.13 966B1–3). But it seems to be Aristotle who formulated this deficiency in terms of his bipartite soul and made it the basis of natural slavery.

In discussing women, Aristotle leaves no doubt about their subordinate and domestic role. He states clearly that men are better suited to command than women (1259b2), and that the role of women is not the bodily service characteristic of slaves but rather the preservation of goods procured by men (1252a33-b5, 3.4 1277b4–5). Moreover, since Aristotle relates virtue to function (1260a16–17), he demands of women a virtue that reflects their domestic role. They will need, Aristotle tells us, less courage than men (1277b20–22), and not the courage of command but rather the courage of subordination (1260a23–24). Similarly women must be temperate but not in the manner of men (1260a21), for were women modest in the way that good men are, they would be chatterers (1277b23).

So far Aristotle's account of women is based upon his conception of their role within the household. But his account goes deeper than this. It also relates women to the distinction between the logical and alogical halves of the soul (1260a6–7) and contrasts the psychic capacities of women with those of both slaves and children. Slaves are said to possess the deliberative faculty not at all; women are said to possess it, but without authority (*akuron*); and children are said to possess it imperfectly (1260a12–14). What Aristotle means in regard to slaves has been stated in the preceding section and what he means in regard to children is

clear enough. The alogical or emotional half of the soul is prior in generation to the logical or reasoning half (7.15 1334b21–22). Children will develop the capacity to deliberate, but during their immaturity they live emotionally and without reflection. However, the case of women is more obscure. At first glance it may appear that Aristotle is simply referring to the subordinate position of women (1259b2, 1260a23). He may seem to be saying that while women possess reason, it does not prevail in the society of men. This would be, of course, true enough. In comparison with men, women lacked authority both in actual Greek city-states and in the society recommended by Aristotle. But this truth does not do justice to Aristotle's point. In this portion of the *Politics* Aristotle is concerned with the virtues appropriate to different kinds of persons including women. On one level this is not a problem. Gorgias had already suggested that virtue is related to function (*Meno* 72A2–4). Aristotle accepts this principle and applies it to women (1260a16–24). The problem is on a more fundamental level: namely, why different kinds of people have different functions or roles in society. Here a reference to the newly developed bipartite psychology and to the capacity of deliberation is useful. When Aristotle says that slaves do not possess the deliberative capacity, he is not drawing a conclusion based upon the menial role of slaves. Rather he is indicating why slaves have the role they do. Similarly in the case of women a reference to their psychological make-up combined with their bodily condition explains their role within the household and therefore ultimately their peculiar kind of virtue. In comparison with man's bodily condition, the bodily condition of women is one of weakness, and this comparative weakness points toward a retiring domestic role within the home. Further, their deliberative capacity is *akuron*, that is to say it lacks authority and is overruled easily. In stating this lack of authority Aristotle is not referring to inter-personal relationships but rather to an intra-personal relationship. Just as he looks within the slave to explain his social position, so he looks within the woman to explain her role and virtues. Her deliberative capacity lacks authority, because it is often overruled by her emotions or alogical side. Her decisions and actions are too often guided by pleasures and pains, so that she is unfit for leadership and very much in need of temperance.

It is important to emphasize that in calling the deliberative capacity of a woman *akuron*, Aristotle is not impugning the cleverness of women. He recognizes that women can think things through and even give reasoned advice. He would see no absurdity, for example, in Ajax praising

the forethought of Tecmessa (Sophocles, *Ajax* 536)[7] or Creon fearing the cleverness of Medea (Euripides, *Medea* 285). His point is not that women deliberate only in some vague and illogical way, but that their deliberations and reflections are likely not to control their emotions. This view is, of course, not an Aristotelian creation *ex nihilo*. It is a common view of women and one that is illustrated often in Greek literature. Medea is a celebrated case. Deserted by Jason for another woman, she is angered and plans to take revenge by killing the children born to her and Jason. Reflection tells Medea that such an act of revenge is excessive and against her own interests. She hesitates, but ultimately her anger (*thumos*) is stronger than her deliberations (*bouleumata*) (Euripides, *Medea* 1079). In Aristotelian terminology her *bouleutikon* is *akuron*, i.e. her deliberative faculty cannot control her anger so that she acts emotionally and unreasonably, but not without considerable cleverness. Women are most clever contrivers of every evil (Euripides, *Medea* 409). In the service of emotion their deliberative faculties are most effective at discovering means to achieve a desired goal. But in controlling and altering unreasonable desires, their deliberative faculties lack authority. Medea understands that she is about to do something terrible (Euripides, *Medea* 1078), but she is not deterred by this understanding. For in the case of Medea and other women reasoned consideration tends to be *akuron*.*

Aristotle's view of women may be false. Certainly the exceptional behavior of a tragic heroine cannot be said to decide what is in the end an empirical issue. But it would be a mistake to think that Aristotle's view is simply the creation of a prejudiced male or, more charitably, the product of an overly keen biologist.[8] On the contrary, it is a thoughtful view that well illustrates how investigations within one sphere of philo-

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[7] Tecmessa is an interesting case, for she is not only a wife but also a slave captured in battle (Sophocles, *Ajax* 211, 489). In the *Politics*, Aristotle focuses on the household and offers an account of woman as wife (1253b7) in her marriage relationship (1253b9–11, 1259a39) to a free man. His remarks do not cover the case of a female slave. Presumably Aristotle would say that Tecmessa is by birth (Sophocles, *Ajax* 487) and also naturally free. Only women lacking deliberative capacity are natural slaves and suitable mates for natural male slaves (cf. 1252b5–7).

* On Penelope, see Chapter 15, Section III pp. 253–254 in this volume.

[8] It is striking that in the *Politics* Aristotle all but ignores biological explanations of female inferiority. On one occasion he does mention a connexion between parental age and female offspring (1335a12–15), but he does not develop this point. In a different context Aristotle was prepared to talk biology (cf. the *Generation of Animals*, where Aristotle explains that a deficiency in heat may affect the working of semen [4.1 766a18–22] and result in a female or deficient offspring [4.3 767b23]), but within his political

sophical enquiry can determine developments within another. Aristotle investigated emotional response and drew a fundamental distinction between reason and emotion. He then applied this distinction to the field of political theory, formulated a bipartite psychology and used this psychology to explain the role of women within society. He credited women with reason and therefore distinguished them from natural slaves who lack reason altogether and from children who have not yet acquired reason. Aristotle recognised that women merit a role that is neither servile nor puerile, but he was prepared to assign them a subordinate role on the grounds that their reason or logical side is *akuron* in relation to their emotional or alogical side.

writings he is guided by recent advances in philosophical psychology and in particular by his newly developed distinction between reasoning and emotional halves of the soul.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

ARISTOTLE'S NATURAL SLAVE

Some thirty years ago,[1] I discussed Aristotle's account of the natural slave in two publications: a book, *Aristotle on Emotion*, and an article, "Aristotle on Slaves and Women."[2] My thesis was and still is that Aristotle viewed the natural slave as a deficient human being. In particular, the natural slave is someone who lacks the capacity to deliberate (*Politics* 1.13 1260a12). That is a severe handicap, but it does not reduce the natural slave to an animal. For unlike an animal, the natural slave does have thoughts and does experience emotions. He may become frightened and angry, but he lacks the capacity to reflect on these emotions and to deliberate about how best to achieve safety and to secure revenge. He, therefore, benefits from the guidance of someone who has deliberative capacity. Such a person is the slave's natural master and together the two form an association which is mutually beneficial. Of course, it is an empirical question whether natural slaves actually exist; and if they do not or if only a few can be found, Aristotle's view of natural slavery becomes a curiosity which practical people will be quick to dismiss. But perhaps persons interested in the history of philosophy have a special reason for considering Aristotle's view, for it is part of a larger development that has its beginning in Plato's Academy. Indeed, unless we go back to the period of Aristotle's residence in the Academy, we may fail to appreciate how a development in one area of philosophical inquiry can have consequences within another.

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[1] This paper was written for a conference on slavery held at the State University of New York at Binghamton on October 24, 1999. The organizer, Warren Murray, planned to publish the proceedings in a wide-ranging and authoritative volume. That plan has recently been abandoned, and therefore I include the paper in this volume.

[2] *Aristotle on Emotion* (London: Duckworth 1975, 2nd edition 2002) 53–57 and "Aristotle on Slaves and Women," in *Articles on Aristotle 2: Ethics and Politics*, edited by J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth 1977) 135–139 = Chapter 14 in this volume.

I

In speaking of a development in one area of philosophical inquiry, I am thinking of philosophical psychology and Aristotle's analysis of emotional response. That analysis is almost certainly a response to debate within the Academy, and its consequences for rhetoric, poetics, ethics and politics were significant. The *Philebus*, Plato's penultimate dialogue and last to be completed,[3] provides us with a picture of the debate within the Academy. Socrates is portrayed discussing mixed pleasures and pains. He recognizes three classes: 1) bodily disturbances like itches and tickles which are soothed by rubbing and scratching, 2) bodily drives like hunger and thirst which may be accompanied by a pleasant expectation of replenishment, and 3) emotions like anger, fear, longing, love, emulation and envy. The first class is said to belong to the body, the second to the body and the soul, and the third to the soul alone. The classification is important for it makes clear that emotions are not dependent on the body (i.e., caused by certain bodily conditions) in the way that itches and tickles, and hunger and thirst are; but it leaves unclear the way in which emotions depend upon the soul (i.e., upon what a person thinks or believes). That is not surprising, for earlier in the dialogue Socrates had tried unsuccessfully to elucidate the relation of thought to pleasure and pain, fear and expectation. At first, Socrates suggested that pleasure and pain often occur together with belief (37E10);[4] then he spoke of pleasure and pain following true and false belief (38B9); finally he stated that true and false beliefs fill up pleasures and pains with their own affection, i.e., with truth or falsity (42A7–9). "Filling up" is a metaphor which avoids the problem without solving it.[5] Further discussion was necessary.

That discussion was carried on within the Academy; and in the *Topics*, we can see Aristotle drawing on it for illustrative purposes. He intro-

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[3] Stylistic studies suggest placing the *Philebus* immediately before the *Laws*. See, e.g., L. Billig, "Clausualae and Platonic Chronology," *The Journal of Philology* 35 (1919) 225–256 and L. Brandwood, *The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues* (Cambridge: University Press 1990) 167–206. Since Plato died before finishing the *Laws*, the *Philebus* is almost certainly Plato's last completed dialogue.

[4] More precisely, Socrates argues that pleasures often occur together with false opinion.

[5] Here and in the paragraph which follows, I am drawing on *Aristotle on Emotion* (above, note 1) 10–12. See also "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions," *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970) 55–58 = Chapter 1, pages 23–28 of this volume.

duces the idea that the thought of outrage may be the genus of anger, but he declares pain a more likely candidate (4.6 127b26–32); he spells out the ambiguity involved in speaking of anger as pain "with" the thought of outrage (6.13 150b27–151a13), and he prefers an explanation in terms of causal connection: anger is pain arising "on account of" (*dia*) the thought of outrage (6.13 151a16–17, 8.1 156a32–33). This analysis in terms of causal connection reappears in the discussion of anger in the *Rhetoric* (2.2 1378a30–32) and is fundamental to the extended treatment of emotional response in *Rhetoric* 2.2–11. Almost certainly that treatment of emotional response was not written for the *Rhetoric*; originally it may have formed part of a lost work like the *Divisions* or that entitled *Emotions*.[6] But whatever the origin of the treatment of emotion in *Rhetoric 2*, it is clear that Aristotle adopted a causal explanation which had consequences beyond the sphere of philosophical psychology. In rhetoric, Aristotle was able to reject the idea of emotional appeal as an extra-rational enchantment which is best avoided altogether or at least confined to prooemium and epilogue. Instead, he not only presented the emotions as intelligent responses which are open to reasoned persuasion, but also recognized emotional appeal as a technical mode of persuasion along side argument and persuasion through character. In poetics, Aristotle was able to counter Plato, who attacked the writers of tragedy and comedy for playing on feelings which are unintelligent and destructive of reasoning capacity (*Republic* 10 604D9, 605B4–5). Once emotions were seen to involve thought and therefore not in themselves closed to reason, Aristotle could associate tragedy with pity and fear (*Poetics* 6 1449b27, 9 1452a2–3) and comedy with the laughable (4 1448b37, 5 1449a34) without endorsing Plato's hostile attitude toward the theater. In ethics, Aristotle was able to replace Plato's tripartite psychology with a bipartite psychology which distinguished between emotion and reasoning and which became the basis for the distinction between moral virtue and practical wisdom. Moral virtue was referred to the alogical half of the soul (*to alogon*) and viewed as a disposition guaranteeing proper emotional response. Practical wisdom was assigned to the logical half of the soul (*to logon echon*) and viewed as a disposition guaranteeing success in deliberation (*Nicomachean Ethics*

[6] The two works are listed in Diogenes Laertius' catalogue of Aristotelian writings (*Lives* 5.23–24). See my article "On the Composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," in *Lênaika*, edited by Ch. Mueller-Goldingen and K. Sier = Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 89 (Stuttgart: Teubner 1966) 174–175 = Chapter 22, page 398 in this volume.

1.13 1102b13–1103a10).[7] In politics, the bipartite psychology underlies Aristotle's discussion of moral education (*Politics* 7.15 1334b21–28);[8] it is also fundamental to the view of slaves, women and children set forth in Book 1 of the *Politics*.

II

In *Politics* 1.13, Aristotle asks whether there is any virtue of the slave in addition to those of being an excellent tool and servant (1259b22–24). The answer must be affirmative; for if the slave is to accomplish the tasks expected of him, he cannot be intemperate and cowardly. Aristotle says that (1259b40–1260a2), but his full answer is more complex. First, Aristotle calls it odd to deny slaves moral virtue, for slaves are men and share in reason (1259b27–28). Then he asks why a slave should be subjected unqualifiedly to rule by a master, if both master and slave possess the perfection of noble goodness (1259b34–36). He adds that any difference in virtue cannot be one of degree, for being ruled and ruling differ in kind, and the more and the less do not differ in that way (1259b36–38). To make clear how the virtue of the master and slave differ, Aristotle turns to his bipartite psychology. He points out that by nature the logical part rules and the alogical part is ruled, and that these parts have different virtues (1260a4–7). The same is said to be true in other cases including that of free man and slave. Whereas the free man who rules over slaves must have complete virtue, the slave does not. He wholly (*holôs*) lacks the capacity to deliberate and possesses only the virtue required for accomplishing his work (1260a7–18).

This characterization of the natural slave is brief, but it is, I think, clear and coherent, providing one recognizes that Aristotle is thinking in terms of his bipartite psychology. The natural slave has thoughts and does respond to situations emotionally. Put technically, the alogical half of his soul is intact. However, the logical half is damaged, so that he lacks deliberative capacity. This does not mean that the natural slave cannot follow the deliberations of his master. Earlier in *Politics* 1.5, Aristotle said that slaves share in reason to the extent that they can perceive it (1254b22), and later in 1.13 he warns against giving

[7] For additional references and fuller discussion, see *Aristotle on Emotion* (above, note 1) 26–37, 63–92.

[8] See *Aristotle on Emotion* (above, note 1) 45–49.

slaves orders without reasons (1260b5–7). The natural slave is like the slave boy in Plato's *Meno*. Socrates is able to lead the boy through a geometrical investigation; but the boy goes wrong or does not know what to say, when he is left to his own resources (82E2, 83E2, 84A1–2, 85A4–5). I am not suggesting that Aristotle would recommend taking natural slaves through geometrical proofs—such abstract thought is not part of their work—but the model is I think instructive. The ability to follow the reasoning of another, while being unable to do the reasoning for oneself, is not an unknown phenomenon. On the contrary, it is common, and for Aristotle it is a fundamental characteristic of the natural slave.

III

Aristotle's characterization of the natural slave does not stand alone. It is presented together with a characterization of women and children. The woman is said to possess deliberative capacity, but to possess a capacity which lacks authority. The child, too, is said to possess the capacity to deliberate; but in his case, the capacity is incomplete (1260a13–14). As with the natural slave, Aristotle is thinking in terms of his bipartite psychology. A woman can deliberate; and to that extent, the logical half of her soul is not deficient. But her deliberations do not control the alogical half of her soul. She is like Medea in the Euripidean play. There the heroine deliberates at length concerning what she ought to do; but in the end, her deliberations are ineffective. Medea is ruled by her anger and acts contrary to reasoned judgment (*Medea* 1079).[9] A child has a different problem. The logical half of his soul is immature, so that his deliberations are likely to be faulty. Of course, his condition is not permanent. The logical half of the soul will develop, so that in time he can be expected to reason well and to act in accordance with reasoned judgment.

We may deplore Aristotle's characterization of women; but it is not unintelligible and seems to occur elsewhere. I am thinking of a fragment of Aristotle's *Homeric Problems*.[10] The question is why Odysseus

[9] On Euripides' *Medea* and Aristotle's bipartite psychology, see my article "On the Antecedents of Aristotle's Bipartite Psychology," *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 11 (1970) 233–241 = Chapter 3, pages 43–51 in this volume.

[10] The work is listed in Diogenes' catalogue of Aristotelian writings (*Lives* 5.26).

revealed his identity to his son Telemachus but not to his wife Penelope.[11] The answer Aristotle is said to have given is that Telemachus could control his emotion, but Penelope could not. Her joy in learning the identity of Odysseus would prevail and prevent her from feigning tears; and that would create suspicion among the suitors (fr. 176.6–13 Rose[3]). Whether or not that is a correct interpretation of the Homeric poem is problematic, but it is in line with what Aristotle says about women in *Politics* 1.13. Their deliberative capacity is without authority. Unlike slaves, women can reason for themselves, but their deliberations are ineffective when it comes to controlling emotional response. And that is true (for Aristotle) whether the emotion be a pleasant one like joy in the case of Penelope or a painful one like the anger of Medea.

IV

In *Politics* 1.13, Aristotle criticizes certain unnamed persons who instruct us to use only orders when dealing with slaves. According to Aristotle, these people err in denying slaves reason, despite the fact that slaves ought to receive reasoned admonition more than children (1260b5–7). Here Aristotle is thinking of a passage in Book 7 of Plato's *Laws*, where the Athenian Stranger is made to tell Cleinias that virtually everything said to a slave should be an order (7.19 777E6–778A1). Aristotle's criticism has been challenged on the grounds that elsewhere in the *Laws* Plato exhibits a willingness to offer slaves instruction that goes well beyond simple orders.[12] That Plato does express himself differently elsewhere in the *Laws* is correct, but how that relates to Aristotle's criticism is problematic. Plato's *Laws* is an unfinished work, and the passage under consideration is linked tenuously to what precedes.[13] Had Plato revised the *Laws*, he might have had the Athenian Stranger qualify his remarks concerning how slaves ought to be addressed. But given the text as we have it, the Athenian Stranger offers no qualification when he recommends addressing slaves with orders. He first tells Cleinias

[11] In fact, the question is more complex in that it includes not only Telemachus and Penelope but also two servants (fr. 176.2–6 Rose[3]). The latter do not affect the issue that concerns us, and for that reason I pass over them without comment.

[12] G. Morrow, *Plato's Law of Slavery in its Relation to Greek Law* (Urbana: University of Illinois 1939) 43–45 and N. Smith, "Aristotle's Theory of Natural Slavery," *Phoenix* 37 (1983) 114, who cites Morrow without discussion.

[13] I agree with T. Saunders, *Plato*, The Laws (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1970) 246.

that slaves ought to be punished justly and not spoiled by admonishing them as one does free men (777E4–6). After that the Stranger takes up the matter of how one speaks to slaves. He recommends giving orders, adding that there should be no jesting with either male or female slaves (778A1–2). This recommendation is not confined to punishment; and although Aristotle seems to take the word "admonish" from the preceding remark concerning punishment (777E5), he is correct that the recommendation concerning address has broad application; and as stated, it rules out reasoned admonition.[14]

A challenge to Aristotle's criticism of Plato, however interesting it may be, should not distract us from what is most important in Aristotle' insistence on admonition. Aristotle is taking account of the fact that the natural slave can perceive reason (1254b22). In fact, he does so better than young children whose capacity to appreciate reasoned admonition needs to develop with time. For that reason, Aristotle tells us that slaves should be admonished more than children (1260b6–7).[15] There is a practical concern involved here. When a slave is given reasons as well as orders, he can follow the reasoning; and as a result, he will be more amenable to accomplishing whatever may be ordered.[16] But there is also an ethical concern which is being met. Slaves are human beings and as such should not be treated like animals. Slaves think, and the master who offers reasons for his commands is permitting the slave to exercise his mental capacities to their fullest. Most often the commands and explanations will be practical. The slave is ordered to fetch water now and told that it will soon be too dark to fetch water. On other occasions, the commands and accompanying explanation will have a moral aspect. The slave will be told not to take something, for it belongs to someone else, so that to take it would be stealing. We are not told at what level of generality a slave's ability to follow reasoning will fail. Since most free men have trouble doing philosophical ethics, there is no reason to think that Aristotle would recommend lessons within

[14] In this section of the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger is broadly concerned with the possession of slaves (7.19 776D3). One issue is how slaves should be punished (777B3, E4), but the recommendation that slaves not be from a single country has little to do with proper punishment (777C8–D2). The same is true of the recommendation to address slaves with orders and to avoid jesting (777E6–778A5).

[15] Morrow (above, note 11) 44 errs here. He reports that Aristotle says "slaves have more need of admonition than *free men*" (my italics).

[16] Similarly a slave will be less aggrieved by punishment, if he is first given a reason for the punishment. See *Rhetoric* 2.3 1380b19–20.

the Peripatos. But equally there is no evidence that Aristotle wanted to restrict admonition to the justification of particular commands. Indeed, he wants a master to be responsible for his slave's moral virtue (1260b3–4), and that suggests explaining general rules of conduct to the extent that a slave can follow such explanations. To be sure, the master may be primarily concerned with his own advantage[17]—he wants an obedient slave—but that should not obscure a happy consequence: the slave is given the opportunity to use his mind and to appreciate why he is ordered to do the things he does.[18]

V

Politics 7.7 is part of a larger discussion of the ideal city-state. Aristotle introduces the chapter by telling us that he has already spoken of the size of the citizen population (in 7.4), and that he will now consider the natural character required of the citizens (7.7 1327b19–20). What follows is a paradigm of Greek prejudice. Aristotle divides the inhabited world into three parts. There are northern Europeans, who are full of spirit (*thymos*) but deficient in thought and skill (*dianoia* and *technê*). As a result they are comparatively free, but have no political organization and cannot rule over their neighbors. There are also Asians, who have the reverse condition. They can think and exercise skill, but lack spirit, so that they live continuously in subjection and slavery. Finally there are the Greeks, who are situated between the two and partake of both spirit and thought. As a result they remain free, well organized politically and capable of ruling over everyone, were they organized

[17] Cf. *Politics* 3.6 1278b32–37, 1279a17–21 and *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.10 1160b29–30.

[18] Nicholas Smith (above, note 11) 114 has criticized me for saying that slaves are given the opportunity to "judge for themselves whether or not a particular course of action is appropriate" ("Slaves and Women" [above, note 1] 137 = page 243 in this volume); the slave who is admonished "decides whether he should obey" (p. 137 n. 6). According to Smith, I greatly overstate the extent of the slave's prerogatives. If I understand Smith correctly, he is calling attention to the fact that slaves are expected to follow orders, whether or not they find the reasons compelling. That is correct; but the fact that a slave is obligated (or compelled) to follow orders does not mean that a slave fails to appreciate whatever reasons may be offered by a master. When a slave finds the reasons compelling, he deems the order reasonable and willingly carries out the order. When he does not find the reasons compelling, he will be less willing and may even balk at carrying out an order. To avoid such a response, a master does well to offer sound reasons.

as one state (1327b20–33). To Aristotle's credit, he does qualify his characterization of the Greeks, saying that the Greek tribes exhibit the same difference in relation to each other: some have a one sided nature, while others exhibit a good mix of both capacities (1327b33–36). Nevertheless, Aristotle fails to qualify his lopsided view of other peoples. That is especially striking in regard to Asians, for their past achievements, or at least some of them, were known to Aristotle.

It has recently been suggested that Aristotle's remarks about Asians contain the key to understanding his doctrine of natural slavery. Instead of being deficient in reasoning capacity, natural slaves, like Asians, lack spirit which is required for the actualization of rational capacity.[19] This suggestion, albeit interesting in itself, is not supported by the text. In the first place, *Politics* 7.7 is not concerned with the natural slave (*physei doulos*).[20] The subject is primarily the nature (*physis*) or innate character of the citizens of the ideal city-state and only secondarily the nature of different ethnic groups (1327b20, 37, 1328a10, 18). Of course, Asians are said to be continually in slavery; but that is presented as a fact and not as part of a theory concerning the natural slave. Furthermore, the discussion in 7.7 is largely a response to Plato's *Republic*. The idea that the Greeks are situated in the middle of the inhabited world and have a corresponding disposition (1327b29–31) may be compared with remarks in *Republic* 4.11 (435E1–436A3), and the criticism of those who think that guardians should be fierce toward strangers (1328a8) is a direct criticism of what is said in *Republic* 2.15 (375D10-E8). In addition, the spirit (*thymos*) to which Aristotle refers is not emotion in general[21] and still less the alogical half of Aristotle's bipartite soul. Rather it is the spirit which characterizes the guardians of Plato's *Republic*. Spirit is necessary, if a state is to maintain its freedom; and for that reason, Aristotle requires it in the citizens of his ideal city-state. Indeed, when Aristotle finishes the

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[19] E. Garver, "Aristotle's Natural Slaves: Incomplete *Praxeis* and Incomplete Human Beings," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 32 (1994) 172–195.

[20] It is significant that the phrase "natural slave" or "slave by nature" (*physei doulos*) is not found in 7.7. In addition, Aristotle seems to accept difference in degree. To be sure, the Asians are said to be without spirit (*athuma* 1327b28), but the northern Europeans are described as rather deficient (*endeestera* 1327b25) in thought and skill. Some Greek tribes are said to have a "one-sided" (*monokôlos* 1327b35) nature; but that would seem to be a matter of degree, for earlier Aristotle has said that Greeks partake of both spirit and thought. Be that as it may, in 7.7 Aristotle never says emphatically that a particular deficiency is total; but in 1.13 Aristotle does emphasizes total deficiency, because that is fundamental to his conception of the natural slave (1.13 1260a12).

[21] As Garver (above, note 18) 187 seems to suggest.

division of the inhabited world and draws a conclusion regarding his city-state, he introduces the Platonic term *thymoeidês*: those who will be led easily to virtue must be thoughtful and spirited (*thymoeideis* 1327b37). There is, then, no direct relationship between 7.7 and the doctrine of natural slavery. The latter is based on a bipartite psychology, not Platonic tripartition; and it is neither explained nor contradicted by what is said in 7.7.[22]

VI

The natural slave is marked off from his master not only by a difference in soul but also one in body. In *Politics* 1.2, the natural ruler and master is characterized as one who can look ahead with his intellect. In contrast, the person who is naturally ruled and a slave is said to be capable of bodily labor (1252a31–34). In *Politics* 1.5, we hear that slaves provide bodily assistance, and that nature intends to make the bodies of slaves different from those of free men. Strong bodies suitable for necessary tasks are those of slaves, while upright bodies unsuited for such tasks are those of free men (1254b16–30). The idea is clear enough. Slaves are marked by bodily strength and provide a service which is comparable to that provided by tame animals (1254b24–26). Natural capacity determines their role within the household. That is sensible enough; but there are difficulties. Aristotle acknowledges that nature often fails to make the bodies of slaves different from those of free men (1254b32–33). That suggests that there is nothing natural about the natural slave being strong in body, for what is natural occurs for the most part.[23] In addition, difference in terms of bodily strength is one of degree. Natural masters do not entirely lack bodily strength in the way that natural slaves are said to lack completely the capacity to deliberate. Hence, difference in bodily strength does not mark a difference in kind and cannot be the basis for the distinction between natural ruler and natural subject (1.13 1259b36–38). That does not threaten the theory of natural slavery, for it can rest on the psychological distinction between having and lacking deliberative capacity. Moreover, it may be desirable that nature often fails to produce natural slaves who have strong bodies. For

[22] For the idea that 7.7 is out of line with the view of natural slavery advanced in Book 1, see Smith (above, note 11) 110–111.

[23] Cf. *Physics* 2.8 198b35–36, 199b24–26.

differences in degree of physical strength may facilitate the assignation of roles within the household. Tasks which constitute heavy labor can be assigned to slaves with strong bodies; but there are other tasks like cooking which require no great strength and yet may be appropriately assigned to slaves (cf. 1.7 1255b26).

VII

The fact that Aristotle compares the natural slave with animals (1.1 1252b11–12, 1.5 1254b24–26) does not take away the slave's humanity. The natural slave may lack deliberative capacity, but he is never denied all capacity to think. He can make the judgments which result in emotional response and he can follow the reasoning of his master. In terms of Aristotle's biological psychology, that of the treatise *On Soul*, the slave has not only the faculties of nutrition and sensation but also that of intelligence, albeit in a limited form. It follows that the slave qualifies as a human being, for cognitive capacity is what marks off human beings from both plants which have only nutritive capacity and animals whose souls rise to the level of sensation.[24] The bipartite psychology, which is fundamental to Aristotle's ethical and political thought, is different from the biological psychology. It locates the logical and alogical halves of the soul within the biological faculty of intelligence (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1.6 1097b33–1098a5).[25] When a man responds emotionally without deliberation, he is exercising his alogical soul. His action may on occasion be hasty and misguided, but it involves an exercise of intelligence and therefore qualifies as human behavior. And that is true of both master and slave.[26]

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[24] Being a thinking creature, the natural slave is not a problem for Aristotle's *scala naturae*. He belongs securely among human beings, so that it is unhelpful and possibly misleading to characterize the natural slave as "une sorte d'hybride, à la frontière de l'animalité, l'humanité et l'utensilité," as does A. Gomez-Muller, *Chemins d'Aristote* (Paris: Félin 1991) 121.

[25] For discussion see *Aristotle on Emotion* (above, note 1) 26–30 and Chapters 4 and 5 in this volume.

[26] If we think of the master as one who possesses perfect virtue, then we may want to say that the master will on occasion act quickly but not with foolish haste, and that his action may have unfortunate consequences but not because the action was inappropriate to the situation as presented. In any case, the natural master and the natural slave are similar in that both are thinking when they respond emotionally to the present situation.

It has been argued in the literature that the natural slave living apart from a natural master—especially in a barbarian land—is in no actual way different from an animal. The argument runs as follows: "The only way in which he (the natural slave) differs from a beast is that he can perceive reason and thus be subservient to it;" The natural slave when living in a barbarian land has no natural ruler or master, and as a result he is not exposed to reason; Hence his potential for participating in reason remains "wholly unactualized," and he is "in no actual way" different from an animal.[27] The argument might have some appeal to Greeks of the fourth century BC. At least it would satisfy their prejudice concerning the mental capacity of barbarians and the quality of their rulers. But in regard to Aristotelian doctrine, the argument is fundamentally flawed, for it involves a misunderstanding of Aristotle's bipartite psychology. The natural slave cannot deliberate, but the alogical half of his soul is intact. If he is placed among barbarians or simply removed from a natural master, he will be denied the opportunity to follow the reasoning of a master. But he does not lead the life of an animal, for he can think and act emotionally. Such behavior is beyond the capacity animals, who are stuck at the level of sensation.[28] Natural slaves are not.

VIII

In *Politics* 1.5, Aristotle asks whether anyone is a natural slave and whether for anyone it is advantageous and just to be a slave (1254a17–20). He tells us that it will not be difficult to consider the matter theoretically and to learn from what occurs (1254a20–21); after that he offers procedural remarks (1254a21-b2). The answer proper begins with a list of different kinds of despotic and political rule, all of which are considered advantageous. The despotic rule of the soul over the body and the political or kingly rule of the logical part of the soul over the emotional part are mentioned first.[29] Then come the rule of

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[27] Smith (above, note 11) 117–122. The quoted portions are from pages 117 and 119.

[28] For further discussion, see my article "Aristotle: Animals, Emotion, and Moral Virtue," *Arethusa* 4 (1971) 137–165 = Chapter 9 in this volume.

[29] When Aristotle first mentions the parts of the soul, he speaks of mind and desire, *nous* and *orexis* (1.5 1254b5), which might suggest his biological psychology, but Aristotle soon makes clear that he is thinking in terms of his bipartite psychology. He speaks of the emotional part and explains "mind" as the logical part (1254b8).

man over animal and that of male over female. In these cases, Aristotle does not specify the kind of rule, but we can easily add that men rule animals despotically, and the male rules the female in a political or kingly fashion.[30] Aristotle concludes that it must hold in the same way for all mankind (1254b14–16). He then turns to slaves and says, "For all those who stand apart to the extent that body and soul and man and beast do—that is the condition of all those whose business is to use their body, and that is the best coming from them—these are by nature slaves, for whom it is better to be ruled in this manner, if it is also true for those named" (1254b16–20). The phrase "in this manner" refers to despotic rule, and "those named" are body and animal. The argument has some appeal, for many slaves do work with their bodies and to that extent they may be compared with animals.

What follows, however, is quite unsatisfactory. Aristotle tells us that "the person who can belong to another—and for that reason he does belong to another—and the person who shares in reason to the extent that he perceives it but does not possess it—for the other animals obey not reason but feelings—is a slave by nature" (1254b20–24). Since this statement is about the natural slave (the Greek sentence begins by mentioning the "slave by nature" 1254b21), we are likely to assume that the capacity to belong to another is natural and that people with this capacity are naturally and justly possessed by others. But that needs to be shown. Aristotle has arguments to show why a slave benefits from the guidance of a master, but he has none which justifies treating slaves as property. Apparently Aristotle is overly influenced by the world he knew. He said at the beginning of the chapter that it would be easy to learn from what occurs (1254a20–21); and now he seems to be reporting what in fact occurs: slaves do belong to their masters. Only he expresses himself as if the ownership of slaves follows from a natural capacity to be owned.

The second part of the statement has already been discussed above in Sections II and IV. Here I want to underline that it counts against ruling slaves in a despotic manner. The slave is said to differ from an animal in that he can perceive reason. The animal cannot do that; instead, it obeys feelings.[31] That weakens the comparison with animals

[30] Aristotle characterizes the rule of the male over the female in various ways: it is characterized as political at *Politics* 1.12 1259b1, monarchical at 1.7 1255b19, and aristocratic at *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.10 1160b32–33.

[31] Aristotle's vocabulary is ambiguous. To express the perception of reason, he uses

which is based on bodily service, and it raises the question why slaves should be treated like chattel. Shouldn't their capacity to perceive reason be respected? Shouldn't they be provided with reasons as well as given orders, so that their full nature will be actualized? Of course, they should; and later in 1.13 Aristotle acknowledges as much when he objects to withholding reason from slaves (1260b5–7).

The rest of 1.5 makes even clearer that Aristotle's argument is fatally flawed. He says that nature intends to provide the slave with a body suitable for physical labor, but then he admits that nature often fails to do so (1254b24–34). Aristotle's next observation is more of an emotional appeal than an argument. Everybody, he tells us, would agree that if some men should excel in body to the extent that the statues of the gods do, other men ought to be their slaves (1254b34–36).[32] Next Aristotle says that it would be far more just to distinguish between master and slave on the basis of a difference in soul, but it is not as easy to see the beauty of the soul as it is to see that of the body (1254b37–1255a1). That admission ought to raise alarms about our ability to distinguish between individuals who are natural masters and those who are natural slaves, but Aristotle ignores the problem. He concludes the chapter by declaring it obvious that some men are free and others slaves, and for the latter slavery is both advantageous and just (1255a1–3).

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the verb *aisthanesthai* (1.5 1254b22), which in other contexts, especially biology, refers to the sensations typical of animals. He also uses *pathêmata* (1254b24) to refer to the feelings of which animals are capable, although the word is often used of human emotions. Cf. 1254b8, where *to pathêtikon morion*, refers to the alogical part of soul which is the seat of emotional response. It is tempting to think that Aristotle has deliberately chosen ambiguous words in order to obscure the difference between men and animals. But the temptation should be resisted. Using ambiguous words is common and need not involve slight of hand. Moreover, in the case of *aisthanesthai*, Aristotle is clear that he is speaking of a form of perception which is peculiarly human.

[32] A. Preus, "Aristotle on Slavery: Recent Reactions," *Philosophical Inquiry* 15 (1993) p. 40 suggests that 1254b34–36 illustrates "the intellectual distance between Aristotle's thought-world and our own." Whereas Aristotle, it seems, would willingly be the slave of Zeus, were the god to appear in Athens, "we modern liberals believe that we would resist to the death enslavement even by the most benevolent extraterrestrial." Prues is certainly correct that our intellectual world differs in important ways from that of Aristotle; here I want only to add a cautionary remark. The lines in question contain no mention of an appearance by Zeus or any other god (only the statues of the gods are mentioned); and more importantly, in their context, the lines function largely as an introduction to the immediately following statement about differences in soul ("and if this is true in the case of the body" 1.5 1254b37). Aristotle reminds us of the way we respond to physical beauty, and then calls for a similar response to psychic beauty (1254b37–1255a1).

IX

We are left with mixed feelings. We may applaud the fact that Aristotle does not simply accept slavery as it existed in the ancient world. He wants to know what sort of person is suited to be a slave, and his answer is based on a sound distinction between reasoning and emotion and a corresponding distinction between logical and alogical halves of the soul. Nevertheless, there is an uncritical side to Aristotle's account of the natural slave. He never demonstrates that such a slave exists; and if that slave does exist, Aristotle leaves us wondering whether we can pick him out with certainty. Moreoever, Aristotle recognizes that he cannot simply assume the justness of owning slaves and of subjecting them to despotic rule; but his argument in favor of ownership and despotic rule is less than successful.

[125/126]

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

ARISTOTLE ON PRIOR AND POSTERIOR, CORRECT AND MISTAKEN CONSTITUTIONS

In *Politics* 3.1 Aristotle offers a first, tentative definition of citizen (1275a22–34) and then considers the relationship of citizen to constitution. His remarks are brief, but the general point is clear enough. The notion of citizen depends upon that of constitution. Since constitutions differ not only in kind but also in priority and posteriority (correct constitutions are prior and mistaken or deviant constitutions are posterior), there is no single, common notion of citizen (1275a35-b5). With this conclusion I do not wish to quarrel. What I want to do is to focus on the priority and posteriority which Aristotle attributes to correct and mistaken constitutions. For scholars have not always understood this priority and posteriority and in any case they have left unsaid certain things which seem to me of philosophic interest and importance.

In Section I, I shall argue briefly against a temporal interpretation of the priority and posteriority of constitutions and then in Section II, I shall point out that the familiar comparison of constitutions with numbers, figures and psychic faculties may be more misleading than helpful. In Section III, I shall refer to Plato's *Laws* and suggest that Aristotle's analysis can be more fully appreciated, when it is seen as a rejection of persuasive definition. Finally in Section IV, I shall focus on passages which not only bring out the normative aspect of Aristotle's analysis but also manifest considerable insight into the logic of grading.

I

We may begin by rejecting an interpretation recently advanced in the literature.[1] This is the view that the priority and posteriority mentioned in *Po1itics* 3.1 is to be construed temporally. At first glance such an interpretation seems attractive. For Aristotle not only describes the temporal use of "prior" as primary and most proper (*Cat.* 12 14a26–28) but also speaks of the city in a way which encourages a chronological

[1] E. Braun, *Das dritte Buch der aristotelischen "Politik"* = *SB Wien* (1965) 20–22, 54–60.

interpretation of political purpose and constitutional arrangement (1.2 1252a24–1253a39, 3.6 1278b15–30). Common advantage is said to bring men together (3.6 1278b21–22) and common advantage is declared the goal of correct constitutions (3.6 1279a17–20). It is tempting to conclude that correct constitutions are temporally prior, being due to some sort of natural, primitive instinct for association and common advantage. Deviant constitutions are a later phenomenon arising only when the motive of common advantage has been lost.[2]

This interpretation enjoys an initial plausibility, but ultimately it must be rejected. The introduction of priority and posteriority in *Politics* 3.1 is not based upon a genetic theory of the *polis* whose historicity is open to question and whose relevance to the larger discussion in 3.1 is not at all obvious. For Aristotle wants to argue from the priority and posteriority of constitutions to the absence of a single, common genus. Toward this end the details of history are irrelevant. Tyranny, for example, may be a historically later phenomenon than kingship (cf. 3.15 1286b16–17 with 5.10 1310b18–20 and Thucyclides 1.13.1) but this piece of history does not in itself rule out treating kingship and tyranny as coordinate species under the common genus of monarchy. Moreover, temporal sequence is hardly touched upon in *Politics* 3 and when it is, the ordering is not always from correct to deviant constitution (3.15 1286b8–22, cf. 4.11 1296a1–5, 1297b16–28, 5.1 1301b6–10, 1316a29–34). Even in the *Ethics* where passage from correct to deviant constitution is emphasized (*EN* 8.10 1160b10–17), Aristotle is careful not to say that such a sequence is invariable. It is only especially common, because the change involved is least and easiest (1160b21–22). We must conclude that temporal order is not central to Aristotle's thinking and that a different interpretation is to be preferred.

II

In *Politics* 3.1 Aristotle is consciously applying the general principle that whenever things form a series such that one comes first and another second and so on, there is nothing or hardly anything common to

[2] Ibid. 59–60. Cf. E. Barker, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle* (New York 1959) 310–311, whose remarks concerning chronological order are properly kept apart from an analysis of priority and posteriority.

such things (1275a35–38).[3] Hence scholars have been quick to group constitutions with numbers, figures and psychic faculties, for Aristotle holds that the members of these classes form such a series and lack a proper genus.[4] In the *Metaphysics* Aristotle argues that there is no number and figure apart from the specific numbers and figures, for whenever things form an ordered series, that which is predicated of the things cannot be something apart from them (3(B).3 999a6–10). Similarly in the *De Anima* Aristotle holds that there is no figure apart from the triangle, the quadrilateral, etc. and no soul apart from the faculties of nutrition, sensation and intellect (3.3 414b20–32).[5] What interests me here is that Aristotle does not mention constitutions in connection with numbers, figures and psychic faculties. I do not want to suggest that Aristotle fails to mention constitutions, because he thinks they cannot be grouped together with numbers, figures and psychic faculties conceived of as ordered series lacking a proper genus. But I do want to suggest that the priority and posteriority of constitutions is in some respects different. In the *Politics* Aristotle is well advised not to illustrate the priority and posteriority of constitutions by reference to numbers, figures and psychic faculties, for such a move might have the unfortunate effect of diverting attention from features which are not shared and which are important for appreciating fully Aristotle's remarks on correct and mistaken constitutions.

A comparatively superficial difference is that while numbers, figures and psychic faculties form single series in which every member is in some relationship of priority or posteriority to every other member, constitutions as presented in *Politics* 3.1 do not form such a single series.[6]

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[3] The addition of *glischrôs* in 1275a38 is probably not significant. It seems to have been added to affect a tentative manner and may be compared with similar additions at *Phys*. 5.3 226b27–28 and *De An*. 3.3 428b19. See my *Aristotle on Emotion* (London 1975) 47 n. 2.

[4] The grouping takes various forms in different authors. See, for example, J. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle* I (Oxford 1887) 242; J. Cook Wilson, "On the Platonist Doctrine of the *asymblêtoi arithmoi," Classical Review* 18 (1904) 256; H.H. Joachim, *Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics*, edited by D. Rees (Oxford 1955) 38; W.D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* I (Oxford 1958) 237; D.W. Hamlyn, *Aristotle's De Anima* (Oxford 1968) 94. In what follows I shall not discuss these scholars individually. I am only concerned with the cumulative impression that the priority and posteriority of constitutions can be usefully elucidated by reference to numbers, figures and psychic faculties.

[5] In another context it might be important to focus on differences between *Metaph*. 999a6–10 and *De An*. 414b20–32. See the interesting remarks of A.C. Lloyd, "Genus, species and ordered series in Aristotle," *Phronesis* 7 (1962) 67–90.

[6] To "*Politics* 3.1" might be added "3.6–8," but either way I am expressing myself

Instead they divide into three groups: kingship and tyranny, aristocracy and oligarchy, polity and democracy. Each group involves priority and posteriority, because each group is composed of a correct and a mistaken form of constitution. But across groups there is no priority and posteriority, so that the correct forms of kingship, aristocracy and polity can be coordinate species of correct constitution—that is to say, species of political arrangement aiming at the common interest (1279a17–18).[7]

Later on we must complicate our account and recognize that in a different context Aristotle will rate and order the correct constitutions, so that finally all six take their place in a single series. But at this moment we should go below what I have called a comparatively superficial difference and notice that this difference is based on Aristotle's teleology. For Aristotle, constitutions are by nature purposeful and properly directed toward a specific *telos* (4.1 1289a17, cf. 3.6 1278b23, 3.9 1280b39). This is not true of numbers and figures. In the case of psychic faculties teleology is important and it is of some interest that when Aristotle names the primary faculty, he does so with an appeal to the principle that everything is properly named from its *telos* (2.4 416b23–25). But in psychology, teleology serves to specify rather than to unite the faculties that are ordered along the *scala naturae*. This is different from the sphere of politics where the *telos* of common advantage serves to unite three different constitutions under the label "correct constitution."

A further difference between constitutions and numbers, figures and psychic faculties concerns the priority of greater value. In the *Categories* Aristotle recognizes that "prior" is often used in an evaluative sense (12 14b4–8) and in the *Metaphysics* he says that the better is always prior to the worse and that a genus is lacking (3(B).3 999a13–14). The application to constitutions is clear enough. Correct constitutions are valued higher than mistaken ones, because they have a proper goal and con-

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cautiously, for later and from a different perspective Aristotle will order the correct and incorrect constitutions in a single series. See below, Section IV.

[7] It might be objected that the species of both the correct and incorrect constitutions form ordered series in that they differ in number: kingship and tyranny are the rule of one man, aristocracy and oligarchy are the rule of the few and polity and democracy are the rule of the many. But this objection seems to forget that in certain cases Aristotle does not think number an essential feature. At least he goes out of his way to argue that oligarchy and democracy are only incidentally the rule of the few and the many (3.8 1279b11–1280a6) and when he comes to discuss polity his focus is upon the middle class in contrast with the very rich and the very poor (4.11 1295b1–3). Cf. Barker (above, note 2) 312.

form to simple justice (3.6 1279a17–19). Mistaken constitutions are deviations that may be called despotic in that they disregard the interests of free men (1279a19–21). They are bad, not good, and therefore are posterior in an evaluative sense. This is not true of numbers and figures, and while Aristotle would want to rate intellect higher than sensation and both of more worth than nutritive and reproductive capacity, he would not want to say that the lower faculties are in any way deviations and violations of simple justice. Deviant constitutions are positively bad. Lower psychic faculties are not in themselves bad, though they can be troublesome and in any case lack the value of intellect.

A final difference is conceptual. The mistaken constitutions are posterior not only because they are of negative value but also because they are conceived of in terms of the correct constitutions. We may compare the *Eudemian Ethics* where primacy is related to definition. "Surgeon" is said to be prior to "surgical instrument," because the *logos* of the former is mentioned or implied in the *logos* of the latter and not *vice versa* (7.2 1236a17–22). Viewed this way, a correct constitution is prior, because it is conceptually independent, while a mistaken constitution is posterior, because it is conceptually dependent upon a correct constitution: tyranny is (essentially) a deviation from kingship, oligarchy is a deviation from aristocracy and democracy is a deviation from polity (1279b4–6, 1289a28–30, cf. *EE* 7.9 1241b32). This kind of logical analysis—often called focal analysis—is well known to readers of the *Metaphysics*.[8] Aristotle applies it to being and uses it to explain the priority of substance (4(Γ).2 1003a33-b10, 7(Z).1 1028a34–36). But he does not use it to establish priority and posteriority among numbers, figures and psychic faculties. Two is prior not because it is conceptually independent of other numbers but rather because it is first among the numbers (*Metaph.* 3(B).3 999a8), i.e., it comes first in the series of natural numbers. This series is a developing, open-ended series whose principle of continuation is understood as soon as any member of the series is understood. This is not required in the case of a focal series. We can understand and define "surgeon" without understanding "surgical instrument" (7.2 *EE* 1236a22) and we can define both "surgeon" and "surgical instrument" without being certain how this particular focal series is to be extended.

[8] On focal analysis see G.E.L. Owen, "Logic and Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle," in *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century*, edited by I. Düring and Owen (Göreborg 1960) 163–190.

Aristotle's comparison between figures and psychic faculties (*De An.* 2.3 414b20–32) is of considerable independent interest, but in this context we may confine our remarks to the fact that Aristotle does not introduce focal analysis to explain the serial order which marks kinds of figures and psychic faculties. Rather, he speaks of the prior always being present potentially in the posterior (414b29–30) and in so speaking passes over an important difference. For while it is a demonstrable truth that any given quadrilateral can be divided into two triangles, it is a matter of empirical observation that sensation does not occur apart from nutritive capacity.[9] Of course, we might develop a conception of soul such that higher faculties logically imply the presence of lower ones, but Aristotle does not do this, not only because empirical issues are properly settled by observation (cf. 2.2 413a31-b1), but also because he accepts the possibility of a separable intellect (2.2 413b24–27, 2.3 415a11–12). This is not to say that Aristotle's analysis of psychic faculties makes no use of logical ties. When he comes to consider the psychic faculties individually, he tells us that activities are logically prior to capacities and in the same way objects are prior to activities (2.4 415a16–22). In other words, objects are prior in the focal series object-activity-faculty and therefore are properly investigated first (2.4 416a20, 2.6 418a7–8).[10] But between the faculties Aristotle does not try to estab-

[9] Cf. Sir David Ross, *Aristotle, De Anima* (Oxford 1961) 224. Here two caveats should at least be mentioned. First, Aristotle might concede that psychological research involves observation and still claim that all developed sciences including psychology can and should be conveyed in a demonstrative manner (see J. Barnes, "Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration," *Phronesis* 14 [1969] 123–152, reprinted in *Articles on Aristotle*, edited by Barnes et al. [London 1975] 65–87). Second, the comparison of psychic faculties with rectilinear figures may be quite helpful in pointing up the way in which a higher psychic faculty tends to inform the activity of a lower psychic faculty. Much as the triangle is not actually present in the quadrilateral, so simple manifestations of nutritive and sensitive capacity are rare in the case of human beings. Man's intelligence seems to affect almost everything he does, so that only in special (often breakdown) cases can we describe the behavior of a human being as a simple manifestation of nutritive and appetitive capacity. Cf. Joachim (above, note 4) 38–39, who perhaps overstates the way in which lower faculties are "essentially modified" in creatures endowed with higher faculties. For while human beings often manifest intelligence in taking nutrition, their nutritive faculty is said not only to be common (to all living things) and vegetative in nature but also to be especially active during periods of sleep (*EN* 1102a32-b5).

[10] I understand *trophê to* have the same sense in 2.4 416a20 as in 416a22 and I interpret the former passage with reference to 2.4 415a21 and 2.6 418a7–8. Hence I prefer the translation of W.S. Hett, *Aristotle, On the Soul*, Loeb edition (London 1957) 91, to that of Sir David Ross, *Aristotle, De Anima* (Oxford 1961) 226, and Hamlyn (above, note 4) 20.

lish a focal series. He treats nutritive capacity first, because it is most common (2.4 415a24) and not because its definition will be mentioned in the definition of any higher faculty.

III

It turns out that Aristotle's analysis of constitutions differs from his analysis of numbers, figures and psychic faculties. This in itself is of some interest, but if we want to appreciate fully Aristotle's remarks concerning the priority of correct constitutions and the posteriority of mistaken ones, we should get away from numbers, figures and psychic faculties and consider Plato's *Laws* 4.5 712B8–4.7 715E2. For here we find the Athenian Stranger anticipating much of Aristotle's argument.[11] The Stranger recognizes a distinction between constitutions which benefit the entire population and those which are despotic and enslave a portion of the city (*Laws* 4.5 713A1–2, cf. *Pol.* 1279a20–21). He also connects correctness with the common interest (*Laws* 4.7 715B3–4, cf. *Pol.* 1279a17–20, 1283b36–42) and even argues in such a way as to suggest that the notion of citizen is dependent upon that of constitution. For the Stranger first decides to withhold the label "constitution" from political arrangements which do not consider the good of the entire community (4.5 712E10, 4.7 715B3) and then makes a similar decision concerning the use of "citizen" (4.7 715B5). To be sure, the Stranger does not formulate a notion of conceptual dependence in the way that Aristotle does (1275a35–36), but he does argue in a way that agrees with Aristotelian method. At very least he seems to recognize the principle that coordinates (*systoicha*) follow coordinates (*Top.* 2.9 114a38-b1, 3.3 118a35–36, 7.3 153b25–26, 8.1 156a27–30)—that a decision concerning the use of *politeia* affects the use of *politês*.

There is, however, one important respect in which the Stranger cannot be said to anticipate Aristotle. This is in withholding the label "con-

[11] Cf. Newman (above, note 4) 215–216. That Aristotle was much impressed by *Laws* 4.5 712B8–4.7 715E2 should be obvious from the passage I am about to cite. Here I would add only that (1) when Aristotle mentions guardians and servants of law (3.16 1287a21–22), his words seem to echo *Laws* 4.6 714A2, 4.7 715C7; (2) when he mentions a connection between law and reason (1287a29–30), he seems to be recalling *Laws* 714A2 and (3) when he is concerned with constitutional mixture and mentions Sparta approvingly (4.7 1293b16, 4.9 1294b19, cf. 2.6 1265b35), he seems to be influenced in part by *Laws* 4.5 712D2–E9.

stitution" from associations that are not directed toward the common good. The Stranger is not ignorant of the fact that Kleinias and other Greek speakers use "constitution" quite generally to refer to various arrangements including democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy, kingship and tyranny (4.5 712B8–C5). Nevertheless, he decides to restrict the use of "constitution" and thereby to give special dignity to a particular kind of constitution—namely, the kind that considers the interest of all citizens. That is what Stevenson and other modern philosophers have discussed under the rubric "persuasive definition."[12] To introduce as a defining mark something which is absent from many arrangements generally spoken of as constitutions is not so much to analyze usage as to recommend a particular kind of constitution, presumably because this kind of constitution is thought to have desirable features lacking in other forms of constitution. What is troubling and perhaps a fault is that in recommending arrangements which consider everyone's interest, the Stranger begins in a way that does not distinguish clearly between making a recommendation concerning how we might beneficially use words and giving a report concerning how we actually do use words: "Those (arrangements) which we just now named are not constitutions but settlements" (4.5 712E9–10). It is only toward the end of the discussion that the Stranger speaks in a way which seems to indicate that he is recommending something new: "These we now say not to be constitutions" (4.7 715B2–3).[13]

With this restricted usage Aristotle is unsympathetic. He is prepared to speak of correct and mistaken forms of constitution, but he is adverse to violating everyday language by withholding the label "constitution" from democracies, oligarchies and tyrannies. Accordingly, he offers an analysis that makes room for correct and mistaken forms of constitution and at the same time actually wards off arbitrary linguistic decisions. For Aristotle's analysis not only makes evident the goal of political associations; it also provides a clear explanation of why democracies, oligarchies and tyrannies are called constitutions.

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[12] C.L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven 1944) 206–226. Cf. R. Robinson, *Definition* (Oxford 1950) 165–170, who has discussed persuasive definition under the heading "Real Definition as the Adoption and Recommendation of Ideals."

[13] The use of *nun* at 4.5 712E10 seems to differ from the use at 4.7 715B3. In the earlier passage *nun* is used to refer back half a page to 4.5 712C3–4. (The OCT is correctly punctuated at 712E10.) In the later passage *nun* does not seem to pick up something just said but rather to emphasize a present decision concerning the usage of "constitution."

They are essentially deviations from polity, aristocracy and kingship and therefore are called constitutions by reference to these correct and primary forms. Ambiguity is mitigated, so that we are disinclined to follow the Stranger. Whatever the practical political gains his restricted usage may promise, we are tempted to follow Aristotle in respecting everyday language.[14]

IV

Aristotle's interest in the priority of correct constitutions does not blind him to alternative ways of classifying constitutions and in *Politics* 4 he reports that men recognize two basic constitutions: oligarchy and democracy. They are said to classify aristocracy as a kind of oligarchy and polity as a kind of democracy in much the same way that they treat the west wind as a kind of north wind and the east wind as a kind of south wind (4.3 1290a13–19). In this particular passage Aristotle does not state explicitly the reasons why men pick oligarchy and democracy as basic constitutions, but two reasons come readily to mind. The first is suggested by a later passage in the *Politics*, where Aristotle reports that since the rich and the poor are mutually exclusive classes which normally coincide with the few and the many, constitutions seem to divide into oligarchies and democracies (4.4 1291b7–13). In other words, a consideration of groups within the city encourages a division into oligarchies and democracies. The second reason is suggested by the analogy with winds. In the *Meteorologica* we are told that north and south winds are most frequent (2.4 361a6). They are the prevailing winds and this fact seems to explain why certain people treat these two winds as standard winds from which other winds are deviations.[15] Similarly with constitutions frequency might be used to select oligarchy and democracy as basic forms (4.11 1296a22–23, cf. 5.1 1301b39–1302a2).

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[14] Aristotle's interest in everyday language is well known, but perhaps it may be noted in this context that Aristotle not only preserves ordinary language in using "constitution" widely to cover deviant as well as correct forms, but also appeals to ordinary language in order to explain using "constitution" narrowly to refer to the specific form of polity (4.7 1293a40, cf. 4.13 1297b24). This is not to suggest that Aristotle was rigidly bound by a devotion to everyday language. In the *Ethics* he acknowledges that men are accustomed to use "constitution" to refer to polity and yet he offers "timocratic" as an appropriate label (*EN* 8.10 1160a33–35).

[15] Cf. H. Rackham, *Aristotle, Politics*, Loeb edition (London 1950) 288–289, note a.

Certainly on the criterion of frequency none of the correct forms could qualify. Kingship and aristocracy are beyond most cities, and polity is a regrettably rare occurrence (cf. 4.11 1295a25–34, 1296a37–40).

Aristotle acknowledges that a division into oligarchies and democracies is especially widespread (4.3 1290a22–24), but he is equally explicit in declaring it truer and better to divide constitutions according to his own framework and so to regard oligarchy and democracy as deviations from one or two well-established forms (1290a23–29). In speaking of one or two forms Aristotle is thinking of kingship and aristocracy (cf. 4.2 1289a30–33) and in speaking of a truer and better division Aristotle is thinking of a normative division. We have already touched upon this point in Section II, where we observed that correct constitutions are prior not only in a conceptual but also in an evaluative sense. Here we may add that a concern with grading leads Aristotle to reject an alternative framework built around two frequent but mistaken constitutions. This is not to overlook the fact that when Aristotle turns his attention from grading to the causes of revolution, he is quite prepared to speak of aristocracy being in some way an oligarchy (5.7 1306b24–27). But when Aristotle is interested in grading he prefers a normative framework and not one built around oligarchy and democracy.

This interest in grading also prompts Aristotle to criticize an unnamed predecessor for speaking of good oligarchy and calling democracy best among bad constitutions (4.2 1289b5–9). What is interesting here is not so much the identity of Aristotle's opponent as the logic of his criticism.[16] He considers the normative aspect of his division so important, that he not only objects to speaking of, say, good oligarchy (1289b7–8) but also favors a mode of expression which suggests his fundamental normative distinction. He does not call it an outright error to speak of one oligarchy being better than another (1289b10–11) but he does not like this mode of speech, for it leaves open whether oligarchy is essentially bad. "Better" is a comparative word which is quite indifferent to the actual value of things graded. Two items may be both very bad and yet one may be properly spoken of as better than the other. Hence Aristotle recommends "less bad" (1289b11), for this expression is commonly used to grade items of negative value. To call one oligarchy

[16] Aristotle may be thinking of Plato's *Statesman* 302–303, but if that is the case, then Aristotle is not only misremembering the Platonic text but also misremembering it to his own advantage (Robinson [above, note 4] 72). I prefer to leave the matter undecided.

less bad than another is to imply that all are bad—that they are all misdirected and therefore all belong to the class of mistaken constitutions.

Aristotle's remarks concerning "better" and "less bad" make clear his interest in maintaining a fundamental distinction between correct and deviant constitutions. However, we should not ignore the fact that these remarks are immediately preceded by an ordering of the correct constitutions. Aristotle recognizes the superior value of kingship and aristocracy (1289a30–33) and then goes on to create a single series running from best to worst political arrangement (1289a38-b5, cf. *EN* 8.10 1160a35-b22). What we need to be clear about is that such a single series is quite compatible with holding that there are three correct constitutions from which three other constitutions deviate. The important point is that grading requires some standard, so that a complication of the standard is likely to complicate the graded series. When Aristotle first introduces correctness in *Politics* 3, he seems to have Plato's *Laws* in mind and in any event is concerned solely with the correctness of the goal. Correct constitutions are those which consider the common good and mistaken constitutions are those which consider the ruler's good (3.6 1279a17–20). This analysis in no way precludes the introduction of a second criterion and therefore a more complicated ranking of constitutions. At the very end of *Politics* 3, Aristotle reaffirms the existence of three correct constitutions and then adds that the best of these correct constitutions must be that which is managed by the best men (3.18 1288a32–34). We have here a new standard—namely, that of virtue (1288a36, or virtue accompanied by resources 1289a33). This standard is not intended to replace the standard of proper orientation. But it can supplement it, and in particular it can be used to help grade correctly oriented constitutions. Kingship may be deemed best (*EN* 8.10 1160a35), for the (true, absolute) monarch is a man of quasi-divine qualities (3.13 1284a10, 4.2 1289a40). Alternatively kingship and (ideal) aristocracy may be grouped together and rated best (4.2 1289a30–33, cf. 5.10 1310b3, 32–34) or possibly aristocracy is to be preferred (3.15 1286b3–7). But whatever the decision concerning these two constitutions, polity ranks third, for a large number of citizens cannot (or at least not easily) possess virtue fully (3.6 1279a40). When virtue is the standard, polity falls short of perfection and therefore may be counted among deviant forms, though from the standpoint of proper orientation, polity is a correct form from which democracy deviates (4.8 1293b23–27).

These last remarks concerning polity have been said to reflect a fundamental mistake in Aristotle's division of constitutions.[17] But this criticism is itself mistaken, for properly understood Aristotle's remarks on polity exhibit considerable understanding of what may be called "asymmetrical pairs"—opposites of which one member is a limit that does not admit comparison.[18] When Aristotle calls properly oriented constitutions correct and then goes on to speak of mistaken deviations, he is recognizing at least implicitly that correctness is not a matter of degree but rather a limit from which it is only possible to fall away. And when Aristotle uses *parekbasis* to refer to deviant forms, he is not choosing a poor word.[19] In fact his choice of label is just right. We may compare correctness with straightness—a comparison which is encouraged in Greek by the ambiguity of *orthos*.[20] Being straight is the opposite of being crooked, but while a line can be more or less crooked, a line is either straight or not straight. Similarly with noses, straightness is an all or nothing proposition. Hooked and snub noses may vary in their contour, but they do not approach the Classical ideal by becoming more and more straight. Rather they become less and less crooked until they are straight. At this point they have reached a limit and become paradigms from which hooked and snub noses are properly said to deviate (cf. 5.9 1309b23).

In the same way constitutions are either correct or incorrect, and Aristotle tacitly recognizes this when he groups polity together with certain (non-ideal) aristocracies, states that these constitutions are not deviations and then goes on to call them deviations of which there are deviations (1293b23–27). The point is that when the virtue of rulers becomes a (part of the) standard, then polity and certain aristocracies are properly spoken of as deviations, though deviations in lesser degree than democracy, oligarchy and tyranny. But when goal-direction is the criterion in play, then polity and the several aristocracies in question meet the standard and are properly spoken of as correct constitutions

[17] E. Zeller, *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics*, translated by Costelloe and Muirhead (New York 1962) 243–244.

[18] I have taken the phrase "asymmetrical pairs" from N. Cooper, "Pleasure and Goodness in Plato's *Philebus*," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 18 (1968) 12. See also E. Sapir, "Grading, a Study in Semantics," *Philosophy of Science* 11 (1944) 115–117.

[19] Barker (above, n. 2) 308, n. 2, suggests that *elleipsis* would be a better label than *parekbasis*.

[20] In labeling the correct constitutions Aristotle uses the adjective *orthos* (3.6 1279a18) which can mean not only correct but also straight. Cf. *LSJ* 1249 *s.v.* II and III.

from which other forms deviate to greater or less degree. In other words, Aristotle recognizes both that correctness requires a standard which may be varied and also that correctness is not a matter of degree. When the standard is complicated by the addition of virtue, then polity becomes not less correct but rather a deviant form.[21] All this may be rather complex, but it is not mistaken confusion. On the contrary, it is the mark of a philosopher who understands the logic of grading.[22]

[21] Of course, Aristotle may slip into everyday language and speak of "the most correct" constitution (4.8 1293b25). But if this is a slip or perhaps a concession to ordinary language (cf. Sapir [above, n. 18] 116), it is far more important that Aristotle speaks of polity and certain aristocracies as deviations, for in so doing he is tacitly recognizing the idea of grading downwards from some standard of perfection.

[22] In conclusion, I want to thank Professor Robert Bolton for taking a keen and helpful interest in this paper. My students in Greek Political Philosophy are also to be thanked for considerable discussion and criticism.

IV

RHETORIC

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

ARISTOTLE ON PERSUASION THROUGH CHARACTER

In his work on rhetoric—his Τέχνη ῥητορική—Aristotle established the framework with which many of us, perhaps most of us, still approach the subject. In particular, the Stagirite recognized three modes of persuasion: namely, through the character of the orator, through the emotions of the hearers and through the arguments of the speech. In addition, he marked off style from delivery and distinguished all of the foregoing from arrangement conceived of as the parts of an oration. His discussion of the three modes of persuasion takes place in the first two books; and his remarks on delivery, style and the parts of an oration are found in the third book. None of that is news. Nor is the fact that Aristotle's treatment of persuasion presupposes some fundamental advances in logic and philosophical psychology. The development of a formal dialectic underlies the account of rhetorical argumentation, and clarifying the relationship between thought and emotion is basic to the account of persuasion through the hearers. Less clear, however, is the thinking that stands behind Aristotle's discussion of persuasion through character. That is not to say that the subject has been passed over in the scholarly literature. In fact, it has recently received considerable attention, and advances have been made.[1] But there is, I think, room for further study; and in my own case, it may be time to collect scattered remarks and to attempt a comprehensive analysis.[2]

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[1] V. Buchheit, *Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos epideiktikon von Gorgias bis Aristoteles*, (Munich 1960) 116–120, 129–131; A. Hellwig, *Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Rhetorik bei Platon und Aristoteles*, (Göttingen 1973) = *Hypomnemata* 38, 251–321; Chr. Gill, "The *Ethos/Pathos* Distinction in Rhetorical and Literary Criticism," *Classical Quarterly* 34 (1984) 153, 157; J. Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero*, (Amsterdam, 1989); E. Garver, "Making Discourse Ethical: the Lessons of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 5 (1990) 73–96; W. Grimaldi, "The Auditor's Role in Aristotelian Rhetoric," *Oral and Written Communication: Historical Approaches*, ed. R. Enos (Newburry Park, 1990) 65–81; J. Sprute, "Ethos als Überzeugungsmittel in der aristotelischen *Rhetorik*," *Rhetorik zwischen den Wissenschaften*, ed. G. Ueding, (Tübingen, 1991) 281–290.

[2] See especially "*Benevolentiam conciliare* and *animos permovere*: Some Remarks on Cicero's *De oratore* 2.178–216," *Rhetorica* 6 (1988) 259–273 = Chapter 19 in this volume, and "Persuasion through Character and the Composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," *Rheinisches Museum* 134 (1991) 152–156 = Chapter 22 in this volume. Also relevant are

I

Two passages in the *Rhetoric* are fundamental for an understanding of Aristotle's notion of persuasion through character. The first occurs in Book 1, Chapter 2, where the Stagirite distinguishes between non-technical and technical modes of proof. The former are said to be present at the outset, like witnesses, evidence taken under torture and contracts (1355b36–37). In contrast, the latter are said to be constructed by the orator (1355b38–39) and presented through his speech (1356a1). Three kinds are listed: proofs that are "in the character of the speaker," those that are "in the auditor's disposition," that is, his emotional condition, and those that are "in the speech or argument itself," that is, enthymemes and the like (1356a1–4). It is clear that Aristotle is working with a tripartite analysis of the oratorical situation: orator, auditor, and the substance of the speech (cf. 1.3 1358a38–b2). He thinks that each of these elements should be considered in constructing a speech, and for that reason three modes of persuasion are identified. Our concern is with the first mode: that which focuses on the speaker. I give Aristotle's words in translation (1356a5–13):

> Therefore (we have a case of persuasion) through character when the speech is such that it makes the speaker worthy of belief. For we believe good men more fully and quickly, (and that is true) generally concerning all matters and absolutely (so) in matters that are not precise but admit doubt. It is necessary that this happen through the speech, rather than on account of a pre-existing opinion about the character of the speaker. For not as some writers on rhetoric posit in their treatises (saying) that the goodness of the speaker contributes nothing to persuasion; rather character has almost the greatest authority in winning belief.

Despite a certain awkwardness in the last sentence,[3] the underlying idea is quite clear. An audience believes a speaker who is respected and

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"Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions," *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970) 40–70 = Chapter 1 in this volume; *Aristotle on Emotion*, (London: Duckworth 1975, reprint 2002) 9–22; "Theophrastus on Emotion," *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 2 (1985) 209–229, reprinted in *Theophrastean Studies* (Stuttgart: Steiner 2003) 71–90; "Aristotle's Platonic Attitude toward Delivery," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 19 (1986) 242–254 = Chapter 20 in this volume; "Un Modo di Affrontare la Distinzione fra Virtu Etica e Saggezza in Aristotele," *Museum Patavinum* 5 (1987) 243–258, reprinted with slight abbreviation as "Aristotle's Distinction between Moral Virtue and Practical Wisdom," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, vol. 4, ed. J. Anton and A. Preus (Buffalo, 1991) 97–106 = Chapter 10 in this volume.

[3] While the text at 1356a10–13 seems clumsy, the emendation of D. Ross—⟨οὐ⟩

trusted. Aristotle knew that and therefore gave special recognition to persuasion through character.

The second fundamental passage occurs in *Rhetoric* 2.1. Aristotle has finished a lengthy discussion of the materials necessary for rhetorical arguments (1.4–14) and a briefer survey of non-technical proofs (1.15). In Book 2 he turns to persuasion through character and emotional appeal. He offers some introductory remarks concerning these two modes of persuasion (1377b21–1378a6) and then focuses on persuasion through character. Here is what he says (1378a6–20):

> There are three reasons why speakers themselves are persuasive. For that is the number of reasons on account of which we are persuaded apart from demonstrative arguments. They are (1) wisdom and (2) virtue and (3) goodwill. For men err concerning what they say or advise, either on account of all of these or on account of some one of them. For either (1) they hold false opinions on account of a lack of sense; or (2) they hold correct opinions but do not say what they think on account of wickedness; or (3) they are wise and virtuous but lack goodwill, on account of which it is possible for them not to advise what they know to be best. And beyond these there is no (fourth). It is necessary, therefore, that the person who appears to possess all these attributes will be persuasive with his audience. How men appear wise and good is to be understood from what has been said about the virtues. For a person may establish his own character in the same way as that of someone else. Concerning goodwill and friendship we must speak in the account of the emotions.

The basic thought has not changed. When a speaker appears to be a good man, the audience is likely to believe what he says. Only here Aristotle makes clearer what constitutes a persuasive character. It is not simple but a combination of three different attributes: (1) wisdom, (2) virtue and (3) goodwill (φρόνησις, ἀρετή and εὔνοια 2.1 1378a8–9). He tells us that men offer erroneous advice because one or more of these attributes is absent (1378a9–15), and that men who possess them all—or at least appear to do so—are persuasive (1378a15–16).

So much is straightforward, but there are grounds for concern.[4] First, when persuasion through character is formally discussed in *Rhetoric* 2.1,

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τίθεμεν for τιθέασιν in 1356a11—printed in his Oxford Classical Text (1959) is not an improvement and therefore properly ignored by R. Kassel, the most recent editor of the *Rhetoric* (1976).

[4] The fact that *Rhetoric* 1.2 mentions only the goodness of the speaker (1356a6, 11–12) is not reason for concern. In 1.2 Aristotle wants to identify the technical modes of proof—those that are produced through the art (1355b38–39) and brought forward through the speech (1356a1, 9)—and that is adequately accomplished without reference

it receives remarkably short treatment. Depending on how one counts, the entire discussion takes only fourteen or fifteen lines. That is all. Aristotle does, of course, refer to other parts of the *Rhetoric* for further analysis. In regard to wisdom and virtue (1378a16–19), he refers to his earlier discussion in Book 1.9, where individual virtues are focused on as the material of epideictic oratory. Concerning goodwill (1378a19–20), he points to his subsequent discussion of individual emotions in Book 2.2–11. That seems sensible enough, for goodwill is closely related to friendship (1378a19), which is discussed under the emotions (2.4). But neither in the discussion of friendship nor anywhere else in the account of emotions do we find an analysis of goodwill. That is puzzling, but equally so is the conjunction of goodwill with virtue and wisdom. At least those of us familiar with Aristotle's ethical thought are likely to ask whether all three attributes are necessary. For the person who is both virtuous and wise—who possesses ἠθικὴ ἀρετή and φρόνησις—is morally perfect and therefore can be counted on to consider the best interests of his audience. Why then introduce goodwill as a third attribute coordinate with wisdom and virtue? Finally, it is rarely noticed that the opening chapter of the *Rhetoric* (1.1 1354a1–1355b25) ignores persuasion through character. There Aristotle emphasizes the importance of demonstration and criticizes emotional appeal, but he says nothing at all about presenting a good character. The same is true of the corresponding portion of book 3, chapter 1 (1403b18–1404a39). Is that an oversight on the part of Aristotle, or is there more to the omission?

In what follows, I shall address these points, adding some reflections on blackening the character of the opponent and on the composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. I shall also offer some reasons why Aristotle's notion of persuasion through character was generally ignored by later rhetoricians. But first it will be helpful to consider some striking antecedents in earlier Greek literature.

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to wisdom and goodwill. In 2.1 Aristotle's focus is different. He turns to persuasion through character and considers the three reasons (1378a7) why a speaker is deemed trustworthy. There is no inconsistency or even awkwardness here. The account is simply progressive.

II

We should be clear at the outset that Aristotle's notion of persuasion through character is not a creation *ex nihilo*. Indeed, if we want to understand fully, his remarks on the topic, we would do well to go back to the very beginning of Greek literature, for there the Aristotelian triad is unmistakably present, or more cautiously, clearly anticipated. I am thinking of the *Iliad* and in particular Book 1, in which Homer introduces the wrath of Achilles. The immediate cause of this wrath is well known. Agamemnon refuses to return Chryseis, the daughter of a priest of Apollo. That leads to a plague and in time to an assembly at which the seer Calchas urges the return of Chryseis. When Agamemnon calls for a replacement, Achilles thinks his own possessions are threatened and ultimately becomes so angry, that he would have killed Agamemnon had Athena not prevented him from doing so. For our purposes the important point is that discussion breaks down so completely that it cannot be resumed unless someone of stature intervenes. That person is, of course, Nestor. Homer introduces him as a person of sweet speech, someone who is clear-sounding and marked by a voice that flows sweeter than honey (1.248–249). These descriptive phrases characterize Nestor's delivery and possibly his style or diction as well. After that the poet mentions two rather different—and for our purposes even more important—qualities. First we are told that Nestor has lived through two generations and is now king in the third (1.250–252). That tells us that he can claim experience and therefore wisdom. In addition, we learn that Nestor is well intentioned toward both Agamemnon and Achilles (1.253). In other words, he has goodwill toward his auditors—an attribute that Aristotle would later build into his notion of ethical persuasion.

When Nestor begins to speak, he engages in emotional appeal. He calls the present situation shameful and says that the Trojans would be pleased to know that quarrelling has broken out between the two Achaeans who excel in council and in fighting (1.254–258). He exhorts Agamemnon and Achilles to obey him (1.259) and then turns to self-characterization. He says that he is older than his two auditors and goes on to tell how he interacted with better men who never showed him disrespect. He fought against persons superior to those currently alive, and his counsels won obedience (1.259–273). In other words, he claims for himself the very attributes he has just assigned to Agamemnon and Achilles: superiority in fighting and in council (1.258). Put

in terms of later theory, he claims virtue (courage) and wisdom—two attributes that Aristotle builds into his theory of ethical persuasion. And if these two attributes are combined with Nestor's good intentions—his goodwill—toward Agamemnon and Achilles (1.253), then this section of the *Iliad* may be said to anticipate the Aristotelian triad. This is not to claim that the Homeric passage is in all respects a perfect anticipation of Aristotelian persuasion through character. Nestor's military prowess is not identical with Aristotle's virtue. At the very least it is too narrow. Moreover, Nestor's goodwill is reported by Homer and not exhibited or laid claim to within Nestor's speech itself, as Aristotelian theory requires (1.2 1356a1, 5). But allowing for these differences, we can say that Homer anticipates Aristotle in that he offers a tripartite characterization of Nestor which is remarkably close to the character that Aristotle believes persuasive when artfully presented in the course of a speech.

Nestor's self-characterization is followed by a call for obedience (1.274). He tells Agamemnon not to take the girl and Achilles not to oppose Agamemnon (1.275–281), but his words have little effect. The two chieftains remain bitterly at odds. Achilles chooses not to fight against the Trojans; and without his presence on the field of battle, the Trojans begin to dominate and in time threaten the very camp of the Achaeans. That leads in Book 9 to meetings, speeches and an embassy to Achilles. Homer again brings Nestor forward, characterizing him as a person of good counsel (9.94) and good intentions toward the assembled princes (9.95). That fits with the earlier picture in Book 1 and reinforces the impression that Homer or the Homeric bards had a certain, perhaps unreflective, understanding of ethical persuasion. When he speaks, Nestor says that no one will have a better idea to offer (9.103–104), and in this way he strengthens his claim to be heard and obeyed. He then speaks of Agamemnon dishonoring Achilles (9.105–111) and urges deliberation concerning how they may best appease the offended warrior (9.111–113). Agamemnon's reaction to this speech is entirely sensible. He acknowledges his previous error and lists the gifts he will give Achilles.

Nestor's words—including ethical persuasion—have done what they are intended to do.[5] The subsequent embassy to Achilles is, of course, less successful, even though Odysseus, Phoenix and Ajax all address

[5] It should, however, be noted that in Book 9 Nestor is speaking to a broken Agamemnon whose despondency has led him to urge abandoning the war (9.17–28).

Achilles. I shall not discuss these speeches, except to mention the opening words of Phoenix, the aged tutor of Achilles. He says that if Achilles is going to return home, he will follow. Then he adds by way of explanation that Peleus, the father of Achilles, had sent him to Troy for the expressed purpose of making Achilles a speaker of words and a doer of deeds (9.434–443). Apparently Phoenix could teach not only the basics of combat but also the skills needed by an orator. Caution is, however, in order. For the entire speech of Phoenix may be an addition to the embassy scene,[6] and the idea of instruction in speaking seems more applicable to the time of the bard than to the period of the Trojan War. But if we keep these caveats in mind, we can ask what form this teaching may have taken. Instruction by example would seem to be the reasonable answer. We can at least imagine Phoenix presenting model speeches on his own and also making certain that Achilles was attentive when chieftains like Agamemnon and Menelaus addressed the Achaeans.[7] If the models and live debates included speeches like those of Nestor discussed above, Achilles will have learned much including the importance of presenting a favorable character before urging a particular course of action.

Let me now leap ahead in time to the Sophistic period and consider a speech in the *Histories* of Thucydides. In book 2 of that work, we learn that the Athenians had seen their land invaded twice and were also suffering from a deadly plague. They had failed in an attempt to reach an agreement with the Spartans and were angry with Pericles for having urged them to go to war. In response, Pericles called a meeting of the assembly, which he addressed at length. His introductory remarks are what interest me, for they include a striking use of persuasion through character. Pericles says that he is not inferior to anyone in regard to determining and expounding what needs to be done, that he is a friend of the city and superior to money (2.60.5). Here we have a

That is very different from the situation in Book 1, where Agamemnon's pride is still intact and his anger an unyielding impediment to sound deliberation.

[6] The speech of Phoenix is so long and in some ways so out of place that one cannot help but ask whether it is a later and not altogether happy addition to the original embassy scene. After all, Phoenix should never have been at the assembly of chieftains that decided on sending an embassy; and quite apart from minor inconsistencies, what Phoenix actually says to Achilles early in his speech cannot have been news to Achilles. Rather Phoenix is made to say what the bard's audience may find delightful, not what Achilles needs to hear—or at least not in such detail.

[7] See G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*, (Princeton 1963) 36.

tripartite characterization that clearly anticipates the Aristotelian triad: determining and expounding what needs to be done are marks of wisdom; being a friend of the city is a matter of goodwill toward one's audience; and being superior to money is a form of virtue. The second and third of the Periclean attributes are, of course, narrower than their Aristotelian counterparts;[8] but now—in contrast with the Homeric passages just discussed—goodwill is claimed within the speech in accordance with Aristotelian theory. In what follows, Pericles reinforces his self-characterization by describing the person of opposite attributes, that is, the person who is unable to explain what he has determined, is hostile to the city and is unable to resist money (2.60.6). That is not Pericles. The citizens recognize as much, and in regard to public policy they are persuaded by the subsequent arguments of Pericles. Attempts to come to terms with Sparta are abandoned, and the war is prosecuted more vigorously. The same citizens, however, continue to be distressed by personal loss. Only after a fine is levied against Pericles, is their anger entirely extinguished (2.65.2–4).

It seems that persuasion through character is not a cure-all. Nestor accomplished nothing when he intervened in *Iliad* 1. Pericles does better when he addresses the citizens of Athens, but he is still a partial loser. On the other hand, Nestor's use of persuasion through character in *Iliad* 9 leads to an entirely successful result. Agamemnon is persuaded, even though the subsequent embassy to Achilles fails. Apparently the technique can be effective (or can be a contributing factor) when used on the right occasion and in the right way. The early teachers of rhetoric—if not Phoenix, then the teachers of the Sophistic period—will have understood as much and offered some form of instruction in self-characterization. Our evidence in regard to the Sophists is meager, but for the fourth century B.C. we have the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetoric to Alexander*. Here we are told that the introductory part of an oration should be used for three things: setting out the sub-

[8] Being narrower is not a fault. Pericles claims for himself attributes called for by his situation, and this situation included the possibility of prosecution under the law of impeachment (εἰσαγγελία). According to Hyperides, *In Defense of Euxenippus* 7–8 and Theophrastus, *ap.* Pollux 8.52 and the *Cambridge Rhetorical Lexicon*, on εἰσαγγελία (= no. 636A–B in *Theophrastus of Eresus, Sources for his Life, Works, Thought and Influence*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh, P. Huby, R. Sharples and D. Gutas, [Leiden 1992]), impeachment could be brought against a politician/orator for *inter alia* subverting the democracy and failing to offer the best advice on account of bribery. For a discussion of impeachment, see M. Hansen, *Eisangelia* (Odense 1975). On the particular case of Pericles, see 71–73.

ject of the speech, getting the attention of the audience and securing its goodwill (29 1436a33–39). It is the third of these uses that interests us, for the author discusses it at length in regard to deliberative oratory, arguing that the way to win goodwill is to present an attractive character and that an orator can do this even when his audience is already favorably disposed. What the orator needs to do is make clear that he himself has goodwill toward the city, that following his advice has often been advantageous and that he is a just man who prefers to sacrifice his own interests rather than to profit from the state (1436b22–26). A comparison with Pericles' self-characterization seems obvious: goodwill toward the city is being a friend of the city, advantageous advice is a matter of expounding what needs to be done and sacrificing one's own interests is being superior to money. Thucydides puts the tripartite characterization at the beginning of Pericles' address to the assembly. The author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* recommends the same three attributes when discussing the introduction of a deliberative speech. This is not to say that the author of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* had his eye on Thucydides when he wrote the relevant section of his handbook. It is only to say that both belong to a tradition that goes back as far as Homer.

Aristotle, too, belongs to this tradition. He not only lists three corresponding attributes but also associates persuasion through character with deliberative oratory. In Book 1.8, he concludes his discussion of the materials necessary for deliberative oratory by acknowledging the importance of character. He tells us that persuasion is accomplished not only through speech involving argumentation but also through speech that exhibits character. We are persuaded by the speaker who appears to possess goodness and goodwill, and therefore need to know the character of each political arrangement. For the character peculiar to each arrangement is most persuasive when dealing with it (1366a8–14). Furthermore, at the beginning of Book 2, Aristotle prepares for the forthcoming discussions of persuasion through character (2.1) and persuasion through the hearers (2.2–11) by telling us that the former is more effective in deliberative meetings (εἰς τὰς συμβουλάς 1377b30) and the latter in judicial proceedings.[9] Then in the actual discussion of per-

[9] τὸ μὲν οὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησιμώτερον εἰς τὰς συμβουλάς ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαι πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς δίκας (1377b29–31). These words are bracketed by the most recent editor of the *Rhetoric*, R. Kassel (1976), in order to make the argument of 1377b22–1378a6 run smoothly. He recognizes that the lines may be a kind of parenthesis but suspects an addition to the text, which may have been made by Aristotle himself. See Kassel's preliminary study *Der Text der aristotelischen "Rhetorik"*

suasion through character, he twice uses a verb that suggests deliberation (συμβουλεύειν 1378a10, 14). In my earlier translation of the passage, I used the English verb "to advise" for reasons of economy. To capture the tie to deliberative oratory, one might prefer an unnaturally long translation like "to recommend in their deliberations." This is not to suggest that Aristotle wants to restrict persuasion through character to deliberative oratory. Indeed, in *Rhetoric* 2.1 he recognizes that presenting good character can be effective in trials as well as in deliberations (1377b25–26). But he emphasizes the latter, and that fits well with the examples we have considered in Homer and Thucydides.

We can now address one of the concerns set forth in Section I of this paper. I am thinking of the brevity with which the topic of persuasion through character is handled in *Rhetoric* 2.1. Were the idea not firmly rooted in the tradition, Aristotle would have given us more. We may contrast the account of emotions that follows in 2.2–11. Aristotle surveys a range of emotions each of which can play a role in persuasion through the hearers. In addition, he breaks new ground. He is *inter alia* explaining the tie between belief and emotion, and in so doing he contributes significantly to the development of philosophical psychology. More cautiously, he applies a development in psychology to the field of rhetoric. But either way, he is doing something quite new. I return to this subject in Section VII. Here I want to emphasize that Aristotle's notion of persuasion through character is largely traditional and therefore is presented appropriately with little comment and two cross references.

III

In the preceding section, I discussed some antecedents of Aristotelian persuasion through character. I do not want to leave the topic without taking notice of Plato's *Gorgias;* for in this dialogue, Plato—Aristotle's teacher—not only recognizes the importance of wisdom, virtue and goodwill, but also uses the triad to make fun of Callicles. The passage I have in mind is found roughly halfway through the dialogue;

(Berlin, 1971) 131–132. I prefer to think of a parenthesis, and in any case I do not believe that the interruption to the argument is sufficient to justify deleting the lines bracketed by Kassel.

it is part of the initial exchange between Socrates and Callicles. The latter claims friendship toward Socrates (485E2–3), warns him to abandon the pursuit of philosophy and insists that his advice is motivated by goodwill (486A4–7). Socrates responds with considerable irony. He likens Callicles to a touchstone for testing gold (486D2–7) and says that he has the three qualifications required for adequately testing whether or not a person is living well. He has knowledge, goodwill and frankness (ἐπιστήμη, εὔνοια and παρρησία 487A2–3). If we think of frankness as a kind of courage (to speak one's mind),[10] a close relationship to the Aristotelian triad is obvious: knowledge relates to wisdom, goodwill is the same in both authors and frankness is a virtue.

What follows in the *Gorgias* also has a parallel in Aristotle's account of persuasion through character. Plato has Socrates say that he has met many people who cannot test him. Some are not wise like Callicles; others do not wish to say what is true, because they do not care about him; still others are wise and friendly but are lacking in frankness (487A3–B2). Here, as in *Rhetoric* 2.1 (1378a9–14), the three positive qualities are followed by an account of what happens when the attributes are absent. In both works, the account takes one case after the other—though the order is different (the absence of goodwill comes second in the *Gorgias* and last in the *Rhetoric*)—and there is explicit recognition of the fact that men who lack one or more of the attributes are apt to say what is not true (*Gorg.* 487A5–6, *Rhet.* 1378a9). This does not mean that Aristotle had his eye on this portion of the *Gorgias* when he wrote *Rhetoric* 2.1. But the similarities are striking and indicative of a common tradition.

I do not want to overlook the fact that Callicles is praised as a suitable partner for Socratic *elenchos*. He is not said to be a persuasive orator, and that may tempt one to deny a close connection between the Platonic triad and that of Aristotle. Indeed, the *elenchos* is a procedure for testing beliefs, and as such is very different from a speech delivered in the assembly or before a court of law. It involves two people asking and answering questions, proceeds by agreement and (in theory at least) leads to true opinion and even knowledge. None of that can be denied, nor would I want to do so. The *elenchos* is a cooperative procedure; and like many other cooperative undertakings, private as well

[10] Cf. Hellwig (above, n. 1) 298, who explains παρρησία as "die positive aktive Freiheit, die darin besteht, ohne Rücksicht auf die Anschauungen des Zuhörers und dessen mögliche negative Reaktion, unbeirrt das zu sagen, was man denkt."

as civic, its success depends on the knowledge, goodwill and virtue of the participants. But having said that, I want to call attention to the fact that Plato's dialogue is *inter alia* concerned with the attributes of the political orator. Prior to the characterization of Callicles (487A2-3), Socrates is made to introduce the same triad—or more accurately, opposed attributes—in order to describe the orator who panders to the Athenian *demos*. This orator is said to be a person whose spirit or mind is shrewd, courageous and naturally adept at interacting with people (463A7–8). In this context, being shrewd (στοχαστικός) is not a matter of knowledge, it is a matter of experience; being courageous (ἀνδρεῖος) is a boldness that is not tied to moral correctness, and adeptness at interaction (δεῖνος προσομιλεῖν) involves the capacity to make a specious show of friendly concern. Later in the dialogue, after the characterization of Callicles, the attributes of the democratic orator are again considered, this time in contrast with those of the fine or noble orator. The latter is conceived as the desirable politician who is good, knows what the citizens need and cares enough to advise what is in their best interest. The former is presented as someone who lacks virtue, knowledge and concern for his fellow citizens. He seeks to please them while doing what is best for himself (502D10–503A9, D6–7, 508C1–2). In this context, we can, I think, say that the characterization of Callicles should not be dismissed as a chance anticipation of the Aristotelian triad. It is rather a deliberate and playful attribution of the qualities that one looks for in a political orator. Plato was interested in these qualities, and so was Aristotle when he discussed persuasion through character.

Before leaving the *Gorgias*, I want to recall a particular worry mentioned earlier in Section I. It is the fact that Aristotle associates goodwill with friendship (φιλία) and refers to the subsequent account of emotions for instruction on how to establish the goodwill of the orator (2.1 1378a18–19), but in neither the discussion of friendship (2.4) nor that of any other emotion does he speak explicitly of goodwill (the word εὔνοια fails to occur). There is a kind of formal oddity here, but it is not, I think, the result of confusion. In this regard, the *Gorgias* may be instructive, for Callicles and Socrates both treat goodwill and friendship interchangeably (Callicles 485E3, 486A4; Socrates 487A3, B1, D4, E5), and Socrates establishes the goodwill of Callicles by citing his behavior among close companions. Callicles is said to have offered them the same advice that he is now offering Socrates, and that is taken as a sure sign of Callicles' goodwill toward Socrates (487B7–

D4).[11] As I see it, Aristotle's handling of goodwill in *Rhetoric* 2.1 is not very different. He, too, associates goodwill with friendship (1378a19), and he refers to the subsequent discussion of emotions because he thinks that an understanding of friendship and other related emotions will make clear how the goodwill of an orator is best established. Certainly the account of friendship contains relevant material. Here I cite only the definition of being friendly: "wishing for someone those things you believe to be good, for his sake and not for your own, and being ready to do these things to the extent possible" (1380b34–1381a1). Combining this definition with the case of Callicles just mentioned, we can say the following. The orator who wants to establish his goodwill toward the audience does well to point out that the advice he is offering is the same advice that he gives to persons known to be his friends. For what he recommends to his friends is what he believes to be good. If that does not work, the orator could take a cue from the account of kindness (χάρις 2.7), making clear that he has repeatedly helped the audience "when it was in need, not in return for anything, not for some advantage to himself," but for the audience's own sake (1385a18–19). How Aristotle actually handled the matter when lecturing from his notes, that is, from the *Rhetoric*, remains, of course, problematic. But it seems clear that the chapters on the emotions are helpful, so that a reference to them is in order.

IV

We may now consider still another concern mentioned in Section I of this paper. I am thinking of the fact that goodwill is listed along side wisdom and virtue (2.1 1378a8–9). If we come to the *Rhetoric* from the *Ethics*—especially *EN* 6.12–13 = *EE* 5.12–13—and if we think of wisdom and virtue as two inseparable attributes that ensure a proper consideration of others, then the coordinate status of goodwill is likely to seem odd. But the approach is wrong. We need to keep in mind that Aristotle's idea of persuasion through character is largely traditional. The Stagirite is working with everyday notions of wisdom and virtue. He is not concerned with the unity of the virtues nor with the idea of a

[11] On the sure or necessary sign (τεκμήριον 487D4) in rhetorical argument, see Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1.2 1357b1–22; 1.3 1359a6–10.

single virtuous disposition that applies to all men at all times. He does, of course, use the Greek word φρόνησις (2.1 1378a8), which plays an important role in his own ethical writings, but I do not think that an interpretation of φρόνησις or wisdom in *Rhetoric* 2.1 should take its start from Aristotle's ethical writings. It should begin with the *Rhetoric* itself and with the rhetorical tradition.

If we heed Aristotle's advice in *Rhetoric* 2.1 (1378a16–18) and turn back to the discussion of virtue in 1.9, we learn that wisdom is a virtue of thought on account of which men are able to deliberate well concerning goods and evils. Aristotle says, that these goods and evils have already been discussed (1366b20–22), and if we follow up this reference and go to 1.6, we learn that men do not deliberate about the end but about the means to the end, that is, about what is of practical advantage (1362a18-20). When men deliberate in an assembly, they are concerned with questions of utility; and the useful in this case means what best serves the city and its political arrangement. Hence Aristotle devotes a chapter to political arrangements: namely 1.8. He tells us that for success in persuading people and in deliberating well it is especially important that we understand the several constitutions and distinguish between their customs, institutions and interests (1365b22–25). The idea is straightforward. A democracy has one orientation and an oligarchy another: freedom and wealth, respectively (1366a4–5). For the loyal citizen, debate in the assembly is not about this orientation but about the means to realize it and to protect it. He looks for the speaker who knows the best way; and when he has identified him, he votes for his proposal.

It may be helpful to look again at Pericles' speech to the Athenian assembly. He claims to be inferior to no one in determining what needs to be done and then adds that he is a friend of the city and superior to money (2.60.5). In speaking of what needs to be done, he is not introducing abstract ethical considerations. He is thinking of practical plans and in particular the best way to defend Athens against Sparta. In short, he claims to be a good deliberator in regard to questions of advantage. But even if the audience is convinced that Pericles' excels in finding the best means to achieve a desired goal, that still leaves room for two questions: Are his deliberations properly oriented? And are they immune to extraneous temptations like bribery? Pericles answers these questions by describing himself first as a friend of the city and then as superior to money. The former description is immediately intelligible, for Pericles has in the past demonstrated his

commitment to democracy. He has introduced payment for service to the state, most notably pay for service on juries. That measure has not been popular with everyone,[12] but for the poor it has provided some freedom from economic restraint, so that Pericles can fairly describe himself as a friend of democratic Athens. The latter description—that Pericles is superior to bribery—is also readily intelligible, for we know that Pericles was subsequently fined for taking bribes. That he came close to being condemned to death is doubtful and most likely an oligarchic exaggeration.[13] But whatever the truth concerning the historical Pericles, Thucydides does provide us with a useful model of elucidating Aristotle's notion of persuasion through character. Wisdom is the deliberative capacity that enables the politician to determine and expound an advantageous course of action.[14] Virtue is being immune to all kinds of temptations, and goodwill is proper orientation: that is, wanting the best for the city and its citizens.

Let me now turn from rhetoric to politics and ethics, beginning with Book 3 of Aristotle's *Politics*. Here in Chapter 4, the Stagirite draws a distinction between the virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man. The latter is said to be single and perfect (1276b33–34). It is a combination of moral virtue and practical wisdom which actually transforms the moral virtues and sets the good man apart from the good citizen (1277b17–18, 25–26). In contrast, the virtue of a citizen is not one, for it is dependent upon the arrangement of the city (1276b30–32). What it is to be a good democrat is different from what it is to be a good oligarch, for democracy is different from oligarchy. After our remarks on deliberative oratory, this ought to be clear enough. In a democracy being a virtuous citizen is doing things that support and improve the democratic arrangement. *Mutatis mutandis* the same holds for an oligarchy (cf. 1276b28–31). Only we must not

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[12] Plato has Socrates report a most unfavorable view: namely that Pericles' measure had made the Athenians lazy, cowardly, talkative and greedy (*Gorgias* 515E5–7). Callicles is made to describe the disaffected as persons with boxed ears (515E8). If we can take Callicles seriously, it would seem that Pericles was disliked by Spartan sympathizers because his political orientation was democratic.

[13] Plato has Socrates report that Pericles was not only convicted of embezzlement and fined, but also nearly condemned to death (*Gorgias* 516A1–2).

[14] Not surprisingly Aristotle's discussion of deliberation in *Rhetoric* 1.4 recalls Pericles' speech. Aristotle identifies war as one of the five major topics of deliberation (1359b32–1360a6) and in the course of discussing the topic he points out the importance of knowing whether the military strengths of one's own country are the same as or different from the strengths of an opponent (1360a1–3, cf. Thuc. 2.62.2).

forget that a democratic city may contain oligarchs and *vice versa*. Such a mixed city falls short of the ideal city in which all citizens share a single orientation, but it is what actually occurs and what gives rise to political tensions. For oligarchs in a democratic city would like to see the political arrangement radically altered; and failing that, they would like to chip away at democratic institutions. They are, therefore, distrusted by the majority of the citizens and normally not listened to when they seek to influence debate. To be persuasive they must first prove their intentions by presenting themselves as friends of the city, as persons full of goodwill to the democratic majority. And that may be much harder than proving themselves good at deliberation and immune to bribery.[15] With appropriate changes the same may be said of democrats in an oligarchy.

Also of interest is *Politics* 5.9, where Aristotle considers criteria for selection to high office. He lists three qualifications: friendship toward the established political arrangement, maximum capacity for accomplishing the duties of the office and the virtue and justice proper to the political arrangement (1309a33–37). The relationship of this triad to that of persuasion through character is obvious and close. Here I comment only on the second qualification: namely, maximum capacity for doing the work of the office (δύναμις μεγίστη τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς 1309a35). The formulation is broad, because it is intended to cover a variety of offices, each of which has its own work. For example, the skills required of a general and those demanded of a treasurer are not the same. The former are rare and the latter common, and for that reason they are weighted differently in the selection process (1309a39–b8). Something similar is true of the knowledge looked for in an orator. This knowledge is not tied to office, but it does vary in accordance with the subject under consideration: for example, war, imports, taxation and the like. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle speaks generally of "wisdom" (φρόνησις). Taking a cue from the *Politics*, we could substi-

[15] Cf. pseudo-Xenophon, *Constitution of the Athenians* 1.6–7, where the oligarchic author tells us why the Athenian democrats let the base individual speak in deliberative meetings: "They know that this man's ignorance and baseness and goodwill (εὔνοια) are more profitable than the virtue and wisdom and ill-will (κακόνοια) of the good man" (1.7). Here we have the traditional triad introduced to explain democratic practice. The mass cannot lay claim to wisdom and virtue, but they do have goodwill. For this reason their advice is more profitable to the democratic majority than that offered by oligarchs who are marked by ill-will. (I am grateful to Eckart Schütrumpf for calling my attention to this passage).

tute "maximum capacity (δύναμις μεγίστη) for dealing with the work or issue at hand." And neither for selection to high office nor for persuasion through character is capacity enough. It must be accompanied by goodwill or friendship toward the political arrangement. Nor, again, is capacity and friendship sufficient. That is clear from *Politics* 5.9, where Aristotle introduces a comparison with the morally weak man who acts against his own interests, even though he both knows what ought to be done and is friendly toward himself. In much the same way, an official or an orator who lacks virtue may give in to temptation and therefore do or advise something that is not in the best interest of the city (1309b8–14).[16]

Moving to the *Ethics*, we find in 6(5).12–13 an account of the fully virtuous individual. He is said to possess both wisdom (φρόνησις) and moral virtue (ἠθικὴ ἀρετή). Aristotle contrasts him with the man of natural virtue who has neither wisdom nor moral virtue in the strict sense. In the perfect individual, these two attributes are present together. To have the moral virtues is to have wisdom and *vice versa*. This notion of perfect goodness has attracted considerable attention among scholars working on the *Ethics*. I shall not attempt an elucidation except to say that Aristotle hammers away at the idea of constant conjunction ("not without" 6.12 1144a30, 6.13 1144b17, 20, 31–32; "with" 6.13 1144b27, 30) without making clear what effect the presence of wisdom has on the several virtues. In *Politics* 3.4, Aristotle speaks of the virtues having another form (ἕτερον εἶδος 1277b17), but the idea is not developed.[17] For our purposes the important point is that full or perfect virtue is an ideal that has little to do with rhetoric, or more cautiously, with a rhetoric that can be of service to the citizens of an actual city-state. Aristotle is fully aware of that, and in the *Rhetoric* he leaves aside perfect goodness. When he speaks of wisdom, he is thinking of the kind of deliberative capacity that can exist apart from moral virtue. If that were not so, he could omit not only a reference to goodwill but also one to virtue. But

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[16] A closely related Peripatetic—probably Theophrastean—discussion of the criteria for office is preserved in the codex Vaticanus 2306, fr. B = *Theophrastus of Eresus* (above, n. 8), appendix 7. See especially lines 10–23 of the appendix.

[17] One is tempted to explain the difference in form by reference to the fact that practical wisdom enters into the definition of the (full) moral virtues. But it should be noticed that a Peripatetic text, perhaps attributable to Theophrastus, speaks of wisdom creating the form (εἰδοποιεῖ) of the just man (Stobaeus 2.7.20 = no. 449A FHS&G). Is this statement a development of that made by Aristotle in Politics 3.4? For some discussion, see my *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts* (Amsterdam 1984), 174.

he is thinking within a long tradition, such that wisdom need not imply virtue and virtue may include more than strictly ethical dispositions. When Nestor speaks of his former military prowess, he is claiming to have exhibited not only courage but also military skill and physical strength. That is part of the Homeric world, but it is also part of the tradition that Aristotle inherits. And just as the Homeric virtue can be distinguished from both excellence in counsel and good intentions toward one's auditors, so the virtue of Aristotelian persuasion through character is independent of deliberative excellence and goodwill.[18]

V

I now want to draw attention to the repeated assertion that persuasion through character makes an orator believable. In *Rhetoric* 1.2 Aristotle introduces the three technical modes of proof and tells us that persuasion through character occurs "when the speech is such that it makes the speaker worthy of belief" (ἀξιόπιστος 1356a5–6). And in 1.9 he introduces his discussion of virtue and vice, the materials of epideictic oratory, by pointing out that the discussion will also provide the materials necessary for persuasion through character. "For with the same

[18] We should, however, avoid exaggerating the difference between Aristotle's ethical and rhetorical notions of character. See my "Aristotle's Distinction" (above, n. 2) = Chapter 10 in this volume. Here I will call attention only to the discussion of narration in *Rhetoric* 3.16. For in this chapter, Aristotle does not use "character" (ἦθος) in an inclusive sense that covers wisdom, virtue and goodwill. Rather, he uses it in a narrow sense that is opposed to thought (διάνοια 1417a23). Quality of character is referred to choice, and quality of choice is referred to the end one pursues (1417a17–18). The good man is conceived of as someone who pursues what is noble. He contrasts with the man who has wisdom and pursues what is advantageous (1417a23–27). That is essentially the doctrine of the *Ethics*, which also involves a distinction between character and thought (1.13 1103a3–10, 2.1 1103a14–15, 6.1 1138b35–1139a1). It is fundamental to the discussion of moral virtue and wisdom (Books 2–4 and 6) and underlies the statement that moral virtue makes choice correct, while another faculty concerns itself with things needed to realize the choice (6.12 1144a20–22), or put differently, that moral virtue makes the end correct, while wisdom guarantees the means (6.12 1144a7–9, 6.13 1145a5–6). These statements have caused much discussion; but if we think of the orator and persuasion through character, they may appear less puzzling. For the orator's wisdom (φρόνησις) is concerned with determining the best means for the city to achieve a given end. In contrast, his goodwill for the city ensures that he has the right end, and his virtue insures that this end is not pushed aside by some personal goal like acquiring wealth for himself. In an ethical context, Aristotle ignores goodwill, but his notion of wisdom (φρόνησις) is much the same. It is an excellence in deliberating about means and as such does not guarantee the end. For that, moral virtue is required.

materials," he says, "we are able to make ourselves as well as another person worthy of belief (ἀξιόπιστος 1366a28) in regard to virtue." Later in 2.1 we do not find the compound adjective "worthy of belief," but the idea is clearly present. Aristotle tells us that "there are three reasons why speakers themselves are persuasive or believable" (πιστοί 1378a6). He lists wisdom, virtue and goodwill, tells us that men fail to say what is true because one or more of these attributes are lacking, and concludes that the speaker who appears to have them all is necessarily believable (πιστός 1378a16) to the audience.

As mentioned in Section I, this emphasis on the speaker fits well with the tripartite division of the oratorical situation. Persuasion through character is concerned with the speaker and therefore distinct from persuasion through the hearers and the argument of the speech. The matter is, however, more complicated, for being persuasive or believable is being believable to one's auditors (τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις 1378a16). In other words, being worthy of belief (ἀξιόπιστος) implies having certain attributes which normally affect listeners in a certain way: namely, they are inclined to believe the speaker because he is, or at least appears to be, the sort of person who does not make false statements (1378a9). This inclination to believe speakers who exhibit certain attributes is not irrational but reasonable, and in some situations it determines how an audience decides a particular issue. Aristotle takes note of such situations in 1.2, where he says that "we believe good men more fully and quickly, (and this is true) generally concerning all matters and absolutely (so) in matters that are not precise but admit doubt" (1356a6–8). This is especially clear in regard to deliberative oratory, for here deductive certainty is a rarity if at all possible. Typically speakers adduce examples from the past (cf. 1.9 1368a29–31, 3.16 1417b13–15, 3.17 1417b38–1418a3) and develop more than one possible course of action. When the arguments themselves do not tip the balance one way or the other, then we reasonably consider the proponents of the various plans and opt for the plan advanced by the most trustworthy speaker. In judicial situations, there may be more room for demonstrating the correctness of a position (cf. 1.9 1368a31–33, 3.17 1418a1–4), but there may be room for doubt as well. And when the doubt is significant, then questions concerning the credibility of the speaker are likely to weigh heavily in reaching an intelligent decision.

Here Aristotle is departing from the teaching of his contemporary rhetoricians. They were, of course, aware that presenting good character works a persuasive effect on the audience, but typically they saw this

effect in terms of emotional persuasion. By way of example, we may cite a passage already referred to in Section II of this paper. I am thinking of the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, chapter 29, where the author discusses the introduction of deliberative speeches. He tells us that the introduction serves three purposes, of which one is arousing goodwill in the audience. In what follows, the author tells us that the orator arouses goodwill by presenting himself as someone who has often offered advantageous advice, is just and full of goodwill toward the city (29 1436b22–26). Here we have the Aristotelian triad, but it is used for a different purpose. It is not seen as providing the audience with good reasons for trusting the speaker; rather it is seen as a way of working on the feelings of the audience.

Aristotle is not blind to the fact that the introduction can be used to win the goodwill of one's audience; and in his own discussion of the introduction in *Rhetoric* 3.14, he mentions this use. What should interest us is that this mention is coupled with the recognition that the introduction can be used to arouse anger (1415a34–35).[19] The coupling is entirely intelligible, for both goodwill and anger are conceived of as emotional responses on the part of the audience. There is nothing wrong here. Goodwill can be an emotion, and like anger it can be extremely helpful in winning the day.[20] For as Aristotle himself points out men differ in their judgments according to their emotional condition (2.1 1378a20). Things do not appear the same to them when they are feeling friendly and hostile or angry and calm (1377b31–32), and for this reason effecting a particular emotional condition may determine what decision an audience reaches.

When Aristotle introduces persuasion through character, he does not want or need to deny any of this. What he does is to offer an alternative. He develops a notion of persuasion through character that does

[19] Kassel (ed. 1976) deletes the mention of anger (καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀργίσαι) in 1415a35. That seems to me a mistake. Aristotle works with pairs in this portion of 3.14. Removing and creating prejudice (1415a27–28) precede goodwill and anger, while securing attention and the opposite (1415a35–36) follow. Kassel deletes the opposite of attention (ἢ τοὐναντίον), also unnecessarily. The idea of removing attention is developed in the immediately following lines: try to produce laughter (1415a37). Arousing anger is not made the subject of further comment, but the idea is clear enough: a speaker excites anger against his opponent (cf. 1415a26–27) and wins goodwill for himself.

[20] In Section VIII, I take account of the fact that goodwill (εὔνοια) is not a single phenomenon. In addition to feelings that influence judgment, there are cases of goodwill that leave the affected person capable of impartial judgment.

not aim at working an emotional effect.[21] It aims at giving the unemotional and impartial auditor good reason for paying attention and possibly deciding in favor of the speaker. I mention paying attention, for Aristotle recognizes that a speaker of good character is more apt to have an attentive audience than one who lacks good character. The Stagirite says so explicitly within his discussion of the introduction (3.14 1415a39) and then goes on to argue that making the audience attentive is common to all parts of a speech. In fact, an audience is usually most attentive at the beginning, so that awakening attention is likely to be more important later on (1415b9–17). The idea that awakening attention is something for the whole speech can easily be transferred to persuasion through character. After all the two can and most often do proceed simultaneously. But freeing persuasion through character from the introduction and making it one of three modes of persuasion that can be employed throughout a speech is only one and (in my opinion) the least important step in the development of Aristotelian persuasion through character. Of (far) greater importance is distinguishing this mode of persuasion from persuasion through the hearers. And that is accomplished by focusing on trustworthiness. The character of the speaker becomes grounds for a reasonable decision and not the cause of an emotion that bends the decision-making capacity of the auditor.[22]

VI

It is time to consider an omission. The discussions of persuasion through character in 1.2 and 2.1 contain no reference to characterizing an opponent. The omission is striking, for presenting one's opponent in a negative light can be an effective way to remove his credibility and to appear good by comparison. Moreover, in 2.1 Aristotle actually lists the bad qualities that are responsible for false statement: lack of wisdom, wickedness and not having goodwill (1378a11–13), but he lists them in order to explain why persons possessing the opposed good qualities are

[21] Here I am disagreeing with Gill (above, note 1), 153, 157, whose interesting article was unknown to me when I first discussed the relation between persuasion through character and emotional response. See "*Benevolentiam conciliare* and *animos permovere*" (above, note 2), 260–265 = Chapter 17 in this volume, pages 339–345.

[22] Cf. 1.1 1354a24–26 and 2.1 1378a19–20. For further remarks, see below, the end of Section VII.

considered worthy of belief. There is no suggestion that the bad qualities should be used to make one's opponent unworthy of belief.[23]

The omission becomes even more remarkable when we consider the practice of fourth-century orators. Aeschines' speech *Against Ctesiphon* 169–176 is especially instructive, for here the orator first spells out the attributes of a good democrat, then says that an oligarch has all the opposite qualities and finally describes Demosthenes as a person of quite undemocratic character. The five attributes of a good democrat are being free-born, having ancestors who served the democracy, being temperate and therefore immune to bribery, having good judgment and rhetorical training, and being courageous (169–170). These attributes do not line up perfectly with the three qualities recognized by Aristotle, but the match is close enough to make comparison possible. Being free-born and having ancestors who served the democracy are important because they rule out inherited animosity toward the city. They seem to guarantee what Aristotle calls goodwill. Being temperate, immune to bribery and having courage line up with Aristotle's virtue. Having good judgment and rhetorical training are more problematic but can be related to Aristotle's wisdom.[24] Aeschines' use of this list is simple. He denies the attributes to Demosthenes, portraying him as an evil person who is *inter alia* not believable or not to be trusted (ἄπιστος 173).[25] The characterization ultimately fails, for Demosthenes' subsequent speech wins the day. But for our purposes the important point is that an orator like Aeschines could have served Aristotle as a model for moving from attributes that make a speaker trustworthy to those that work

[23] It may be worth underlining that listing bad qualities is not the same thing as recommending that they be used to damn another person. We may compare Pericles who first credits himself with three desirable attributes and then refers to the person of opposite qualities. He has no particular person in mind. He simply creates a negative character in order to dissociate himself from it (Thuc. 2.60.6). Aristotle does very much the same thing in 2.1.

[24] It is not clear how we should understand good judgment. Hellwig (above, n. 1) 301 relates this attribute to both wisdom and goodwill. The initial description ("thought choosing the best things," 170) suggests to me a developed capacity for means-end deliberation and therefore wisdom in a non-ethical sense. But the subsequent characterization of Demosthenes ("evil in regard to his life," 174) suggests a lack of virtue. Aeschines is, of course, an orator interested in damning Demosthenes, not a philosopher aiming at clear, discrete categories.

[25] Aeschines' characterization of Demosthenes actually serves two (or more) purposes. It aims at making Demosthenes not only a person who cannot be trusted (173) but also someone who is by law disqualified from receiving the crown proposed by Ctesiphon (176).

an opposite effect when applied to an opponent. But Aristotle does not mention the opponent, let alone recommend slander as part of persuasion through character.[26]

A further reason for noticing Aristotle's silence concerning the opponent takes us back to Section V. There I argued that Aristotle focuses on making the orator worthy of belief (ἀξιόπιστος), and that in doing so he creates a mode of persuasion that is compatible with sober judgment. If that is correct, should not Aristotle also recognize that characterizing an opponent as not believable (ἄπιστος) is compatible with sound judgment? Certainly there are occasions when an audience needs to be told the truth about an opponent; and if the orator conveys that information correctly, he is not warping the judgment of his audience. Rather he provides what the audience needs to know in order to make an intelligent judgment.[27]

I think there is a difficulty here, but I want to suggest three reasons for Aristotle's silence. First slandering an opponent was and still is too common a phenomenon to be encouraged. Second, even when negative characterization is entirely fair, it can backfire so that the audience ends up hostile to the speaker and not the opponent.[28] Both these considerations may have influenced Aristotle, but it should be noticed that the Stagirite himself provides rejoinders. In 1.1 he says that all good things except virtue can be misused. That includes an art like rhetoric (1355b2–7). Self-characterization as well as description

[26] Aristotle's silence concerning the opponent is also noticeable in 1.9, where materials for speeches of praise and blame are considered. At the beginning of the chapter, Aristotle tells us that he is going to discuss virtue and vice and then states that he will be covering the materials of persuasion through character, "For from the same (sources) we shall be able to make ourselves and another worthy of belief in regard to virtue" (1366a27–28). That is correct, but given the preceding reference to vice and the general context, i.e. materials for praise and blame, one wonders why Aristotle fails to mention the possibility of blackening the character of an opponent. After all, he need not have said much; and he knows how to be brief. We may compare the end of 1.9. Having finished his discussion of virtues and other matters relevant to a speech of praise, Aristotle says simply and correctly that abuse can be constructed from the opposite qualities (1368a7). Had he wanted to, he could have added, earlier in the chapter, an equally brief reference to damning the opponent.

[27] Before introducing the five attributes that mark the good democrat, Aeschines tells the jurors that if they pay attention to Demosthenes' fair-sounding words, they will be deceived; but if they focus on his real character, they will not be (3.168). Whatever the truth concerning Demosthenes, Aeschines is not saying anything foolish. Auditors should know who is speaking (going to speak) to them, and on occasion, they do well to heed negative remarks about one speaker or the other.

[28] Cf. Aeschines, *Agst. Ctes.* 174.

of the opponent can be misused, but it does not follow that they should be avoided at all times. Furthermore, in 3.17 Aristotle recognizes that speaking not only about another person but also about oneself can have a negative effect on the audience. He does not, however, recommend avoiding all forms of characterization. Rather he advises occasionally putting remarks—positive as well as negative—into the mouth of a third person (3.17 1418b24–26).

The third reason is that Aristotle's idea of persuasion through character is closely tied to deliberative oratory. Because I have already said much about this tie, I limit myself here to pointing out that deliberation need not be a contest between opponents. When Homer has Nestor speak in *Iliad* 1 and 9, he does not introduce an opponent in order to speak against him. And when Thucydides has Pericles address the assembly in the second year of the war, no second speaker is brought forward to state an opposed view. This is not to suggest that oligarchs never contradicted democrats and *vice versa*. It is only to say that in a deliberative situation—in contrast to a judicial situation—there may not be an opponent to slander or otherwise describe.[29] In the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, the point is made implicitly. The introduction to a deliberative speech is discussed without mention of an opponent; the corresponding remarks on judicial oratory include instruction on running down an opponent (35 1442a11–14). Aristotle's position is not very different. When there are opposed parties, negative characterization may play a role in deliberative oratory; but deliberation is not always a struggle between parties, so that characterizing the opponent is not an essential part of deliberative oratory (3.13 1414b1–4, 3.14 1415b32–37).[30]

[29] Hence the tripartite division of the oratorical situation—speaker, listener and substantive argument—cannot be expanded to include the opponent, if it is to be universally applicable. And that is true not only in regard to deliberative oratory but also in regard to epideictic.

[30] For negative characterization of an opponent in a deliberative speech, see also 3.17. There Aristotle recommends taking note of an opponent's false statements on extraneous matters, for they are evidence that his other statements are false (1417b36–38). Such characterization can be useful, but it only occurs when there are opposed speeches (ὅταν ἀντιλογία ᾖ 3.13 1414b3), and in such cases the characterization is not part of a deliberative speech per se (ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾖ συμβουλή 1414b4). For more on 3.17 (1417b36–38), see Section VII.

VII

I turn now to the composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and begin with what seems to me undeniable: namely, that in 1.1 Aristotle presents a narrow view of rhetoric. It is restricted to reasoned argument and opposed to the practice of contemporary rhetoricians who focus on the auditor and his emotional condition. As an art (ἔντεχνος μέθοδος), rhetoric is concerned with modes of persuasion or proof (περὶ τὰς πίστεις)—with demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) and especially the enthymeme (1355a3–8) which is called the "body of proof" (σῶμα τῆς πίστεως 1354a15). The rhetoricians are said to have little or nothing to offer concerning this artful mode of persuasion (1354a12, b21).[31] Rather they concern themselves with emotions which warp the judgment of the audience (1354a24–26). Aristotle does not deny that such an approach can be suc-

[31] At 1354b20–21 Aristotle asserts clearly that the rhetoricians have nothing to say about the artful or technical proofs: περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντέχνων πίστεων οὐδὲν δεικνύουσιν. Earlier at 1354a12–13 he says that the writers of the *Arts* have worked out a small part of the τέχνη: ὀλίγον πεπονήκασιν αὐτῆς μόριον. There are, I think, two ways to understand his words at a12–13. First, Aristotle may be recognizing that the rhetoricians have made some contributions to rhetorical argument. They have, for example, studied the use of maxims, which are not the "body of proof" but nevertheless useful for proving one's case (cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 267C1 with Arist., *Rhet.* 2.21 1394a19–1395b19 and 3.17 1418b33–38). Second, Aristotle may be allowing for the fact that the rhetoricians have worked on accessories (1.1 1354a14) like emotions and the parts of an oration. The first interpretation is attractive, but it is hard to ignore 1354b17: persons discussing the parts of a speech are said to do technical or artful work (τεχνολογοῦσιν). I leave the matter open and underline the fact that nowhere in 1.1 does Aristotle say that emotional appeal is a technical mode of proof.

It may be helpful to refer to *On Sophistical Refutations* 43. Here Aristotle introduces a contrast between the art (τέχνη) of rhetoric and that of dialectic: the former is said to have been discovered and developed by predecessors; the latter is said not to have existed at all (οὐδὲν παντελῶς ὑπῆρχεν 183b36, cf. 184b1) until Aristotle began to work on the subject. In regard to rhetoric, Tisias, Thrasymachus and Theodorus are cited by name (183b31–32), and they along with unnamed others are credited with increasing the art (183b31) so that much is said to have existed (ὑπῆρχε πολλά 184a9). Coming from *Rhetoric* 1.1, we may at first be startled by these remarks, but on reflection we can say the following. In both *On Sophistical Refutations* 43 and in *Rhetoric* 1.1, Aristotle recognizes that some of the earlier rhetoricians were doing systematic work (τεχνολογεῖν) and thereby developing what is normally considered an art (τέχνη). Only in *Rhetoric* 1.1 Aristotle wants to advance a narrow notion of rhetoric, such that the art is restricted to argumentation, especially demonstration by enthymeme, and therefore appropriately described as the counterpart of dialectic (1354a1, 1355a3–10). From this perspective, it is correct to say that the earlier writers offer little or nothing concerning technical proofs (1354a12–13, 1354b20–21). It would be surprising if they had, for the subject of dialectic did not exist at all (183b36).

cessful, but he thinks that orators should stick to the subject under discussion and demonstrate their position (1354a27–28). What the rhetoricians belabor are extraneous matters "outside the subject" (ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος 1354a15–16, b16–17, 1355a18–19). They discuss things like the introduction and the narrative of a speech, and in these discussions they concern themselves with nothing other than ways to control the condition of the audience (1354b18–20). For Aristotle that is unacceptable. It has no place in a well organized city-state (1354a18–24, 1355a1–2) and is properly excluded from the art of rhetoric.

As an introduction to the *Rhetoric*, this chapter is quite remarkable. It restricts technical proof or persuasion—the ἔντεχνοι πίστεις (1354b21, cf. 1354a13)—to demonstration, despite the fact that the very next chapter counts persuasion through character and through the hearers among the ἔντεχνοι πίστεις (1.2 1355b35–1356a20). Moreover, Aristotle's comments on emotional appeal seem quite out of line with the subsequent treatment of persuasion through the hearers, including the long discussion of individual emotions in Book 2.2–11. Various explanations have been offered in the scholarly literature; here I mention one that seems to me especially attractive. It is that Aristotle begins his treatise by setting forth an ideal rhetoric. He thinks this form of the art suitable for the well-governed city, but he also recognizes that such a city is quite rare or non-existent. Hence, he turns in 1.2 to everyday reality and sets forth a second best rhetoric that makes room for persuasion through character and through the hearers.[32]

I am very sympathetic to this explanation, but in my judgment it cannot be the whole story. For it does not adequately explain the fact that the view of rhetoric set forth in 1.1 recurs both in 3.1 and in the discussion of arrangement which runs from 3.13 to 3.19. I cannot discuss all the problems which surround the opening of Book 3 and the ending of Book 2, and therefore content myself with pointing out that 3.1 is in fact two introductions.[33] The first (1403b6–18) recognizes the three modes of persuasion discussed in books 1–2 and therefore forms a suitable transition to book 3. The second (1403b18–1404a19) is very different. It not only fails to exhibit knowledge of the three modes of

[32] Cf. J. Sprute (above, note 1) 288 and *Die Enthymemtheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik* (Göttingen, 1982) 36–41.

[33] Book 2 ends with a summary passage (1403a34–b2) that forms a transition to Book 3 *qua* discussion of style and arrangement. Its relation to the introductions that make up 3.1 need not concern us here.

persuasion but also presents a narrow view of rhetoric that is in line with 1.1. Arousing pleasant and painful responses in the audience is discouraged, while arguing one's case on the basis of facts (ἀγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς πράγμασι) is approved. With the exception of demonstration (ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι), all other things are said to be superfluous, even if they are effective on account of defects in the auditor (1404a4–8).[34]

We have, then, two introductions—1.1 and the second part of 3.1—which advance a narrow view of rhetoric. The same view stands behind the discussion of arrangement which begins in 3.13. There Aristotle tells us that a speech has two parts: preliminary statement (πρόθεσις 3.13 1414a34) and proof (πίστις 1414a35). The reason given is that a speaker must state his subject or case (τὸ πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν) and prove it by demonstration (ἀποδεικνύναι 1414a30–31). Contemporary rhetoricians are said to multiply parts in a ridiculous manner: they recognize narration and introduction, although the former belongs only to the judicial speech, while the latter occurs in deliberation only when there is a struggle between parties (1414a36–b4). Aristotle does allow for a "maximum" division that includes four parts: introduction and conclusion as well as preliminary statement and proof (1414b8–9). But his basic view remains unchanged. The primary task of the orator is demonstration and that presupposes a statement of the case—two parts, not four.

What follows in 3.14 is instructive. Aristotle discusses the introduction; and in regard to judicial speeches, he tells us that the introduction can be used to announce the topic and aim of one's speech (3.14 1415a12–13, 22–23). But he is careful to add that an introduction should be omitted when the subject is clear and of no magnitude (1415a23–24). In addition, he calls remarks about the speaker remedial and says that they are used to counter prejudice (1415a24–32). A favorable self-characterization may be demanded by the particular situation; but like an appeal to the hearer—like arousing goodwill or anger—it is a foreign element. "All such things," Aristotle says, "are outside the speech (ἔξω τοῦ λόγου), for they are directed toward a worthless auditor who listens to things outside the subject matter (ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος). If the auditor were not like that, there would be no need of an introduction, except perhaps to state the subject briefly" (1415b5–6). Concerning the deliberative speech, Aristotle has less to say largely because he thinks that the introduction has almost no place in deliberative oratory.

[34] For further discussion of 3.1, see my "Aristotle's Platonic Attitude" (above, note 2) 246–253 and the literature cited there = Chapter 20 of this volume, pages 357–365.

The audience knows the subject, so that an introduction is unnecessary, unless one needs to instill or remove prejudice, or increase or diminish the importance of the topic under discussion (1415b32–37).

The language of 3.13–14 recalls that of 1.1 and 3.1, as does the general emphasis on demonstration. I want to suggest that we are dealing with portions of the *Rhetoric* that reflect an early period in Aristotle's thinking about rhetoric. He is greatly impressed by Plato's interest in an ideal rhetoric. He recalls the famous comparison of sophistic rhetoric with cookery (1.1 1354a1, cf. *Gorg.* 465D7–E1), rejects delivery as a vulgar technique dependent on a faulty political arrangement (3.1 1403b34–1404a1, cf. *Republic* 3 397C3–E1) and consciously introduces the enthymeme to replace Platonic dialectic. From this ideal rhetoric Aristotle does turn to the real world but not immediately to the rhetoric set forth in 1.2. Rather the primary contrast is with the rhetoric of contemporary handbooks, including the handbook that Aristotle himself composed. I mean 3.13–19. For here we have the discussion ordered by the parts of a speech in accordance with fourth-century practice. This arrangement is combined—uneasily—with a belief in two essential parts. The awkwardness of this combination is perhaps clearest in 3.17, where Aristotle discusses proof (πίστος). At the outset, the Stagirite tells us that proofs should be demonstrative (1417b21). He is thinking especially of the enthymeme, but he allows for example (1418a1) and replacement with a maxim (1418b33–34). What is striking is that he also allows for self-characterization and emotional appeal. He does that because he is writing a practical handbook. That is to say, he is following the practice of contemporary rhetoricians who did not restrict the art to demonstrative argument. However, Aristotle is careful to insist that self-characterization and emotional appeal should be used apart from demonstration (1418a12–21);[35] and in the case of deliberative ora-

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[35] Wisse (above, n. 1), 48 says that Aristotle "suddenly returns" to the three technical modes of persuasion. I think the idea of a return is unfortunate, for the passage does not presuppose the three technical modes which are a later development. Instead it presupposes the development of enthymematic argument which, we are told, should be kept apart from and preferred to traditional methods like arousing emotion and winning favor through good character.

It may be helpful to look more closely at Aristotle's actual words in 3.17. He tells us to avoid enthymemes "when we make our speech express character" (ὅταν ἠθικὸν τὸν λόγον [*sc.* ποιῇς]), for demonstration has neither character nor choice. Instead we should use a maxim, saying, e.g., "I gave it, even knowing that 'Trusting is wrong'" (1418a15–19). It is quite clear that Aristotle is concerned with speech that exhibits moral character, and for that reason he mentions choice and a general rule of conduct. There

tory, he emphasizes that such practices are essentially digressions. He speaks of the orator departing from the subject[36] and tells us to use them when we are at a loss concerning what to say (1418a29).

In 3.19, Aristotle concludes his discussion of arrangement with remarks on the epilogue. His fundamental outlook has not changed. In 3.13 he told us that the epilogue is useful for recalling what has been said (1414b12); in 3.19 he says more about this use than any other (1419b28–1420b2). But since he is writing within the handbook tradition, he adds remarks on three other uses: first, making the hearer well disposed to the speaker and negatively disposed to the opponent; second, amplification and its opposite; third, producing emotions in the hearer. The first is of especial interest to us. Aristotle presents it in terms of praise and blame (1419b15) and explains that the speaker should make himself out to be a good man and the opponent a bad one (1419b16–17). This is not persuasion through character as we know it from 1.2 and 2.1. There is no mention of either wisdom or goodwill. Goodness alone is associated with the speaker; and in accordance with contemporary rhetorical thinking, we are also told to present the opponent in a bad light. That plays no part in persuasion through character. Moreover, the presentation of good and bad character is clearly marked off from—it is subsequent to—demonstrating the truthfulness of the speaker and the falsehood of the opponent (μετὰ τὸ ἀποδεῖξαι αὑτὸν μὲν ἀληθῆ τὸν δὲ ἐναντίον ψευδῆ 1419b14–15). The basic idea is straightfor-

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is no mention of either wisdom or goodwill. That is not surprising, for the passage is not concerned with or even dependent on the notion of persuasion through character. We may compare 2.21, where Aristotle says that the use of maxims makes our words or speech express character (ἠθικοὺς … ποιεῖ [*sc.* τὸ γνωμολογεῖν] τοὺς λόγους). He refers to choice as a manifestation of general principles and is silent concerning wisdom and goodwill (1395b13–17). That is the language and the thought of 3.17. In both passages, speech expressive of character is conceived of in terms of moral character apart from wisdom and goodwill. But that does not imply incompatibility with persuasion through character. Moreover, the phrase "speech expressive of character" (ἠθικὸς λόγος) is not a *terminus technicus* and therefore can be used in reference to various attributes including those of persuasion through character. Cf. 1.8, where goodwill is mentioned along with goodness (1366a10–11). See also 2.18 where Aristotle refers to his remarks on character in 1.8 and tells us that he has made clear how speeches expressive of character ought to be made (πῶς τὲ καὶ διὰ τίνων τοὺς λόγους ἠθικοὺς ποιητέον 1391b22–23).

[36] The text here (1418a29) is problematic. I follow manuscript F and read ἐξίστηται. Manuscript A has ἐξίστη, which is the basis of Spengel's conjecture ἐξιστῇ. The orator is said either to depart from the subject (cf. E.M. Cope and J.E. Sandys, *The "Rhetoric" of Aristotle* [Cambridge, 1877] 3.203–204) or to lead the auditor away from the subject (cf. M. Dufour and A. Wartelle, *Aristotle, "Rhétorique,"* Budé edition, [Paris 1973] 3.91). On either reading, Aristotle is speaking of a digression.

ward. Demonstrating truthfulness and falsehood does not belong to the epilogue but to the part of the speech called proof. There the speaker demonstrates that his own position is true or correct and that the assertions of the opponent are false. Concerning the latter, one of Aristotle's remarks in 3.17 is of especial interest. He tells us that the deliberative orator should consider whether his opponent says anything false on extraneous matters. For these false statements seem to be proof that the opponent makes false statements on other matters (1417b36–38). This is an inductive argument—a fact which may explain why Aristotle goes on to tell us that argument by example is more closely connected with deliberative oratory than with judicial oratory (1418a1–2). However that may be, Aristotle clearly thinks that claims to truthfulness—including claims to being trustworthy—and the opposite should be established by argument as part of the proof. Persuasion through character as set out in 2.1 is not involved, because it was developed later as part of the doctrine of three technical modes of proof.[37]

When and why Aristotle adopted a new tripartite view of technical proof is problematic, but we do have an important hint in Plato's *Philebus*. There Socrates is made to distinguish between emotions like anger and fright on the one hand and itches and tickles, and hunger and thirst on the other. All are mixed pleasures and pains, but only emotions belong to the soul alone. What Socrates fails to explain is the relationship that exists between emotions and the thoughts that underlie them. Socrates uses the preposition "with" and the verb "to follow" to characterize the relationship, but no satisfactory conclusion is reached. Ultimately Plato has Socrates say that he will continue the discussion tomorrow (50D8–E1). That is almost certainly a dramatic way of calling attention to on-going debate in the Academy. Aristotle was part of that debate and probably responsible for analyzing the relationship between thought and emotion in terms of cause and effect. Certainly he adopted the analysis and applied it to rhetoric.[38] In particular, he recog-

[37] Wisse (above, n. 1), 55 sees a "real contradiction" between persuasion through character and what is said in 3.19 1419b16–17. Perhaps his hypothetical reader would have such a reaction, but it seems to me more important to recognize that any difficulty is the product of joining texts that have quite different points of view. In addition, I am worried when Wisse, 56, emphasizes the relationship between persuasion through character and 3.17 1417b36–38, for this passage is concerned with proof in a narrow sense that should not be confused with the three technical modes of proof that Aristotle developed later.

[38] Scholars have understandably, but I think unfortunately, looked (more or less exclusively) to Plato's *Phaedrus* in order to understand the development of Aristotle's

nized that emotional appeal can be an intelligent procedure. Auditors become angry when they believe themselves insulted; and they can be persuaded by argument that insult has occurred. Similarly, an audience can be frightened by arguments that demonstrate imminent danger. No tricks need be employed; valid arguments can do the job. Once that was understood, Aristotle could firmly reject the sophistic view of emotional appeal as some kind of extra-rational enchantment (cf. Gorgias, *Helen* 10, 14 and Thrasymachus, *ap.* Plato, *Phaedrus* 267C7–D1) and recognize persuasion through the hearers as a technical mode of proof coordinate with persuasion through the speech itself.

That gives us two technical modes of persuasion. My guess is that work on emotion quickly led to recognizing persuasion through character as a third mode. For Aristotle held an inclusive notion of emotion such that emotional response involves more than having certain thoughts. It also involves feeling pleasure and pain and being affected in judgment. He makes the point explicitly in *Rhetoric* 2.1. He first tells us that things do not appear the same to men who feel friendly and hostile (1377b31–1378a6) and then defines emotion as "all those feelings on account of which men by changing differ in regard to their judgments, and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure" (1378a20–21). As I see it, Aristotle used this conception of emotion to distinguish between two different ways in which an audience may react to a speaker of good character. When the audience is pleased with the speaker and is affected in judgment, then it responds emotionally. It feels sympathy and is partial to the speaker.[39] But there are other occasions when

thinking on emotion. When they do, then they are likely to say, as Wisse (above, note 1) 42 does, that "we know of no antecedents for Aristotle's analysis of the emotions in 2.2–11." In fact, Plato clearly points the way in the *Philebus*. See my *Aristotle on Emotion* (above, note 2) 9–12. Here I would say that the account of different kinds of character presented in 2.12–17 is only loosely connected to the preceding discussion of emotions in 2.2–11. It seems to have its roots in Plato's *Phaedrus* 271C–272D (cf. *Rhet.* 2.13 1390a25–28 with *Phdr.* 271D5–7) and to predate the discussion of emotions in 2.2–11.

[39] Aristotle never denied that emotions—at least strong emotions (see Section VII) like fright and anger—affect the perception and ultimately the decision of an audience. Rather, he came to recognize that emotions relate to thought in two ways: (1) beliefs cause emotional responses (2) which in turn influence subsequent judgment. Put in rhetorical terms, (1) an orator uses arguments to induce or alter beliefs, and in that way he controls the emotions of his auditors and (2) the decision they reach.

Grimaldi (above, note 1) 67 says that Aristotle's "study of emotion is not meant to enable the speaker to manipulate the auditor and twist him about by arousing an unjustified and irrational emotional response, and so corrupting his judgment, since such a use of emotions is strongly condemned in the opening chapter" of the *Rhetoric*.

the audience feels no pleasure or pain and remains quite unaffected in judgment. On such occasions the audience does not respond emotionally, but it may deem the speaker worthy of belief. Such an evaluation can affect the decision ultimately reached by the audience; but when it does, it does so as one consideration among many. If Aristotle saw that—and I am suggesting that he did—then he could reasonably mark off persuasion through character from persuasion through the hearers and treat it as a third mode of persuasion.[40]

VIII

In conclusion, I want to look beyond Aristotle and take note of the fact that his notion of persuasion through character was largely ignored by later writers on rhetoric. The general decline of the Peripatos after Theophrastus may have played a role, but there must be more to the story, for we can be sure that some of Aristotle's teachings did not pass unnoticed. An obvious example is the doctrine of three technical modes of proof. Cicero knows this tripartite division and makes significant use of it in the work *On the Orator* (2.114–115, 181, 310), but he regards good character as a way of winning favor (*benevolentiam conciliare* 2.182). That is, he regards it as a way of arousing a positive emotional response in the audience and thereby blurs the Aristotelian distinction between persuasion through character and persuasion through

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I agree that the opening chapter condemns emotional appeal, but that chapter is early and presents an ideal rhetoric. Moreover, it is misleading to focus on the arousal of "unjustified and irrational response," for orators can and often do arouse reasonable emotional responses. In a democratic assembly, sensible discussions of, e.g., impending danger may awaken feelings of fright which are entirely justified and affect the decision ultimately reached. Aristotle is aware of that and rightly offers an account of emotion that is applicable to popular assemblies and juries.

[40] I have been advancing a developmental theory that is intended to explain certain difficulties in the composition of the *Rhetoric*. Let me be clear that this theory is neutral in regard to questions of editorship. It may be that Aristotle himself combined earlier portions that advance a narrow view of rhetoric with later portions that recognize three technical modes of persuasion. If so, some version of the "ideal rhetoric" explanation is likely to be correct. Aristotle put 1.1 up front because he continued to believe that a well-organized city restricts the orator to arguing the case on the basis of the facts. Alternatively, someone after Aristotle, perhaps Andronicus, put together the books as we now have them. In that case, Aristotle may have lost interest in the possibility of an ideal rhetoric and begun his course of lectures with 1.2. There is, I fear, no way to decide the matter with certainty.

the hearers. Perhaps Cicero himself had not read the *Rhetoric*, or only superficially; but that cannot be said of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who may have begun his study of rhetoric with the Peripatetics.[41] In both the *First Letter to Ammaeus* (passim) and the work *On Literary Composition* (25 p. 126.6 Usener–Radermacher), Dionysius refers explicitly to the Aristotelian treatise. In the *Lysias*, he does not mention the *Rhetoric* by name; but in section 19, he makes reference to the tripartite division of technical proof (τριχῇ δὴ νενεμημένων τούτων [*sc.* ἐντέχνων πίστεων] εἴς τε τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ ἦθος 19 p. 30.21–31.2 U-R) and discusses proof under the headings of fact, character and emotion. Dionysius even uses the term "worthy of belief" (ἀξιόπιστος 19 p. 31.11) within the discussion of proof resulting from character (ἐκ τῶν ἠθῶν 19 p. 31.8), and that recalls *Rhetoric* 1.2, where Aristotle uses the same term to introduce the notion of persuasion through character (1356a5–6). However, Dionysius does not mention the Aristotelian triad set forth in 2.1: namely, wisdom, virtue and goodwill. The omission may be significant, for Dionysius is mixing proofs which are different in kind: proof as one of the traditional parts of an oration and proof as a technical procedure that finds application throughout an oration. In the portion of the *Lysias* that concerns us, Dionysius has organized his remarks according to the parts of an oration. In 17–18, he discusses the introduction, preliminary statement and narration; in 19, he considers that part called proof. He is, in fact, following the handbooks (τέχναι 17 p. 27.23, 18 p. 29.21), which assign character and emotion a role within the proof. There is a parallel within Aristotle's *Rhetoric* namely, in 3.17, where the Stagirite discusses the part called proof (1418a12–19). But if my argument in Section VII is correct, that chapter was composed before persuasion through character was formulated and identified as one of three technical modes of proof. More importantly, the notion of character present in *Rhetoric* 3.17 is not that of 2.1. It is limited to ethical attributes. The same is true of character in *Lysias* 19.[42]

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[41] See G. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 300 B.C.–300 A.D.* (Princeton 1972) 346.

[42] Like Aristotle in 3.17 (1418a17, 40), Dionysius refers to choice and good character (19 p. 31.11, 14–15, 19–20). The impression conveyed is that moral character is central and that the aim is to arouse a positive feeling in the auditors, on account of which they will decide the issue in favor of the speaker. That may be compatible with Aristotle's notion of persuasion through character, but it is not identical with the notion as set forth in *Rhetoric* 2.1.

Dionysius' treatment of proof is, I think, confusing, but it need not be attributed to ignorance. More likely it reflects his overriding interest in style and consequent neglect of the technical modes of proof. Indeed, an increasing concern with the literary aspects of rhetoric will have encouraged Hellenistic rhetoricians to ignore Aristotle's technical notion of persuasion through character. But having said that, I want to emphasize another and, I think, more fundamental reason why Aristotle's notion of persuasion through character lacked influence. It is that this notion is very much an abstraction based on the idea that the rhetorical situation has three parts: the orator, the auditor and the substance of the speech. I am not saying that this division is in itself wrong, but I do want to suggest that it is theoretical and often blurred in practice. That is clear in regard to emotional appeal, for while this mode of persuasion can occur apart from sober argument, it need not do so. The orator may use enthymemes and examples to arouse anger in the audience, and on occasion arguing one's case on the basis of the facts is the best way to achieve an emotional effect. Similarly, in regard to persuasion through character, an orator may use arguments to establish his claim to wisdom, virtue and goodwill. And by presenting a good character, he may be establishing a premise necessary for arguing his case.[43] In addition—and more importantly—presentations of good character often encourage attention on the part of the audience and at the same time arouse feelings of goodwill. I have already touched on this point in Section V. Here I want to observe that arousing goodwill need not be construed as exciting a mind-bending emotion. It may be conceived of as awakening a mild response that is compatible with sound judgment. Hence, it is tempting to take a hint from Isocrates and say that the best situation is one in which the auditor experiences "common goodwill" (κοινὴ εὔνοια) toward all speakers.[44] In order to reach a sound decision, it is desirable that every speaker be

[43] Presenting good character can be an important element in arguments based on probability. E.g., "Being a man of this sort, I am unlikely to have done a certain deed" (in a judicial case where the orator is the defendant) or "… am unlikely to fail in performing some service in the future" (in a deliberative assembly where the orator advances himself for a particular role).

[44] In *Antidosis* 22, Isocrates makes the point negatively, criticizing the Athenians for not exhibiting common goodwill to competing parties (οἱ μὴ κοινὴν τὴν εὔνοιαν τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις παρέχοντες). It should be underlined that the notion of goodwill that I am developing here and associating with Isocrates does not rule out using the Greek word εὔνοια to refer to an emotion that affects one's judgment. Isocrates himself uses the word this way in *Antidosis* 134–135. See J. de Romilly, "*Eunoia* in Isocrates or the

wise, virtuous and marked by goodwill. And when that desideratum is realized, the audience does not favor one speaker over the other. It feels a common goodwill, hears each side equally (ὁμοίως)[45] and reaches a decision confident that it has been well advised by each of the speakers.

The basis for such an analysis can be found in Aristotle's *Ethics* 9.5, where goodwill is marked off from feelings of friendship on the grounds that it lacks intensity and desire (1166b33). A similar analysis was most likely offered by Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus, who in his work *On Emotions* recognized that closely related emotions differ by the more and less (Simplicius, *On Aristotle's Categories* p. 235.7–8 = no. 438 FHS&G).[46] For our purposes, the important point is that the Peripatetics themselves divided emotions into those that are strong and those that are weak. Goodwill belongs among the mild emotions, and that encourages the idea that goodwill is compatible with impartial judgment. We should, of course, keep in mind that Aristotle's definition of emotion in *Rhetoric* 2.1 explicitly connects emotional response with altered judgment (1378a20–21), but that definition is very much a "rhetorical" definition intended to cover those emotions that are usefully excited by orators who want to control appearances and thereby affect judgment (1377b31–1378a6). It is not intended to be a general definition covering all phenomena that can be brought under the label "emotion."[47] If that is correct, goodwill can be an emotion, albeit a gentle one that leaves the auditor in control of his critical faculties.[48]

The idea that goodwill may be a mild emotion compatible with reaching an impartial decision—Isocrates' common goodwill—is, I think, attractive; but it had no more influence among later writers on rhetoric than did Aristotle's notion of persuasion through character. I

Political Importance of Creating Good Will," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 78 (1958) 96. (I am grateful to Jerome Bons for calling my attention to this article).

[45] In *Antidosis* 21, Isocrates refers to the oath that bound Athenian jurors to hear "equally" (ὁμοίως). Common goodwill is thought of as ensuring impartiality.

[46] It is clear from Simplicius' report that Theophrastus recognized a difference in degree between fault-finding, anger and rage. Whether Theophrastus or Simplicius applied the same analysis to goodwill and friendship is not entirely clear, but given the passage from Aristotle's *Ethics* and the fact that Theophrastus wrote a treatise on emotion, I believe that he did. See "Theophrastus on Emotion" (above, note 2) 212–215, reprint 74–79.

[47] See "Theophrastus on Emotion" (above, n. 2) 225–226, reprint 90.

[48] Alternatively we might choose to say that the definition of 2.1 is authoritative within the sphere of rhetoric: i.e., for rhetorical theory, it can be taken as a general definition that admits no exceptions. In that case, the goodwill spoken of by Isocrates would not count as an emotion.

know of no source that tells us why, but two related considerations are likely to have weighed heavily. First, most people see rhetoric as a means to victory. Whether they are politicians or lawyers involved in civic affairs or schoolboys engaged in debate, the goal is winning; and toward that end, the presentation of good and bad character is naturally viewed as a way of gaining favor for the speaker and removing it from the opponent. Second, if one accepts emotional appeal as a proper part of the rhetorical art, there is no compelling reason to advance a theory of self-characterization that leaves the audience unaffected and therefore capable of sound, impartial judgment. Of course, Aristotle had offered an analysis of emotions that dissociates them from extra-rational charms and ties them to belief, but he was also clear that emotions like anger and fright affect the way an audience perceives and decides the issue before it. The Stagirite had in fact abandoned the quest for an ideal rhetoric which emphasizes truth and protects the impartiality of the auditor. Rhetoricians, I suspect, understood that and accordingly ignored Aristotle's emphasis on trustworthiness. They instructed their pupils in how to gain favor for themselves while blackening the character of the opponent.[49]

[49] Earlier versions of this paper were read at the Universities of Leiden and Utrecht on May 1 and 21, 1991, at the Free University in Amsterdam on May 15, at the Institute of Classical Studies London on May 30 and at The Pennsylvania State University on October 24. I am grateful for suggestions made on those occasions and also for support provided by The Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study. The research for and writing of this paper was largely done at NIAS. Finally, I want to thank Eckart Schütrumpf and Jerome Bons for interesting references (see above, notes 15 and 44) and David Mirhady for reading through this paper and making helpful suggestions.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

ARISTOTLE'S ACCOUNTS OF PERSUASION THROUGH CHARACTER

Some years ago at a conference in Tatnic, Maine, I suggested that Cicero's account of winning goodwill (*benevolentiam conciliare*) is not a simple development of Aristotelian persuasion through character (*pistis dia tou êthous*).[1] For Cicero is interested in creating favor for the orator and his client; as a result he blurs Aristotle's distinction between persuasion through character and emotional appeal. In contrast, Aristotelian persuasion through character is not intended to arouse an emotion in the audience. It provides grounds for trusting the orator and does not undermine the impartiality of the audience. This view of Aristotelian persuasion through character has been refined and developed since the Tatnic conference. I discussed it in a lecture at The Pennsylvania State University[2] and have published several articles on the subject.[3] Others, too, have taken up the topic and generally endorsed my view.[4] Normally that would be grounds for silence, but it now appears to me that Aristotle's account of persuasion through character is more complex than I had realized. In particular, there are two principle accounts, not one, and the two accounts reflect two different orientations which should be clearly stated in order that the accounts can be properly understood.

[1] The conference was held on 2 October, 1987 and proceedings were published in *Rhetorica 6* (1988); my contribution is *"Benevolentiam conciliare* and *animos permovere:* Some Remarks on Cicero's *De oratore* 2.178–216" = Chapter 19 in this volume.

[2] The lecture was held on 23 October, 1991 as part of a lecture series organized by Christopher L. Johnstone.

[3] "Persuasion through Character and the Composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," *Rheinisches Museum* 134 (1991) 152–156 = Chapter 22 in this volume; "Aristotle on Persuasion through Character," *Rhetorica* 10 (1992) 207–244 = Chapter 17 in this volume; "Ethos," *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik*, ed. G. Ueding, vol. 2 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1994) col. 1517–1525.

[4] J. Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos* (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1989) 34; L. Calboli Montefusco, "Aristotle and Cicero on the *officia oratoris*," in *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh and D. Mirhady = *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 6 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994) 67–68 (Calboli Montefusco is careful to distinguish *benevolentiam conciliare* as set forth in the *De oratore* from *delectare* as found in the *Brutus, Orator,* and *De optimo genere oratorum*); *E.* Schtrumpf, "Non-Logical Means of Persuasion in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and Cicero's *De oratore,"* in *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle* 110 n. 90.

In what follows, I shall (1) set forth the principle passages; (2) discuss the first account—that of *Rhetoric* 1.2—which is oriented toward judicial oratory; (3) discuss the second account—that of 2.1—whose focus is deliberative oratory; and (4) take up a parenthetical remark—one found in 1.8—which is concerned with deliberative oratory but differs in an important way from the second account. It would be foolish to think that I am now offering the "last word" on persuasion through character, but perhaps I can provide some helpful corrections as well as new perspectives.

The Principle Passages: Rhetoric *1.2 and 2.1*

There are two passages in the *Rhetoric* that are fundamental for understanding Aristotle's thinking on the character of the orator. The first occurs in book 1, chapter 2. There Aristotle defines rhetoric (1355b26–34), draws a distinction between technical and nontechnical proofs (1355b35–1356a1), and lists three modes of technical proof.[5] He says that the first—our special concern—is "in the character of the speaker," the second is "in disposing the listener in some way" (i.e., arousing an emotional response), and the third is "in the speech itself through showing or appearing to show something" (1356a1–4).[6] This initial list is immediately followed by brief remarks concerning each of the three modes, beginning with that which is "in the character of the speaker." Here is what Aristotle says about this mode (1356a5–13):

> Therefore [we have a case of persuasion] through the character [of the speaker] when the speech is such that it makes the speaker worthy of belief. For we believe upright men more fully and quickly, [and that is

[5] The three modes are introduced as "proofs provided through the speech" (1.2 1356a1). The label "technical proof" is not repeated, but there can be no doubt that the proofs taken up for discussion are technical modes. Unlike the non-technical modes, which pre-exist and are merely used by the speaker (1355b36), the "proofs provided through the speech" are all the product of the speaker or speech writer and therefore satisfy Aristotle's criterion for counting proofs as technical; namely, that they be constructed by the orator or invented by him (1355b38–39). The verb "to invent" (*heurein*) is Aristotle's, but its occurrence does not mean that Aristotle has a developed notion of "invention" (*heuresis*). In particular, it does not mean that Ciceronian *inventio* is already present in Aristotle. See Schtrumpf (above, note 4) 100–105.

[6] It is clear that this threefold division of technical proof is based on a tripartite analysis of the oratorical situation into speaker, listener, and argument (cf. 1.3 1358a38-b2). The division governs, albeit imperfectly, the organization of *Rhetoric* 1–2.

> true] generally concerning all matters and absolutely [so] in matters in which there is no exact knowledge but opinions differ. It is necessary that this happen through the speech, rather than on account of a preexisting opinion about the character of the speaker. For not as some writers on rhetoric posit in their treatises [saying] that the uprightness of the speaker contributes nothing to persuasion; rather character has almost, so to speak, the greatest authority in winning belief.[7]

The second passage is found in book 2, chapter 1. After a brief reference to the preceding discussion of materials for deliberative, epideictic, and judicial oratory (1377b16–20),[8] Aristotle tells us that it is not enough to produce persuasive arguments. The orator must also do two other things: he must present himself as a certain kind of person, and he must work an emotional effect on the audience (1377b21–24). The former is said to be more useful in deliberative situations and the latter in judicial proceedings (1377b25–1378a6). In the remainder of the chapter, Aristotle first discusses the self-presentation of the orator and then introduces the topic of emotional appeal (1378a6–30). The following is what Aristotle says concerning the first topic (1378a6–20).

> There are three reasons why speakers themselves are credible. For that is the number of reasons on account of which we are persuaded apart from demonstrative arguments. They are [1][9] wisdom and [2] virtue and [3] goodwill. For men err concerning what they say or advise, either on account of all of these or on account of some one of them. For either [1] they do not hold correct opinions on account of a lack of sense; or [2] they hold correct opinions but do not say what they think on account of wickedness; or [3] they are wise and upright but lack goodwill, on account of which it is possible for them not to advise what they know to be best, and beyond these there is no [other cause]. It is necessary, therefore, that the person who appears to possess all these attributes will be credible with his audience. How men appear wise and good is to be understood from what has been said concerning the virtues. For a person may establish his own virtue in the same way as that of someone else. Concerning goodwill and friendship we must speak in the account of emotions.

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[7] The last sentence (1356a10–13) is awkward, and an emendation of the Greek text was printed by D. Ross in his Oxford Classical Text (1959). The emendation is, however, not an improvement and therefore is passed over in silence (i.e., without specific reference in the apparatus criticus) by R. Kassel in the Teubner edition (1976).

[8] The reference is to 1.4–14. The intervening discussion of non-technical proofs in 1.15 is not mentioned in 2.1. See below, note 23.

[9] The numbers in brackets are added for the sake of clarity. This contrasts with *Politics* 5.9 1309a33–39 (see n. 29), where the numbers are part of the Greek text.

This passage is longer and fuller than that found in 1.2. It lists three attributes that a speaker seeks to claim for himself; wisdom (*phronêsis*), virtue (*aretê*), and goodwill (*eunoia*). In contrast, the passage from 1.2 mentions only uprightness (*epieikeia* 1356a11–12). Since "uprightness" is almost certainly used synonymously for "virtue"[10]—in 2.1 men of virtue are called "upright" men (*epieikeis* 1378a13)[11]—it is natural to say that 1.2 is simply a first statement in which Aristotle mentions one of three attributes. In 2.1 he offers a more detailed statement, adding two attributes for a total of three. In both passages, Aristotle is concerned with a single mode of persuasion that is distinct from both arguing the issue (proof "in the speech itself") and emotional appeal (proof "in disposing the listener in some way"). The fundamental idea is that a speaker becomes credible (*pistos* 2.1 1378a6–16) or worthy of belief (*axiopistos* 1.2 1356a5–6) by presenting himself as a man of wisdom, virtue, and goodwill. When arguments on different sides of an issue are equally strong, the listener has little choice but to consider the speakers and to decide in favor of the person who appears wise, virtuous, and full of goodwill. Such a decision is not an emotional response. The listener experiences no strong feeling of joy, exhilaration, or the like. Rather, he recognizes that wisdom, virtue, and good will are grounds for trust, and therefore supports the speaker who exhibits these attributes most clearly and fully.

As a composite statement concerning persuasion through character, the preceding paragraph has merit, but it also obscures some interesting differences between 1.2 and 2.1. A case in point concerns "character" (*êthos*). In 1.2, when listing the three modes of technical proof, Aristotle uses the phrase "in the character of the speaker" (1356a2–3); and some two lines later, when introducing his comments on persua-

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[10] That is, "virtue" (*aretê*) in the sense of moral virtue or virtue of character. In the passage quoted from 2.1, "virtue" is first used in this narrow sense: it is distinct from practical wisdom (1378a8–9). Subsequently it is used inclusively to cover both moral virtue and practical wisdom (1378a17). Cf. *Politics* 5.9 1309b5–6, where "uprightness" is a variation on "virtue," both words being used to distinguish goodness of character from the experience and knowledge required of generals. For more on *Politics* 5.9, see the section below entitled "The Speaker's Character in Deliberative Oratory: On 2.1."

[11] "Upright" men (*epieikeis*) are also referred to in 1.2 1356a6. It may be worth noting that Greek lacked a common adjective cognate with *aretê*, so that Aristotle necessarily used words like *epieikês* and *agathos* when he wanted to describe someone as virtuous. In 1.2, Aristotle first used the adjective *epieikês*, "we believe upright men," and subsequently introduced the cognate noun *epiekeia* (1356a6, 11–12). In the latter passage, he might have used *aretê* but chose not to vary his vocabulary.

sion through character, Aristotle begins with the phrase "through the character [of the speaker]" (1356a5). That contrasts with 2.1, where the word "character" (*êthos*) does not occur, let alone the two phrases found in 1.2. Unless I misunderstand the passages, this difference is not simply verbal. It reflects a substantial difference: one of orientation. In 1.2 Aristotle is concerned with judicial oratory and therefore focuses on that attribute which carries special weight in courtroom cases. In 2.1 Aristotle has a different concern, namely, deliberative oratory and the three attributes that give politicians credibility.

The Speaker's Character in Judicial Oratory: On 1.2

In 1.2, Aristotle's remarks on self-presentation by the speaker are confined to character (*êthos*). This character is an established moral disposition, which contrasts with deliberative capacity. The contrast is found in several of Aristotle's works, including the *Ethics*, the *Poetics*, and the *Rhetoric*. In the *Ethics*, it underlies the distinction between the moral virtues and practical wisdom (*êthikai aretai* and *phronêsis)*. The former are called virtues of character (*aretai tou êthous)*, and the latter belongs among the virtues of thought (*aretai tês dianoias*, 1138b35–1139a1). In the *Poetics*, the distinction between character and thought is found within the qualitative parts of a tragedy. Character is what makes us say that a stage figure is a certain sort or person. Thought is shown when a stage figure demonstrates and generally argues for something (1450a5–7, b11–12). In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle introduces the distinction within the discussion of narration in judicial oratory. We are advised to reveal choice and to avoid speaking from thought, for the former manifests character and the latter practical wisdom. We should say, for example, "I wanted that and made a choice; and if I did not profit, so much the better" (1417a15–18, 23–27).[12]

In 1.2, Aristotle uses the noun *epieikeia* and the adjective *epieikês* (1356a6, 11–12) in order to specify the character a speaker ought to exhibit. That character is moral goodness; it contrasts with *phaulotês* or

[12] For fuller discussion of the passages mentioned in this paragraph, see my article "Aristotle's Distinction between Moral Virtue and Practical Wisdom," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy* 4: *Aristotle's* Ethics, ed. J. Anton and A. Preus (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991) 97–102 = Chapter 10 in this volume, pages 189–195.

"baseness" (cf. 1.15. 1376a28–29).[13] *Epieikeia* may be translated in various ways, including "goodness," "uprightness," and "fair-mindedness."[14] I have preferred "uprightness" and have translated *phaulotês* as "baseness." That seems to capture the contrast nicely; but I want to acknowledge that "fair-mindedness" is attractive in that it suits an ambiguity in Aristotle's use of *epieikeia* and *epieikês*. Sometimes the two words are not used generally in reference to moral goodness but narrowly for what is fair or equitable. This usage is found in *Rhetoric* 1.13, where Aristotle takes account of the fact that laws cannot cover all cases. He tells us that the fair (*to epieikes*) seems to be just, and the fair is what is just contrary to written law (1374a26–28). Fair individuals (*epieikeis*) are said to be forgiving: they take account of circumstances and the intention of the lawgiver (1374b3–13). Similarly in *Ethics* 5.10, Aristotle offers reflections on the fair or equitable as rectification of law (1137b26, cf. b12–13); but he also recognizes that the word *epieikês* is used more generally for what is good (1137b1). And earlier in 4.9, he himself uses the word in reference to the virtuous man. The topic is whether shame is a virtue, which Aristotle denies. He tells us that shame is not characteristic of the fair-minded or upright man (*epieikês* 1128b21). For shame is felt at voluntary actions, and upright men never voluntarily do what is base (1128b28–29). Rather it is the base man (*phaulos*) who does what is shameful (1128b25–26).

The application to *Rhetoric* 1.2 is immediately intelligible: in judicial oratory, the speaker's character is important. A prosecutor improves his chances of obtaining a conviction if he can show that the defendant is *phaulos*—base or vicious—either generally so or in some relevant respect, for then the judge or jury will think the defendant likely to have committed the crime in question. Conversely, the defendant wants to present himself as *epieikês*, an upright or virtuous individual, for such a person does not commit acts of injustice. The defendant will be less interested in establishing his goodwill toward the victim, for good will may give way to vice or moral weakness. He will be even less interested in manifesting practical wisdom; indeed, he may even wish to present

[13] The lines 1376a28–29 conclude the text 1.15 1376a23–29 quoted in translation later in this section. For the adjectives *epieikês* and *phaulos*, see 2.19 1392b22–24.

[14] For the first two, see the translation of Rhys Roberts in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, vol. 2, ed. J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) 2155 and 2194 (1.2 1356a6, 11–12; and 2.1 1378a13); for the third, see George Kennedy's translation in *Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (Oxford: University Press, 1991) 38 and 121 (the same passages).

himself as simple minded and generally lacking in reasoning skills, for deliberative capacity may be a prerequisite for committing the alleged crime.[15]

It may be helpful to consider Aristotle's treatment of nontechnical proofs and in particular his remarks on witnesses who give testimony concerning the character of the speaker and his adversary (1.15. 1376a23–29):

> There are testimonies concerning the speaker himself and others concerning the adversary, and testimonies concerning the deed and others concerning character. It is clear, therefore, that [the speaker] can never be at a loss for useful testimony. For if there is no testimony relating to the deed, either agreeing with the speaker or contradicting the adversary,[16] at least there will be testimony concerning the character either of the speaker himself with a view to his uprightness or of the adversary with a view to his baseness.

This passage concerns the testimony of witnesses in judicial proceedings. The testimony is taken in advance of the courtroom speech and is not to be confused with persuasion through character *qua* technical proof.[17] Nevertheless, Aristotle's statement concerning the testimony of witnesses shares an important feature with his remarks on persuasion through character in 1.2. In both passages, we have not only an explicit reference to character (*êthos* 1.2 1356a2, 5; 1.15. 1376a28) but also a clear reference to the uprightness (*epieikeia*) of the speaker (1.2 1356a11; 1.15 1376a28–29). The reason for referring to uprightness is the same in both places: persons of good character do not commit crimes.

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[15] See my article "On the Composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric:* Arguing the Issue, Emotional Appeal, Persuasion through Character, and Characters Tied to Age and Fortune," in *Festschrift Carl Werner Müller*, ed. Chr. Mueller-Goldingen and K. Sier in *Beiträge zur Altertumskunde* (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1996) 183–184 with note 53 = Chapter 23 in this volume, page 407. In *On the Murder of Erathosthenes*, Lysias has the defendant rebut a charge of premeditated entrapment not only by denying planning and foreknowledge (40–42) but also by presenting himself as a naïve person who is easily deceived (10).

[16] My translation of 1376a26–28 differs from that of Kennedy (*Aristotle* 113): "for if there is no testimony relating to the fact or supporting the speaker or contradicting the opponent …." The first "or" seems to me an error. There are not three alternatives, only two: "if there is no testimony relating to the deed, *either* (testimony) supporting the speaker, or (testimony) contradicting the opponent …." Each of the alternatives concerns testimony relating to the deed. Cf. the Oxford translation of Rhys Roberts (*Complete Works of Aristotle* 2192): "For if we have no evidence of fact supporting our own case or telling against that of our opponent …"

[17] On Aristotle's discussion of witnesses, see D. Mirhady, "Non-technical *Pisteis* in Aristotle and Anaximenes," *American Journal of Philology* 112 (1991) 6, 13–16.

It is true that 1.15 contains a reference to the character of the adversary, his baseness (1376a29), which is missing in 1.2, but that does not speak against comparison with 1.2. In fact it enhances the comparison. For in 1.15, in regard to both the speaker and his adversary, Aristotle is clearly concerned with moral character in a judicial context.[18] Similarly, in 1.2 Aristotle's focus is on the courtroom and the benefits of establishing moral character.

In 1.2, at the end of the discussion of persuasion through character, Aristotle criticizes certain writers of rhetorical handbooks who deny that the uprightness of the speaker contributes to persuasiveness. According to Aristotle the reverse is true: character has almost the greatest authority with regard to persuasion (1356a10–13). The writers of handbooks to whom Aristotle refers are not further identified in this passage, but from the preceding chapter (1.1) it seems clear that Aristotle is criticizing writers who emphasize emotional appeal in judicial oratory, for in that chapter Aristotle attacks the writers of handbooks who ignore arguing the issue in favor of extraneous matters. They are said to pass over enthymematic argument and to concentrate on arousing pity, anger and the like,[19] which has nothing to do with the issue but is directed toward the person who is judging the case (1354a11–18). Their concern is how orators affect the condition of a decision-maker (1354b19–20). They say nothing about deliberative oratory; instead, all try to write about speaking in court (1354b25–27), for in judicial cases it pays to win over the listener or judge, so that he listens with partiality and surrenders himself rather then deciding between the disputants (1354b31–1355a1). The same writers of handbooks are almost certainly the target of Aristotle's attack in 1.2. They are said to recognize little or no persuasive force in the uprightness of the speaker, for they put their confidence entirely in emotional appeal. Aristotle disagrees with these writers and calls uprightness most authoritative. He challenges them on

[18] If the testimony shows that the adversary is of bad character, he loses his credibility. Should he be the defendant, he will be thought likely to have committed the crime. In cases where he is the plaintiff, he will appear to be the sort of person who brings false charges.

[19] At 1.1 1354a17, Aristotle mentions pity and anger, because he is thinking of judicial oratory, in which the arousal of these and similar emotions can be quite effective. The immediately preceding mention of slander (a16) also reflects the courtroom, in which orators employ slander to arouse anger and hate. I am not claiming that such emotions are never usefully aroused in a deliberative situation; but their primary home is in the courtroom.

their own ground—judicial oratory[20]—and makes a technical proof out of that attribute, uprightness or moral goodness, which is so important in courts of law. If Aristotle expresses himself strongly in saying that the speaker's character has "almost, so to speak, the greatest authority in winning belief,"[21] the strength of his expression is entirely appropriate, for he is replying to writers who have themselves overstated the importance of emotional appeal.

The Speaker's Character in Deliberative Oratory: On 2.1

In 2.1, there is a shift in focus. Aristotle is concerned with deliberative oratory and therefore mentions wisdom and goodwill as well as virtue (1378a8–9). All three attributes are looked for in the credible speaker, for when they do not occur together, men fail to give the best advice (*sumbouleuein* 1378a10, 14). Aristotle explains that men who lack wisdom hold false opinions; that men who opine correctly do not say what they think on account of wickedness; and that men who are wise and upright may lack goodwill and therefore fail to offer the advice which they know to be best (1378a10–14). Aristotle states clearly that these three explanations of bad counsel are exhaustive—"and besides these there is none" (1378a14–15)—and concludes that the speaker who appears wise, virtuous and full of goodwill is credible to the listeners (1378a15–16).

The connection with deliberative oratory is clear even before the mention of three attributes.[22] Aristotle begins with a brief reference to the preceding treatment of materials for deliberative, epideictic, and judicial oratory (1377b16–20),[23] after which Aristotle tells us that

[20] According to 1.1 1354b25–26, the writers of handbooks have completely stayed away from deliberative oratory. This may be overstatement, but it is not a wild exaggeration. The special interest of these writer has been judicial oratory, and Aristotle meets them head-on by advancing a notion of persuasion through character that is oriented toward the courtroom.

[21] In 1.1, Aristotle says that the enthymeme is, "so to speak, without qualification most authoriative among the modes of proof" (1355a7–8). In 1.2, Aristotle does not contradict this assertion and rate the character of the speaker more important than enthymematic argument. "Almost" (1.2 1356a7–13) is weaker than "without qualification" (1.1 1355a7), and in both passages Aristotle is careful to add "so to speak." More important, Aristotle asserts himself strongly in 1.2 because he wishes to counter the writers of handbooks who overrate the authority of emotional appeal in judicial oratory.

[22] Ie., before the passage that is discussed in the preceding paragraph and quoted in translation above.

[23] The reference is to 1.4–14. There is no reference to the immediately preceding

persuasion through character is more useful in deliberative oratory, while emotional appeal is of greater utility in judicial oratory. I give the passage in full (1377b21–31):

> Since the art of rhetoric exists for the sake of judgment—for men judge advice and a legal verdict is a judgment—the orator must not only consider how the argument of his speech will be most demonstrative and credible, but also make himself a certain sort of person and the hearer as well. For it is quite important, especially in giving advice but also in legal proceedings, that the speaker appear to be a certain sort of person and that [the listeners] think him to be disposed toward them in some way, and in addition that [the listeners] themselves happen to be disposed in some way. That the speaker appears to be a certain sort of person is of greater use with a view to giving advice, and that the listener be disposed in some way (is of greater use) with a view to legal proceedings.

In what follows, Aristotle makes clear what he means by the listener "being disposed in some way." The reference is to the emotional condition of the audience. Aristotle first mentions emotional conditions useful in legal proceedings: friendly feelings and hate, anger and gentleness. When a juror has been so affected that he has friendly feelings toward the defendant, then he will see no injustice or only a little in the deeds of the defendant. The opposite is the case if the juror has been brought to hate the defendant (1377b31–1378a3). After that, Aristotle mentions emotional conditions useful in deliberative situations. Should a member of the assembly desire something pleasant and view it with confidence, then he thinks that it will come about and be good. Should he be indifferent or annoyed, then he will think the opposite (1378a3–6). Here we have a reminder that emotional appeal can be used effectively in deliberative assemblies, but that does not contradict Aristotle's fundamental claim: emotional appeal is more useful in the courtroom, and persuasion through character has greater utility in matters of counsel.

This conclusion may seem inconsistent with persuasion through character as presented in 1.2, but there is no formal inconsistency, for Aristotle has two recommendations for two different circumstances.

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account of nontechnical modes of persuasion in 1.15. This omission may be an indication that Aristotle's mind is on deliberative oratory, for the nontechnical modes of persuasion concern judicial oratory (1.15 1375a23–24). Nevertheless, there are grounds for caution. First, the transitional passage at the beginning of 2.1 may have been inserted by an editor. Second, the nontechnical modes are easily passed over in silence, not only because they are nontechnical (neither constructed by the orator nor, strictly speaking, part of his speech) but also because they are treated as a kind of appendix to Aristotle's account of the materials for judicial oratory (1375a23–30).

In 1.1, he recommends that the speaker exhibit uprightness, for his thoughts are on the courtroom; and in 2.1, he recommends three attributes that suit the assembly and other deliberative situations. Uprightness or virtue is not dropped; instead it is listed alongside wisdom and goodwill.[24] The significance of this triad is not in doubt. Aristotle is referring to three attributes whose connection with good advice had long been recognized.[25] One well-known example from the fifth century is found in book 2 of Thucydides' *Histories*. There the statesman Pericles is made to address the assembly at the end of the second year of the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians have seen their land invaded twice and are now suffering the ravages of a plague. An attempt to reach an accord with Sparta has failed and the people are angry at Pericles for advising them to undertake the war. In this context, Pericles calls a meeting of the assembly and addresses the people, urging them to persevere. Of especial interest is the introduction to Pericles' speech, for there the statesman engages in self-characterization (2.60.5–6):

> And yet you are angry at such a man as myself, who is, I think, I [1][26] inferior to no one in knowing and setting forth what needs to be done, [2] a friend of the city, and [3] superior to money. For [1] the man who knows [what needs to be done] and does not explain [it] clearly is in the same condition as if he had not thought of [what needs to be done]; and [2] the man who has both but is full of ill will toward the city, will not present a [recommendation] with the same loyalty; and [3] if this too is present and yet conquered by money, everything will be sold for this one thing.

Here we have Aristotle's triad in only slightly altered form. Practical wisdom is divided into being able to determine a proper policy and to set it forth; goodwill corresponds to being a friend of the city; and

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[24] As was mentioned earlier, men of virtue are called "upright men" (*epieikeis*) at 2.1 1378a13.

[25] The connection can be found already in the first book of Homer's *Iliad*, where Nestor speaks in the assembly of princes. Agamemnon and Achilles are quarrelling over whether Agamemnon should take for himself the girl Briseis, who had been given as booty to Achilles. Nestor will urge Agamemenon not to take the girl and Achilles not to oppose Agamemnon (1.274–281); but before Nestor gives this advice, Homer describes him as well intentioned toward both Agamemnon and Achilles (1.253), after which he claims for himself superiority in battle and council (1.259–273). In Aristotelian terms, Homer describes Nestor as full of goodwill and then has Nestor claim the virtues of courage and practical wisdom. See "Aristotle on Persuasion through Character" (above, note 3) 211–214 = Chapter 17 in this volume, pages 285–287.

[26] The numbers in brackets are not part of the Greek text. They have been added for the sake of clarity, just as they have been added to the translation of 2.1 (see note 9).

virtue is narrowed to being superior to money, i.e., a particular moral virtue much looked for in politicians. Pericles even anticipates Aristotle by remarking on the harmful effects of the opposite condition: being unable to set forth a policy clearly, having ill will toward the city, and being unable to resist money. The first of these opposite conditions—being unable to set forth policy in a clear manner—is narrower than Aristotle's lack of sense (1378a11),[27] but the general idea is the same: an absence of practical wisdom inhibits counsel, as does an absence of goodwill and virtue.

It is clear that the three attributes of 2.1 are not an Aristotelian discovery. They are traditional and a matter of practical politics.[28] It is, therefore, hardly surprising that they occur in *Politics* 5.9, where Aristotle discusses the criteria for high office. Here is how Aristotle introduces them (1309a33–39):

> Those who are going to hold the controlling offices [in a city-state] ought to possess a certain three attributes: [1][29] friendship toward the established political arrangement, [2] maximum capacity for the work of the office, [3] virtue and justice: in each political arrangement the [kind of virtue and justice proper] to the political arrangement. For if what is just is not the same in all political arrangements, then there must also be different kinds of justice.

The first of the three criteria, friendship (*philia*) toward the established political arrangement (*politeia)*, recalls the second attribute claimed by the Pericles: namely, being a friend of the city (*philopolis*). In both cases, the idea is basically the same. The reliable statesman, the man most qualified for office and most persuasive when recommending a policy, is *inter alia* favorably disposed toward the city in its present form.[30]

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[27] In 2.1, Aristotle uses "lack of sense," *aphrosunê* (1378a11), to express the absence of "practical wisdom," *phronêsis* (a8). Practical wisdom is an excellence of thought (1.9 1366b20); and in the case of politicians, that includes not only the ability to conceive of a policy but also to state one's recommendation in an intelligible manner.

[28] In regard to the tradition, see n. 25 concerning Homer's *Iliad*. On the practical side, pseudo-Xenophon offers an interesting answer to the question why Athenian democrats allow the knavish individual to speak in the assembly: "They know that this man's ignorance and knavishness and goodwill are more profitable than the virtue and wisdom and ill-will of the respectable man" (*Constitution of the Athenians* 1.7).

[29] In this passage, the numbers in brackets reflect the Greek text: "first … then … third" (1309a34–36). That is not true of the numbers in brackets within the translations of *Rhetoric* 2.1 (see note 9) and of Thucydides 2.60.5 (see note 26).

[30] I shall soon add a qualifier. In the case of the orator, being favorably disposed need not be a well-established disposition. Instead, it may be an occurrent emotion of no long standing.

He is not trying to replace democracy with oligarchy or vice versa. The second criterion—maximum capacity for the work of the office—differs from Pericles' first attribute, the capacity for determining and setting forth what needs to be done, in that there is no explicit reference to public speaking. The omission is understandable, for not all offices demand oratorical capacity. But allowing for this difference, it is clear that Aristotle's "maximum capacity" and Pericles' "knowing what needs to be done" are closely related. In both cases, we are to think of task-related capacity. When selecting a general, we look for capacity based on experience in battle; and when deciding whether or not to declare war, we accept the advice of that speaker who has a demonstrated knowledge of warfare. Finally, the third criterion listed by Aristotle, virtue and justice, includes Pericles' third attribute, superiority to money.[31] It excludes the vicious man who values money and therefore is likely to steal from the treasury or to give bad advice because he has been bribed. It also excludes the morally weak man, who does not overvalue money but may on occasion give way to temptation and steal from the treasury or offer bad advice for the sake of gain.[32]

Aristotle qualifies the third criterion, virtue and justice, by adding a reference to political arrangement. The virtue looked for in a candidate is that which suits the political arrangement (1309a36–37). The qualification is a matter of some interest, for it underlines the fact that Aristotle is not thinking of a single virtuous disposition which applies to all men in all circumstances. We may compare *Politics* 3.4, where Aristotle distinguishes the virtue of the citizen from that of the good man. The latter is said to be single and perfect (1276b33–34); it is that combination of moral and intellectual excellence which Aristotle discusses at length in his ethical treatises.[33] In contrast, the former takes vari-

[31] In fact, Pericles was not above taking money; and if Socrates' statement in Plato's *Gorgias* is not an oligarchic exaggeration, Pericles was not only fined for embezzlement but also nearly condemned to death (516A1–2).

[32] On moral weakness, cf. *Politics* 5.9 1309b8–14. Among politicians contemporary with Aristotle, Demosthenes may serve as an example of weakness in regard to money. Plutarch, citing Demetrius of Phalerum, tells us that he could not be corrupted by money coming from Macedon, but he was accessible to gold from Susa and Ecbatana and was overwhelmed by it (Plut., *Demosthenes* 14.1–2 = Dem. Ph. fr. 156 Stork).

[33] Instead of "combination," it might be better to speak of a "unity" of moral and intellectual excellences, for in the ethical treatises Aristotle advances a conception of perfection such that moral virtue and practical wisdom do not come apart (esp. *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.12–13; *Eudemian Ethics* 5.12–13). That alone is sufficient to mark off the virtue and wisdom of the perfect man (e.g., Socrates) from the virtue and wisdom

ous forms, for it is dependent upon the arrangement of the city-state (1276b30–32). What it is to be a good citizen in a democracy is different from what is to be a good citizen in an oligarchy, for the two political arrangements are different. In a democracy, the good citizen strives to preserve the democratic arrangement; in an oligarchy, he seeks to do the same for the oligarchic arrangement (1276b28–29). That does not mean that democrats, in their zeal to preserve a democracy, should strive to remove all oligarchs from the city; nor should oligarchs seek to destroy all democrats. In *Politics* 5.9, Aristotle touches on this matter. He says that in democracies and oligarchies alike, political leaders err when they divide a city in two. In democracies, demagogues ought to seek to speak (*legein*) on behalf of the wealthy; and in oligarchies, the oligarchs should appear to speak on behalf of the people. Rather than swear to be full of ill-will (*kakonous*) toward the people, oligarchs ought both to hold and to exhibit the opposite attitude (1310a2–12). The application to rhetoric is obvious. The orator who wishes to unify his city does well to present himself as a man of goodwill toward all the citizens.

In the passage just cited, Aristotle speaks of demagogues "seeming" (*dokein* 1310a6) to speak on behalf of the wealthy, and of oligarchs "exhibiting" (*hypokrinesthai* 1310a10–11) an opposite attitude toward democrats.[34] Those words may suggest feigned concern, and undoubtedly there are moments to be disingenuous. But Aristotle also says that the oligarch ought to hold (*hypolambanein* 1313a10, without *dokein* or a similar verb expressing appearance) a positive attitude toward democrats.[35] That is not a slip.[36] Aristotle is concerned with the unity of the city, and

looked for in candidates for office and in credible speakers. For in the latter two cases, the attributes do come apart, so that a politician can be wise and not virtuous or virtuous and not wise. Cf. *Politics* 5.9 1309a39-b14 and *Rhetoric* 2.1 1378a9–14.

[34] The verb *hypokrinesthai* is used for acting on the stage, where appearance is paramount. However, the verb is also used of an orator's delivery (*Rhetoric* 3.1 1403b23; 1413b23, 28, 30) and need not imply a feigned exhibition. It is, therefore, aptly used by Aristotle in a passage concerning how oligarchs ought to express themselves. That is not to overlook the fact that the immediate context is the oligarch's oath to hold ill-will and to plan whatever evil he can (1310a9–10, 11–12). Nevertheless, the passage as a whole is about speaking on behalf of political opponents: democrats on behalf of oligarchs and oligarchs on behalf on democrats (1310a6–7). The verb *hypokrinesthai* applies every bit as much to the public speeches of oligarchs as to their sworn oaths; or even more so.

[35] The repetition of *kai* in 1310a10 separates *hypolambanein* from *hypokrinesthai:* it is necessary *both* to hold an opposite attitude (i.e., goodwill), *and* to exhibit this attitude. Goodwill is important and so is expressing it.

[36] Earlier in 5.9 Aristotle cites the principle that the persons in favor of the political

that cannot be achieved by endless acts and words of deception. There must be genuine goodwill, at least on occasion; and that goodwill must be manifested in some, even most, political speeches.

What, then, is this goodwill? Is it a fixed disposition or an emotional response?[37] There is, I fear, no simple answer to the question. If we focus on the need to unify the city, we will think of an established disposition to wish all citizens well; but if we consider political strife in ancient Greece, then occasional, short-lived feelings of goodwill would seem to be all that can be hoped for.[38] Be that as it may, I want to *suggest* that in *Rhetoric* 2.1, goodwill (*eunoia*), is to be thought of as an emotion. Aristotle does not repeat the phrases of 1.2 (i.e., "in the character of the speaker" [1356a2–3] and "through the character [of the speaker]" [1356a5]), because the mention of the character (*êthos*) by itself could be misconstrued. In 2.1, Aristotle is recommending a mode of persuasion in which an emotion (goodwill) and an intellectual quality (wisdom) are given equal status alongside moral character. Moreover, Aristotle refers to his discussion of emotions for instruction on how a speaker creates the appearance of goodwill (1378a19–20).[39] The reference is entirely

arrangement should be in the majority (1309b16–18), after which he is careful to say that extreme forms of democracy and oligarchy are self-destructive (1309b30–35) and that neither democracy nor oligarchy can exist and endure without the wealthy and the multitude (1309b38–39).

37 The choice here is not between a persistent emotion that may be latent and an occurrent one whose presence is manifested by the speaker (cf. Homer, *Iliad* 1.80–83 and 102–104). Rather it is between an *êthos* and a *pathos;* i.e., between an established disposition acquired through civic *paideia* and a feeling that may or may not reflect the character of the speaker.

38 When analyzing Aristotle's notion of persuasion through character, we do well to emphasize debate within the city-state. Nevertheless, we should remember that politicians occasionally went abroad as ambassadors. Sometimes they addressed allies, but on other occasions they addressed a hostile audience, which had good reason to suspect anything that might be said. In such a situation, the orator might choose to appeal solely to the self-interest of the audience, but a show of goodwill might also have some effect. If the hostility was of long standing, the orator could hardly claim that he and his fellow countrymen had an established disposition of goodwill toward the audience, but he might claim a change of heart or new feeling, especially if he could address his audience under some convincing description. For example, an Athenian might address the Spartans as Greek allies against the Persian King, ignoring the fact that the Spartans were long-standing enemies who supported oligarchic governments over democratic ones.

39 In the immediately preceding lines (1378a16–19), Aristotle refers to the account of virtue in 1.9 for instruction on how to appear wise and good. In 1.9 Aristotle tells us that this chapter will offer materials as a result of which a speaker is believed to have a certain sort of character (1366a25–26). Aristotle then adds that this is the second

sensible, for emotions motivate deliberation. Anger makes men deliberate about how to achieve revenge, and fright makes men consider ways to achieve safety.[40] Goodwill *qua* emotion is no different. The orator who feels (experiences) goodwill toward the city is motivated to offer sound advice; and if the listeners believe that the speaker is moved by goodwill, they are likely to accept his advice.

It may be helpful to state clearly that Aristotle's mode of expression throughout 2.1 is compatible with construing goodwill as an emotion. To introduce his subject, Aristotle says that the orator must not only consider the argument of the speech, "but also make himself a certain sort of person and the hearer as well" (1377b24). Here the same phrase, "a certain sort of person" (*poion tina*), is used of both the condition of the speaker and that of the listener. The phrase itself is quite general and covers not only well-established dispositions like moral virtues but also short-lived ones like emotions. In the case of the hearer, the condition in question is undoubtedly emotional;[41] in the case of the speaker, it is a complex, of which one component (goodwill) is, I think, an emotion. That seems to be confirmed by what follows. Aristotle calls it important "that the speaker appear to be a certain sort of person and that [the listeners] think him to be disposed toward them in some way" (1377b26–28). Here again we have the words "a certain sort of person" (*poion tina*), but this time Aristotle adds "to be disposed in some way" (*pôs diakeisthai*). The latter phrase recurs two lines later in reference to the emotional condition of the audience (1377b30–31).[42] Unless I misunderstand Aristotle, he has expanded his description of the speaker in order to make clear that the speaker's condition, or perceived condition, is emotional as well as one of wisdom and virtue. The hearers think that the speaker feels goodwill toward them and assume that this emotion is motivating his deliberations.

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mode of persuasion. At first reading that may seem confused, for in 1.2 persuasion through character is introduced first (1356a2–3, 5–13), but in fact there is no confusion. The materials for persuasion through argument are presented first (1.4–14), and when Aristotle turns to persuasion through character in 2.1 he first refers to the preceding discussion of these materials (1377b16–23) and then, second, takes up the condition of the speaker (1377b24, 1378a6–20) before, third, that of the judge or listener.

[40] Cf. *Rhetoric* 2.5 1383a6–7; and on this passage, see my *Aristotle on Emotion* (London: Duckworth, 1975, 2nd edition 2002) 79–80.

[41] Cf. 1.1 1354b20.

[42] Cf. 1.2 1356a3, where emotional appeal *qua* technical mode of persuasion is first introduced as "disposing the hearer in some way," *ton akroatên diatheinai pôs*.

There are, however, two difficulties with this analysis. First, the definition of emotion that follows in 2.1 concerns strong emotions that cause a change in judgment (1378a20–21). If the hearers think the speaker is experiencing an emotion of this kind—if they believe that his mind is now no better than a warped straightedge (cf. 1.1 1354a25–26)—they will be suspicious of his recommendations and more apt to believe another speaker who appears dispassionate. Second, the account of the individual emotions that follows in 2.2–11 does not discuss goodwill. The omission is puzzling and might indicate that Aristotle did not conceive of goodwill as an emotion. The reference to the account of individual emotions might then be the confused addition of a later editor. Concerning this second objection, it is possible to refer to the accounts of friendship (*philia* 2.4) and kindness (*charis* 2.7) and to say that the discussion of these emotions provides material which can be easily transferred to goodwill. For example, the definition of friendship—"wishing for someone those things you believe to be good, for his sake and not for your own, and being ready to do these things to the extent possible" (1380b34–1381a1)—could guide the orator who wants to present himself as full of goodwill toward his audience. Similarly, the orator might draw on the account of kindness, claiming that he wants to assist the audience "in its need, not in return for anything, nor for some advantage to himself, but for some advantage to the audience" (1385a18–19). In lecture, Aristotle himself may have made the connection between these passages and goodwill. If he did, then he (not an editor) may well have introduced the reference to the account of individual emotions, making special mention of friendship (2.1 1378a19–20).[43]

This still leaves the first objection: if emotions are conceived of as strong feelings that affect sound judgment, an orator *qua* adviser should not claim them for himself. This objection is, I think, well taken, but I do not think it fatal to the claim that in 2.1 Aristotle thinks of the goodwill of the speaker as an emotional condition. Rather, it points up a lack of clarity in Aristotle's treatment of emotion. He needs to draw a clear distinction between strong emotions that are usefully aroused in

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[43] The issue is complicated by the fact that the account of individual emotions was almost certainly written for a different context and transferred to its present position, probably but by no means unquestionably by Aristotle himself. See my "On the Composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*" (above, note 15) 174–175 with notes 32 and 34 = Chapter 23, pages 398–399 in this volume.

the audience, precisely because they affect judgment, and weak emotions that motivate without impairing judgment. Aristotle may have thought the general idea obvious and therefore left it unstated. Alternatively, he may have discussed it at some length in a lost work like *Emotions [or On] Anger* (Diogenes Laertius, *Lives* 5.23). In any case, there is a passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aristotle marks off goodwill from feelings of friendship, pointing out that goodwill lacks the intensity and desire of the latter (9.5 1266b33–34). The application to rhetoric is, I think, obvious. The intensity of feelings of friendship make a person biased, and for that reason the feelings are important in emotional appeal (2.1 1377b31–1378a3). In contrast, goodwill, being milder, may motivate without disturbing judgment. In the audience, it arouses attention and encourages an open mind, so that a sound decision is reached.[44] In the speaker, it gives direction to his deliberations; and together with wisdom and virtue, it ensures that he will advise what is best for the audience.

Speech Expressive of Character: On 1.8

In the preceding section, I have suggested that "goodwill" (*eunoia*), in 2.1 should be construed as an emotion. I now want to consider a passage that calls for a different interpretation. It occurs in 1.8, where Aristotle discusses political arrangements. He tells us that being able to persuade and to deliberate well requires knowledge of all political arrangements, including their customs, legal usages, and advantages (1365b22–26). Differences in the supreme authority are spelled out (1365b26–1366a2), as are the ends of each political arrangement (1366a2–6). Differences in customs, legal usages, and advantages are referred to the ends of political arrangements, and the character of the speaker is mentioned on account of its connection with ends (1366a6–16). It is the last passage that interests me. It runs as follows:

> It is clear, therefore, that the customs [*êthê*] and legal institutions and advantages relating to the end of each [political arrangement] must be

[44] When an orator openly asks his audience to listen with goodwill (e.g., Lysias, *In Defense of Mantitheus* 9: *met' eunoias akroasasthai)*, he is calling for a fair hearing and not urging his listeners to surrender their capacity to make an informed judgment. In fact, there is nothing to prevent an audience from feeling goodwill toward all speakers, even though the speakers are opposed to each other. That is what Isocrates calls "common goodwill," *koinê eunoia* (*Antidosis* 22).

> distinguished, for men choose [these] by referring to this [the end of the political arrangement]. Since persuasion occurs not only through demonstrative argument but also through speech expressive of custom/character [*êthikos logos*]—for we trust the speaker because he appears to be a certain sort of person, i.e., if he appears good or full of goodwill or both—we should know the customs [*êthê*] of each of the political arrangements. For the custom [*êthos*] of each is necessarily most persuasive with regard to each. These [customs] will be grasped in the same way [as the character of the speaker].[45] For customs/characters [*êthê*] are clear on account of choice, and choice is referred to an end.

Here Aristotle is concerned with the customs of different political arrangements. He tells us that we should know these customs, for the speaker who uses them effectively increases his persuasiveness.[46] Parenthetically, Aristotle makes reference to the character of the speaker, saying that goodness and goodwill have a persuasive effect. The reference is promoted by the fact that the same Greek word, *êthos*, is used for both *custom* and *character*.[47] In addition, the customs of political arrangements are grasped "in the same way" as the character of a speaker; that is, custom and character are made clear through reference to an end.

For our purposes, the important point is that here in 1.8 goodwill is mentioned within a discussion of *êthos*. It is part of the speaker's character and not an emotion. Like goodness, it is manifested "through speech expressive of character" (*di' êthikou [logou]* 1366a10).[48] The notion of speech expressive of character is not opaque and occurs elsewhere

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[45] The Greek phrase *dia tôn autôn*, "through the same thing" or "in the same way" (1366a14), is not altogether clear in this context, but given the preceding reference to the character of the speaker it seems most likely that Aristotle is saying that both the *êthê* of political arrangement and those of speakers are grasped in the same the way, i.e., through the ends. In adopting this interpretation, I am following E. Cope and J. Sandys, *The Rhetoric of Aristotle*, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1877) 157; and departing from Kennedy, *Aristotle* 77.

[46] Aristotle can express himself quite briefly, for the idea is neither obscure nor new. Cf. Plato's *Gorgias*, where Socrates is made to tell Callicles that political success requires likening one's self to the political arrangement (512E5–513A4) and that whoever can make him most like the Athenian demos will help him become a politician and orator, for each group is delighted by speeches spoken in its own character (B6–C2). Socrates says that imitation is not good enough; there must be a genuine likeness (B3–4). This observation is intended to make clear how mistaken it is to admire political success in a city like Athens, but it also points up the fact that many people, including the teachers of rhetoric, believe that artful self-presentation, whatever the speaker's real character, can be persuasive in political oratory.

[47] See E. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's* Rhetoric (London: Macmillan, 1867) 108–113, 181–183.

[48] *Logou* is supplied from 1366a9: *di apodeiktikou logou.*

in the *Rhetoric*. Three passages may be mentioned. One occurs in 2.18, where Aristotle summarizes what he has already accomplished. As part of this summary, Aristotle refers to the customs of political arrangements—i.e., to 1.8—and says that the he has determined how speeches are made expressive of custom/character (1391b20–23). A few lines later, there is another reference to making speeches expressive of custom/character (b26–27), but there is no reference to speeches manifesting emotion. A second passage occurs in 2.21. Here Aristotle takes up the maxim (*gnômê*) and toward the end of the discussion says that maxims may be used to make speeches expressive of character. He explains that maxims reveal choice, and morally good maxims make the speaker appear to be of good character (1395b12–17). Again there is no reference to emotion, though earlier in the chapter there is mention of emotion. Aristotle distinguishes between using (contradicting) maxims when the speaker wants to manifest good character and when he wants to speak emotionally. The two uses are regarded as distinct; and character, not emotion, is explained in terms of choice (1395a18–32). A third passage is found in 3.17, where Aristotle discusses proof as a part of an oration. He warns against using enthymemes when one creates emotion and when one makes speech expressive of character.[49] Again he separates emotional speech from that which expresses character. The latter is connected with choice, and as in 2.21, we are told to use maxims to express character (1418a12–21).

It seems to me that all these passages, including 1.8, work with a single notion of speech expressive of character. Since it occurs both in Aristotle's handbook-like treatment of the parts of an oration (3.17)[50] and in a summary passage that makes no mention of emotional appeal as a technical mode of persuasion (2.18),[51] it probably predates the

[49] The Greek verb *poiein* is used with *pathos* in 1418a12 and understood with *êthikon ton logon* in a15. In translating a12 "creates emotion," I follow Kennedy (*Aristotle*, p. 274), who has "would create *pathos*." Roberts (*Complete Works of Aristotle* 2265) translates "trying to rouse feeling." That seems to me misleading, for it may suggest that Aristotle's primary concern is with arousing an emotional response in the listeners. On the contrary, Aristotle's concern is with the speaker and his manifestation of emotion. That can and often does arouse emotion in the listeners (3.7 1408a23–24); but it is nevertheless distinct from their response.

[50] See my "Aristotle on Persuasion through Character" (above, note 3) 235–236 = pages 308–309 in this volume.

[51] I am here disagreeing with Cope and Sandys (*Rhetoric of Aristotle* 2:175), who suggest that Aristotle intended "to include the *pathê* under the general head of *êthikoi logoi*," and with Kennedy (*Aristotle*, p. 173 n. 104), who thinks Cope's view probable, but

establishment of three technical modes of persuasion. That might explain in part the oddity of recognizing two attributes in 1.8, and not three as in 2.1.[52] But whatever the truth concerning the development and composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, it seems certain that goodwill in 1.8 should not be construed as an emotion. It is an attribute of character; and as such, it is presented through speech expressive of character (*di' êthikou* [*logou*]).

If this interpretation of 1.8 is correct, what should we say about 2.1? Should goodwill in both 1.8 and 2.1 be construed as a character trait? Or was it correct to interpret goodwill in 2.1 as an emotion? My preference is to accept the latter alternative and to say that Aristotle works with two notions of the speaker's goodwill. In 1.8, he views it as part of the speaker's character; in 2.1, he regards it as a weak emotion. That is potentially confusing, which may be one reason why later rhetoricians distinguished between weak and strong emotions, labeling the former *êthê*, "character-traits," and the latter *pathê*, "emotions." The distinction is most familiar to us from Quintilian, who speaks of it as an ancient tradition (*Oratorical Education* 6.2.8–9). We find it already in Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Demosthenes* 2 and 22); and in my judgment, we should look for its origin in the early Peripatos.[53]

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adds the possibility that Aristotle "just overlooked" the preceding account of emotions. See my "On the Composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*" (above, note 15) 179–180 and 184 with notes 45 and 55 = Chapter 23, pages 402–403, 408 in this volume.

[52] While I think it probable that persuasion through character as set forth in 2.1 is a comparatively late addition to Aristotle's course of lectures on rhetoric, the omission of any reference to practical wisdom in 1.8 may reflect no more than a difference in topic. In 1.8, Aristotle is discussing customs that serve the ends of political arrangement. Parenthetically he introduces the character of the speaker and mentions traits that refer to ends. The moral virtues involve choice, which is directed toward an end, and goodwill is above all a proper orientation toward the political arrangement. In contrast, practical wisdom is concerned with discovering means and takes its direction from moral virtue and goodwill. For that reason it may have been omitted in 1.9 but mentioned in 2.1, where Aristotle's topic is the attributes looked for in a fully credible speaker. He lists three attributes, including practical wisdom, and says that all are required for credibility. In 1.8, Aristotle allows that the speaker may be persuasive if he is good or full of goodwill or both (1366a11–12). Only two attributes are listed, and one alone may be sufficient to win the trust of the listener. That may jar with the doctrine of 2.1, but there is no formal inconsistency, for it is only in the later chapter that Aristotle is concerned to list all the attributes of the fully credible speaker.

[53] While no text tells us that early Peripatetics labeled weak emotions *êthê*, there is an interesting passage in Simplicius' commentary *On Aristotle's Categories* 8.8b26–27, in which Theophrastus (*Sources* no. 438 FHS&G) is said to have recognized a difference in degree between closely related emotions. The passage places goodwill among the weak emotions and friendship among the strong. For more on this passage and on

Whatever its origin may have been, extending the use of *êthos* to cover weak emotions will have enabled rhetoricians to sidestep difficulties concerning goodwill. They could group goodwill together with virtue and practical reason—they could call goodwill an *êthos* and say that the speaker reveals it in *êthikos logos*—without having to decide whether goodwill is a part of character or a weak emotion. From one point of view, that is replacing one ambiguity with another; but from a different point of view it is a practical way to deal with a real difficulty. Most often the deliberative orator wants to present himself as dispositionally full of goodwill; but as was pointed out in the previous section, there are occasions when the speaker cannot plausibly claim long-standing goodwill, and an audience would not believe him if he did. On these occasions, a feeling of goodwill, a positive emotion, is what the artful speaker tries to present. Rhetoricians understood that; and having widened the meaning of *êthos*, they did not need to complicate their analysis by distinguishing different kinds of goodwill. They could speak simply of *êthos* and the speaker's use of persuasion through character.

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the likelihood that some early Peripatetic decided to call weak emotions *êthê*, see my article "Quintilian 6.2.8–9: *Ethos* and *Pathos* and the Ancient Tradition," in *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh and D. Mirhady, vol. 6 of *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 1994) 183–191, reprinted in W. Fortenbaugh, *Theophrastean Studies* = *Philosophie der Antike* Bd. 17 (Stuttgart: Steiner 2003) 244–252.

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CHAPTER NINETEEN

BENEVOLENTIAM CONCILIARE AND *ANIMOS PERMOVERE*: SOME REMARKS ON CICERO'S *DE ORATORE* 2.178–216

In 1973 Elaine Fantham published an article entitled "Ciceronian Conciliare and Aristotelian Ethos."[1] I have recently read this piece and been much impressed by Fantham's remarks concerning *De oratore* 2.178–216. In particular, I have found quite instructive her discussion of the way in which *benevolentiam conciliare*—winning goodwill—can be regarded as a form of emotional appeal. I want to pursue this insight, and in the following three Sections of the paper I hope to develop it and to throw light on related concerns. In Section I, I shall argue that Cicero's account of winning goodwill is not a simple development of Aristotelian antecedents. For Cicero blurs the Aristotelian distinction between persuasion through character and emotional appeal, and while Aristotle makes room for the impartial auditor, Cicero is interested in creating favor for the orator and his client. In Section II, I shall elucidate my thesis by reference to Antonius' speech in defense of Norbanus and also consider Cicero's emphasis upon mildness and vehemence: the former being useful for winning goodwill and the latter for arousing emotions like anger and fright. Finally in Section III, I shall suggest that the absence of a general definition of emotion is not so much a fault as a sign of prudence on the part of Cicero. And along the way, both in Sections I and III, I shall make reference to the rhetorical handbooks and argue that Cicero is more influenced by this tradition than by Aristotelian antecedents.

I

At *De oratore* 2.114–115 Cicero has Antonius recognize that persuasion depends upon three things: proof, winning favor, and arousing emotions (cf. 2.181, 310). The next 100 sections are organized in accordance with this division: roughly, proof (2.116–177), winning favor (2.178–184),

[1] *Phoenix* 27 (1973) 262–275.

emotional appeal (2.185–216),[2] and the whole reminds one of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. For in that work three modes of persuasion are distinguished (1.2 1356a1–20) and then discussed one after the other: first persuasion through argument (1.4–14), then persuasion through character (2.1) and finally persuasion through the hearers or emotional appeal (2.2–11).[3] What interests me is the relationship between Cicero's account of winning favor and Aristotle's remarks concerning persuasion through character (*pistis dia tou êthous*), for here a significant difference seems clear. Aristotle is concerned that the orator appear worthy of belief (*axiopistos* 1.2 1356a5–6) and argues that this will be accomplished if the orator presents himself as a man of intelligence or practical wisdom, virtue, and goodwill (*phronêsis, aretê*, and *eunoia* 2.1 1378a8–9). Cicero, too, recognizes the importance of presenting good character (2.182), but his account is more complex. It involves a distinction between orator and client (*orator* and *ille pro quo* 2.182) and an emphasis upon winning goodwill (*benevolentiam conciliare* 2.182). The former depends upon Roman legal practice, and the latter reflects Cicero's interest in winning the day (*valet … multum ad vincendum* 2.182). When an audience is impressed by the good moral character of a speaker, it favors (*favere* 2.178) him, and the same is true in regard to a client. Conversely, a perception of bad qualities removes goodwill (*benevolentiam abalienare* 2.182), and for this reason Cicero recommends blackening the character of an opponent (2.182–183).

Aristotle does mention goodwill (*eunoia* 2.1 1378a9, 19), but he is concerned that the orator exhibit goodwill toward his audience. In contrast, Cicero focuses on the goodwill that an audience feels toward an orator and his client. There is, of course, no incompatibility here. Exhibitions of goodwill toward the audience may result in (contribute to) feelings of goodwill directed toward orator and client. But Aristotle does not make this connection, and as far as I can tell this is no mere oversight. For if he had made the connection, he would not have

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[2] I say "roughly" organized, because 2.178–181 is in fact introductory to both winning favor and emotional appeal, and 211–216 is a kind of conclusion which picks up all three kinds of persuasion.

[3] I am ignoring *Rhetoric* 1.15 which concerns non-technical proofs and 2.12–17 which deals with different kinds of character. I do, however, agree with Fantham (above, note 1) 270 that *Rhetoric* 2.12–17 continues the discussion of persuasion through the hearers. The orator should know the characteristics which normally accompany different ages and other conditions, in order that he may work effectively on the emotions of his particular audience.

been able to maintain a clear distinction between persuasion through character and persuasion through the hearers: the former aiming at credibility, the latter at emotional response. This is not true of Cicero. He is concerned with winning favor, and it is toward this end that he recommends presenting good character. In other words, he is interested in arousing an emotion which will color the perceptions of an audience and in this way contribute to victory.

It may be helpful to compare Cicero's account of love (*amor* 2.206–207). It enjoys pride of place within the treatment of individual emotions and involves an interesting distinction between love and esteem (*caritas*). The former is connected with seeming useful, the latter with appearing good (2.206). For our purposes the important point is that in both cases Cicero seems ready to speak of winning (*conciliare*) an emotional response. When a speaker appears useful or at work on behalf of good and useful men, he wins love for himself, and when he defends men of virtue, he wins esteem (*namque haec res amorem magis conciliat, illa virtutis defensio caritatem* 2.206). We are also told that a speaker can win love for someone else: e.g., a client, by calling attention to his unselfish actions (2.207). Here the verb "winning over" (*conciliare*) occurs three times (twice in 2.206, once in 2.207), and feelings of love and esteem are tied to perceiving valued qualities, in much the same way that goodwill has been tied to a perception of good character. It would seem, then, that love, esteem, and goodwill are for Cicero closely related and that winning goodwill (*benevolentiam conciliare*) is a form of emotional appeal. But this does not appear to be true of Aristotelian persuasion through character. In the relevant sections of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle does not speak of winning the auditor's goodwill, and there is no suggestion that persuasion through character can be brought under the heading of persuasion through the hearers.

It might be objected that the proposed interpretation fails to take account of Aristotle's statement that we believe good men more (fully) and more quickly (*mallon kai thatton* 1.2 1356a7). These words suggest an emotional condition in which the auditor is inclined one way or the other and therefore tell against the preceding interpretation.[4] In response, I do not want to deny that the words are compatible with an emotional condition. The Ciceronian orator who wins goodwill for himself and removes it from his opponent enjoys an audience that is

[4] I am indebted to Eckart Schütrumpf for calling these words to my attention.

disposed to believe him fully and quickly. But Aristotle's words are also compatible with a different kind of audience—one which is unemotional and yet interested in the speaker who is worthy of belief. I am thinking of auditors who must reach a decision even though certainty cannot be attained. Facts about the past may be in dispute and claims about the future may leave room for doubt (cf. 1.2 1356a7–8). Such a situation is common enough both in courts of law and in deliberative assemblies, and given such a situation it is reasonable, not emotional, to take account of the wisdom, moral character and goodwill of the speakers. In fact, it is characteristic of the sober-minded juror and assemblyman to believe good and wise men more readily than others. I cannot prove that Aristotle had such an auditor in mind when he wrote his remarks on persuasion through character. But at very least his mention of wisdom and his silence in regard to gaining favor with the audience open the door to unprejudiced judgment—the kind of impartiality which Cicero seeks to remove through winning goodwill for the speaker and blackening the opponent.

The idea of impartiality seems to me important, for if I understand Aristotle correctly, his account of persuasion through character differs from Cicero's account of winning favor in that it gives due recognition to a laudable kind of auditor: namely, the impartial person who wishes to reach a correct (just, useful) decision and therefore wants to be addressed by speakers who are unlikely to make false statements (cf. 2.1 1378a9–10). Such an auditor looks for speakers of the kind described by Aristotle: i.e., those who are wise, virtuous, and good-willed, and he does so on both (all) sides of an issue, because he wants trustworthy statements from all parties concerned. And when he recognizes such a speaker or speakers, he is not won over but rather ready to listen carefully in order to reach a decision in accordance with the arguments presented. We may compare Plato's *Apology*, in which Socrates emphasizes not only his own good character but also his concern for the jurors (19A3, 35D8). He wants attention and a fair hearing, but he does not seek favors (35C2–5). Indeed, Athenian jurors were bound by oath to listen impartially to both sides and not to render a decision out of favor or enmity.[5] Socrates respects that oath, and I suspect that Aristotle did too. At least the account of persuasion through character does not men-

[5] For a reconstruction of the juror's oath see J. Burnet, *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito* (Oxford, 1924) 148. On listening impartially (*homoiôs*) to both sides, see Isocrates 15 (*Antidosis*).21.

tion winning favor, and in this way it seems to make room for the good juror or judge (cf. *Apol.* 18A5) who gives all arguments a fair hearing and then renders a verdict that is not influenced by feelings of goodwill or their opposite.

Here I want to add a caveat. I am not suggesting that impartiality necessarily rules out feelings of goodwill. It does not and on occasion the impartial auditor may even experience feelings of goodwill toward both (all) parties involved in a case. He may experience what Isocrates calls "common" or equal goodwill (15.22). This is a kind of ideal situation. Both parties are—or at least appear—wise, virtuous and good-willed, so that the auditor may feel goodwill in two directions. But having said this I want to be clear that Aristotle seems to regard such feelings in an auditor as incidental to persuasion through character.[6] That mode of persuasion aims at making the orator worthy of belief (*axiopistos*) and not at working an emotional effect on the auditor. And when feelings of goodwill happen to occur in an auditor, they need not determine how he votes. At least Aristotle recognizes no necessary connection between feelings of goodwill and acts of favor. Goodwill may be felt towards people whom we do not know and cannot help (cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.2 1155b32–1156a5 and 9.5 1166b30–1167a21),[7] and in a court of law or in the assembly goodwill may be felt without determining how we vote. Of course, this is not what Cicero wants, and to ensure a practical effect he combines self-commendation with blackening the character of one's opponent. But Aristotle is not Cicero, and persuasion through character is not identical with winning favor.

Whatever the truth concerning feelings of goodwill and Aristotelian persuasion through character, I do not think that Aristotle's remarks in *Rhetoric* 1.2 and 2.1 constitute an especially important antecedent for Cicero's account of winning favor, and if an Aristotelian antecedent is to be named, I would prefer to cite 3.14, for here Aristotle takes explicit notice of both goodwill and prejudice: the former is won for the speaker and the latter is excited against the opponent (1415a25–28, 34, b18).[8] Moreover, Aristotle is discussing introductions (in particular,

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[6] Here I am responding to criticisms generously offered by Robert Gaines.

[7] See my *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts* (Amsterdam: Grüner Verlag 1984), 146 and 286.

[8] Aristotle thinks that a prosecutor does well to excite prejudice at the close of a speech (3.14 1415a28–34), but he is also clear that exciting prejudice is a regular feature of introductions (1415b18–19).

the introduction to a judicial speech 1415a8), and in this context he not only mentions goodwill and prejudice but also speaks of producing attention (*prosektikon poiein* 1415a36) and readiness in learning (*eis eumatheian anagein* 1415a37–38). This triad also occurs in the *De oratore* in a similar context. At 2.80 Antonius lists the parts of a speech and says that Greek rhetoricians instruct us to begin in such a way that we make an auditor good-willed (*benevolus*), ready to learn (*docilis*), and attentive (*attentus*).[9] Antonius returns to the triad two sections later and argues that creating goodwill, readiness to learn, and attention should not be confined to the introduction. A similar point is made by Aristotle in regard to attention (1415b9–17). Later in the *De oratore*, Antonius considers more fully the several parts of a speech, and again in the context of the introduction he mentions the same triad. He also refers to Greek rhetoricians and warns against any limitation to the introduction. In addition, he lists sources from which one can put together an introduction: from the client, from the opponent, from the subject, from those in front of whom the issue is discussed (2.321), and Aristotle does the same in *Rhetoric* 3.14: from the speaker, from the auditor, from the subject, from the opponent (1415a26–27). What all this suggests to me is that Cicero's remarks on winning goodwill are not so much derived from Aristotle's account of persuasion through character as from handbook accounts of the introduction (especially the introduction to judicial speeches). Such accounts predate Aristotle (cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 29 1436a33–1438a2, 36 1441b33–1442b28) and were repeated for centuries with little variation (cf. *Rhet. ad Herennium* 1.6–8 and Quintilian 4.1.5). Cicero has them from contemporary rhetoricians (cf. *Inv.* 1.20–23), so that the connection with Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is at best indirect. Further, it was a Hellenistic rhetorician steeped in handbook material who decided to interpret Aristotle's persuasion through character in terms of winning goodwill. In so doing he was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that Aristotelian persuasion through character involves presenting good moral character. That was also part of the handbook material on introductions and an important means for winning favor.[10] But if Aristotle's account of persuasion through character lent itself to such an interpretation, it does not follow that Aristo-

[9] That Antonius is reporting the teaching of Greek rhetoricians is made clear at 2.77.

[10] Cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 29 1436b22–26, 36 1442a10–11, *Rhet. ad Herennium* 1.8 and *Inv.* 1.22.

tle thought of persuasion through character as a technique exclusively or even primarily concerned with enticing (*allicere* 3.215, 324) the auditor: i.e., so influencing him that he was left inclined (*inclinatus* 2.324, cf. 2.129, 187) in one direction or the other. As I see it, Aristotle either focused on or at least intended to make room for satisfying the reasonable demands of an intelligent auditor who wanted to maintain his impartiality.[11]

II

It may be helpful to consider a speech, which is described at some length within the discussion of emotional appeal (2.197–203). I am thinking of Antonius' defense of C. Norbanus in the year 95 B.C. Norbanus had acquired aristocratic enemies earlier in 103 B.C., when he prosecuted Q. Caepio for treason under the law of Appuleius. Eight years later these enemies saw an opportunity for revenge and brought Norbanus to trial under the very same law. There was no denying what Norbanus had done, and the speech of P. Sulpicius for the prosecution was so passionate and so effective that Antonius found himself scarcely daring to begin a defense (2.197). But he did speak and did so with great cleverness. He barely touched upon the law of Appuleius (2.201) and instead argued that some cases of civil discord, including that in which Norbanus was involved, are just (2.199, cf. 2.124). After this Antonius launched an emotional attack against Caepio and succeeded in directing hostile feelings toward him (2.199, cf. 2.124). Finally Antonius sought to win favor through self-commendation. He made clear that he was defending Norbanus out of loyalty to his former quaestor and that here as in all such cases his motives were quite unselfish (2.200–201). The result was victory for Antonius, and as he puts it, the case was won more by working an emotional effect than by teaching (*magis adfectis animis iudicum quam doctis* 2.202). This comment is of some interest, for it brings together the last two portions of Antonius' speech: the one being inflammatory and the other involving self-commendation (*altera concitationem habet, altera commendationem* 2.201). Both portions are regarded as having an emotional effect and as such distinct from teaching or rea-

[11] Even if Aristotle's account of persuasion through character lends itself to interpretation in terms of winning goodwill, nothing in this account suggests blackening the opponent's character. That idea is found in Aristotle's discussion of the introduction.

soned argument (with *doctis* 2.202 cf. *docebam* 2.199).[12] This involves the same blurring of Aristotelian categories as discussed in Section I.

After Antonius finishes describing his speech, Sulpicius acknowledges the truth of the description (2.202) and develops a point which Antonius did not make clear: namely, that the speech had a kind of introduction. Antonius had recognized that defending Norbanus seemed hardly honorable and therefore decided to counter this impression at the outset. He pointed out that Norbanus had been his quaestor and that this created a close, binding relationship, which necessitated joining the defense. The excuse was effective, and Sulpicius speaks of Antonius using it to pave the way to being heard (*quam tibi primum munisti ad te audiendum viam* 2.202). Here we have something like Aristotelian persuasion through character. Intelligence and goodwill are not mentioned, but good moral character is. Antonius presented himself as loyal and selfless and so prepared the way for the rest of his speech. Alternatively we might compare Aristotle's remarks on the introduction. For there we are given a string of remedial measures including the removal of prejudice (3.14 1415a24–28). But if we opt for this comparison, we should be clear that the Aristotelian list includes remedies not used by Antonius in his introductory remarks. In particular, Aristotle takes notice of creating goodwill in one's audience (1415a34). Sulpicius makes no mention of Antonius trying to do this, and as I see it, there is no reason to go beyond what is said. Antonius had a simple and entirely honorable goal: he wanted to be heard.[13]

Winning favor was a further step, which began with the argument about civil discord. By arguing that popular unrest is often justified and by concluding that there had never been an instance of discord more just than that which involved Norbanus (2.199, cf. 2.124), Antonius won the goodwill of the people (*populi benevolentiam mihi conciliarem* 2.220). This is of some interest, for it makes clear that winning goodwill is not always accomplished by focusing on one's own character and deeds (*probari mores* 2.182). There are other subtler means such as a reasoned argument that puts the auditor in a better light. Further, Cicero's three kinds of persuasion: proof, winning favor, and arousing

[12] Cicero sometimes uses the verb *docere* to refer to proof: i.e., the first mode of persuasion discussed in *De oratore* 2. See, e.g., 2.121 and 128.

[13] Here I differ from G. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton, 1972) 82, who speaks of Antonius acquiring the sympathy of the jury before going on to his principle argument.

emotion, have goals, which can be pursued simultaneously. One can argue for a particular conclusion while aiming at favor or a particular emotional effect.[14] And one can win favor for oneself while raising hostile feelings against an opponent. But having said this I want to be clear that Cicero tends to treat winning favor and arousing emotions as two quite separate kinds of persuasion. At least he thinks that the former ought to be mild (*lenis*) and the latter vehement (*vehemens* 2.183–184, 211–212). Antonius' successful defense of Norbanus is paradigmatic. The attack on Caepio was vehement and succeeded in arousing hostile feelings. After that Antonius adopted a mild manner and presented himself in favorable terms. Again success, and the case was his.

Here it may be helpful to consider a particularly puzzling passage that follows upon the survey of individual emotions. After telling us that commendation calls for mildness and emotional appeal for vehemence (2.211), Antonius says that there is a certain resemblance between the two which makes it difficult to keep them apart (*difficilis ad distinguendum similitudo*). For some of the mildness by which we win over our audience ought to flow into (*influere*) the sharp force of emotional appeal, and from the latter some energy is to be blown into (*inflare*) the former. And no speech is more tempered (*temperatior*) than that in which the harshness of strife is suppressed by the humanity of the orator himself, and laxity of mildness is strengthened by a certain gravity of strife (2.212). This passage has been said to reveal Cicero's embarrassment concerning the fact that winning goodwill overlaps upon emotional appeal,[15] but I am not convinced of this. First, I do not see anything in the passage which must be taken as embarrassment. Indeed if Cicero (through Antonius) is recognizing (or thinks he is recognizing) a real difficulty and not one of his own making, then there should be no embarrassment. Second, nothing in the passage itself suggests that

[14] In regard to arguing for a conclusion and at the same time aiming at an emotional effect, cf. 2.164 with 2.199. The first passage occurs within Antonius' discussion of proof and contains an example which concerns Caepio and Norbanus: If *maiestas* is the grandeur and dignity of the state, then the man who delivered the army to the enemies of the Roman people diminished the state's *maiestas*, not the man who delivered the one who did it into the power of the Roman people. Such an argument is intended to prove the innocence of Norbanus, but it also serves to arouse hostile feelings against Caepio and so relates to the second passage in which Antonius describes how he excited grief by referring to the loss of the army.

[15] Fantham (above, n. 1) 267.

Cicero is focusing on the fact that winning goodwill is working an emotional effect in the same way that, e.g., winning love (2.207) is working such an effect. The word "goodwill" (*benevolentia*) does not occur, and the emphasis (beginning in 2.211) seems to be on stylistic difference: namely, the mildness of commendation and the vehemence of emotional appeal.

What then is at issue? Two things come to mind. First, here at the end of the discussion of emotional appeal, Cicero may think it important to underline the fact that undiluted emotional appeal does not create a balanced speech. The orator who combines mild commendation with vehement appeals does better than one who does not. And the same is true in regard to an unbroken (excessive) use of commendation. A judicious mix is almost always best. Second, Cicero may have been impressed with the fact that mildness and vehemence form a property range—in this case, a range of intensity—in which difference is a matter of degree. We may compare hot and cold which form a temperature range. Hot belongs to one end and cold to the other, but the two are not neatly marked off from each other. Instead they differ by more and less. Perhaps then Cicero sees an analogy between, say, hot and cold water or air on the one hand and vehement and mild speech on the other. Such an analogy is suggested by his use of the verbs "flow-into" (*influere*) and "blow-into" (*inflare*), but whatever the truth concerning these particular verbs, it would be a mistake to conclude that the Ciceronian distinction between winning favor and arousing emotion depends entirely upon a difference in degree. The distinction also (and even primarily) depends upon at least two other factors: namely, restricting the means for winning favor to the presentation of good character (bad in the case of one's opponent) and making goodwill (*benevolentia*) the peculiar object of commendation. Hence when Antonius describes his defense of Norbanus and talks of mixing (*admiscere*) the mild kind of oratory with the vehement kind (2.200), and when Sulpicius uses the same image (*miscere*) in his subsequent remarks (2.203), they are not suggesting a mix in which two portions lose their identity in the way that hot and cold water do when poured together. In Antonius' speech, vehement attack and mild commendation remain distinct and are described as such.

III

Cicero has Antonius discuss emotional appeal at some length, but he never has him offer a clear statement concerning the nature of emotional response. This is a striking omission, for Cicero twice has Antonius emphasize the importance of definition. On one occasion, Antonius contrasts his defense of Norbanus with learned discussion concerning the arts and argues that the latter, as against the former, calls for definitions which neither omit anything nor include too much (2.107–109). On another occasion, he tells us that every discussion ought to begin with a definition (1.209) and then goes on to define the orator (1.213).[16] But in regard to emotion, Antonius fails to offer a definition. He tells us that an orator does not need to know whether anger is a boiling of the mind or a desire for revenge (1.220), and nowhere, either in Book 1 or in Book 2, does he offer anything like a clear general statement concerning the nature of emotional response. Antonius may (or may not) be correct concerning the needs of the orator who enters the foray of judicial and legislative debate, but the discussion depicted in the *De oratore* is of a different kind. It takes place away from the forum and raises issues of a general nature.

Why then does Cicero have Antonius discuss emotional appeal without offering a definition of emotion?[17] There is an obvious dramatic reason: Cicero wants to depict Antonius as someone who distances himself from idle learning, especially that of the Greeks (2.4).[18] But there is a second and, I think, more important reason: namely, that the nature of emotional response is not easy to pin down. There are central cases like anger and fright (*iracundia* and *timor*, cf. 2.208–209), and there are puzzle cases like cheerfulness and sadness (*hilaritas* and *tristitia*, cf. 3.197). The former are grounded on belief: anger depends upon thinking oneself outraged, fright upon a belief in imminent dan-

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[16] Cicero uses the verb *explanare* in 1.209. He varies it with *definire in* 211, *dicere* in 212, *putare* and *appellare* in 213 and *describere* in 214. Such variation is stylistic and for our purposes unimportant.

[17] Cicero does use the descriptive phrase "movement of the mind" (*motus animi, mentis* 2.115, 185), but it is no definition and not intended as such. In fact, it is so vague that it can be used in reference to all three modes of persuasion. Cf. 2.70 where Cicero has Antonius speak generally of the orator moving the minds of the audience (*mentes movere*).

[18] See my "Cicero's Knowledge of the Rhetorical Treatises of Aristotle and Theophrastus," in *Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh and P. Steinmetz = *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 4 (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction 1989) 43–45, reprinted in *Theophrastean Studies* (Stuttgart: Steiner 2002) 276–279.

ger. In contrast, the latter may have non-propositional causes: e.g., a physiological condition or an external stimulus like infectious rhythm.[19] Are they, then, emotions or moods, and should a definition of emotion be so formulated that it includes or excludes them? Cicero himself will not have spent much time worrying about such questions, but he certainly knew that the Hellenistic Schools were in disagreement concerning the nature of emotional response. The polemic between Stoa and Peripatos was familiar to him and even finds expression in Antonius' remarks at 1.220. Moreover, the older Peripatetics, who gave much attention to emotions and made emotional appeal a respectable part of rhetoric, seem never to have formulated a general definition of emotion (cf. Aspasius, *In Arist. EN* 2.5 1105b21–23, *CAG* vol. 19.1 p. 44.20–21).[20] This is not to overlook the fact that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* contains a definition: "emotions are all those (feelings) on account of which men differ in regard to judgments and which are followed by pain and pleasure" (2.1 1378a19–21), but this definition is so inclusive that it admits bodily disturbance like stomachaches and headaches. Aristotle seems to recognize this, but he does not attempt to fine tune the definition. Instead he adds a list of typical emotions (2.1 1378a22) and then after programmatic remarks, goes on to discuss the emotions individually.

Against this background Cicero's silence concerning the general nature of emotional response seems not at all odd and even prudent. Rather than have Antonius offer a less than satisfactory definition, he has him begin the discussion of emotional appeal with an illustrative list (2.185) and end the discussion with an analysis of individual emotions (2.206–211). Along the way he makes clear that he is concerned with strong feelings. He uses intensive forms like *permotio* and *permovere* (2.185–186, cf. *commovere* 2.189 and *concitare* 2.191) and argues that the feelings under consideration cannot be excited unless the speaker himself appears deeply moved: Crassus inflames the audience when he is seen to be afire (*incendere, ardere* 2.188), and Antonius does the same

[19] Cf. 3.197, where Cicero recognizes that rhythms can bring on cheerfulness and sadness (*hilaritas* and *tristia*). In the case of prose rhythm, there are always words present, so that meaning as well as rhythm works an effect. But rhythm without words—e.g., that of a pipe (*tibia*)—can create a mood.

[20] See my "A Note on Aspasius, *In En* 44, 20–21," *Proceedings of the World Congress on Aristotle* (Athens: Ministry of Culture and Sciences 1981) 1.175–178 = Chapter 2 in this volume, and "Theophrastus on Emotion," in *Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life and Work*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh, P. Huby and A. Long = *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 2 (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction 1985) 224–226, reprinted in *Theophrastean Studies* (above, note 18) 88–90.

when he is seen to be ablaze (*flagrare* 2.190). Looking forward in time, one thinks of Quintilian, who associates emotional appeal with strong, vehement feelings (*adfectus concitati, vehementer commoti* 7.2.9) and contrasts these feelings with others which are gentle or mild (*mites, lenes* 6.2.9) and occasioned by commendation (6.2.13). For our purposes, however, it may be more instructive to look backward in time to Theophrastus, who is said to have analyzed rage, anger, and faultfinding (*thymos, orgê* and *mempsis*) in terms of the more and less, and who most likely did the same in regard to love and goodwill (*philia* and *eunoia*, Simplicius, *In Arist. Cat.* 8 8b26–29a13, *CAG* vol. 8 p. 235.3–13 = 438 FHS&G). If this is correct, as I believe it is,[21] then Cicero and Quintilian too will have benefited (directly or indirectly) from early Peripatetic discussions. The general distinction between vehement and mild feelings will have been well established, and the particular remarks of Cicero and Quintilian on love and goodwill (*De or.* 2.182–184, 206–207, *Inst.* 6.1.9, 12) can be said to have Theophrastean roots.

Here a caveat may be in order. We should not confuse the vehement and mild emotions experienced by an audience with the vehement and mild style of an orator. Moreover, we should not think that a strong emotion like anger can only be aroused by a vehement style and conversely that goodwill cannot be won without mildness. It may be true that arousing anger is not easy (*neque … facile*) if one exhibits mildness (2.190), and that in regard to winning goodwill mildness is a help (*adiuvat* 2.182), but the correlation between emotion and style is not absolute. There are times when vehemence manifests good character and wins favor for an orator, and there are other times when an argument set forth calmly or submissiveness in the face of outrage occasions a strong response in one's audience.[22]

Why then does Cicero so emphasize the connection between style and emotion? A complete answer will undoubtedly have several parts. Here I mention two which seem to me especially clear. First, Cicero's view of emotion is vaguely Stoic. He thinks of a thorough-disturbance

[21] See my *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts* (above, n. 7) 145–150 (the Greek text of Simplicius is LI on p. 15), "Theophrastus on Emotion" (above, n. 20) 212–213, reprint 75–76, and "Quintilian 6.2.8–9: *Ethos* and *Pathos* and the Ancient Tradition," in *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh and D. Mirhady = *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 6 (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction 1994) 183–191, reprinted in *Theophrastean Studies* (above, note 18) 244–252.

[22] On submissiveness as an effective method of exciting hatred, see Quintilian, *Institutiones* 6.2.16.

(*perturbatio* 2.178, 214) which is connected with error and hostile to considered judgment (2.178).[23] Working an emotional effect is not just nudging the auditor but overwhelming him, and that according to Cicero requires not only a period of time but also a full and forceful presentation (2.214). In contrast, winning favor works a modest effect—it leaves the auditor inclined toward the speaker—and that calls for a mild style, not the force appropriate to emotional appeal (2.129).

The second answer concerns rhetorical practice. At the very outset of a speech, orators often seek to win favor, and they do so while employing a mild style. At the conclusion, they try to arouse emotions and become vehement. Not surprisingly this practice is reflected both in the rhetorical handbooks and in the things Antonius is made to say. We may compare the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, in which the introduction is connected with both winning goodwill and mild style (1.6–8, 11), and Antonius' recognition of the fact that introductions are normally mild and a place for winning goodwill (2.316–317, 322). Equally instructive is the way Antonius lists the three modes of persuasion. Sometimes proof comes first (2.115, 310), both because it is well received by everyone (cf. 2.310) and because it is given pride of place within Antonius' discussion of the three modes (2.116–177). On other occasions it comes second, with winning favor first and emotional appeal third (2.121, 128). This latter order reflects practice and handbook wisdom—one opens by winning favor and closes by stirring up emotions—and not surprisingly Antonius adds that the first calls for mildness and the third for force (2.129). This is not to overlook the fact that Antonius states repeatedly that winning favor and arousing emotions are not tied to some particular part of a speech (2.81, 184, 310, 322). Here he is an Aristotelian (cf. 3.14 1415a25, b9) and Aristotle's *Rhetoric* certainly works an indirect influence on much that is said in the *De oratore*. But for understanding what is said about winning favor and arousing emotion, the rhetorical tradition is just as, or even more important.

[23] For the combination *perturbatio* and *error*, see *Orator* 118, and for the Stoic idea of emotion as a *commotio animi* which is vehement and alienated from right reason, see, e.g., *Tusculanae disputationes* 4.11.

CHAPTER TWENTY

ARISTOTLE'S PLATONIC ATTITUDE TOWARD DELIVERY

In his introduction to book 3 of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle touches briefly on delivery (*hypokrisis*). He recognizes its power (1403b21), says that the subject belongs as much to rhetoric as to poetics (1403b21–27) and makes special mention of voice. Good delivery, he explains, is a matter of using one's voice correctly in regard to different emotions: using a loud, soft, or in-between voice, a high, low, or intermediate pitch, and various rhythms (1403b27–32). Up to this point Aristotle's remarks appear quite positive, but what follows is rather different. Aristotle returns to the power of delivery and tells us that speakers skilled in delivery win the day because of defects in political arrangements (1403b32–35).[1] This is the first indication of a negative assessment, and it is quickly reinforced. We are told that the subject of delivery appears to be vulgar and that such a view is well taken (1403b36–1404a1). Delivery should be regarded as something necessary rather than correct (1404a1–3). The right thing to do is to argue one's case on the basis of facts and issues, for, aside from demonstrative argument, everything else is superfluous and of importance only because of defects in one's audience (1404a5–8).

What interests me here is not so much the fact that Aristotle expresses a negative attitude toward delivery[2] as the fact that this negative attitude is quite out of line with other portions of Aristotle's rhetorical theory and with his philosophy in general. In Part I, I want to make this clear by setting out five different difficulties, each of which leaves us with the same question: Why does Aristotle express himself the way he does in *Rhetoric* 3.1? In Part II, I shall offer an answer that takes account both of the composition of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and of Platonic antecedents.

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[1] In 1403b35 I follow the manuscripts and read *politeiôn*. I do not read *politôn*, which is printed in the *OCT* and is originally a conjecture by Spengel. Besides being unnecessary, the conjecture obscures an interesting relationship with Plato's *Republic* 3 397E1. See below, Section II.

[2] See, e.g., E.M. Cope, *An Introduction to Aristotle's* Rhetoric (London: Macmillan 1867) 277–278; G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1963) 283; L. Arnhart, *Aristotle on Political Reasoning* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press 1981) 163–165.

I

1. Let me begin the aporetic portion of this paper by mentioning Aristotle's attitude toward pleasure and pain. In *Rhetoric* 3.1, he says that a speaker should limit himself to causing neither pain nor delight (1404a4–5). Such an injunction may harmonize well with Aristotle's favorable attitude toward arguments based upon facts (1404a5–6), but it does jar with his discussion of style in *Rhetoric* 3.2–12. For here the conveyance of pleasure seems to be accepted with approval (1404b10–12, 1405a8–9). Not that pleasure is the primary goal of style. Clarity and appropriateness are most important (1404b1-4), and pleasure is a consequence of these primary qualities; e.g., of avoiding meanness and undue elevation in one's choice of words (1404b7–12, 1414a18–27). But whatever its proper explanation and ranking, being pleasurable is a recognized and approved quality of good style. And if this is so, what is wrong with a pleasurable delivery? Why should an absence of pleasure and pain be first choice?

2. A different reason for wondering about Aristotle's remarks in Rhetoric 3.1 is his treatment of prose rhythm in 3.8. Aristotle argues that prose should not have a strict meter like poetry, nor should it be quite without rhythm (1408b21–22). A paeonic quality is preferred because, from among the several metrical feet discussed by Aristotle, the paean alone gives rise to no definite meter and is least obtrusive (1409a8–9). With the details of this argument we need not concern ourselves, but it is worth underlining that Aristotle treats prose rhythm within the discussion of style, and that in 3.12, at the conclusion of this discussion, he offers some backward-looking remarks which include a mention of rhythm (1414a27). This interests me, for Aristotle also makes reference to rhythm earlier in 3.1, within his general description of delivery. We are told that delivery resides in voice and *inter alia* in the use of rhythms (1403b30). This is immediately intelligible, for rhythm is largely a matter for the ear, and it is best tested by reading aloud. I am not suggesting that Aristotle is involved in any real confusion. Prose rhythm is discussed under style, because rhythm is created through choice of words and their composition. But if this is so, why is delivery a kind of necessary evil (1404a2–3)? In regard to rhythm, it is the natural and most effective way to manifest one's skill in composition.

3. Still another reason for questioning Aristotle's attitude toward delivery is his concern with the speaker's character (*êthos*). He recognizes that we believe good men more fully and readily than others (1.2 1356a6–7), and he makes the presentation of appropriate character one of the three primary means of effecting persuasion (1.2 1356a1–4, 3.1 1403b9–13). He insists that this kind of persuasion be accomplished by what the speaker says (*dia tou logou*) and not be the result of previous reputation (1.2 1356a9–10). In other words, he wants this mode of persuasion to be technical in the sense of something we construct or invent, not something non-technical because pre-existing and not constructed (1355b35–1356a1). All this seems straightforward, only one wonders why this does not open the door to delivery. For, when we speak we use voice, and so necessarily adopt some form of delivery. Moreover, voice is an important medium for conveying character. Aristotle takes note of this in his *Ethics*, where he describes the high-minded individual as one who speaks in a deep voice and a deliberate manner (*EN* 4.3 1125a13–14). Similarly, in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle draws a distinction between written and "combative" style, tells us that the latter is especially given to delivery and adds that this particular style is of two kinds: ethical (*êthikê*) and emotional (3.12 1413b3–10). The general point is clear and correct: a particular style effectively delivered manifests character. But if Aristotle is clear about this, why does he call delivery superfluous and incorrect? (3.1 1404a1–7).

4. A further puzzle is generated by the statement that ability in delivery is a matter of nature and less technical than style (3.1 1404a15–16). From one perspective this remark is unproblematic. Some people are born with rich, clear voices over which they have considerable control. Others are not, and while training can overcome certain deficiencies, it cannot work miracles. The earliest teachers of rhetoric will have known this and some, like Thrasymachus, will have been moved to argue that delivery is given to us by nature and not by art (Quintilian 3.3.4). So Aristotle's statement has antecedents in an earlier Sophistic period, but to say that delivery depends upon nature is one thing, to label it vulgar (1404a1) is another. And if this is not immediately clear, we need only remind ourselves of Aristotle's treatment of metaphor. He says that mastery of metaphor cannot be acquired from another person (3.2 1405a9–10): i.e., it is a matter of natural endowment (*Poetics* 22 1459a7). Yet he does not call it vulgar. On the contrary, he recognizes its power (3.2 1405a4) and gives it considerable attention within his discussion

of style. What then is wrong with delivery? As a natural capacity of considerable power, shouldn't it too merit serious and favorable attention?

5. The problem becomes more basic when we reflect on the fact that voice; i.e., the organ (or organs) of speech, is one of our natural parts (cf. 3.1 1404a22, together with *On Soul* 2.8 420b5–421a6) and as such should have an identifiable function. At least, Aristotle thinks that the parts of human beings, like those of animals, are there to serve a purpose: namely, to enable us to live the life appropriate to human beings. And while many of the same parts are found in both human beings and animals, these parts exhibit differences which relate to differences in life style. This is certainly true of voice. Both human beings and animals have voice in the sense of an ability to utter sounds which have significance and give expression to feelings of pleasure and pain, but only in the case of human beings are the relevant organs formed in such a way that speech is possible. And it is speech or discourse which forms the basis of intelligent life within the city state. This is well-known Aristotelian doctrine and therefore needs little documentation, but perhaps I may mention two passages. The first is *On Parts of Animals* 2.16–17, where Aristotle argues that nature has provided human beings with a tongue and lips different from those of other animals, because these parts are intended to make speech possible. Aristotle does not overlook the fact that these parts also serve other functions which are not unique to human beings; the tongue is for taste and lips protect the teeth; but he is emphatic that the tongue and lips of human beings are designed for discourse (659b30–660a27). The second passage is found in *Generation of Animals* 5.7. Here Aristotle notes that higher and lower pitch varies according to sex and then says: "This is especially clear in the case of humans, for nature has especially endowed them with this capacity, because they alone among animals make use of speech and voice is the matter of speech" (786b18–22). In other words, variation in pitch is not some accident which happens to occur in the delivery of an orator (cf. *Rhet.* 3.1 1403b29–30). Rather, it is natural and essential to the spoken language of human beings in much the same way that variation in voice, i.e., in tone or emphasis, is fundamental to human discourse. This would be especially clear to an ancient Greek who tended to focus on spoken language. He would notice that individual words have pitch accents, and he would also observe that variation in voice often serves to distinguish one speech act from another, i.e., to make clear when

a question is being asked as against a statement being made. The latter point actually receives some attention in *Poetics* 19, where Aristotle brings command, prayer, question, and the like under the label "figures of style" and assigns an understanding of these several different speech acts to delivery and to the master of this art (1456b8–13). By using the term 'style' (*lexis*) in this context Aristotle is, of course, blurring the distinction between grammar and style, and by using the label 'art of delivery' (*hypokritikê*) he is ignoring the difference between a grammatical knowledge of spoken language and skill in delivery. This undoubtedly reflects the fact that grammar had not yet become an independent subject, and in some contexts this is a failing. But for our purposes the important point is that Aristotle recognizes the fundamental role that voice plays in communication. And, since he does this, we might expect him to go on and do justice to the role voice plays in oratory, i.e., to recognize with approval the way in which a speaker's delivery helps make discourse not only clear and enjoyable but also persuasive. After all, human beings are marked by opinion and belief which are in principle open to persuasion (*De anima* 3.3 428a18–24), and for human beings persuasion is not just a matter of argumentation on the basis of facts and issues. It is a much more complex activity, which includes manifestation of character, expression of emotion, appropriate style, and effective delivery.

II

From an Aristotelian point of view, delivery deserves better treatment than Aristotle gives it. This seems to me undeniable, but not inexplicable. The important point is that *Rhetoric* 3 is very much influenced by Plato. This need not mean that the book was written during Aristotle's residence in the Academy, and for the main thesis of this paper strong and lasting Platonic influence is enough. But having said this, I want to be quite clear that in my judgment most of Book 3 was written during Aristotle's Academic period and that any passages which do not belong to this period are additions to the original body of material.[3] For

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[3] The clearest cases are the several references to Isocrates' *Address to Philip*. These occur in three chapters: 3.10 1410b29–30, 1411a30–31; 3.11 1411b28–29, 1412a16, 1412b5 (possibly to *On the Peace*); 3.17 1418b27. Following Düring (see below, note 4) I take these references to be additions to the original text, but whether additions or part of the

an overall assessment of the issue, perhaps I may limit myself to mentioning Düring's study of the dateable names and events found in Book 3, the intellectual background to this book, and Platonic reminiscences occurring therein.[4] As a detailed argument, I want to offer an analysis of 3.1, for it is this chapter which especially concerns us and which most clearly raises chronological issues.

Aristotle begins Rhetoric 3.1 with a look backwards and a look forwards. He tells us that a discussion of speech or discourse must cover three topics: (1) proof, (2) style, and (3) arrangement (1403b6–8), that proof has already been dealt with (1403b9–15), and that it is now time to speak about style (1403b15–18). He does not say explicitly when he will discuss arrangement, but the impression conveyed is that the discussion will follow upon that of style, and in fact it does follow, beginning with Chapter 13. So much seems quite straightforward, but not what comes next in 3.1, for instead of getting on with the discussion of style, Aristotle introduces a new tripartite division: (1) the sources of persuasion, (2) style, and (3) delivery (1403b18–21). The third of these items is not mentioned in the earlier division, and the first, despite an obvious affinity, is not easily identified with proof as explained in the initial division. For there proof covers the three modes of persuasion discussed at length in Books 1 and 2: logical, emotional, and ethical persuasion (cf. 1403b9–13 with 1356a1–4). In the second division Aristotle's focus is more limited. He is concerned with argumentation based on facts and issues (*ta pragmata* 1403b19, 1404a6). He calls this kind of argumentation just and sets up a contrast between demonstration and everything else which is said to be superfluous (1404a5–7). In this context, everything else includes not only delivery but also style, and much as delivery is recognized only as something necessary (1404a3), so style is said to have some small claim to be necessary, but to have no place in the teaching of geometry (1404a8–12).

What are we to say about *Rhetoric* 3.1? I think the obvious and correct response is that the chapter is not a single introduction to what follows but two introductions, awkwardly joined together.[5] The first (1403b6–

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original text, these references do not take us much beyond Aristotle's Academic period. Plato died in 347 B.C., and the *Address to Philip* belongs to 346 B.C.

[4] I. Düring, *Aristoteles* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter 1966) 121–125.

[5] Here I am in agreement with Düring (above, n. 4) 121, who characterizes 3.1 as *ein Flickwerk*. I disagree only in regard to the length of the opening portion. Düring thinks it runs from 1403b6 to 1403b15 (1403a15 is a typographical error). In my opinion it runs to 1403b18.

18) takes account of Books 1–2 and the three modes of persuasion discussed in these books.[6] The second (1403b18 onward) ignores Books 1–2 and exhibits close ties to what follows in the rest of Book 3, e.g., the emphasis upon argumentation based on facts and issues has a parallel later in the discussion of style (3.1 1404a6, 3.12 1414a12-13), as does the attention given to voice without any mention of gesture (3.1 1403b27, 3.12 1414a16). Further, the second introduction is most likely to be the earlier of the two. Here a comparison with Book 1, Chapters 1–2 may be helpful, for these chapters constitute the introduction to Aristotle's discussion of proof, i.e., the three modes of proof discussed in Books 1–2, and, like the introduction to Book 3, they contain a basic awkwardness: Chapter 1 is quite out of keeping and even inconsistent with Chapter 2. In Chapter 1, emotional appeal is marked off from proofs proper to the art (*entechnon* 1354a13, b21, 1355a4) of rhetoric. The latter is explained by reference to the enthymeme (1354a13, b22, 1355a6–7), while the former is likened to warping a carpenter's rule (1354a25–26). In 1.2 there is a marked turnaround. Now emotional appeal joins the ranks of proofs proper to the art (*entechnoi* 1355b35) of rhetoric. It is looked upon as proof through *logos* (1356a1), and later in Book 2 it receives detailed treatment from a rhetorical point of view.

In regard to Book 1, there is a perfectly straightforward way of accounting for the inconsistency. Chapters 1 and 2 are neither continuous nor contemporary.[7] Chapter 1 is the earlier. It emphasizes

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[6] A separate issue is how the beginning of 3.1 relates to the close of Book 2 (2.26 1403a34-b2). See F. Solmsen. *Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik und Rhetorik* (Berlin: Weidmann 1929) 31–33, Kennedy (above, n. 2) 103, and Düring (above. n. 4) 118. My own inclination is to follow Düring and to attribute the closing lines of Book 2 to Andronicus.

[7] Not everyone would agree. For example, Cope (above, n. 2) 140, who clearly recognizes the way in which Aristotle's remarks in 1.1 seem to be "cutting the ground from under his feet," denies any real problem. On his view, Aristotle "is to be understood as speaking only comparatively, whilst he is pointing out the defects in the existing 'arts' and their mode of dealing with rhetoric" W.M.A. Grimaldi, *Aristotle*, Rhetoric I (New York: Fordham 1980) 8–10, 19–20, 38–39 is critical of Cope, but also denies any real inconsistency. So does J. Sprute, *Die Enthymemtheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht 1982) 36–41, 61–67. Since a full refutation would be much too long in this place, I limit myself to two observations. First, no amount of cleverness can undo the fact that 1.1 and 1.2 flatly disagree as to whether emotional appeal is *entechnon* (1354a13, b21, 1355a4, b35). Second, if one wants to understand *entechnon* in 1.1, one should turn to the *Phaedrus*, where Plato uses the term (277B2) and argues for a *technê rhêtorikê* which excludes delivery, style, and whatever else occupied the attention of contemporary teachers of rhetoric. This second point I shall be developing as my paper

the enthymeme and, more generally, demonstration (1354al4, 1355a5–6) and exhibits marked Platonic influence: the initial characterization of rhetoric as the counterpart of dialectic (1354a1) is a play on *Gorgias* 465D7–E1, the concern with contemporary *technai* (1354a11–13) has a general relationship to *Phaedrus* 266D5–267E9, and the particular mention of prejudice, pity, and anger (1354a16–17) invites comparison with *Phaedrus* 267C7–D2. Chapter 2 is later than Chapter 1. It recognizes emotional appeal as a proper mode of persuasion and forms a suitable introduction to Books 1–2. My guess is that a similar explanation is correct for *Rhetoric* 3.1: there are two different introductions. The first, with its recognition of emotional persuasion (1403b11), is chronologically later.[8] The second, which focuses on demonstrative argumentation based on facts and issues (1403b19–20, 1404a5–7), is the earlier, and noticeably Platonic: geometrical proof is recognized as a kind of standard (1404a12), and when mention is made of *graphomenoi logoi* (1404a18), one recalls the *Phaedrus* and Plato's attack on the *gegrammenos logos* (277E5).[9] Since both the emphasis upon demonstration and strong Platonic influence are also found in 1.1, I am inclined to believe that the second introduction in 3.1 belongs to the same period as 1.1. This need not mean that they were written "within a day of each other," only that both belong to a relatively early period when Platonic influence was especially strong.

An apparent difficulty should not be ignored. It is that while *Rhetoric* 1.1 is superseded by 1.2 and emotional persuasion receives considerable attention in 2.1–11, the second introduction in 3.1 is not set aside (it remains the proper introduction to the subsequent discussion of style), and delivery, unlike emotional persuasion, never receives independent treatment. The difference here is real, but instead of creating difficulties for the interpretation being advanced, it actually tells in favor of strong Platonic influence. Let me begin with the treatment of emotion, for the point I wish to make has already been argued in the literature.[10] It is that making emotional appeal part of the art of rhetoric was not so much a departure from Plato as a response to Plato's research.

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progresses.

[8] Düring (above, n. 4) 121 argues for a date after 334 B.C.

[9] See R.P. Sonkowsky, "An Aspect of Delivery in Ancient Rhetorical Theory." *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 90 (1959) 261–265.

[10] W.W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions," *Archiv für die Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970) 56–58 = Chapter 1 in this volume, pages 24–26.

In the *Philebus*, Plato had concerned himself with the question how thought relates to emotion (36C3–50E2). The problem received considerable discussion within the Academy (we can find echoes of the Academic debate in Aristotle's *Topics*, e.g., 4.5 127b26–32, 6.13 151a14–19, 8.1 156a27–34), and an answer had been formulated by the time Aristotle wrote the account of *pathê* which makes up *Rhetoric* 2.1–11. Thoughts, i.e., beliefs like "This is dangerous" and "This is unjust," were seen to be the cause of emotions like fright and anger, and this in turn led to the realization that emotional appeal need not be a matter of enchantment (as Thrasymachus seems to have suggested; see Plato, *Phaedrus* 267D1) or wizardry (cf. Gorgias, *Helen* 10). It could take the form of serious argumentation leading to particular beliefs which are the cause of emotional response. Further and equally important, Aristotle realized that Plato's call for an art of rhetoric involving knowledge of the soul (*Phaedrus* 270B1–271B5) actually opens the door to emotional appeal or, as Aristotle calls it, persuasion "through the hearers" (1.2 1356a14). By spelling out the condition of people disposed to particular emotions, the objects of these emotions, and the grounds which underline them (2.1 1378a23–25), Aristotle was both satisfying the demands of his teacher and moving beyond the position recorded in *Rhetoric* 1.1. Accordingly, he promoted emotional appeal to the status of persuasion through *logos* (1.2 1356a1; cf. *Phaedrus* 261A8, 271B3–5, C10) and wrote the introduction, which is now *Rhetoric* 1.2.

The fact that Aristotle sticks with the second introduction to 3.1 and never gives delivery special treatment should also be understood as a direct response to Plato's teachings and indeed to principles laid down in the *Phaedrus*. For, in this dialogue, Plato is at pains to distinguish between what is and what is not proper to the art of rhetoric. He recognizes that the available handbooks contain a great deal of material, but he regards this material as merely preliminary to the art (269B7–8). The true art, he thinks, is marked by a knowledge of the truth (259E5, 277B5)[11] and by a dialectical method which involves collection and division (265C8–266C1). Given this understanding of rhetoric, both style and delivery are readily dissociated from the art and assigned to the realm of "artless practice" (*atechnos tribê* 260E5).

[11] In fact, the knowledge associated with the art of rhetoric is of several kinds: knowledge of the subject under discussion (259E4–6, 277B5–6), knowledge of the soul (270B1–271C4, 277B8), knowledge of several types of discourse (271B1, D4, 277C1), and knowledge of right occasions (272A4–7).

There is, of course, no explicit mention of delivery in the *Phaedrus*, neither in the discussion of handbook material (266D7–267D4) nor anywhere else. But silence here is no objection and indeed not unexpected, for it fits well with Aristotle's statement that delivery had not yet been taken up by the teachers of rhetoric (3.1 1403b21–22). Furthermore, it need not mean that a rhetorician like Thrasymachus took no notice whatsoever of delivery. Plato acknowledges his ability to move crowds (267C7–D1), and Aristotle credits him with a work on appeals to pity (3.1 1404a14–15). Assuming that Aristotle is not contradicting himself, Thrasymachus's work will have been primarily concerned with style,[12] but it is also likely to have touched upon matters which later rhetoricians discussed under the heading of delivery. My guess is that it did and that this is the background against which Plato writes. When he dissociates stylistic concerns from the true art of rhetoric, he is at the same time removing delivery (albeit tacitly) from this art. Aristotle, of course, makes special mention of delivery, but on the larger issue he follows Plato. He dissociates both style and delivery from the art of rhetoric proper, i.e., he does not discuss them in *Rhetoric* 1–2, which originally formed a separate *Technê rhetorikê* (Diogenes Laertius 5.24), and he keeps style and delivery together, treating them in *Rhetoric* 3, which was originally separate from Books 1–2 and carried its own title, *Peri Lexeôs* or *On Style* (Diogenes Laertius 5.24).[*]

It will be helpful to compare *Republic* 2–3, where Plato has Socrates discuss the musical education of future guardians. The discussion falls into two parts: the first deals with tales or stories (376E9–398B9) and the second with songs and tunes (398C1–403C8). Our concern is with the first part, in which Socrates turns his attention to *logoi* (376E9) and in particular to myths told to young children. Socrates is interested in these myths, because they have content and leave opinions (*doxai* 377B8, 378D8) in the mind of young people. If the content is wholesome, the myths are acceptable, but when they depict the gods as vicious and inconsistent, they are then quite unacceptable in a well-organized city

[12] This is, of course, a disputed point. Here I will only say that I take *ekeinê* (1404a12) to refer to style and that my interpretation is in agreement with the Anonymous Commentator, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* 21.2 p. 161.32–33, L Radermacher, "Artium scriptores," *Sitzungsberichte Wein* 227.3 (1951) 74, Arnhart (above, n. 2) 165, and others.

[*] Whether our Book 3 of the *Rhetoric* is to be identified with the Περὶ λέξεως in two books listed by Diogenes Laertius (5.24) now appears to me problematic. See Chapter 21, Section IV in this volume.

state. Socrates does not tell us what ought to be said about men, for this would presuppose an answer to the question whether justice pays (392A8–C5). Instead, he turns from *logoi* to *lexis* (392C6), i.e., from what should be said to how it should be said (392C7–8). Socrates is especially concerned with dramatic passages, in which poets do not speak in their own voice but rather represent someone else as speaking. For such passages call for imitating the style or diction of the imagined speaker, and when they are read aloud by a rhapsode or actor, the imitation is carried over to voice and gesture (393C5–6, 397B1–2, cf. 395D3). The question Socrates asks is whether guardians should be good at imitation (394E1) and the answer he arrives at is that they should imitate only one thing, namely, the good man (395C3–5, 396C5–8) whose speech involves only small changes in tone and rhythm (397B6–C1). They should not imitate the inferior person (395C5–396A6) who mimics everything (397A1–B2), while making use of all kinds of variation in pitch and rhythm (397C3–6).

Plato's central concern here is, of course, political and ethical, not rhetorical. But having said that, I want to note two ways in which this portion of the *Republic* is closely tied to Aristotelian rhetoric. The first is a matter of the structure or framework which shapes rhetorical theory. Plato draws a distinction between what should be said and how it should be said (*ha lekteon, hôs lekteon* 392C7–8, 394C7–8, 398B7–8) and divides his discussion into two corresponding parts (376E9–392C5, 392C6–398B9). In much the same way Aristotle distinguishes between what one ought to say and how one-ought to say it (*ha dei legein, tauta hôs dei eipein* 3.1 1403b16–17) and treats the former in *Rhetoric* 1–2 and the latter in *Rhetoric* 3. Moreover, when Plato discusses *logoi* he is concerned with the fact that poets attempt to persuade (*peithein* 391D6), and when they are successful their audience is persuaded and so believes (*peithesthai* 391C1, 8) what the poets have been saying. Similarly, Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric* (our Books 1–2) is concerned with persuasion through *logos* (1.2 1356a1). This is not to obscure the fact that poetry rarely takes the form of rhetorical argument, but both convey beliefs and both admit a distinction between the beliefs conveyed and the style in which the beliefs are conveyed. Further, Plato's willingness to treat voice and gesture under the label "style" (*lexis* 392C6) is neither surprising nor out of line with Aristotle's approach in the third book of our *Rhetoric*. It is not surprising, because others, like Thrasymachus, seem to have done the same, and anyway in the context of moral education there is no need to make a sharp distinction between style and delivery. They can

be treated together as different aspects of a speaker's "manner" ("how", *hôs* 392C8). It is not out of line with *Rhetoric* 3, for while Aristotle does distinguish between style and delivery (3.1 1403b20–22), it is also true that in 3.12 he introduces delivery within the discussion of style, and in 3.1 he states that delivery is technical in regard to style (1404a16). This remark is difficult, but if I understand it correctly, Aristotle is recognizing the fact that style actually determines delivery.[13] By introducing, say, asyndeton and repetition a writer includes dramatic elements which call for variation in voice and which lose their effect when robbed of delivery (3.12 1413b17–31). This point is not made by Plato, nor does his focus on moral education provide a natural occasion for such an observation. But it is nevertheless true that Plato's discussion tacitly recognizes a close connection between style and delivery and so encourages the kind of discussion we find in *Rhetoric* 3.12.

The second way in which the *Republic* passage relates to Aristotelian rhetoric concerns attitude and is of especial importance, for it can help us understand why Aristotle labels delivery vulgar (3.1 1404a1) and says that speakers skilled in delivery win the day on account of defects in political arrangements (*dia tên mochthêrian tôn politeiôn* 1403b34–35). The negative assessment expressed by these remarks has a direct parallel in *Republic* 3, where Socrates tells us that the more worthless a person is, the more he engages in imitation (397A1–B2), and that the delivery of a bad man is marked by every kind of variation in pitch and rhythm (397C3–6). Such a person is said to be extremely pleasing to children, their tutors, and the great mob (397D7–8), but ill-suited to the political arrangement (*politeia* 397E1) under discussion. I do not want to suggest that Aristotle would want to follow the *Republic* in every detail. He would not base an evaluation of delivery on the dubious premise that each citizen should have only one role and therefore avoid everything that may be regarded as playing more than one role (cf. 397E1–2). But once we allow for such differences, we can say that Aristotle's attitude toward delivery is Platonic. When he says that a speaker should restrict himself to causing neither pain nor delight (1404a4–5), he has in mind an exaggerated delivery which Plato thinks especially pleasing to the mob. And when he attributes the success of speakers skilled in delivery to defects in political arrangements (1403b34–35), he is reflecting Plato's view that delivery would have little effect in a well-

[13] See the excellent comments by Sonkowsky (above, n. 9) 259–261.

organized city state. There would be no place for a demagogue like Cleon—one whom Aristotle (or some associate) describes as especially responsible for corrupting the people of Athens and the first to shout aloud while on the speakers' platform (*Constitution of the Athenians* 28.3).[14]

[14] Versions of this paper were read at a panel discussion held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the American Philological Association (Winter 1984 and Spring/Summer 1985; Toronto, Canada); at a conference on Continuities in Classical Greek Rhetoric (The Pennsylvania State University, Delaware County campus); and before groups of classicists at the Universities of Bamberg, Freiburg, and Saarbrücken, West Germany. I am grateful for comments made on these occasions. The basic research for this paper was supported in large measure by the National Endowment for the Humanities, whose ongoing support of Project Theophrastus is greatly appreciated.

[93/94]

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

WHAT WAS INCLUDED IN A PERIPATETIC TREATISE ΠΕΡΙ ΛΕΞΕΩΣ?

I

For many of us working on Greek rhetoric, the title Περὶ λέξεως suggests a work on "style." We think of Aristotle's treatment of λέξις in Book 3 of the *Rhetoric*, and we assume that the title refers above all to a treatment of diction and composition. We think of unusual words and metaphors, which elevate speech above the level of conversation, and we think of rhythm and periodic structure, which add an aesthetic quality not found in ordinary discourse. We are also likely to think of the need for clarity and suitability in choosing words and composing sentences. Indeed, we will recall that Aristotle sets forth a tripartite virtue of style: one which combines clarity with elevation and appropriateness.

We may also think of Theophrastus' treatise Περὶ λέξεως. The work has not survived, but the several reports that do (681–704 FHS&G) suggest that Theophrastus covered more or less the same topics that we find in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. To be sure, he recognized "correct Greek" as a virtue along side Aristotle's three qualities (684), but Aristotle himself had touched upon the topic (*Rhet.* 3.5), and speaking Greek (or Latin or whatever language) correctly is fundamental to clarity. If we move beyond rhetoric and consider Aristotle's remarks on λέξις in *Poetics* 20–22, we find much the same material under discussion. Diction, especially metaphor, receives special attention, clarity is discussed and there is recognition that style must be appropriate or risk becoming ludicrous. Theophrastus wrote two works entitled *On Poetics*, both of which are lost. No surviving fragment is specifically concerned with poetic style, but in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is a reasonable guess that Theophrastus followed his master closely and discussed *inter alia* diction, clarity and suitability.

If we stop our reflections at this point, we are likely to conclude that the title Περὶ λέξεως, refers to a discussion of rhetorical style or more generally to a discussion of literary style covering not only oratory but also poetry and more. In saying "more," I am thinking of history, for we are told by Cicero that Theophrastus picked out Herodotus and

Thucydides as historians who dared to speak more fully and more ornately than their predecessors (697 FHS&G). It is possible, then, that Theophrastus' work Περὶ λέξεως was an inclusive treatment of literary style, and if that is correct, should we assume that other Peripatetic treatises bearing the same title had a similar focus? Here we should be cautious, for we possess some fragments of Eudemus' work Περὶ λέξεως, and these fragments suggest a treatise concerned with logical issues. One of the fragments (fr. 25 Wehrli) is found in Alexander's *Commentary on Aristotle's Topics*. The commentator is discussing Aristotle's statement that a dialectical premise is a question involving an opinion which is acceptable to everyone, most people or the wise (104a8). Alexander tells us that not every premise is a question, but the dialectical premise is, and that not every question is a dialectical premise, for there are several kinds of questions (69.13–14 Wallies). Thereupon follows a threefold division of the question, which Eudemus is said to have put forward in his work Περὶ λέξεως (69.15). The division is into 1) questions about an attribute, e.g., What attribute belongs to Socrates? 2) questions about an essence, e.g., "What is a man?" and 3) questions about a premise, e.g., "Is it the case that the cosmos is spherical?" (69.16–28). The third kind of question contains a proposition, which can become a premise in an argument, if the questions is answered in the affirmative. In contrast, the first two do not admit a simple affirmative answer. The questions require substantive responses (the interrogative word needs to be replaced) before a proposition or premise is obtained. If we ask what may have been the purpose of Eudemus' threefold division, a plausible answer is suggested by context. Alexander is discussing Aristotle's *Topics*, which is a logical treatise concerned with dialectic. If Eudemus was also concerned with dialect, he may have presented a brief list of questions which, albeit incomplete,[1] was adequate for marking off the dialectical question that generates a premise from other questions whose form is perfectly acceptable outside the sphere of dialectic. If that is correct, we have a first piece of evidence suggesting that a work Περὶ λέξεως may be concerned with logical forms of expression as well as literary style.

A second fragment of Eudemus (26 Wehrli) is also of interest. It comes from Alexander's *Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics* and concerns the notion of a ὅρος or term in a categorical or predicative premise. After explaining that Aristotle denied the verb "to be" the

[1] E.g., questions concerning causation (διὰ τί) are not included.

status of a third term alongside the subject and predicate (15.4–22), Alexander rather unexpectedly expresses doubt concerning the denial. He asks whether it may not be an absurdity, and adds that Eudemus makes the point at length in the first book of his Περὶ λέξεως. Whether Eudemus' discussion of "to be" concerned the copula or the existential "to be" need not trouble us here. What is clear is that we have a second text in which there is an explicit reference to the treatise Περὶ λέξεως, and in which the subject is logical and not one of literary style.

A third fragment (28 Wehrli) comes from Alexander's *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*. The commentator is discussing Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic forms and in particular arguments that are introduced in favor of the forms but have negative consequences. In this context, Alexander sets out four arguments that are said to bring in the "third man." Concerning the first of these arguments (83.34–84.7Hayduck), Alexander tells us that it is based on the principle that similar things are similar by participation in some identical thing (85.3–5). He also says that it has been used by others and by Eudemus with clarity in Περί λέξεως (85.9–11). Aside from the title of the treatise, we are given no specific indication of the context, in which Eudemus used the argument, but a close look at the argument is suggestive. It begins with a reference to substances, which are certainly primary substances and in particular individual men like Socrates and Plato, who are named later. What is predicated in common of certain things is said to be something else apart from these things, and the form of man is said to be one in number. At the end and throughout, the individuality of the form is emphasized. That suggests to me a connection with Aristotle's use of the third man argument in *Sophistical Refutations* 22. There the argument is introduced as an example of sophisms caused by the form of the expression, τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως.[2] The noun "man" is understood as referring to an individual, τόδε τι, but that is a mistake. It is a common term, and according to Aristotle, such terms signify a quality or a relation or a mode or something of that kind (178b36–39). Perhaps Eudemus made similar use of the third man argument in Περὶ λέξεως, but whether he did or did not, he was interested in mistakes attributable to expression. We may compare a passage in Simplicius' *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* (fr. 61 Wehrli). Here Eudemus is reported to have dealt with an objection to locating movement in that which is

[2] For the Greek phrase see *SE* 4 165b27, 166b10.

affected and moved. The objection turns on verbs of sensing, e.g., ὁρᾶν "to see" and ἀκούειν "to hear," which are active in form. Eudemus pointed out that in such cases we are deceived because we attend to the verbal form, ἀπατώμεθα … τῇ λέξει, and fail to consider that what perceives is affected (439.17–23 Diels).[3]

II

In the preceding section, I have suggested that a Peripatetic work Περί λέξεως may consider argumentation and more generally logical issues as well as literary style. That should not be surprising when one considers the fact that the very first words of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* identify rhetoric as the counterpart of dialectic (1.1 1354a1). Dialectic has its own stylized procedure, and when properly practiced it distinguishes between clear and confusing modes of expression. In this regard, it may be of some interest to consider *Rhetoric* 2.24. Aristotle has just completed a review of 28 topics or lines of argument, which an orator may find useful in arguing his case. Now in Chapter 24, he turns to apparent lines of argument, i.e., those which are in some way faulty or confusing but nevertheless present the appearance of an acceptable argument. Aristotle reminds us that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism (cf. 1.2 1356b3–4, 2.22 1395b22–23) and argues that since syllogisms are both genuine and apparent, so enthymemes are both genuine and apparent (2.24 1400b34–37). He then turns to the lines of argument which give rise to apparent enthymemes and focuses on two lines which are said to be caused by expression: they are παρὰ τὴν λέξιν (1401a1). The first kind is introduced by an explicit comparison with dialectic: " just as in dialectic one does not go through a syllogism and yet makes a final statement in the manner of a conclusion—'Therefore so and so is not true; therefore necessarily so and so is true'—so in the case of enthymemes speaking in a compressed and antithetical manner gives the appearance of an enthymeme, for such λέξις is the province of an enthymeme. And such an appearance is caused by the form of the expression" (παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως a7). The comparison with dialec-

[3] For a fuller discussion of the Eudemian fragments relating to λέξις see my article "Eudemus' Work *On Expression*," in *Eudemus of Rhodes*, ed. I. Bodnár and W. Fortenbaugh = *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* vol. 11 (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction 2002) 59–84.

tic recalls *Sophistical Refutations* 15, where Aristotle, using very much the same language, speaks of how the person putting questions deceives his respondent by making a final statement in the manner of a conclusion, even though he has proved nothing (174b8–12). Applied to the enthymeme the idea is straightforward: enthymemes are identified with a certain mode of expression, so that a speaker who adopts this mode may deceive the listener into thinking that a genuine enthymeme has been advanced when in fact the words of the speaker have only the appearance of an enthymeme.

This mode of speaking—expressing oneself in a compressed and opposed or antithetical manner (συνεστραμμένως καὶ ἀντικειμένως 1401a5)—is of special interest, for both compression and antithesis may be brought under the label λέξις. In regard to compression, I cite Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who tells us that according to Theophrastus, Thrasymachus was the first person to introduce compression, i.e., a λέξις which compresses thoughts and expresses them compactly, and which is entirely appropriate and even necessary in forensic speeches and every real contest (695 FHS&G). Dionysius does not tell us where Theophrastus asserted the priority of Thrasymachus, but since he cites Theophrastus' work Περὶ λέξεως on two other occasions (688 and 692 FHS&G), it is reasonable to believe that here too he is drawing on Περὶ λέξεως. And if that is correct, we may at least wonder whether the Theophrastean treatise was narrowly confined to those issues of style that Aristotle discusses in Book 3 of his *Rhetoric*. It may have contained some discussion of the λέξις of argumentation and dealt with certain matters that find expression in Book 2 of the *Rhetoric*.

An opposed or antithetical manner of expression has a long history in rhetoric. It is especially identified with Gorgias, whose prose style combines antithesis with balanced clauses and similarity in sound.[4] Gorgias' style soon came to be regarded as excessive, but Aristotle is clear that antithesis can embellish the cola of a period and add urbanity (3.9 1409b32–1410a23, 3.10 1410b28–29, 36). He is also clear that such a λέξις facilitates comprehension and has the appearance of a syllogism (3.9 1410a21–23). This last observation comes as no surprise, for earlier Aristotle had discussed arguments "from opposites" (2.23 1397a7–19)

[4] In the *Helen*, Gorgias combines these stylistic features when stating the conclusion of questionable arguments: εἰ λόγῳ ἐπείσθη, οὐκ ἠδίκησεν ἀλλ' ἠτύχησεν (15), εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα, οὐχ ὡς ἁμάρτημα μεμπτέον ἀλλ' ὡς ἀτύχημα νομιστέον (19). On the use of εἰ and εἴτε in the *Helen*, see below n. 7.

and refutations "by way of opposition" (2.25 1402b4–6). Theophrastus will have followed Aristotle in recognizing the importance of arguing from opposites, and he is reported to have considered antithesis a mark of controversy and therefore inappropriate in encomia, which involve the amplification of what is agreed upon (693 FHS&G).[5] The statement that antithesis is inappropriate in encomia is not an unqualified dismissal of antithesis from encomia. Rather it concerns proof of the deeds attributed to the honoree. Since the deeds are assumed to be agreed upon by all, there is no need to refute objections, and therefore no need for antithesis as a feature of controversy.[6]

Returning now to *Rhetoric* 2.24, I take up the second kind of apparent enthymeme caused by expression, παρὰ τὴν λέξιν. It is attributed to homonyms, i.e., equivocals or words that sound the same and yet have different meanings. Aristotle gives several examples of which I cite one. "λόγος (speech) is the best thing, because good men are worthy not of money but of λόγος (esteem). For 'worthy of λόγος' is not univocal" (1401a21–23). Here Aristotle first gives the apparent enthymeme and then adds the reason why it is only apparent: namely, it depends on equivocation. The same kind of apparent argument is discussed by Aristotle in *Sophistical Refutations* 4. It comes first under the heading παρὰ τὴν λέξιν. Here is one example. "Bad things are good, for things δέοντα (what ought to be) are good, and things bad are δέοντα (necessary). For δέον is used in two senses. It means what is necessary, which is often true of things bad—for in some cases what is bad is necessary—and we say that things good are δέοντα (ought to be)" (165b34–38). Here, as in the *Rhetoric*, we have an example followed by an explanation in terms of equivocity. As presented, the example seems all too sophistic and of little interest to the political orator, but with slight changes it may seem more relevant. For example, the claim that war and taxes are δέοντα is harmless as long as δέοντα is understood as "necessary," but it becomes dangerous, if δέοντα is construed in an evaluative manner: what ought to be. Perhaps an audience of college professors would never confuse the two meanings of δέοντα, but ordinary citizens listening to heated debate in the Athenian

[5] Aristotle is also mentioned in 693 FHS&G, but no passage in our *corpus Aristotelicum* makes the point explicitly.

[6] Clearly antithesis can be useful in other ways. For example, when the speaker wants to amplify the deeds of the honoree, he may find it effective to assert that the honoree alone succeeded while all others failed. Cf. Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1.9 1368a11.

agora might be less alert to the perils of equivocity. In any case, it is, I think, clear that equivocity can be detrimental to communication, including argumentation, and for that reason it is not to be ignored by writers on λέξις.

III

I now want to suggest that developments in logic may have influenced Peripatetic discussions of λέξις. I am thinking of advances in hypothetical syllogistic and how these advances will have brought to the fore certain modes of expression and also provided a new means for elucidating certain aspects of style.

Much as dialectical arguments have a formal structure (a series of questions each of which can be answered in the affirmative), so hypothetical syllogisms have a formal structure. For example, syllogisms which proceed "through a continuous proposition" have a major premise which takes the form "If P, then Q." If one adds the minor premise "But P," the conclusion "Therefore Q" follows. And syllogisms which proceed "by way of a separative proposition" have a major premise whose form is "either P or Q." Add the minor premise "But P," and the conclusion "Therefore not-Q" follows. In a purely logical context, it may be useful to insist on using these forms, but in a rhetorical context, rigorous adherence to syllogistic formulae may be out of place and even harmful because artificial.[7] It would, therefore,

[7] I have written "may be out of place," for there are rhetorical contexts in which the repeated use of syllogistic language may be desirable for its stylistic effect. A striking example is the *Helen* of Gorgias. The sophist argues in four steps that Helen is not to be faulted for going to Troy with Paris. Each step is introduced by a continuous proposition, one beginning with εἰ ("if" 6, 7, 8, 15), and three of the four steps are concluded in a similar manner (6, 15, 19). At the conclusion of the fourth step, Gorgias collects all four into a compound proposition in which εἴτε replaces εἰ: "If she did what she did enamored by sight, or if persuaded by speech, or if seized by force, or if compelled by divine compulsion, (then) in every case, she escapes the accusation" (20). What we have here is an abbreviated series of syllogisms "through a continuous proposition." Gorgias could have supplied four minor premises—"But she did act enamored by sight," "But she did act persuaded by speech," *etc.*—but the supplements are obvious, so that he moves directly to the conclusion, making clear that it applies to all cases (πάντως 20). Gorgias is playing with the structure and language of hypothetical syllogistic and doing so a century before Theophrastus and Eudemus investigated the hypothetical syllogism. The effect will not have been lost on his contemporaries, but Peripatetics of the second generation will have been better equipped not only to

be useful to discuss variation in expression. For example, in an argument "through a continuous proposition," the major premise need not take the form "if P, then Q." It is also possible to formulate the major premise with a relative clause. Instead of saying, "If the beginning is possible, then the end is possible," one can say, "Of what the beginning is possible, the end is too." The example is taken from Book 2 of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.[8] Here is a different example from later in the same book. Instead of saying, "If a man strikes his father, he strikes his neighbor," one can say, "Who strikes his father strikes his neighbors."[9] Both examples derive from a well-known line of argument: "If the less likely is true, then the more likely is too." I know of no text which makes clear that such variation was discussed in Peripatetic works Περὶ λέξεως, but given Theophrastus' interest in hypothetical syllogistic and his interest in rhetoric, I would not be surprised if he did so.

A different matter is how one expresses "if" in a premise composed of antecedent and consequent. Most often one uses εἰ, but it is also possible to replace εἰ with εἴπερ. What interests me is that εἴπερ has two distinct uses. It can be a strengthened form of "if," but it can also imply without announcing the truth of the antecedent.[10] That may seem economical, but we should keep in mind that this double usage can mislead an audience. The speaker—the clever orator with a sense of timing and a delivery that invites conviction—says "εἴπερ P," and the audience assumes that P is true when in fact it is false. Here the error is attributable to the form of expression; it occurs παρὰ τὴν λέξιν. Again we do not know whether Theophrastus or Eudemus discussed such an error in a treatise Περὶ λέξεως, but given Peripatetic interest in ambiguous usage, it would not be surprising if one or the other did so.

Still, a different matter is using hypothetical syllogistic to elucidate style. Here I am thinking of metaphor based on analogy. Aristotle tells us that this kind of metaphor occurs when B is related to A as D is related to C, and B is used instead of D or D instead B (*Poet.* 21 1457b16–19). An Aristotelian example is that of old age and evening. I give it here in translation: "As old age is to life, so evening is to day;

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elucidate the logic of Gorgias' speech but also to appreciate how the repeated use of εἰ and εἴτε works a stylistic effect. It appears artificial but not unwanted, for Gorgias is not arguing in court. He is constructing a display piece, which he characterizes as his own plaything (παίγνιον 21).

[8] *Rhet.* 2.19 1392a16.

[9] *Rhet.* 2.23 1397b15–16.

[10] See LSJ *s.v.* II.

therefore, one will call evening the old age of the day … and old age the evening of life or sunset of life" (1457b22–25). There is nothing wrong here. Metaphor based on analogy can be viewed as a four-term relationship similar to a mathematical proportion. And much as we can say that 4 is to 2 as 8 is to 4 because in both cases the relationship is 2 to 1—i.e., the initial number is double that which follows—so in Aristotle's example of analogical metaphor we can say that in both cases the relationship is one of end to process. A man progresses through life to old age, and the day continues until sunset. But whereas the mathematical relationship can be established by an accepted procedure—when 4 is divided by 2 and when 8 is divided by 4, the answer is 2—there is no clear procedure for establishing the relation that exists between the terms of an analogical metaphor. Indeed, as formulated by Aristotle, the relationship is not explicitly mentioned. We have four variables that may be replaced by "old age," "life," "evening" and "day," but there is no variable that may be replaced by "the end of a process." That may not have troubled Aristotle, for he thinks that mastery of metaphor is a matter of natural talent (*Poet.* 22 1459a7) and something that cannot be taught (*Rhet.* 3.2 1405a9–10).[11] The relationship is perceived or intuited, not calculated. But even if Peripatetics of the second generation agreed with Aristotle concerning the mastery of metaphor, they may have felt the need to present analogical metaphor in a way that gives explicit recognition to the relationship that unites the two sides of an analogy. And if they did feel such a need, they could turn to hypothetical syllogistic and make use of a syllogism "through analogy." It takes the form "As A is to B, so C is to D; but A is R to B; therefore C is R to D." Here "R" is a variable representing a common relationship, i.e., one that characterizes each of the two pairs. Applying the formula to the Aristotelian example, we get: "As old age is to life, so evening is to day; but old age is the end of life; therefore evening is the end of day." Hence, when we speak metaphorically of the evening of life, we are referring euphemistically to the end of life. If we substitute "sunset" for "evening," we may actually give a positive ring to "old age," for many people view sun-

[11] At *Rhet.* 2.20 1394a5 Aristotle tells us that seeing similarities is easier as a result of philosophy. That may appear to contradict the idea that mastery of metaphor cannot be taught, but in fact there need be no contradiction. Aristotle can hold both that mastery of metaphor depends on natural talent, and that philosophy can develop and strengthen natural talent.

set as the prettiest and best time of day. In another context, we might choose to present youth in a positive light. We might, for example, follow Pericles and compare youth to the spring of the year. The listener understands "spring" not only as the beginning of the year but also as the best time of the year, and transfers that evaluation to youth. In both cases, we might speak of evaluation παρὰ τὴν λέξιν. By introducing metaphor and by carefully choosing the word which is transferred, we shape the listener's attitude toward the subject under discussion.[12]

IV

Having suggested ways in which the development of hypothetical syllogistic may have influenced discussions of λέξις, and before that having considered connections between λέξις and argument in Book 2 of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, I now want to return to Eudemus' treatise Περὶ λέξεως and put forth a *caveat*. We cannot conclude on the basis of a few fragments that Eudemus' work was narrowly focused on argument and therefore very different from the like named works of Aristotle and Theophrastus. The Aristotelian work is listed by Diogenes Laertius in his catalogue of Aristotle's writings (5.25). It contained two books or rolls, which are often identified with the two parts of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 3. One book will have concerned itself with rhetorical style, which is the topic of *Rhetoric* 3.1–12, and the other with the arrangement of an oration, which is the topic of 3.13–19.[13] If that is correct, there may well be a significant difference between the Eudemian and Aristotelian works; and the same may be true in regard to the Theophrastean work. In Diogenes' catalogue it is assigned one book (5.47), and the surviving fragments suggest a rhetorical work in which topics like beautiful words, balanced structure and similarity in sound were discussed.[14] Here we need to remember that the Eudemian work

[12] See "Teofrasto di Ereso: argomentazione retorica e sillogistica ipotetica," *Aevum* 74 (2000) 72, reprinted in English as "Theophrastus of Eresus: Rhetorical Argument and Hypothetical Syllogistic," in *Theophrastean Studies* = *Philosophie der Antike* 17 (Stuttgart: Steiner 2003) 43.

[13] P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain: Éditions Universitaires de Louvain 1951) 103–104.

[14] For beautiful words, see 688 FHS&G, and for balanced structure and similarity in sound, see 692 FHS&G. For the view that the Eudemian and Theophrastean

contained more than one book. Two fragments (26 and 27) refer to the first book, ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ, of Περὶ λέξεως, and two others (25 and 28) refer to the books, ἐν τοῖς, (plural). That tells us that the Eudemian work was at least two books long, and it may have been longer.[15] In that case, there was room to discuss not only expression in regard to argument but also expression in elevated literature, poetry as well as oratory.

We should also remember that the identity of Aristotle's work Περὶ λέξεως with Book 3 of the *Rhetoric* is a guess, which has found favor for two reasons. First, Diogenes' catalogue lists a *Rhetoric* in two books (5.24). It is assumed, not unreasonably, that those two books correspond to the first two books of our *Rhetoric* in three books. To find the missing third book, one is tempted to look to Περὶ λέξεως and to say that its two books are identical with *Rhetoric* 3.1–12 and 3.13–19. Second, this identity is supported by a widely held belief concerning Andronicus of Rhodes: namely that he edited Aristotle's writings and in doing so combined closely related texts. He will have inspected the work Περὶ λέξεως, determined that it belonged to rhetoric and made it Book 3 of the *Rhetoric* we know today. That is possible, but the editorial work of Andronicus is not well documented and may be more the creation of modern scholars than serious historical fact.[16] Furthermore, *Rhetoric* 3.1–12 and 3.13–19 are not a well-matched pair. Indeed, 3.13–19 appears to have been an independent handbook that was awkwardly added to the *Rhetoric* in order to supply some discussion of arrangement. I am, therefore, hesitant to accept the identity of Περὶ λέξεως and *Rhetoric* 3. Rather, I am inclined to believe that Aristotle's work Περὶ λέξεως was a rather full treatment of the topic announced in the title,[17] and that this treatment became the basis of subsequent discussions. Eudemus' Περὶ λέξεως is likely to have added some new material, e.g. a discussion of

works were fundamentally different, see D. Schenkeveld, "Theophrastus' Rhetorical Works: One Rhetorical Fragment Less, One Logical Fragment More," in *Theophrastus: Reappraising the Sources*, ed. J. van Ophuijsen and M. van Raalte = *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 8 (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction 1998) 79–80.

[15] E. Martini, "Eudemus II" in Paulys Realencyclopädie 6 col. 901.

[16] See J. Barnes, "Roman Aristotle," in *Philosophia Togata* II, ed. J. Barnes and M. Griffin (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997) 1–69.

[17] It is possible that the title refers only to the first portion of the work—occasionally a title refers only to the chapters with which a work begins (Moraux 103)—but it is simpler and less speculative to understand the title as an indication of what the work as a whole contained.

appropriate expression in hypothetical premises, but it will also have been largely Aristotelian. And both works may have been two books long.[18]

Discussion of Eudemus' work in relation to that of Aristotle is complicated by a passage in Simplicius' commentary *On Aristotle's Categories* 4 1b25–2a10 (65.2–10 Kalbfleisch).[19] There Aristotle is said to have discussed negative expressions and inflections with reference to the categories, and he is said to have done so in the *Methodics*, *Divisions*, and *Matters concerning Expression*, Τὰ περὶ τὴν λέξιν.[20] According to Simplicius, the last named work was deemed spurious by some persons, but in any case it was a work of Peripatetic authorship. I offer two comments. First, it is not certain that *Matters concerning Expression* is to be identified with the work Περὶ λέξεως listed in Diogenes' catalogue of Aristotelian writings (5.25). The former may have been a preliminary study or collection of material used in the latter; or the former may have been spurious and the latter genuine. But if the work cited by Simplicius is the work listed in Diogenes' catalogue, then it is not to be identified with *Rhetoric* 3. For the third book contains no discussion of negative expressions and inflections with reference to the categories. Second, whoever the author may have been, *Matters concerning Expression* apparently contained discussion of the relationship between (kinds of) expression and the categories. That helps us understand the Anonymous Coislinianus, who remarks that a work Περὶ λέξεως could be regarded as a substi-

[18] Galen's work *On Eudemus'* On Expression is listed as "three commentaries" (Galen, *On His Own Works* 14 p. 123.3–4 Mueller). That does not mean that the Eudemian work was three books or rolls long: one book being the subject of each commentary. We may compare Galen's work *On (Aristotle's) De interpretatione*; it is listed as "three commentaries" (14 p. 122.20). Here a single book is the subject of three commentaries.

[19] I am grateful to Rainer Thiel for calling the passage to my attention. It was printed with some variations in text by V. Rose, *Aristotelis qui ferebantur librorum fragmenta* (Leipzig: Teubner 1886) fr. 118 p. 107.20–108.6.

[20] In one manuscript of Simplicius' commentary (K, 14th cent.), the last of the three Aristotelian titles occurs as Τὰ παρὰ τὴν λέξιν. That suggests a work concerned with sophisms caused by expression (cf. the work of Galen entitled Περὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφισμάτων); but the manuscript is comparatively late (J, which has περί, is 11th cent.) and is likely to involve an unnecessary emendation. The preposition περί was changed to παρά by a scribe or someone else who knew that περί plus genitive is more common in titles, and perhaps recalled Aristotle's use of the phrase παρὰ τὴν λέξιν in the *Sophistical Refutations* 4 164b24. For some remarks on περί plus the accusative in titles, see W. Fortenbaugh, "Theophrastean Titles and Book Numbers: Some Reflections on Titles Relating to Rhetoric and Poetics," in *Fragmentsammlungen philosophischer Texte der Antike*, ed. W. Burkert *et al.* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1988) 190–191 with n. 35, reprinted in *Theophrastean Studies* (Stuttgart: Steiner 2003) 204–205.

tute for works entitled *Categories* (xxiii.34–36 Busse).[21] Whether Eudemus' work could be so regarded is in my judgment unlikely, but both it and the like-named work of Aristotle may have devoted space to questions concerning categories.

The case for distinguishing sharply between the works of Eudemus and Theophrastus may appear stronger. The Theophrastean fragments, which survive, are rhetorical, and the work was only one book in length. Of course, Usener wanted to make the work four books long, but today no one accepts his view.[22] Nevertheless, there is reason for caution. Apart from being listed in Diogenes' catalogue, Theophrastus' work Περὶ λέξεως is cited by title only twice (nos. 688 and 692 FHS&G). There is, of course, a bundle of texts that are properly brought under the rubric style or expression,[23] but it does not follow that they all come from the work Περὶ λέξεως. And even if they do, there is no compelling reason to think that they exhaust the topics discussed by Theophrastus in Περὶ λέξεως. A work in one book has room for a wide variety of topics; and Theophrastus may have chosen to express himself succinctly, when discussing topics adequately dealt with by Aristotle. That would be in line with what Boethius tells us: "On all matters about which he (Theophrastus) argues after his master, he touches lightly on those which he knows have been said by Aristotle earlier, but follows up more diligently other things not dealt with by Aristotle" (*On Aristotle's De interpretatione, Second edition*, 1 introduction = 72A FHS&G). Perhaps, then, Theophrastus went beyond his master and discussed the λέξις of argumentation. He was after all interested in logic and according to Diogenes Laertius, wrote a work in one book entitled *Definitions Concerned with the Language of Syllogisms*, Ὁριστικὰ περὶ λέξεως συλλογισμῶν (5.50 = 1.287 = 68 no.11 FHS&G). The work has been connected with the first book of Theophrastus' *Prior Analytics*,[24] but whether the con-

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[21] Busse's text is found in *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* vol. 4.5 (Berlin: Reimer 1897) xxiii.34–36. The text with translation also appears as Theophrastus 71G FHS&G.

[22] H. Usener, *Analecta Theophrastea*, Diss. (Leipzig 1858) 9, 20, reprinted in *Kleine Schriften von Hermann Usener* 1, ed. L Radermacher (Leipzig 1912–1913) 57, 66–67. The last person to endorse Usener's view was F. Wehrli, "Theophrast," in *Die Philosophie der Antike* 3, ed. H. Flashar (Basel: Schwabe 1983) 513. See Fortenbaugh (above n. 20) 186–187, 194 with note 50, reprint 207–208.

[23] In FHS&G, texts 681–704 are collected under the rubric *Elocutio*.

[24] See I. Bochenski, *La Logique de Théophraste* (Fribourg: Librarie de l'Université 1947) 28 and M.Sollenberger, *Diogenes Laertius'* Life of Theophrastus, Diss. (New Brunswick NJ 1984) 376. S. White, "Eudemus the Naturalist," in *Eudemus of Rhodes*, ed. I. Bodnár and W. Fortenbaugh = *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* vol. 11 (New

nection is real or not, the title testifies to Theophrastus' interest in the λέξις of argumentation. That the same interest was also manifested in the work Περὶ λέξεως is not thereby proven, but the possibility seems real, so that Wehrli may be correct, when he explains the difference between the fragments of the Eudemian and Theophrastean works as an accident of transmission.[25]

Whatever the truth concerning the work of Aristotle and Theophrastus, we should take seriously the possibility that Eudemus' work included discussion of oratorical and poetic style. Among the sayings of Eudemus preserved in Arabic sources, we find the following: "He (Eudemus) said, 'The word is matter, the meaning form; speech is its perceptible aspect, and style the beauty of the perceptible aspect.'"[26] The Arabic word translated by "style" implies eloquent style; it is immediately explained as beauty of the perceptible aspect. "Perceptible" occurs twice and translates an Arabic word whose primary meaning is "visible." Out of context, the second occurrence could be understood in this primary sense (metaphor may be used to evoke beautiful images, which are seen by the mind's eye); but when the two occurrences are taken together and in their context, a more inclusive sense, i.e. translating "perceptible," is almost certainly correct. "Word" at the beginning of the saying means spoken word or voice, φωνή, and speech as "its perceptible aspect" refers to audible statements and the like. Hence, the subsequent reference to the "beauty of the perceptible aspect" ought to include *inter alia* the avoidance of hiatus, balanced clauses and prose rhythm.

I do not want to lay great weight on a single saying transmitted to us by Arabic sources,[27] but I do want to underline that a full treatment of

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Brunswick NJ: Transaction 2002) 217 suggests that 'Ὁριστικὰ περὶ λέξεως συλλογισμῶν should be attributed to Eudemus and not to Theophrastus. On White's argument and my reasons for not following him, see my commentary on the rhetorical and poetic fragments of Theophrastus (Leiden: Brill 2005) 123–124 n. 225.

[25] F. Wehrli, "Eudemos von Rhodos, Menon und weitere Aristotelesschuler" in *Die Philosophie der Antike* 3, ed. H. Flashar (Basel: Schwabe 1983) 531. I record Wehrli's statement as a serious possibility and not because I accept it without qualification. Certainty is, I fear, unobtainable.

[26] The saying is no. 6 in the list compiled by Dimitri Gutas, "Eudemus in the Arabic Tradition," in *Eudemus of Rhodes*, ed. I. Bodnár and W. Fortenbaugh = *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 11 (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction 2002) 5. My few remarks on the meaning of the Arabic words are entirely dependent on Gutas.

[27] The saying is referred only to Eudemus; no work is mentioned. Failure to refer to a work is not in itself grounds for questioning the authenticity of the saying. None of the sayings attributed to Eudemus mentions a work; such silence is typical of the genre.

λέξις will not omit discussion of voice. In this regard, it may be instructive to consider Aristotle's *Poetics*, for there, Aristotle begins a discussion of λέξις by taking note of various forms of expression, σχήματα λέξεως. He means different speech acts—the command, prayer, statement, threat, question and answer—which differ in intonation and are best understood by the person who has mastered delivery (19 1456b8–13). Aristotle goes on to discuss the parts of expression, μέρη τῆς λέξεως, beginning with the element, i.e. the letter, and the syllable. For detailed investigation, we are referred to works on metrics (20 1456b20–38). In referring speech acts to delivery and letters and syllables to metrics, Aristotle is not saying that these topics have no place in an inclusive study of λέξις; rather he is taking note of the fact that these topics have been studied by specialists and that they are not fundamental to poetics. They are in fact more basic, being essential to clear communication. The verb ἐβάδισεν is called by Aristotle "an inflection according to the delivery." It may express a fact: "He walked"; but given the right intonation, it is a question, "Did he walk?" (20 1457a21–23). And the letters ου convey different meanings depending on aspiration and pitch accent: οὗ and οὐ. Wrongly expressed they render a sentence unintelligible or give rise to what Aristotle calls a sophism through prosody (20 1456b31–33, *Sophistical Refutations* 4 166b1–6, 21 177b35–178a2).

In concluding my paper, I offer a summary whose thrust is cautionary. Given that Eudemus' work Περὶ λέξεως was two or more books in length and given that we possess very few fragments of the work, we should not assume that the work was narrowly focused on expression in argumentation. It may have discussed much more, e.g., the elements of spoken communication, diction and composition, and the virtues of style both in regard to prose and poetry. Equally, we should not assume that Eudemus addressed all these topics. For aside from a single saying attributed to Eudemus in Arabic sources, there is no surviving fragment which exhibits an interest in elevated prose and poetry. In contrast, Theophrastus' work Περὶ λέξεως may have been narrowly focused on literary style, but the absence of fragments dealing with the λέξις of argument is not decisive. Theophrastus like Eudemus was keenly interested in hypothetical syllogistic, so that he may have included some discussion of such matters in his Περὶ λέξεως. Concerning Aristotle we have more evidence. His discussions of λέξις in the *Rhetoric* and in the *Poetics* do survive and are concerned with literary style. But Book 2 of the *Rhetoric* and the *Sophistical Refutations* make clear that he was inter-

ested in the λὲξις of argument, and what little we know of the work Τὰ περὶ τὴν λέξιν suggests that he may have written at length on λέξις and from points of view that are properly described as logical, not literary.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

PERSUASION THROUGH CHARACTER AND THE COMPOSITION OF ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC*

It is well known that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was originally two works. Our Books 1 and 2 formed an *Art of Rhetoric*, while Book 3 was a separate treatise *On Style* (Diogenes Laertius 5.24).[1] Who combined these two works is nowhere stated explicitly, but it seems reasonable to think of Andronicus, who edited the *Corpus Aristotelicum* in the latter half of the first century B.C. He is said to have organized the *Corpus* by subject matter (Porphyry, *Vit. Plot.* 24), and we can easily imagine him joining texts that were written independently of each other—texts that belong to different periods in Aristotle's development and occasionally contain views that are at odds with each other.[*]

This is, of course, an old idea, but it remains important for understanding the *Corpus Aristotelicum* as a whole and the *Rhetoric* in particular. The introduction to *Rhetoric* 1–2 is a case in point. It is composed of two chapters, 1.1 and 1.2, of which the first appears to be the earlier. Rhetoric as an art is restricted to argumentation, and other modes of persuasion like emotional appeal are labeled accessory (1354a13–14, b19–22). In contrast, the second chapter adopts a more inclusive notion of rhetorical art. Emotional appeal is now recognized as a technical mode of persuasion and placed alongside argumentation and the presentation of good character. A similar dichotomy is also found in the introduction to *Rhetoric* 3. This introduction does not extend to two chapters—it is confined to 3.1—but it does have two distinct parts of

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[1] See P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain 1951) 97, 103–104, G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton 1963) 103 and I. Düring, *Aristoteles: Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens* (Heidelberg 1966) 118. For the purposes of this paper we need not consider the possibility of further divisions: e.g., picking out *Rhet.* 2.23–24 and identifying it with the lost work entitled *Divisions of Enthymemes* (Diogenes Laertius 5.24).

[*] Since this article was written, scholars have begun to call into question the editorial work of Andronicus. I am not prepared to deny Andronicus any role whatsoever in the establishment of the *Corpus Aristotelicum* as we know it, but I now have doubts concerning the details of Andronicus' editing and in particular whether our Book 3 of the *Rhetoric* is to be identified with the work Περὶ λέξεως, which is listed by Diogenes Laertius (5.24). See "What Was Included in a Peripatetic Treatise Περὶ λέξεως" = Chapter 21, Secton IV in this volume.

which the first (1403b6–18) is likely to be the later. It includes emotional appeal and persuasion through character and so contrasts with the second (1403b18–1404a39) which adopts a positive attitude toward argument based upon facts. Other modes of persuasion are called superfluous and said to be effective only because of defects in one's audience.

This interpretation of *Rhetoric* 1.1–2 and 3.1 has already been argued for in the scholarly literature.[2] My concern here is with an omission—a supporting argument that is not only new but also of some independent interest. Its focus is persuasion through character (πίστις διὰ τοῦ ἤθους). Aristotle introduces this mode of persuasion in 1.2 (1356a2–13), discusses it briefly in 2.1 (1377b23–1378a19) and mentions it again in 3.1 (1403b11–12). What I find striking is that neither 1.1 nor the second part of 3.1 (beginning 1403b18) refers to persuasion through character. This may be chance, but I do not think so. Aristotle is reacting to contemporary rhetoricians who advised orators not only to present their own character in a favorable light but also to denigrate their opponents, and in both cases their recommendations were directed toward working an emotional effect on the auditor. We may compare the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*,[3] where these matters are discussed as part of the *prooemium*. The speaker is advised to present good character as a way of winning goodwill for himself (30 1436a37, b16–17) and to vilify his opponents in order to excite anger against them (37 1442a11–14). Not surprisingly Aristotle's own discussion of the *prooemium* in *Rhetoric* 3.14 contains similar material; an orator may use the introductory portion of a speech to remove or create prejudice, secure goodwill or arouse anger (1415a27–36). But Aristotle is equally clear that such uses of the *prooemium* are extraneous. They are directed toward worthless auditors who pay attention to what lies outside the issue under discussion (1415b5–6). This is the language of 1.1 and the second part of 3.1 (cf. 1354a15–18, b16–20; 1404a5–8), and together these sections of the *Rhetoric* advance a narrow view of the rhetorical art: argu-

[2] Düring (above, n. 1) 121 correctly characterizes 3.1 as a *Flickwerk*. On 1.1 and 1.2 in relation to the two parts of 3.1, see W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's Platonic Attitude Toward Delivery," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 19 (1986) 247–248 = Chapter 20 in this volume, pages 358–360. There is, of course, an opposing view, especially in regard to 1.1–2. See, e.g., W. Grimaldi, *Aristotle*, Rhetoric *I* (New York 1980) 8–10, 19–20, 38–39 and J. Sprute, *Die Enthymemtheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik* (Göttingen 1982) 36–41, 61–67.

[3] The *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* is often attributed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus. But whether or not this attribution is correct, its handbook-like character is not in doubt. See, e.g., Kennedy (above, n. 1) 114–115.

ment alone counts as artful persuasion (1.1 1354a13–15, cf. 3.13 1414a30–36); everything else is superfluous (3.1 1404a7) and at best remedial (3.14 1415a25).

But if this is true, how can Aristotle express himself as he does in 1.2 and 2.1? Why do these chapters recognize persuasion through character as artful? The answer is, I believe, that these chapters belong to a later stage in Aristotle's thinking about the art of rhetoric. He has separated persuasion through character from emotional appeal and developed a notion of persuasion through character that eliminates the unattractive features with which it had been associated. There is no longer any mention of denigrating one's opponent or of attempting to win favor with the audience. Instead, Aristotle focuses on credibility. Persuasion through character aims at making the speaker worthy of belief (ἀξιόπιστος 1.2 1356a5–6), and it accomplishes this goal through manifestations of wisdom, virtue and goodwill (φρόνησις, ἀρετή and εὔνοια 2.1 1378a8–9).

The importance of these three qualities had not been overlooked by contemporary rhetoricians. For example, the author of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* considers what an orator should say about himself when the audience is already favorably disposed toward him. The recommendation offered is that the orator mention his goodwill for the city, point out that his advice has been beneficial and say that he is a just man, ready to sacrifice his own interests (30 1436b21–26). In other words, the orator should lay claim to the three attributes named by Aristotle: namely, goodwill toward the citizens, wisdom in offering advice and virtuous character. There is, however, a significant difference in goal. In the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* these three attributes are thought of as a way to arouse or maintain favorable feelings on the part of the audience (30 1436a37, b16–17). In Aristotle's *Rhetoric* they are the means by which an orator establishes his credibility. This is not to suggest that Aristotle ever wanted to deny the effect that these attributes have on an audience. On the contrary, he was from beginning to end fully aware that manifestations of virtue and well-wishing on the part of an orator often arouse positive, friendly feelings in his audience (*Rhet.* 2.4 1381a14, 27). What is new is the recognition that wisdom, virtue and goodwill are important apart from emotional effect, and that the sober-minded (unemotional) auditor actually looks for these qualities in a speaker. For as Aristotle tells us, men who lack wisdom hold false opinions, and if they lack virtue or goodwill, then they do not say what they actually believe (2.1 1378a9–14). Moreover, there are many situations in which

certainty is not attainable. Jurors considering the past and assemblymen deliberating about the future may be confronted with opposing arguments each of which enjoys a measure of persuasive force. In such situations it is reasonable to consider the character of the speakers and to believe the person that excels in wisdom, virtue and goodwill. Aristotle recognizes this and argues that we believe good men more often and more quickly, and we do this whatever the issue be and especially in cases where there is no exact certainty but rather difference of opinion (1.2 1356a6–8). It seems, then, that Aristotle has come to look upon wisdom, virtue and goodwill in a new light. He sees them as qualities that an intelligent audience looks for in a speaker and he develops a corresponding notion of persuasion through character. The presentation of character is now conceived of as a way in which speakers meet the demands of thoughtful auditors.

In conclusion, let me return to the beginning of this paper and to the work of Andronicus. As I see it, he is responsible for the composition of our *Rhetoric* in three books and in particular for the dichotomous nature of the introductions to Books 1–2 and Book 3. Each of these introductions contains an earlier and a later portion. The earlier portions, 1.1 and the second part of 3.1, emphasize arguing the issue and refer the practices of contemporary rhetoricians to defects in the audience. The later portions, 1.2 and the first part of 3.1, exhibit a wider conception of the rhetorical art—one that makes room for emotional appeal and persuasion through character. The shift here is striking and dependent upon two closely related developments. First (and this is old hat), Aristotle's work on emotion had led to a new understanding of the way in which emotions are grounded on belief and therefore open to reasoned argument. Once considered hostile to reasonable debate, emotional appeal was now seen to be compatible with arguing an issue before intelligent auditors. Accordingly, Aristotle collected all forms of emotional appeal under the label "persuasion through the hearers" and made this mode of persuasion an integral part of the rhetorical art.[4] Second (and this has been the focus of the present paper), Aristotle recognized that presentations of good character need not aim at working an emotional effect. They may be intended to establish the credibility of the speaker and so to meet the demands of sober-minded auditors. Aristotle, therefore, created a third mode of persuasion which he

[4] W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions," *AGPh* 52 (1970) 61–64 = Chapter 1 in this volume, pages 29–32.

labeled "persuasion through character" and placed alongside argumentation and emotional appeal. These developments led Aristotle to write a new introduction to Books 1–2 (i.e., our 1.2), and when Andronicus joined Book 3 to Books 1–2 he felt obliged to write the short introduction with which Book 3 begins and which takes notice of the three modes of persuasion discussed by Aristotle in Books 1–2. Another editor might have done things differently. He might have suppressed the older introductions, leaving only the second, newer introduction to Books 1–2. That would have tidied things up a bit, but we would have lost some precious indications of an early stage in Aristotle's thought. Perhaps, then, we should thank Andronicus for cutting and pasting in such an untidy, awkward manner. He has, after all, preserved texts from different periods, and in so doing he has given us the materials necessary for appreciating developments in Aristotle's thinking about the art of rhetoric.[5]

[5] Versions of this paper were read at the Institute for Classical Studies, London on 21 March 1988 and at a Symposium on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, honoring Father William Grimaldi, held at Fordham University on 23 April 1988. I am grateful for questions raised and suggestions made on both those occasions.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

ON THE COMPOSITION OF ARISTOTLE'S *RHETORIC*

Arguing the Issue, Emotional Appeal, Persuasion through Character, and Characters Tied to Age and Fortune

Central to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is the recognition of three technical or artful modes of persuasion (ἔντεχνοι πίστεις): namely rhetorical argument, the presentation of the speaker's character and the arousal of emotion in the audience (1.2 1355b35–1356a20). The discussion of rhetorical argument includes both subject matter and forms of argument; it is discussed at length in 1.2–15 and 2.18–26. The analysis of the speaker's character is quite brief; it occurs in 2.1, where reference is made to the discussion of virtue in 1.9 and to the account of individual emotions in 2.2–11. This account of emotions and (to some extent) the immediately following remarks on different kinds of character in 2.12–17 constitute Aristotle's treatment of emotional appeal. There are several difficulties here,[1] but none is greater than that presented by the opening chapter of the treatise. For in this chapter, 1.1, the art of rhetoric is restricted to arguing the issue under consideration. The character of the speaker is passed over in silence, and emotional appeal is explicitly rejected. The writers of handbooks are criticized for considering extraneous matters (περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται) like slander, pity, anger and similar emotions of the soul (1354a15–18). The writers are said to concern themselves with how a judge may be put into a particular mental state and to offer nothing in regard to artful proofs (περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντέχνων πίστεων ουδὲν δεικνύουσιν 1354b20–21). That is, they fail to explain how one becomes enthymematic (ἐνθυμηματικός 1354b22) or skilled in rhetorical demonstration (ἔστι δ' ἀπόδειξις ῥητορική ἐνθύμημα 1355a4–7). Such remarks are quite out of harmony—they are inconsistent[2]—with the threefold division of artful proof which is

[1] For example, the chapters 2.12–17 are by position a supplement to the preceding discussion of emotions, but it is doubtful whether they were originally written for such a purpose. I shall consider the matter below in section IV.

[2] See e.g. J. Brunschwig, *Aristote, Topiques*, Paris: Budé ed. 1967, l.xcix and G. Kennedy, *Aristotle on Rhetoric, a Theory of Civic Discourse* (Oxford 1991) 28; also my articles: "Aristotle's Platonic Attitude toward Delivery," *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 19 (1986) 248 = Chapter 20 in this volume, page 359; "Persuasion through Character and the Composition of Aristotle's Rhetoric," *Rheinisches Museum* 134 (1991) 153 = Chapter 22

introduced in the very next chapter, 1.2, and then developed in the course of Books 1 and 2.

In what follows, I want to offer a developmental explanation of this inconsistency. In particular, I intend to suggest that Aristotle initially championed a narrow view of rhetoric in which arguing the issue was all-important (Sec. I). Later, however, he adopted a more inclusive view, which took account of the emotions (Sec. II), the character of the orator (Sec. III) and characters attributable to different ages and fortune (Sec. IV). This development will be tied to investigations within the Platonic Academy, so that Aristotle's development can be seen against a larger background. I shall not pretend to explain every awkwardness in the *Rhetoric* as it has been transmitted to us, but I hope to make clear that the major difficulties are not mere lapses or whimsical shifts on the part of Aristotle. Rather they are indications of serious reflection concerning important topics.

I am also hoping that my argument will meet the high standards of Carl Werner Müller, the dedicatee of this volume.[*] As a Gräzist of remarkable range and as Editor of *Rheinisches Museum*, he knows and has encouraged my earlier work on the *Rhetoric*. If he thinks the present paper an advance over modest beginnings, I shall be pleased, not least because much of the preparation for this essay was accomplished in the Saarbücker Seminar für Klassische Philologie, where Carl Werner Müller is the Professor Ordinarius of Greek.

I. *Arguing the Issue and Avoiding the Extraneous*

An attractive way to account for the inconsistency between 1.1 and 1.2 is to say that 1.1 presents an ideal rhetoric,[3] which is essentially Platonic.[4] The opening sentence recalls the *Gorgias* and draws an analogy with

in this volume, page 383 and "Aristotle on Persuasion through Character," *Rhetorica* 10 (1992) 232–233 = Chapter 17 in this volume, pages 305–306.

[*] *ΛΗΝΑΙΚΑ. Festschrift für Carl Werner Müller*, ed. Chr. Mueller-Goldingen and K. Sier = *Beiträge zur Altertumskunde* 89 (Stuttgart: Teubner 1996).

[3] J. Sprute, *Die Enthymemtheorie der aristotelischen Rhetorik* (Göttingen 1982) 36–41 and *Ethos als Überzeugungsmittel in der aristotelischen Rhetorik: Rhetorik zwischen den Wissenschaften*, ed. G. Ueding (Tübingen 1991) 288.

[4] See Brunschwig (above, note 2) 1.xcvii and Kennedy (above, note 2) 26; also "Aristotle's Platonic Attitude" (above, note 2) 246–253 = pages 357–365 in this volume and "Aristotle on Persuasion through Character" (above, note 2) 235 = page 308 in this volume.

dialectic (1354a1). Aristotle is addressing students in the Academy and offering a provocative critique of the sophistic art in order to emphasize the need for greater attention to the logic of rhetorical argument.[5] What follows in 1.2 is a more realistic rhetoric. Argumentation is prominent, but so are the character of the speaker and emotional appeal. This interpretation is, I think, largely correct; it may, however, be helpful to state clearly that the ideal rhetoric set forth in 1.1 is not simply the product of a philosopher's imagination. It is an ideal that can be and occasionally was realized in the Greek city-state. In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle says as much when he refers to decisions rendered in the well governed cities of his own time (εἰ περὶ πάσας ἦν τὰς κρίσεις καθάπερ ἐν ἐνίαις γε νῦν ἐστι τῶν πόλεων καὶ μάλιστα ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις) and then names the Athenian Areopagus as a court in which discussion of extraneous matters is banned (1.1 1354a18–24). From the *Constitution of the Athenians* it is clear that the prohibition extended to other courts: litigants in private cases are said to swear an oath that they will speak to the issue (εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐρεῖν 67.1).[6] Not surprisingly this prohibition finds expression in Attic oratory.[7] I cite two examples from Lysias. In the third oration *Against Simon*, the speaker, who is defending himself before the Areopagus, begins his conclusion with a *paraleipsis*.[8] He says that he could relate many things, but since it is not lawful to speak outside the subject (ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν 46), he urges the judges to consider the actions of his opponent.[9] Of course, the speaker soon mentions his own services to the city and then concludes with a call for pity (47–48), but that only illustrates how a good speechwriter could combine respect for proper procedure with a conventional appeal to the judges. A second example is provided by Lysias' first speech, *On the Murder of Eratosthenes*. The speaker is defending himself before a special court of fifty-one persons at the Delphinium outside the walls of

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[5] Kennedy (above, note 2) 26.

[6] I am grateful to David Mirhady for calling this text to my attention. See the comments of P. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaiôn Politeia* (Oxford 1981) 718–719 and R. Wallace, *The Areopagos Council, to 307 B.C.* (Baltimore 1985) 124.

[7] Wallace (above, note 6) 124 cites Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates* 11–13. In these sections, Lycurgus states that he will say nothing false or outside the subject (οὔτε ψευδόμενος οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγων 11); he refers to the Council of the Areopagus as the finest model in Greece (12); and he exhorts the judges to follow this example and not to give into those who speak outside the subject (μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν 13).

[8] S. Usher, "Individual Characterization in Lysias," *Eranos* 63 (1965) 106.

[9] W. Grimaldi, *Aristotle*, Rhetoric I, *A Commentary* (New York 1980) 11.

Athens. He introduces the narrative by telling the judges that he will set forth from the beginning all the facts of his case (ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑμῖν ἅπαντα ἐπιδείξω τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πράγματα 5), and he prepares for the proof by stating that persons who do injustice deny the truth, lie and stir up anger in the audience (28). Here in the first speech, as in the third, factual considerations are opposed to extraneous matters including emotional appeal, and in both speeches this opposition functions as a rhetorical topos within transitional passages. Apparently the position Aristotle adopts in *Rhetoric* 1.1 is not only ideal and Platonic; it is also a reflection of both actual judicial procedure and the artful practice of the *logographos*.

For a full understanding of the inconsistency between 1.1 and the art of rhetoric subsequently set forth in Books 1 and 2, we should also consider Book 3, for the view of rhetoric advanced in 1.1 recurs in that book. The opening chapter, 3.1, contains two introductions (1403b6–18 and 1403b18–1404a19), of which the first exhibits knowledge of the three technical modes of persuasion, while the second does not. Instead it focuses on style and delivery, sharply criticizing the latter whose effectiveness is attributed to bad political arrangements (διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν πολιτειῶν 1403b34–35). That is Platonic (cf. *Republic* 3 397A–E)[10] and may be compared with the mention of well governed cities in 1.1 (1354a20). Also reminiscent of 1.1 is the approval given to argument based on facts. Aristotle says that justice seeks nothing more in a speech than to cause neither pain nor delight (μήτε λυπεῖν μήτ' εὐφραίνειν), for it is just to contend by means of the facts themselves (αὐτοῖς … τοῖς πράγμασιν) and everything apart from demonstration (ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι) is superfluous (1404a4–7). The result is that delivery will not be discussed; and while style will be, Aristotle appears to do so with some hesitation, for style is concerned with appearance and has no place in teaching geometry (1404a11–12).[11] It is a source of pleasure, as

[10] For discussion see "Aristotle's Platonic Attitude" (above, note 2) 252–253 = pages 364–365 in this volume.

[11] The mention of geometry is Platonic. Cf. *Gorgias* 450D6–7, E9, 465B7 (in likening rhetoric to cookery, Socrates explicitly adopts the method of geometry and offers a four term analogy), *Republic* 7.9–10 526C–528E, *Theaetetus* 162E4–7 and *Laws* 7.20–21 817E–820E. We are told that Plato himself fostered mathematical investigations within the Academy (cf. Diogenes Laertius 3.24 and Proclus, *Commentary on Euclid's* Elements 211.18–212.4); and we can be certain that Aristotle was impressed by this Academic activity. In his *Topics*, for example, i.e., in his early work on dialectic, he makes repeated reference to geometry (e.g., 1.1 101a7; 1.10 104a36–37; 2.3 110b6). On the *Analytics*, see

Aristotle recognizes in 3.2 (1404b10–12), but justice is best served when a speech is neither painful nor pleasant (1404a4–5).[12]

The introduction to the account of arrangement, 3.13, also relates closely to 1.1. Aristotle focuses on arguing the case—it is necessary to state the matter at issue and to demonstrate one's position (ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τό τε πρᾶγμα εἰπεῖν περὶ οὗ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀποδεῖξαι 1414a30–31)—and he concludes that an oration has two necessary parts: preliminary statement and proof (πρόθεσις and πίστις 1414a34–35). This division is compared with the distinction between problem and demonstration (πρόβλημα and ἀπόδειξις 1414a35–36), and that recalls the analogy with dialectic set forth in 1.1 (1354a1).[13] In addition, the divisions being taught by rhetoricians are treated with scorn (1414b12–18) in a manner reminiscent not only of Plato's *Phaedrus* 266D7–267D4[14] but also of earlier remarks in 1.1, where Aristotle tells us that those who concern themselves with the proem and narration deal with extraneous matters (1354b16–19).[15] Finally, like 1.1, 3.13 contains no mention of the

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J. Barnes, "Aristotle's Theory of Demonstration," *Phronesis* 14 (1969) 127–137, reprinted in *Articles on Aristotle*, vol. 1, ed. J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R. Sorabji (London 1975) 68–77.

[12] It was long recognized that the pleasures of an oration can mislead an audience. Cf. e.g., Thucydides 3.40.2, where Cleon first lists the pleasure of speeches (ἡδονὴ λόγων) as one of the three influences most prejudicial to a ruling state. In 3.40.3, he goes on to say that orators who convey delight through speech (τέρποντες λόγῳ ῥήτορες) will find opportunities for display in matters of less importance, and not where a city pays dearly for brief pleasure.

[13] See E. Cope and J. Sandys, *The* Rhetoric *of Aristotle* (Cambridge 1877) 3.157, citing Aristotle, *Topics* 1.11 104b1: πρόβλημα … διαλεκτικὸν θεώρημα. Kennedy (above, note 2) 258 n. 171 refers to geometry. That would fit well with 3.1 1404a12 and might be supported by *Topics* 1.1 100a27–28, where Aristotle explains demonstration (ἀπόδειξις) as reasoning from premises which are true and primary. But Aristotle does speak of demonstration in connection with the dialectical problem: e.g., *Top.* 1.1 105a8 and 1.18 108b19; and in *Rhetoric* 1.1 1355a5–6 demonstration is rhetorical argument. It may be added that the orators often speak of demonstrating (ἀποδεκινύναι) their case: e.g., Lysias 16, *For Mantitheus*, 3 and 8; and they sometimes do so in a way that creates a contrast with emotional appeal: e.g., Lysias 7, *On the Olive-Stump*, 41–42.

[14] Compare Aristotle's criticism of Theodorus and Licymnius at 1414b12–18 with *Phaedrus* 266E–267C.

[15] Handbooks organized according to the parts of an oration regularly dealt with matters foreign to an ideal rhetoric. By way of illustration, I refer to P.Oxy. 410. This papyrus contains fragments of a rhetorical handbook whose date is uncertain. The original editors, B. Grenfell and A. Hunt, date the papyrus to the early fourth century B.C. (*Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, Part III [London 1903] 26). If they are correct, then it has preserved for us a more or less contemporary example of the material criticized by Aristotle. However, their date is by no means certain, and recently scholars have suggested a post-Aristotelian date: E. Bower, "ΕΦΟΔΟΣ and *Insinuatio* in Greek and Latin

three technical modes of persuasion introduced in 1.2, and indeed there seems to be no room for either persuasion through character or emotional appeal. For our purposes, the important point is that Aristotle's criticism of the current divisions of an oration does not prevent him from subsequently offering an account of arrangement based on traditional divisions. That is perhaps most striking in the case of narration, for in 3.13 the narrative part of a speech is Aristotle's first example of ridiculous division (1414a36). It is said to belong only to judicial oratory (1414a36–38), but in 3.16 Aristotle discusses narration and organizes his remarks in accordance with the three kinds of oratory: first epideictic, then judicial and finally deliberative (1416b16–29, 1416b29–1417b11 and 1417b11–20 respectively). However, Aristotle does not forget what he has said in 3.13. He remains scornful—"ridiculous" occurs again at 1416b29—and narration is said to be least common in deliberative oratory, for no one narrates future events (1417b11–13).

What are we to make of this? Should we say that 3.13 is a provocative introduction like 1.1? Here, I think, we must be careful, for 1.1 and 3.13 are not the same *qua* introduction. In fact, 1.1 is not a proper introduction to the subsequent account of three technical proofs. It is provocative because it is so entirely out of line with what follows. An ideal or Platonic rhetoric is announced but not developed. In the case of 3.13 the reverse is true. The account of arrangement that follows in 3.14–19 exhibits no radical shift in attitude or approach. The discussion of the proem in 3.14 does indeed list techniques for securing and discouraging the attention of the audience; but it also includes a reminder that all such techniques are outside the argument and directed toward a worthless auditor who listens to matters outside the subject (πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα· πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ

Rhetoric," *Classical Quarterly* 8 (1958) 228–229 and L. Calboli Montefusco, *Exordium, Narratio, Epilogus* (Bologna 1988) 13 n. 32. Whatever the true date, the papyrus may be said to illustrate the sort of material to which Aristotle objects in *Rhet.* 1.1 and 3.13. There are remarks on the proem and the narrative portion of an oration, and these include precepts which are extraneous to the Aristotelian ideal. In regard to the proem, we are told to use a simple style and not a written one, to use expressions of opinion and not assertions of knowledge, for speaking in this way gives the impression of fairness (1–15). In the case of narration, the benefits of simulated forgetfulness and irony are noted (114–123). This is not to suggest that all the precepts are at odds with an ideal rhetoric. For example, we are told to avoid shameful language (70–79). But even here an advocate of an ideal rhetoric might object that the purpose behind the recommendation is wrong, for the intention is to be persuasive through appearing high-minded (76–79) and not through demonstrating one's position.

πράγματος ἀκούοντα 1415b5–6).[16] As an introduction 3.13 might better be compared with 3.1. For the latter is not followed by a new beginning. On the contrary, Aristotle stands firm by his rejection of delivery, and his account of style emphasizes clarity. It comes first among the virtues of style (3.2 1404b2; 3.12 1414a23) and is a fundamental reason for embracing metaphor (1404b36–37). In contrast, ambiguous language is associated with the Sophists, who are called workers of evil (1404b37–39)—persons who have little interest in justice, if that means sticking to the facts and avoiding the superfluous (cf. 3.1 1404a5–7).

This difference between consistent and inconsistent introductions—between 3.1 and 3.13 on the one hand and 1.1 on the other—is, I think, best explained by recognizing a development in Aristotle's thinking. We know little about his first years in the Academy, but apparently he was critical of contemporary rhetoric. At least the Gryllus, his first work, which was written about 360 B.C., is said to have contained an argument denying that rhetoric is an art (Quintilian, *Instit. Or.* 2.17.14).[17] We are also told that he taught rhetoric and was critical of Isocrates (e.g., Cicero, *De or.* 3.141).[18] The latter may be as much myth as reality, but it is worth mentioning that Isocrates adopted the division into parts criticized by Aristotle in 3.13.[19] Perhaps then 3.13–19 is Aristotle's first teaching manual composed during the mid-350s.[20] It is full of directions expressed not only with impersonal forms (e.g., δεῖ and verbals ending in -τέον) but also with second person forms of the pronoun, adjective and verb including imperative.[21] The chapters that make up this manual were, of course, subject to revision. In fact we can

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[16] For remarks on the discussion of the proof in 3.17, see "Aristotle on Persuasion" (above, note 2) 235–236 = pages 308–309 in this volume.

[17] Quint. 2.17.14 = fr. 69 Rose³ and fr. 2 Laurenti. A date *post quem* for the work is provided by the death of Gryllus in 362 B.C.

[18] For parallel and related passages together with commentary, see I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, Göteborg 1957, 311–314. On Philodemus, *Rhetorica, P.Herc.* 1015/832, 2.50–63 Sudhaus, see T. Dorandi, "Epicuro contro Aristotele sulla Retorica," in *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*, ed. by W. Fortenbaugh and D. Mirhady, *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 6 (New Brunswick NJ 1993) ch. 7.

[19] On Isocrates, see L. Radermacher (ed.), *Artium scriptores*, SAWW 227.3 (1951) B 24 no. 29–34 pp. 160–162 and no. 41 p. 164; Cope (above, note 13) 3.157–158 and *An Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric* (London 1867, repr. Hildesheim 1970) 331–332; F. Sieveke, *Aristoteles, Rhetorik* (München 1989) 293.

[20] Düring (above, note 18) thinks that Aristotle began teaching rhetoric in reaction to Isocrates some time between 360 and 355 B.C.

[21] For the pronoun see 3.16, 1417b7, the adjective 1417a3 and the verb 3.16 1417a34–35; 3.17 1418a10–12 including the imperative 3.16 1417a36, b7–8; 3.17 1418a12.

be certain that illustrative material was added after Plato's death and Aristotle's departure from the Academy in 347 B.C.[22]—perhaps during the years 343–341 B.C. when Aristotle was in Macedonia teaching Alexander[23]—but whatever the date(s) of such revision(s) the basic slant of the manual remained unchanged.

The sections on style, 3.2–12, are more puzzling, but I suspect that they too were written or at least begun during Aristotle's residence in the Academy.[24] My reason for saying that is not simply the rejection of delivery and emphasis on clarity. It is also Aristotle's interest in prose rhythm including his emphatic endorsement of the paeonic foot (3.8 1409a1–21). Modern scholarship on Plato's style has shown convincingly that the later dialogues—the *Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Politicus, Philebus* and *Laws*—exhibit an increasing use of the paeon. This development will not have gone undiscussed in the Academy, and Aristotle will have expressed his view on the matter. The remarks on rhythm in *Rhetoric* 3.8 are, I think, a reflection of this Academic discussion; they may even have contributed to Plato's increasing preference for the paeon. The same can be said of the hexameter, which Aristotle rejects (1408b32–33) and Plato avoids.[25]

II. *Emotional Appeal*

It is a matter of some interest that stylistic studies not only place the *Philebus* immediately before the *Laws*—i.e., next to last among the Pla-

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[22] A reference like that at 3.17 1418b27 to Isocrates' *Philippus* 4–7 cannot be earlier than 346 B.C. and therefore appears to be an addition to the original teaching manual.

[23] Cf, G. Kennedy, "Brief Mention," *American Journal of Philology* 111 (1990) 89.

[24] The reference to Theodorus' voice in 3.2 1404b22–24 suggests that the actor was alive when the passage was written. If that is the case, then this portion of the *Rhetoric* would seem to date from the 350s. See W. Burkett, "Aristoteles im Theater: Zur Datierung des 3. Buchs der Rhetorik und der Poetik," *Museum Helveticum* 32 (1975) 67–72. However, references to Isocrates' *Philippus* (3.10 1410b29–30 referring to *Philippus* 73; 3.11 1412a16 and b5–6 referring to *Philippus* 40 and 61) cannot be earlier than 346 B.C. and therefore suggest a revision sometime after Plato's death in 347, probably during Aristotle's Macedonian period and before his return to Athens in 335.

[25] For the connection between Aristotle's endorsement of the paeon and Plato's later style, see L. Billig, "Clausulae and Platonic Chronology," *The Journal of Philology* 35 (1919) 228 and L. Brandwood, *The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues* (Cambridge 1990) 183. For Aristotle's rejection of heroic or hexameter rhythm (3.8 1408b32–33) and its avoidance by Plato, see Billig 231, 234, 255.

tonic dialogues[26]—but also suggest connecting the *Philebus* more closely with the middle books of the *Laws* than with the early books.[27] That may reflect contemporaneous composition;[28] but whatever the precise relationship between the two works, the *Philebus* contains valuable evidence of discussion within the Academy toward the end of Plato's life. In particular, the *Philebus* provides a rather clear picture of Academic interest in emotional response. Socrates is made to distinguish emotions like anger and fright from both sensations like itches and tickles and bodily drives like hunger and thirst. All are called mixed pleasures and pains, but only the emotions are said to belong to the soul alone. What Socrates fails to clarify is the way emotions relate to the beliefs (δόξαι) which accompany them. He uses the preposition "with" (μετά 37E10) and verbs like "to follow" and "to fill up" (ἕπεσθαι 38B9 and ἀναπιμπλάναι 42A9) in order to characterize the relationship; but a satisfactory explanation is never achieved. As a result, Socrates is made to say that the discussion will be continued tomorrow (50D8–E1).[29] That is a dramatic technique for calling attention to on-going investigation within the Academy. A reflection of the investigation can be found in Aristotle's *Topics*, where modes of argument are often illustrated by examples drawn from Academic discussion. I cite two passages from the middle books. In 4.6 Aristotle considers ways to attack an assigned genus. He recommends showing that a more or equally likely candidate is not the genus and illustrates the procedure by reference to anger. Both pain and the thought of outrage are said to be part of the essence of anger; and if the former is not the genus, then neither is the latter (127b26–32).[30] In 6.13 Aristotle considers definitions in which the preposition "with" occurs. He advises making clear how the preposition is used

[26] We can also say that the *Philebus* appears to be Plato's last completed dialogue, for the *Laws* was left unfinished at his death.

[27] Billig (above, note 25) 233–234 and Brandwood (above, note 25) 184, 206. For an attempt to challenge the stylometric arguments, see R. Waterfield, "The Place of the *Philebus* in Plato's Dialogues," *Phronesis* 25 (1980) 276.

[28] Brandwood (above, note 25) 184 with note 12.

[29] For more detailed discussion of the *Philebus*, see "Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970) 56–58 = Chapter 1 in this volume, pages 24–26.

[30] Brunschwig (above, note 2) 1.109 deletes ὀλιγωρίας ("of outrage" 127b31). I much prefer to keep the received text, not only because of ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι in 127b32 but also because of the parallel at 6.13 151a15–17. Moreover, it seems quite possible that Aristotle or some other member of the Academy was prepared to ask whether the thought of outrage is a genus. It is common to emotions like rage, anger and complaining, and therefore might be thought of as their genus.

and lists various possibilities including a causal use which is illustrated by anger. When this emotion is defined as "pain with the thought of being outraged," the preposition "with" means "caused by" (151a14–19).

The passage from *Topics* 6.13 suggests a causal explanation of the relationship between emotion and belief. The suggestion seems fully accepted in the last book of the *Topics*. I am thinking of 8.1, where Aristotle advises arguing from coordinate terms. If we want to establish that an angry person desires revenge on account of apparent insult, we should first establish that anger is a desire for revenge on account of apparent insult (156a30–33). Here anger receives a causal definition; and except for being shorter, the definition agrees perfectly with that found in *Rhetoric* 2.2 (1378a31–32). The agreement is striking and, I think, significant. Book 8 of the *Topics* is regularly regarded as later than the middle books. It may be as late as 343 B.C. and therefore belongs to the period during which Aristotle was in Macedonia.[31] But whatever the precise date, the definition of emotion in 8.1 seems to reflect Aristotle's own view—one that he worked out some time after the composition of Books 4 and 6. We cannot say with certainty where Aristotle first advanced this view, but I think it probable that he did so in a lost work like the *Divisions* (Διαιρέσεις).[32] Such a work is likely to have contained more than formal (schematic) divisions. It will have offered definitions; and in the case of the emotions it may have extended the analysis to include the condition which makes a man prone to an emotion, the object toward which an emotion is directed and the grounds on which an emotion is based. That is, of course, speculation; but it is in line with what Aristotle says in *Rhetoric* 2.1: namely, that it is necessary to divide or analyze (διαιρεῖν 1378a22) each of the emotions. In making this statement, Aristotle is not announcing a totally new investigation of emotional response. Rather he is announcing his intent to incorporate within his lectures on rhetoric an analysis worked out independently and in response to debate within Plato's Academy.

Returning now to *Rhetoric* 1.1, we can say why this chapter is not a proper introduction to the subsequent account of three technical

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[31] J. Rist, *The Mind of Aristotle: A Study in Philosophical Growth* (Toronto 1989) 285.

[32] The *Divisions* is found among Aristotle's logical works in the list of Diogenes Laertius 5.23. I name it as only one possibility. Another is the work entitled *Emotions*. It too is listed by Diogenes among the logical writings (5.24) and may have contained divisions. See P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain 1951) 92, 191 and my *Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts* (Amsterdam 1984) 96–97.

proofs. Like 3.1 and 3.13, it was composed during the 350s when Aristotle was already teaching rhetoric but had not yet developed a clear notion of emotional response. He championed argument based on the facts of the case and was critical of contemporary rhetoricians for concerning themselves with extraneous matters including emotional appeal. During the 340s his thinking changed. He came to understand the relationship between emotion and belief and as a result began to view emotional appeal as a rational procedure compatible with arguing the case.[33] He analyzed individual emotions in one or more works now lost, transferred the analysis to rhetoric,[34] formulated the doctrine of three technical proofs and wrote a new introduction, 1.2, to take account of these changes.

The analysis of individual emotions contained in 2.2–11 seems to have been integrated into the *Rhetoric* with less than full attention to detail. I say that, because the analysis is hard to reconcile with the definition of emotion given in 2.1. The definition speaks of feelings accompanied by pain and pleasure (οἷς ἕπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή 1378a21–22), but the subsequent analysis includes emotions that have little or no connection with pain and pleasure. Hate is explicitly said to be without pain and therefore different from anger (2.4 1382a12–13); and kindness is defined as an act of service without any reference to feeling or sensation (2.7 1385a17–19). There is an undeniable awkwardness here, but a few observations may help to clarify matters. First, the definition of emotion in 2.1 is narrow and rhetorical: emotions are limited to "those feelings on account of which men so change as to differ in judgment" (δι' ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις). Weak emotions that do not affect judgment are irrelevant in regard to emotional appeal and therefore excluded; and while weak emotions may lack a close tie to feelings of pain and pleasure, strong emotions are generally associated

[33] To say that emotional appeal is "compatible with arguing the case" is not to say that emotional appeal cannot be used to defeat the stronger arguments of an opponent. It is rather to recognize that emotional appeal is not always hostile to arguing the issue. Indeed, an orator who argues the case can and often does arouse an emotional response: by demonstrating, e.g., that an outrageous crime has been committed, he arouses anger and thereby strengthens his position.

[34] The account of emotions in the *Rhetoric* begins with anger (2.2). That suggests that the transfer here imagined may not have been from the *Divisions* or the work entitled *Emotions* (see above, note 32) but from another work on emotion entitled *On Emotions, Anger* (Diog. Laert. 5.23), where the mention of anger may reflect the first emotion discussed in the work. The title may, however, be corrupt, and the character of the work (logical or ethical?) is uncertain. See *Quellen* (above, note 32) 96–98.

with such feelings. In addition, the Academic investigation of emotion had proceeded on the assumption that emotions like anger and fright are mixed pleasures and pains (Plato, *Phil.* 47D5–E3). As a result, the association with pleasure and pain was almost automatic; dissociation would be a mark of sophistication. I suspect that Aristotle did achieve that level of sophistication in the course of studying emotions. He came to recognize that an emotion like hate is an exception: it is both a strong emotion that affects judgment and also a painless one.[35] Given the definition of emotion in 2.1 and the explicit reference to pain and pleasure, we might have expected Aristotle to ignore hate; but he does not do so, for hate is important to an orator (2.1 1377b31–1378a3) and therefore properly included within a rhetorical discussion of individual emotions (2.4 1381b37–1382a15).[36] What then should we say about the general definition of emotions in 2.1? Certainly it is faulty; and if my guess is correct, it is earlier than the discussion of individual emotions in 2.2–11. Perhaps it dates from the 350s, for it would fit well with an introduction like 1.1: emotions affect judgment (2.1 1378a20–21), so that appeals to the emotions have no place in the deliberations and trials of a well-governed city (1.1 1354a15–21). But whatever its date, the definition is followed by a programmatic statement, which is entirely in line with the subsequent discussion of individual emotions. Aristotle tells us that we must discuss three things: e.g., the condition of men prone to anger, the persons toward whom anger is directed and the grounds for anger (2.1 1378a24–25); and that is exactly what he goes on to do in 2.2–11.

The definition of emotion is not the only awkward element in 2.1. Prior to that definition occurs Aristotle's discussion of persuasion through character (1378a6–20). We learn that the credible speaker is marked by practical wisdom, moral virtue and goodwill (φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια 1378a8–9), but we are not told how a speaker gives the impression that he possesses these attributes. Instead, we are referred to what has been said concerning virtue and to the (subsequent) account

[35] For further discussion of hate, see my "Theophrastus on Emotion," in *Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life and Works*, Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities 2 (New Brunswick NJ 1985) 219, reprinted in *Theophrastean Studies* (Stuttgart: Steiner 2002) 83.

[36] There are many situations, e.g. criminal cases, where the judges have not been personally insulted and therefore are not easily moved to anger. Perhaps the judges can be made to identify with the person who has been mistreated; and if that is achieved, then they may become angry. But it is often simpler to characterize the defendant as an odious type of person, for hate is felt toward classes of people. As Aristotle puts it, if we believe that the defendant is a certain sort of person, then we hate him (2.4 1382a2–7).

of emotions. The first reference is immediately intelligible, for the preceding discussion of virtue in 1.9 includes remarks about practical wisdom and moral virtue. The second reference is, however, less than clear. For while Aristotle's words are simple enough—he says that goodwill and feelings of friendship must be discussed within the account of emotions (περὶ δὲ εὐνοίας καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον 1378a19–20)—the account of emotions which follows in 2.2–11 includes no discussion of goodwill. There is, of course, an account of friendship in 2.4, but it is silent concerning goodwill and does not mention persuasion through character.

A similar—less than clear—reference occurs in the discussion of the proem in 3.14. There Aristotle discusses remedial measures including those which are intended to arouse goodwill and anger in the audience (1415a34–35).[37] Aristotle states unequivocally that such measures are directed toward a worthless audience which listens to things outside the subject under discussion (1415b5–6), but that does not prevent him from referring to a previous discussion of the sources of goodwill (1415b25). The reference invites comparison with that in 2.1 (1378a16–20), for in both cases Aristotle not only speaks of sources for arousing goodwill (ὅθεν and πόθεν) but also indicates that the discussion referred to covers several different emotions (ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη and καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων).[38] Since the account of arrangement, 3.13–19, appears to have been composed in the mid-350s and then added to a decade or more later,[39] two alternatives suggest themselves: either an early discussion of emotions has been lost, or the reference in 3.14 is a later addition based on that in 2.1.

The first alternative is, I think, less probable, partly because the early course of lectures emphasized argument based on facts. But having said that, I want to acknowledge that Aristotle's preference for arguing the issue did not prevent him from dealing with matters like style and the parts of an oration. Similarly it need not have prevented him from discussing emotion. And if he needed a positive reason for doing so, the practice of the *logographoi* could have provided one. I cite two passages

[37] The mention of anger is bracketed by R. Kassel in his edition of the *Rhetoric* (Berlin 1976) 184. That is, I think, a mistake. See "Aristotle on Persuasion" (above, note 2) 227 n. 19.

[38] Similarly the quotation from Homer in 3.14 invites comparison with 2.1: in the former friendship replaces goodwill (1415b27); in the latter friendship is mentioned together with goodwill (1378a19).

[39] See note 22.

from Lysias. In the sixteenth speech, *In Defense of Mantitheus*, the speaker, who has been elected to the Council, is accused of having served in the cavalry during the reign of the Thirty. He first defends himself against the specific accusation and then proposes to speak about his entire life. He recognizes that in most cases a defendant should confine himself to the charge, says that public scrutinies are exceptional and asks the members of the Council to listen to him with goodwill (δέομαι οὖν ὑμῶν μετ' εὐνοίας ἀκροάσασθαί μου 9). Here the *logographos* neatly combines what Aristotle emphasizes, arguing the issue, with an explicit appeal for goodwill.[40] Equally instructive is the proem to the first speech, *On the Murder of Eratosthenes*. The speaker appeals for a sympathetic hearing; and although the word "goodwill" does not occur, the idea is clearly present[41] and combined with an attempt to stimulate feelings of outrage against Eratosthenes (1).[42] That too is Aristotelian. It illustrates in a single passage what Aristotle has in mind when he speaks of a remedial proem derived from an attempt to create goodwill and to arouse anger (3.14 1415a34–35).[43]

Aristotle's remarks in 3.14 reflect the actual practice of the *logographoi*. To what extent Aristotle supplemented these remarks when lecturing before students cannot be determined with any certainty. My guess is that he did say more on emotions like goodwill and anger,[44] but I see no compelling reason to believe that Aristotle's early course of lectures included a formal, extended treatment of individual emotions. Moreover, if we consider what Aristotle says in 2.18, we can, I think, reject the idea with some certainty. For this chapter contains a summary of

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[40] Cf. D. MacDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens*, London 1978, 168, who discusses the scrutiny (*dokimasia*) and cites Lysias 16 to illustrate the introduction of extraneous material. S. Usher, *Greek Orators I: Antiphon and Lysias*, Warminster 1985, 255 points out that in practice the members of the Council would have welcomed any evidence which might facilitate a decision between rival candidates.

[41] The opening words of the proem are a poorly disguised pitch for sympathy: περὶ πολλοῦ ἂν ποιησαίμην, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὸ τοιούτους ὑμᾶς ἐμοὶ δικαστὰς περὶ τούτου τοῦ πράγματος γενέσθαι, οἷοίπερ ἂν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς εἴητε τοιαῦτα πεπονθότες (1.1).

[42] Cf. Usher (above, note 40) 222, who brings the speaker's attempt to stimulate outrage under the rubric *locus indignationis ab auditoribus*.

[43] Of course, Aristotle does not mean to imply that a proem must aim to arouse *both* goodwill *and* anger, but the passage in *Lysias* 1.1 combines the two aims in a striking way.

[44] In 1.1 Aristotle tells us that the writers of handbooks concentrated on emotional appeal (1354b19–20). He may have disapproved of this emphasis; but in class he may have felt compelled to expand on his written remarks in order to keep his students from going elsewhere.

Aristotle's original plan—or at least an early plan—for Books 1 and 2. Mention is made of the three kinds of oratory and their premises (1391b23–26); the same is true of sources for making speeches ethical (1391b26–27), arguments common to all kinds of oratory (1391b28–1392a1) and enthymemes and paradigms (1392a1–3). There is, however, no reference to a discussion of emotional response.[45] That is not surprising, if the account of emotions in 2.2–11 dates from the 340s. The early lectures of the 350s did not include an in-depth treatment of emotional response and the references to such a treatment—those occurring in 2.1 and 3.14—date from the 340s.[46] They point to the existing account of individual emotions in 2.2–11; and while this account contains no explicit mention of goodwill, the discussions of friendship (2.4) and kindness (2.7) contain enough relevant material to explain the references in question.[47] Certainly it would have been easy for Aristotle to supplement his prepared remarks on friendship and kindness with comments on goodwill and the character of a credible speaker.

III. *Persuasion through Character*

The account of persuasion through character in 2.1 ends with a reference (1378a19–20) apparently dating from the 340s. Should we assign a similar date to the account itself? Here I think we need to draw a distinction between persuasion through character as one of Aristotle's

[45] Cope (above, note 13) 2.175 and Kennedy (above, note 2) 173 n. 104 suggest that the emotions are to be thought of as included in the reference to ethical speeches (1391b27). It seems to me more natural to construe the mention of ethical speeches—more precisely, "sources from which it is possible to make speeches ethical" (ἐξ ὧν ἠθικοὺς τοὺς λόγους ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν b26–27)—as a reference to 1.8 1366a8–16, where Aristotle speaks explicitly of ethical speech (1366a10). In fact, the connection with 1.8 is made earlier in 2.18, when Aristotle says that he has previously discussed the characters aligned with constitutions and as a result determined how one ought to make speeches ethical (πῶς τε καὶ διὰ τίνων τοὺς λόγους ἠθικοὺς ποιεῖν 1391b22–23). Furthermore, the phrase "ethical speech" occurs in the discussion of proof as a part of an oration (3.17 1418a15, cf. a38). Apparently Aristotle uses it independently of and prior to the development of persuasion through character conceived of as one of three technical *pisteis*. I discuss this development in the next paragraph.

[46] It is possible that the references were added at different times. In particular, the reference in 3.14 may have been added after that in 2.1, perhaps by a later editor like Andronicus.

[47] See "Aristotle on Persuasion through Character" (above, note 2) 219–220 = page 293 in this volume.

three technical modes of proof and traditional uses of self-characterization. In regard to the former, a date in the 340s seems to me quite certain. For in 2.1, as in 1.2, persuasion through character is presented as an alternative to emotional appeal. Its goal is to establish credibility (1.2 1356a5–6; 2.1 1378a6–7) and not to arouse feelings of pleasure and pain such that the audience is affected in judgment (2.1 1378a20–22). The speaker presents three attributes that a sober-minded audience looks for in a credible speaker; and when the facts of a case are difficult to determine, the audience regularly and reasonably believes the speaker who exhibits wisdom, virtue and goodwill.[48] That is persuasion through character conceived of as a technical mode of persuasion, and it is quite distinct from emotional appeal in that there is no attempt to bend the mind of the listener (cf. 1.1 1354a26). Neither of these two modes of persuasion was given technical status when Aristotle first lectured on rhetoric. We can see that clearly in 1.1, where enthymematic reasoning alone is called technical (1354b20–22); emotional appeal is rejected and character is passed over in silence. Later in the 340s, when Aristotle developed a clear understanding of the relationship between belief and emotion, he recognized emotional appeal as a technical mode of persuasion. At the same time or soon afterwards, he increased the technical modes to three. For having developed a clear understanding of emotional response, he thought it important to distinguish mind-bending appeals from those presentations of character that do not aim at gaining favor. And in doing this, he was departing from the practice of contemporary rhetoricians who treated self-characterization as a way of arousing emotion—of winning goodwill[49]—in order to influence judgment. Aristotle was, of course, in full agreement that emotion affects judgment, but he also saw that the character of the speaker can (and often does) play a significant role in rational decision-making.

Turning now to traditional uses of self-characterization, I want to call attention to the fact that Aristotle's triad of attributes has antecedents in earlier Greek literature. In fact, the very beginning of Greek literature, Homer's *Iliad*, presents Nestor as a speaker who is not only

[48] See my "*Benevolentiam conciliare* and *animos permovere*," *Rhetorica* 6 (1988) 262 = Chapter 19 in this volume, page 342.

[49] Cf. the pseudo-Aristotelian *Rhetoric to Alexander* 29, where the author tells us that a speaker may win the goodwill of his audience by presenting himself as someone who has offered useful advice in the past, is just and feels goodwill toward the city (1436b22–26). That is the same triad of attributes which Aristotle recognizes. Only here the triad aims at arousing an emotional response.

well intentioned toward the persons he addresses (1.253) but also prepared to say that he has fought against better men and won obedience through his counsels (1.259–273). In other words, Nestor is presented as a man of goodwill, virtue (courage) and wisdom.[50] Even more striking is the way in which the historian Thucydides has Pericles characterize himself during the second year of the Peloponnesian War. Attica has been invaded twice by Sparta and a plague has taken hold of the city. The Athenians are not only discouraged but also angry at Pericles for having persuaded them to undertake the war. In this context, Pericles decides to address the assembly; but instead of beginning straightway with reasons for persevering, he says that he is not inferior to anyone in regard to determining and expounding what needs to be done, that he is a friend of the city and superior to money (2.60.5). That is clearly the Aristotelian triad: wisdom, goodwill toward the democracy and virtue (an incorruptible character).

Here a caveat is in order. The fact that orators often find it advantageous to present a tripartite character does not mean that the triad of attributes is exclusively rhetorical. It is not. Office holders, including administrators who may never speak before the assembly, need the attributes in question. Not surprisingly they occur in Book 5 of the *Politics*, where Aristotle lists qualifications for high office: namely, friendship toward the established political arrangement, maximum capacity for doing the work of the office, and the virtue and justice proper to the political arrangement (5.9 1309a33–37).[51] Furthermore, the attributes

[50] For a second example, cf. the Homeric description of Kalchas as one who knows everything (1.70), is well intentioned to the persons addressed (1.73) and blameless (1.92). In this case, all three attributes are mentioned by Homer in his narrative; they are not part of Kalchas' speech. The case of Nestor is different in that two of the attributes are claimed within his address. Only one, being well intentioned, remains outside. In Aristotelian persuasion through character, all three attributes are to be claimed or in some other way presented through the words of the speaker.

[51] See "Aristotle on Persuasion through Character" (above, note 2) 223–224 = pages 296–297 in this volume and E. Schütrumpf, "The Model for the Concept of ETHOS in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*," *Philologus* 173 (1993) 15 (Arist., *Pol.* 5.9 is mentioned in note 22). Aristotle's phrase "friendship toward the established political arrangement" (φιλίαν πρὸς τὴν καθεστῶσαν πολιτείαν) may be compared with Pericles' self-description, "friend of the city", cited above (φιλόπολις Thuc. 2.60.5). The former is more complex and precise, but both refer to the goodwill which motivates a patriotic politician. It should be underlined that this goodwill is not an idle wish; it is an enthusiasm which manifests itself in action. By way of illustration, I refer to Demosthenes' *On the Crown* 301. Here the orator is defending the steps he took to meet dangers presented by Philip. He asks "what ought to have been done by the politician of goodwill" (τί χρῆν τὸν εὔνουν πολίτην ποιεῖν) and then restates the question, giving a tripartite description of the politi-

are not peculiar to the sphere of politics. They are useful in many different cooperative endeavors including the search for knowledge by two or more persons. For this reason, a variation of the triad is used by Plato to describe the ideal interlocutor. In the *Gorgias*, Callicles is compared with a touchstone for testing gold and said to possess knowledge, goodwill and frankness (486D2–7, 487A2–3). There is considerable irony here,[52] but that only reinforces my point. In order to play with the three attributes, they must be recognizable as qualities regularly and correctly demanded of partners in a serious undertaking. Aristotle, therefore, does nothing original when he lists wisdom, virtue and goodwill as the attributes of a credible speaker. He is drawing on tradition and showing common sense.

Before leaving persuasion through character, I want to call attention to the fact that the tripartite analysis offered in 2.1 is closely tied to deliberative oratory and therefore well suited to the ideal rhetoric set forth in 1.1. There the superiority of deliberative oratory is clearly stated. Its activity is called nobler and fitter for a citizen than that concerning private transactions. In addition, the teachers of rhetoric are criticized for ignoring deliberation and devoting themselves to the courtroom, where judges are prone to listen with partiality (1354b22–1355a1). The account of persuasion through character in 2.1 is entirely

cian: "What ought to be done by the person engaged in politics with all forethought and eagerness and justice on behalf of the fatherland" (τί τὸν μετὰ πάσης προνοίας καὶ προθυμίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος πολιτευόμενον). Here we have the Aristotelian triad (forethought = wisdom, eagerness = goodwill, justice = virtue), and the replacement of "goodwill" with "eagerness" underlines the motivating aspect of friendship for the city. Cf. 312, where "goodwill" and "eagerness" occur together, referring to a zealous love of the city.

[52] There is also considerable art involved in Plato's use of three attributes. Earlier Socrates is made to dissociate rhetoric from fine things (463A3–4) and to deny that rhetoric is a technical pursuit (A6–7). It is said to belong to the soul which can hit the mark (στοχαστική), has courage (ἀνδρεία) and is by nature capable of interacting with people (δεινὴ προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις). It is given the generic name "flattery" (A7–B1). Unless I overestimate the care with which Plato has constructed the *Gorgias*, he is at 463A–B already looking forward to 487A and setting up a comparison between the attributes of the successful orator and those of the reliable partner in dialectic. Capacity in hitting the mark (without reflection) corresponds to (and falls short of) knowledge; courage relates closely to frankness (cf. 494D4); the ability to interact in the manner of a flatterer contrasts with goodwill. It may be pleasant (cf. πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὁμιλεῖν 513D3), but disinterested concern is absent. We may compare 491B–D, where Callicles says that the person who is both wise in political matters and courageous (491B1–2, C6–7; or has knowledge and courage 495C4–5) ought to rule. Here too there is no suggestion of goodwill, for Callicles' ruler is concerned with his own advantage.

in line with these remarks in 1.1. Partiality is not an issue; and while the triad of attributes—wisdom, virtue and goodwill—suits the deliberative situation, it can be quite unhelpful in the courtroom. Aristotle says as much in his discussion of narration. He tells us that the narrative part of a judicial speech should be ethical and exhibit choice. We should not give the impression of calculation; rather we should say things like "I wanted that and chose it; and if I did not benefit, so much the better." For the former (i.e., calculation) belongs to the man of practical wisdom, the φρόνιμος, who pursues advantage; the latter to a morally good man who pursues what is noble (3.16 1417a15–27). Here Aristotle recommends that the speaker avoid remarks that suggest the calculations typical of practical wisdom. In many courtroom situations, that is good advice;[53] but it is quite out of place in a deliberative assembly, where selecting an advantageous course of action depends upon wise counsel. I do not want to overlook the fact that there are occasions when a defendant might help his case by appearing clever. Like the speaker in Lysias' seventh speech, *On the Olive-Stump*, he might want to be thought of as a clever individual who would always weigh the possible gain against the possible penalty and therefore never commit the crime of which he is accused (12). For our purposes, however, the important point is that the Aristotelian triad comes apart in the courtroom. And that should not surprise us, for the triad fits deliberative situations, not judicial ones.

If that is correct, then Aristotle is himself open to the sort of criticism that he brings against the writers of handbooks. He says that they divide speeches in a ridiculous manner, for narration of the kind they talk about belongs only to judicial oratory; it cannot belong to epideictic and deliberative oratory (3.13, 1414a36–38). Similarly we might criticize Aristotle on the grounds that his kind of persuasion through character (i.e., the kind that involves wisdom, virtue and goodwill) belongs only to deliberative oratory. Aristotle was, I think, well aware of this difficulty; and in the opening sections of 2.1, he seems to concede the point, telling us that the presentation of character is more

[53] Cf. the first speech of Lysias, *On the Murder of Eratosthenes*, in which the defendant must rebut the charge of premeditated entrapment. Toward this end it is not only important to argue that planning and foreknowledge were not involved (40–42) but also useful to present oneself as a simple-minded or naïve person who is readily deceived (10). See Usher (above, note 40) 220, 223; and cf. P.Oxy. 410 (above, note 15) lines 114–121, where the writer of the handbook tells us that it is sometimes useful to pretend forgetfulness, for that suggests spontaneous action as against a calculated plot.

useful in deliberative situations (1377b29–30).[54] Aristotle does, of course, say that presentations of character can make a difference in the courtroom (1377b26), but the assertion remains unexplained. In particular, we are not told whether the character in question must be the triad of attributes which is discussed in the subsequent account of the speaker's character (1378a6–20).[55] Significantly this account makes no reference to judicial oratory; only deliberation is mentioned (1378a10 and 14). In my judgment, that reflects the fact that the triad suits the deliberative orator. In any case, the extension to all kinds of orator,[56] in particular to that of the courtroom, is strained and did not become standard among later rhetoricians.[57]

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[54] The lines 1377b29–31 are bracketed by Kassel (above, note 37) 76. That is unnecessary. See "Aristotle on Persuasion through Character" (above, note 2) 216 n. 9 = pages 289–290 in this volume.

[55] When Aristotle first introduces persuasion through character in 1.2, he does not list the three attributes mentioned in 2.1. Instead he speaks of men who are fair-minded (ἐπιεικεῖς 1356a6). This characterization seems to emphasize moral goodness (cf. 2.19 1392b23–24) and therefore appears well suited to the courtroom (cf. 1.15 1376a28–29). In 1.8 Aristotle speaks of the man who appears to be morally good and possessed of goodwill (ἀγαθός and εὔνους 1366a11). Practical wisdom is not mentioned, which is consistent with the emphasis upon exhibiting choice (προαίρεσις 1366a15, cf. 3.16 1417a23–26). It should, however, be underlined that there is no explicit mention of persuasion through character (διὰ τοῦ ἤθους) in 1.8. Instead Aristotle speaks of persuasion through ethical speech (δί ἠθικοῦ ⟨λόγου⟩ 1366a10), and that suggests an early date prior to the establishment of the three technical modes of persuasion (cf. 3.17 1418a15, 38). See above, note 45.

[56] A cautionary word concerning epideictic oratory seems in order. Aristotle does not say explicitly which attributes an epideictic orator might want to claim for himself, and at a more fundamental level, he ignores the question whether self-characterization is appropriate in an epideictic speech. Moreover, when he turns to self-characterization in 2.1, he seems to restrict his remarks to deliberations and judicial proceedings leading to judgment (1377b21–22), and that appears to exclude epideictic oratory (cf. 1.3 1358b2–6). Clearly the epideictic orator is not central to Aristotle's thinking about persuasion through character. Nevertheless, the three attributes listed by Aristotle might well play an important role in the selection of an epideictic speaker, and if the chosen speaker finds his own character challenged, he might help himself by laying claim to wisdom, virtue and goodwill. Cf. Thucydides 2.34.6–35.1, discussed in the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik* under "Ethos".

[57] Something similar can be said concerning the handling of "the opinion of the speaker" in the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum*. This supplementary proof is bipartite: the speaker shows that he has experience concerning the matters under discussion and that it is to his advantage to tell the truth (14.8 1431b10–13). That is a variation on persuasion through character as presented in *Rhetoric* 2.1. Being experienced corresponds to having practical wisdom and finding it advantageous to tell the truth does the job that virtue and goodwill do. Not surprisingly the author of the *Rhet. ad Alex.* lists "the opinion of the speaker" among proofs most appropriate to deliberative speeches (32.1 1438b33–35) and does not mention it when supplementary proofs are first introduced (7.2 1428a18–19;

IV. *Characters Tied to Age and Fortune*

Moving now to 2.12–17, we find Aristotle again discussing character, but in a very different way. Without explicit reference to the speaker or to the audience, Aristotle surveys first the attributes that mark young men (2.12), then those typical of old men and men in their prime (2.13–14), and finally those tied to fortune: i.e., those found in persons who are well-born, rich and powerful (2.15–17). The survey follows on the account of individual emotions, and that suggests viewing the survey as a supplement useful for constructing emotional appeals. Such a view is certainly not foolish. An orator who knows that young men are quick-tempered (2.12 1389a9) will, when confronted by a youthful audience, consider whether exciting anger may help his case. And if he knows that old men are cowardly and given to anxiety (2.13 1389b29–30), he will recognize the possibility of exciting fear in an audience of older people. But however useful the survey may be in regard to emotional appeal, its utility is not restricted to this mode of persuasion. It can also be applied to the character of the speaker. For if a young speaker or his *logographos* knows that youth is marked by good hopes (2.12 1389a19, 27), he will think it natural to fill the prologue with expressions of confidence, much as Lysias does in the sixteenth oration, *For Mantitheus* (1–2).[58] And when narrating events, such a speaker or writer will take note of youthful idealism (2.12 1389a32–33) and use phrases like "I chose that; and even if I gained nothing, it is better so" (3.16, 1417a26–27). Furthermore, the survey can be called upon when the speaker's opponent or some third person is being described. For example, when a rich man is brought into court and accused of seducing another man's wife, the prosecution may find it helpful to focus on the defendant's wealth, for persons of substance are self-indulgent and likely to commit adultery (2.17 1391a19). Or again, in a deliberative situation, it may be relevant to cite attributes tied to good and bad fortune. For a strikingly Aristotelian example, I refer to Book 3 of Thucydides' *Histories*, where Diodotus addresses the Athenian assem-

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the manuscript tradition is correct), for the author is concerned with proofs especially useful in accusation and defence (6.3 1428a6–7). When it is subsequently discussed among the supplementary proofs (14.8–9 1431b10–19), it seems out of place, for the other supplementary proofs, witness, torture and oath, are closely tied to judicial oratory. For further discussion, see David Mirhady, "Non-technical *Pisteis* in Aristotle and Anaximenes," *American Journal of Philology* 112 (1991) 9–12.

[58] See Usher (above, note 40) 253.

bly and argues against imposing capital punishment on all the male inhabitants of Mytilene. He tells his audience that extreme punishment is no deterrent (3.45.1–3) and reflects on the ways men are affected by fortune. Poverty, he says, constrains men and makes them bold so that they undertake risks. Wealth produces the same result through arrogance and greed, and similarly with the other conditions of fortune (3.45.4). What these other conditions are is not made explicit, but we can take a hint from Aristotle and suggest power and weakness (2.17 1391a20-b7).

It seems, then, that Aristotle's survey of different kinds of character can be helpful in a variety of ways. It supplements both the immediately preceding discussion of emotions in 2.2–11 and the account of persuasion through character in 2.1. In addition, it can play a role in constructing a narrative, attacking the character of an opponent and deliberating about important matters of state. That leaves open, however, the question of when and why the survey was first composed. One possibility is that it was written early, during the 350s, in response to a passage in Plato's *Phaedrus*, where Socrates insists that the orator must know what kinds of soul there are (272D1–2). A connection with two passages in the *Gorgias* is also possible. In one, Callicles contrasts the philosopher with the person who is noble and good, arguing that the former is helpless because he lacks *inter alia* experience of the pleasures and desires of men, and generally of their characters: τῶν ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, καὶ συλλήβδην τῶν ἠθῶν (484D5–6).[59] In the other passage, Socrates tells Callicles that whoever can make him most like the Atheman demos will help him become a politician and rhetorician/orator, for each group of people is delighted with speeches spoken in its own character: τῷ αὑτῶν γὰρ ἤθει λεγομένων τῶν λόγων ἕκαστοι χαίρουσι (513B8–C1). The very words invite comparison with the end of *Rhetoric* 2.13, where Aristotle says that all men are receptive of speeches spoken in their own character and similar to themselves: ἀποδέχονται πάντες τοὺς τῷ σφετέρῳ ἤθει λεγομένους λόγους καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους (1390a25–26). Caution is, however, in order, for *Rhetoric* 2.12–17 makes no mention of the demos or any other well-defined political group. Indeed, the absence of examples from oratory suggests that this survey of different kinds of character was not originally written

[59] While Aristotle's account of the characters of age and fortune includes more than pleasures and desires, it does not ignore them. Cf. the account of old men: 1389b26, 32–35; 1390a9–15.

for rhetorical instruction.[60] It may, for example, have originated in an ethical-political context or been part of a collection like the lost *Divisions*. Certainty here is unattainable, but I think it likely that the survey was originally independent of Aristotle's lectures on rhetoric. It was written during the 350s and transferred to its present place during the 340s, soon after the existing account of individual emotions became part of rhetorical instruction.[61]

V. *Conclusion*

Finally I summarize my thoughts on the development of Aristotle's teaching and writing on rhetoric. The early lectures, those of the 350s, are likely to have covered a variety of topics. Aristotle presented an ideal view that emphasizes arguing the issue under consideration (1.1, 3.1, 3.13). He was critical of contemporary rhetoricians for concentrating on emotional appeal and the parts of an oration, but this criticism did not prevent him from discussing such topics within a course of lectures organized according to the divisions of an oration (3.13–19). He also offered instruction in style. Some of his views, especially those on prose rhythm (3.8), may date from the end of the Academic period, toward 347 B.C.; others like those on clarity *qua* virtue of style may have been developed earlier during the 350s. Whatever the exact dates, the Academic lectures included remarks on emotional appeal as part of, e.g., the discussion of the proem and epilogue (3.14 and 19). However, an extended, in-depth treatment of the subject did not become part of the rhetorical lectures until later, perhaps the second half of the 340s, when the existing account (2.2–11), originally written for a different context, was made part of rhetorical instruction. At roughly the same time,

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[60] See Kennedy (above, note 2) 164, and cf. 176 on *Rhet.* 2.19.

[61] Such a sequence is compatible with the apparent reference at 2.13, 1390a22 to the preceding discussion of pity in 2.8 1385b13–19. The reference may have been added in the 340s, when the account of individual emotions and the survey of different characters were made part of the course on rhetoric. More problematic is the brief remark at 2.13 1390a25–28 (already mentioned in connection with *Gorgias* 513B8–C1) concerning receptivity to speech spoken in character. Its position after the accounts of young and old men and before that of men in their prime seems awkward. That may reflect a halfhearted effort to integrate the survey of different characters into the rhetorical lectures. Nevertheless, the remark itself is not narrowly rhetorical. It is equally appropriate to politics and ethics and may well belong to the survey as originally composed.

the character of the speaker became a separate topic—one of the three technical modes of persuasion (1.2, 2.1)—and the account of characters tied to different ages and fortunes (2.12–17) was transferred to rhetoric from a different context.

[37/38]

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

CICERO AS A REPORTER OF ARISTOTELIAN AND THEOPHRASTEAN RHETORICAL DOCTRINE

I

Recent years have seen an increased interest in Cicero's rhetorical works. Numerous articles have appeared in the journals and several influential books have been published.[1] The general thrust has been favorable to Cicero. Old-fashioned *Quellenforschung* has been largely set aside, and Cicero's originality has been strongly emphasized. With this development I have no quarrel. Indeed, we should all be pleased, only we should also keep in mind that Cicero is not above criticism, and that *Quellenforschung* goes in two directions. Whereas most practitioners of the art have attempted to identify the Greek sources on which Cicero has drawn, there are other practitioners who are concerned with Cicero as a source for lost Greek authors. The former practitioners generally admire the Greeks and view Cicero as an unoriginal author, who took ideas from others and dressed them up in elegant prose. The latter group of practitioners are not especially concerned with Cicero's originality. Rather, they are interested in Cicero's reports concerning his predecessors and whether these reports are accurate or inaccurate. For accurate reports are useful for recovering the doctrines of authors whose works have been lost. But inaccurate reports are misleading and therefore impede attempts to uncover the past.

I am a practitioner of the latter kind of *Quellenforschung*, and in this paper I want to look at Cicero as a source for early Peripatetic rhetorical theory, especially the theory of Aristotle's pupil and colleague, Theophrastus. My reasons for doing so are threefold. 1) Theophrastus is generally regarded as an influential writer on rhetoric, but all his rhetorical works have been lost. Later sources for his doctrines are sur-

[1] Among recent books, the following should be mentioned: A.D. Leeman *et al.*, *M. Tullius Cicero, De oratore libri III, Kommentar* (Heidelberg: Winter 1981–1996), J. Wisse, *Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero* (Amsterdam: Hakkert 1989), J. May and J. Wisse, *Cicero, On the Ideal Orator* (Oxford: University Press 2001) and *Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric*, ed. J. May (Leiden: Brill 2002).

prisingly few, and among them Cicero stands out. In the most recent collection of sources, the section on rhetoric and poetics contains forty-seven texts (667–713 FHS&G). [2] Fourteen are Ciceronian, and of these all may be viewed as rhetorical.[3] Among the other sources, Dionysius of Halicarnassus is represented by five texts, Quintilian by five and Demetrius Rhetor by four. 2) Critics of Cicero's reports concerning Greek rhetorical theory are occasionally dismissed as driven by anti-Ciceronian bias.[4] I concede that an anti-Ciceronian bias, if unqualified, is unacceptable. But when the issue is historical truth, there is good reason to approach Cicero with considerable caution. [5] 3) Cicero says much about Aristotle's views on rhetoric. That is important, for

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[2] FHS&G = *Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for His Life, Writings, Thought and Influence*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh, P. Huby. R. Sharples and D. Gutas (Leiden: Brill 1991, reprinted with corrections 1992).

[3] If there is an exception, it is text 713 FHS&G, which may relate to both rhetoric and poetics. I discuss the text below in Section III.

[4] The charge of anti-Ciceronian bias is directed at me by J. Wisse, "*De oratore: Rhetoric, Philosophy, and the Making of the Ideal Orator*" in *Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric*, ed. J. May (Leiden: Brill 2002) 386 n. 14. Cf. May and Wisse (2001) 39 n. 52.

[5] The need for caution in dealing with Ciceronian reports concerning the views of earlier philosophers (as against writers on rhetoric) is well known. I offer here a single example that I find particularly instructive. It is *On Ends* 2.27, where Cicero faults Epicurus for recognizing three genera of desire: natural and necessary, natural but not necessary and neither natural nor necessary. He condemns the division in strong terms—"this is not dividing but breaking up"—and tells us that there are two genera of desire: natural and empty. The former genus, he says, divides into two: natural and necessary and natural and not necessary. Epicurus, it would seem, has erred in failing to distinguish between generic and specific desires. But has he? The Epistle to Menoeceus, which is preserved by Diogenes Laertius in his *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.127, suggests otherwise. In the epistle, Epicurus first recognizes two kinds of desire, those that are natural and those that are empty, after which the philosopher divides natural desires into those that are natural and necessary and those that are only natural. This is exactly the division that Cicero faults Epicurus for failing to make. In fairness to Cicero, it should be acknowledged that this careful division—first into two genera and then one genus into two species—is not explicitly recognized in the so-called Sovran Maxims, a summary of doctrines, which is also preserved by Diogenes Laertius 9.149. There we seem to have a simple tripartite division of desire into natural and necessary, natural and not necessary and neither natural nor necessary. Perhaps Cicero only knew this summary, so that his criticism is based on an imperfect statement of Epicurean doctrine. That may be the case (I am not accusing Cicero of deliberately passing over evidence that would tell against his criticism), but for our knowledge of Epicurus' teachings, it makes little difference whether Cicero had only the statement found in the Sovran Maxims or based his attack on some other text. The important point is that Cicero seems not to have sorted through the evidence or to have done so too quickly, and as a result he has saddled Epicurus with an analysis that does injustice to his considered opinion. (I am indebted to my colleague Kirk Sanders for calling *On Ends* 2.27 to my attention).

Aristotle is not a lost or fragmentary author. We can compare Cicero's statements concerning his doctrines with what he actually says in the surviving treatises. And in this way, we can form a judgment concerning Cicero's reliability—a judgment that has special weight when we turn to Aristotle's pupil, Theophrastus, and ask whether Cicero reports his views accurately. I am not claiming that a reporter always treats his subjects with equal care, but in the case of the two leading Peripatetics, he is likely to do so.

My method will be simple. In Sections II to IV, I shall look at three of Cicero's rhetorical works: *On Invention*, *On the Orator* and the *Orator*. In each case, I shall call attention to statements concerning Aristotle that speak for caution when evaluating reports concerning an author like Theophrastus, whose works are lost. I shall also look at and evaluate what Cicero says about Theophrastus. In Section V, my conclusion will be that Cicero does assist us in recovering the teachings of Theophrastus, but his value as a source should not be overstated. His reports are sometimes quite general, and on occasion what appears to be Theophrastean material may be better construed as a Ciceronian addition.

I do not claim that the proposed procedure is foolproof, but I do think that such a procedure is an important first step when dealing with a fragmentary author. Put generally and succinctly, the study of fragments should begin with a study of the sources.

II

On Invention may have been written between 91 and 89 B.C., when Cicero was 15 to 17 years of age. Later dates have been proposed, but none later than 80 B.C.[6] Originally Cicero planned to write an *ars* that covered the five traditional parts of rhetoric: invention, disposition, expression, memory and delivery (1.9), but only the first part was completed. If we focus on Cicero's age at the time of composition, we must be impressed by what was accomplished, but that is not the focus of this paper. Rather, we are concerned with what Cicero says about early

[6] G. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton: University Press 1972) 107–110 suggests that *On Invention* was written between 91 and 89 B.C. W. Kroll, "Die rhetorischen Schriften," *s.v.* "Tullius, Nr. 29" in *Paulys Realencyclopädie* vol. 7A (1939) col. 1093 thinks that a date as late as 80 B.C. is possible.

Peripatetic rhetoric, and in this regard the work is of some interest, for it provides clear examples of Cicero reporting doctrines set forth in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, but doing so on the basis of secondary sources.[7] An example occurs early in *On Invention*, when Cicero discusses the material of rhetoric. He cites Gorgias and Aristotle and reports that the former extended the material of rhetoric to include any and every subject.[8] In contrast, the latter is said to have recognized only three kinds of subjects: epideictic, deliberative and judicial (1.7). The report of Aristotelian doctrine is in agreement with what Aristotle says in *Rhetoric* 1.3 (1358b6–13), but there is nothing here that encourages us to think that the youthful Cicero had been studying the Aristotelian treatise at first hand. Indeed, since Cicero's explanation of epideictic, deliberative and judicial subject matter is remarkably similar to that put forward by the author of the *Rhetoric to Herennius* (1.2), it is reasonable to assume that both authors are drawing on the same secondary source or at least closely related sources.[9]

A rather different example is provided by a passage in which Cicero tells us that judicial, deliberative and epideictic oratory differ in end. In regard to deliberative oratory, Cicero first says that Aristotle accepted advantage as the end. After that he asserts his own preference for a twofold end: both honor and advantage (2.156). Here Cicero is drawing on a secondary source (most likely the same secondary source that he drew upon when discussing the material of rhetoric), but this time the source is faulty. To be sure, in *Rhetoric* 1.3, Aristotle does connect deliberative oratory with advantage, but he goes on to add that justice and honor may also be considered (1358b24–25). This is not a one-time addition. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle is careful to tell us that when people deliberate, they consider what is easiest and what is best (3.3 1112b17). In other words, moral considerations are not irrelevant when deciding on a course of action. Cicero will not have known this passage from the *Nicomachean Ethics* any more than he knew the passage from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*; he is not lying when he presents a partial picture of Aristotle's view concerning the end of deliberative oratory. But he does use this partial picture (acquired at second hand) to

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[7] Scholars are in agreement that at the time of writing *On Invention*, Cicero had no direct knowledge of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. See, e.g. Wisse (1989) 111.

[8] Cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 447C.

[9] In the *Rhetoric to Herennius* 1.2, Aristotle is not mentioned, but such omission is not significant. For Aristotle's name occurs nowhere in the *Rhetoric to Herennius*. In fact, no Greek writer is mentioned by name.

establish himself as an independent thinker who is capable of correcting a highly respected predecessor. Moreover, were the two Aristotelian treatises lost (i.e., the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Rhetoric*), we would likely have a different picture of the founder of the Peripatos. Following Cicero, we might think that he viewed deliberation as a totally amoral activity.

I turn now to Cicero's treatment of deductive argument. He recognizes two ways in which this mode of reasoning is analyzed. One is a five-part analysis that divides a deductive argument into a major premise, proof of this premise, a minor premise, proof of this premise, and a conclusion. The other analysis recognizes three parts; it does not treat the proofs of the two premises as separate parts (1.58–60). Cicero tells us that he prefers the five-part analysis, adding that it has been adopted by all who take their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus. He then opposes deduction to induction, saying that Socrates and the Socratics were major practitioners of induction, while Aristotle and Theophrastus were especially given to using deduction (1.61).[10] This report is of considerable interest, for we have Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and can say that it nowhere recommends a five-part analysis of deductive argument. [11] Perhaps then Theophrastus recommended such an analysis, and if that is correct, then we are indebted to Cicero for adding to our knowledge of an important but fragmentary writer on rhetoric. I would welcome such an addition, but I think the truth otherwise. Cicero never quite says that Aristotle and/or Theophrastus embraced a five-part analysis. What he says is that those who take their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus have adopted analysis in five parts. If the phrase "take their start from" is used as it is later (2.7),[12] then Cicero is referring to later Peripatetics who may have introduced a five-part analysis into their teaching of rhetoric. Moreover, naming Theophrastus along side of Aristotle was conventional, so that the mention of

[10] Among the sources for Theophrastus, *Inv.* 1.61 equals 674 FHS&G.

[11] A passage like *Rhet.* 1.2 1357a7–10 ("it is possible to form syllogisms and to draw conclusions on the one hand from premises that have been previously established by syllogism and on the other from premises that have not been so established but are in need of a syllogism because they are not generally accepted") may be said to encourage five-part analysis (proof of the major and proof of the minor premise must be added to the two premises and the conclusion). But a passage that may be viewed as encouraging five-part analysis is different from a passage that explicitly recognizes and endorses five-part analysis.

[12] *De inv.* 1.61 *ab Aristotele et Theophrasto profecti*; 2.7 *ab hoc (sc. Aristotele) profecti.*

Theophrastus may carry no special significance.[13] Indeed, it is not clear that an actual member of the school was the originator of five-part analysis. For having said that Aristotle and Theophrastus were given to using deduction, Cicero mentions a third user: namely, those rhetoricians who are considered most elegant and artful. My guess is that these rhetoricians, whoever they may have been, were the first to develop an analysis into five parts. While not members of the Peripatos, they will have oriented themselves toward the school and were pleased to associate themselves with its most famous representatives.

Cicero's treatment of five-part analysis is of interest for quite a different reason. It exhibits a clash between ambition and truthfulness. After introducing the dispute between those who favor a five-part analysis and those who favor one in three parts, Cicero announces that he will set out the controversy and give the arguments of both sides. What he does, however, is unsatisfactory. He gives a less than clear example of five-part deduction[14] and fails to give reasons for preferring five parts. In contrast, he gives reasons for preferring three parts but no example (1.58–60). The imbalance might be excused as a failing attributable to youth, but that would overlook what is almost certainly motivating Cicero. He wants to enhance his own image, and toward that end, he makes a fresh start, saying that he prefers five parts and that he must explain his preference (1.61). There follows an elaborate argument that is intended not only to show the possibility of five-part analysis but also to expose the error of three-part analysis.[15] That is what we expected Cicero to offer when he first set out the controversy (1.58–60). Instead, the argument has been withheld and advanced as Cicero's own explanation in favor of five-part analysis.[16] I do not want to be unfair to the young Cicero, but it appears that a strong desire to impress the reader has led him to dissemble. To be sure, Cicero was not the only ancient

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[13] See D. Runia, "Aristotle and Theophrastus Conjoined in the Writings of Cicero" in *Cicero's Knowledge of the Peripatos*, ed. W. Fortenbaugh and P. Steinmetz = *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 4 (New Brunswick: Transaction 1989) 23–38.

[14] On this example, see S. Schweinfurth-Walla, *Studien zu den rhetorischen Überzeugungsmitteln bei Cicero und Aristoteles* (Tübingen: Narr 1986) 158 and my paper, "Cicero, On Invention 1.51–77: Hypothetical Syllogistic and the Early Peripatos," *Rhetorica* 16 (1998) 32–35, reprinted in *Theophrastean Studies* (Stuttgart: Steiner 2003) 57–59.

[15] "But if that is so, it is false that there is no argument of more than three parts" (1.63).

[16] For fuller discussion of this argument (especially the involvement of hypothetical syllogistic), see "Cicero *On Invention*" (1998) 35–39, reprinted in *Theophrastean Studies* 59–62.

to engage in this sort of dissembling. One thinks of the author of the *Rhetoric to Herennius*, who begins his discussion of style by denouncing the use of borrowed examples and stating his intention to coin his own (4.1–10). However, in what follows, the author presents borrowed examples without acknowledging that they are not his own. His earlier claim to originality turns out to be an exaggeration or outright dishonesty.[17] The same is true, I fear, of Cicero's claim to explain his preference for five-part analysis.

Before leaving *On Invention*, I want to mention a later passage in which Cicero compares himself with the painter Zeuxis, who is said to have painted a picture of Helen of Troy for the people of Croton. He had the most beautiful girls of the city brought together in one place, and from them he selected five to be his models (2.1–3). Similarly Cicero claims to have based his treatise on more than one model. He tells us that all writers were collected in one place, and that he excerpted from them what each said best (2.4). He even boasts that he had a larger collection of models to choose from than Zeuxis had. For the painter could draw on only the girls of one city at one particular time, but he could select what pleased him from all who had written on rhetoric from the very beginning to the present time (2.5). Cicero is exaggerating to the point of dishonesty, and in what follows he admits as much. First he refers to the Peripatetics and tells us that everyone reads Aristotle's survey of early rhetoricians, i.e., Aristotle's *Collection of Arts*, rather than the actual writings of these rhetoricians. He adds that Aristotle's followers contribute something of value (2.6–7) and then turns to the school of Isocrates. Cicero admits that he has not seen Isocrates' *Art of Rhetoric*, but he claims to have found precepts by pupils and followers of Isocrates (2.7–8). Finally, Cicero mentions certain eclectics who combined Aristotelian and Isocratean doctrine, after which he says that he had before himself, as far as possible (*quoad facultas tulit*), all these authorities, both the eclectics and earlier writers (2.8). The phrase "as far as possible" is significant, for it is an admission that the initial claim to have assembled all the relevant writings (2.4–5)

[17] I agree with A. Corbeill, "Rhetorical Education in Cicero's Youth" in *Brill's Companion to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric*, ed. J. May (Leiden: Brill 2002) 35, who writes: "Scholars have succeeded in demonstrating that the Auctor is over-exuberant, if not outright dishonest, in his claims of independence. This is especially evident in Book Four, where he exaggeratedly claims to have used his own examples to illustrate aspects of rhetorical style." Kinder is G. Kennedy (1972) 130–134, who excuses the author by saying that he has adapted his examples and engaged in translation.

is at best an exaggeration. Indeed, his basic sources were most likely late handbooks (*artes* 2.8) composed by eclectic rhetoricians. Certainly one wonders why Cicero contrasted himself with Zeuxis and claimed to have assembled all the relevant literature. Such a boast may be attributable to youth, but it also raises questions concerning Cicero's credibility.

III

The work *On the Orator* was written in 55 B.C., as much as 35 years after *On Invention*. It is a work of maturity (Cicero was 51 years of age) and generally considered Cicero's finest work on rhetoric. With that assessment I have no quarrel. What concerns me is the issue of reliability. Let me begin by acknowledging that *On the Orator* is a dialogue and not history. Historical figures are introduced, but their portrayal is not always in accord with historical fact. That is permitted by the genre and is not in itself a fault.[18] An example is Antonius, who claims to have read both the book in which Aristotle set forth the views of all earlier writers on rhetoric and the books in which Aristotle stated his own views on the topic (2.160). There can be no doubt that Antonius is referring to Aristotle's *Collection of Arts* and to the work that we know as the *Rhetoric*.[19] That Antonius had actually read through the *Rhetoric* is not to be believed. Cicero is presenting a particular picture of Antonius—someone who, despite pretending otherwise, has considerable knowledge of Greek rhetorical theory—and toward that end Cicero makes Antonius claim to have read the *Rhetoric*. What worries me here is not the departure from historical truth but rather the idea (repeatedly advanced in the scholarly literature) that Cicero is using Antonius to tell the reader something about his own sources, i.e., Cicero, by way of Antonius, is suggesting "that he (Cicero) has read the *Rhetoric*."[20] That may be the suggestion, but is it based on

[18] J. Wisse, "the Intellectual Background of the Rhetorical Works" in *Brill's Companon to Cicero: Oratory and Rhetoric*, ed. J. May (Leiden: Brill 2002) 338–340.

[19] P. Moraux, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen vol. 1 (Berlin: De Gruyter 1973) 41.

[20] Wisse (1989) 151, who writes "strongly suggests". Cf. May-Wisse (2001) 165 n. 123 and Wisse (2002) 385. Two of Cicero's letters, *Att.* 4.10 and *Fam.* 1.9, have been cited to support the idea that Cicero knew the *Rhetoric* at first hand. I discuss these letters in an Appendix at the end of this paper.

fact? Much depends on what one means by "reading." It is possible that at some time Cicero did have the *Rhetoric* in his hands and had even read through it quickly, but that he had read it with care seems to me most unlikely. Indeed, had he read the work carefully, he would not have had Antonius go on to say that Aristotle despised the art of rhetoric (2.160). To be sure the *Rhetoric* contains some harsh remarks concerning the art as it was being taught in the 4th century, but the *Rhetoric* as a whole clearly exhibits a respect for the art. Indeed, in some respects the *Rhetoric* satisfies Plato's call for a new and philosophic rhetoric.[21]

Prior to Antonius' claim to have read the *Rhetoric*, Catulus is made to suggest that Antonius had read and studied what Aristotle has to say about *loci*, i.e., topics or lines of argument (2.152). Catulus appears to be referring to Aristotle's treatise called *Topics*,[22] and if that is correct we again have Antonius reading a work that he is unlikely to have read, let alone studied. Should we, then, interpret Catulus' suggestion as an indication of Cicero's own reading? That may seem reasonable, if we construe Antonius' claim to have read the *Rhetoric* as an indication of Cicero's reading, but the idea becomes less appealing, if we reflect on what Cicero says eleven years later (44 B.C.) in the introduction to his own *Topics*. There Cicero tells us that his work is an extended recollection of what the Aristotelian treatise contains (5), but in fact what follows is not based on that treatise. We need not conclude that Cicero is lying, but he is in error. Apparently he has mistaken a different work for the Aristotelian treatise. And if Cicero did not know the Aristotelian treatise in 44 B.C., there is no reason to believe that he was any better informed earlier in 55 B.C., when he wrote *On the Orator*.[23]

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[21] A good example is the analysis of individual emotions in *Rhet.* 2.1–11. It agrees formally with the procedure recommended by Plato in the *Phaedrus*: a *logos* should begin with a definition (263D2–3) and subsequent portions should be arranged according to a certain necessity (264B4, 7). Moreover and more importantly, in employing a deductive method to analyze the emotions, Aristotle is guided by principles set forth in his own *Analytics*. See "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 52 (1970) 40–70 = Chapter 1 in this volume.

[22] Moraux (1973) 41 and Wisse (1989) 143, 148.

[23] May and Wisse (2001) 39 n. 52 assert that Cicero's confusion concerning the *Topics* "has no bearing on the question of Cicero's knowledge of the *Rhetoric*." (See also Wisse [1989] 133–145). I disagree. If Antonius' alleged knowledge of the Rhetoric can be transferred to Cicero, can't Antonius' alleged knowledge of the *Topics* be transferred to Cicero? Only in the case of the *Topics*, it is certain that Cicero did not know the work in 44 B.C. and presumably was no more knowledgeable eleven years earlier.

Antonius' response to Catulus' suggestion concerning the *Topics* is of some interest. He first tells us that exhibiting knowledge of things Greek hurts a speaker and then says that total disinterest in Greek learning would be brutish and inhuman. Accordingly Antonius recommends paying attention to the Greeks from afar, and this he claims to have done, saying that he has tasted them in summary form (2.153). Here, I suggest, we may have the best indication of Cicero's own reading. He has not totally ignored Aristotle, but he has kept his distance, acquiring some knowledge either through cursory reading or by making use of summaries and collections of excerpts.[24] An illustration of the latter possibility may be found in Antonius' argument for the existence of an art of rhetoric. It runs as follows: Since many orators argue cases haphazardly while others do so more cleverly as a result of practice and experience, it must be possible to discern why some orators speak better than others. And whoever does this over the entire province of rhetoric will discover the art or at least something like the art (2.32). A similar argument in similar words (albeit in Greek as against Latin) is found in the introductory paragraph to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. It has been argued that the correspondence between the passages is unique and "cannot be a matter of tradition."[25] That seems to me overstatement. We have seen that in *On Invention*, Cicero expresses his preference for five-part deduction, which he says has been adopted by all who take their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus (1.61). On my reading of this passage, Cicero is referring to Hellenistic rhetoricians who counted themselves among the followers of Aristotle. And if that is correct, there was a Peripatetic tradition in Hellenistic rhetoric,[26] and that tradition may well have preserved certain arguments of Aristotle, either in collections of excerpts or in summaries of the master's work. Indeed, a succinct argument for the existence of an art of rhetoric found in an introductory paragraph to an Aristotelian treatise is just the sort of passage that would be excerpted and passed on along with other

[24] Caveat: I am not suggesting that Cicero shared the mind-set of Antonius. He did not need to hide nor did he want to hide his knowledge of Greek literature. He may, nevertheless, have tasted it from afar in that he sometimes consulted summaries and on other occasions read works in the original without careful study.

[25] Wisse (1989) 114.

[26] The existence of such a tradition is hardly to be doubted. Indeed, the Peripatetics themselves (as against rhetoricians who identified themselves with the Peripatetics) continued to teach rhetoric. See the remarks on Staseas in the immediately following paragraph.

choice bits of Aristotelica. I do not press the matter, for our concern is with Cicero as a reporter of Aristotelian and Theophrastean doctrine. In having Antonius argue for an art of rhetoric, Cicero does not refer to Aristotle, so that if the *Rhetoric* had been lost, we would not know that Aristotle anticipated Cicero.

Earlier in *On the Orator*, Aristotle and Theophrastus are mentioned together in three passages, none of which testifies to first hand knowledge of either Aristotle's or Theophrastus' treatises, i.e., esoteric works on rhetoric. In one passage (1.49 = 51 FHS&G), Crassus is made to say that the two Peripatetics were eloquent in the subjects they discussed. That is a description of the dialogues of Aristotle and Theophrastus and not their school treatises. No information is conveyed concerning Cicero's familiarity with either Aristotle's *Rhetoric* or the rhetorical treatises of Theophrastus. The other two passages are closely related. In the first (1.43 = 667 FHS&G), Scaevola says that the Peripatetics would prove that the supports and embellishments of speaking ought to be acquired from them,[27] and that Aristotle and Theophrastus have written better and at greater length than all the teachers of rhetoric. The latter assertion is quite general, and in regard to length it may be an exaggeration, but the former seems fair enough. Certain Peripatetics of the second and first centuries B.C. will have claimed rhetorical instruction for themselves. As an example, I cite the Peripatetic Staseas, who is later mentioned by Crassus as someone who might be summoned to present a contemporary view of rhetorical practice. He is described as a leader in his field and may well have spoken often and glowingly about the accomplishments of Aristotle and Theophrastus. In the other passage (1.55 = 668 FHS&G), Crassus is disagreeing with Scaevola. He says that Aristotle and Theophrastus do not claim rhetorical subjects as their own. Rather, they acknowledge that these matters belong to orators. That is, indeed, an odd assertion, and the justification for it is no better. In labeling their books "rhetorical" the Peripatetics are admitting that what they say on these matters belongs to the orators, i.e., the ῥήτορες. That is a gross misunderstanding of the Peripatetic practice of labeling works in accordance with contents. It is hard to imagine anyone believing that the argument represents the thinking of even a minor Peripatetic, let alone Aristotle and Theophrastus.

[27] The wording here echoes what Cicero says concerning Aristotle in *Inv.* 1.7.

Much later in the dialogue, when Cicero has Crassus report Aristotle's view of prose rhythm (3.182–183), demonstrable error occurs. Cicero has Crassus begin his report with remarks concerning the iambic and "trochaic" rhythms. In contrast, Aristotle begins his account with the heroic (dactylic) rhythm (3.8 1408b32). That in itself is unimportant, but what Crassus goes on to report is noteworthy. We are told that both the iambic and the "trochaic" rhythms occur in everyday speech, but in the *Rhetoric* that is said only of the iambic rhythm (1408b33–34). In addition, Cicero has Crassus confuse the trochee (—u) with the tribrach (uuu). In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle uses the Greek word τροχαῖος for the trochee (1408b36). In *On the Orator*, Crassus speaks of the *trochaeus*, which is the word Cicero regularly uses for the tribrach. That is not the end of confusion. Crassus tells us that Aristotle encourages the use of the heroic rhythm, providing its use is limited to two feet or a little more. But Aristotle does not speak of two feet, and despite a textual difficulty, it is clear that he rejects the heroic rhythm (1408b32–33, 1409a7–8). Why Crassus's report is so wrong at this point is a matter of speculation. Perhaps Cicero was thinking for himself. He may have observed that Aristotle not only attributes dignity to the heroic rhythm (1408b32) but also demands that prose achieve a measure of dignity (1308b35). Putting the two together, he may have been misled into thinking that Aristotle must have welcomed the heroic rhythm. Or perhaps Cicero had a copy of the *Rhetoric* that differed from the text we have today. Or perhaps he was following a faulty summary in a Latin handbook: one that *inter alia* translated τροχαῖος with *trochaeus*. Or perhaps he read his source (whether the *Rhetoric* itself or a summary) too quickly. For our purposes, however, we can leave the matter undecided. What is important is that we see Cicero through Crassus offering a report of Aristotelian doctrine that is erroneous in several ways. And that should give us pause when dealing with reports that cannot be checked in such a straightforward manner, because the work or works that stand behind the reports have been lost.

Crassus concludes his remarks on Aristotle by pointing out Aristotle's preference for the paeon. The first paeon, which begins with a long syllable (—uuu), is Aristotle's choice for the beginning of the period, and the fourth paeon, which ends with a long (uuu—), is preferred at the end (3.183). Here Crassus reports correctly what is said in *Rhetoric* 3.8 (1409a11–21), but he interrupts his remarks with a quasi-footnote concerning the cretic (—u—). He says that the fourth paeon is almost equal to the cretic, not in the number of syllables but by the measure

of the ear, which is the more accurate judge.[28] Two examples involving cretics follow. The first is a line of poetry composed entirely of cretics. The second is the beginning of a speech of Fannius. Again we have all cretics. After that Crassus says, "He thinks this (*hunc*) more suited to endings which he wishes to terminate for the most part in a long syllable." Here the reader's comprehension is challenged, for the pronoun "this" (*hunc*) seems to refer to the cretic (picking up *a quo numero*, with which the example from Fannius is introduced). But "he" (*ille*) almost certainly refers to Aristotle. Crassus is repeating what has already been made clear: namely that Aristotle prefers a fourth paeon at the end of a period. We might fault Cicero for adding a remark on the cretic that not only breaks up his report concerning Aristotle but also has the potential for confusing the reader. I prefer, however, to emphasize Cicero's readiness to introduce something on his own. In principle there is no reason why he should avoid adding material that enriches a report or otherwise enhances his prose, but if we are using reports to recover lost doctrine, then we must keep in mind that additions by Cicero are possible. In the next section, I shall consider examples from the *Orator*,[29] but for the moment I want to stay with *On the Orator*.

Immediately after the report concerning Aristotle, Crassus says that prose should be marked by loose rhythm. He cites Theophrastus in support of this view (3.184 = 701 FHS&G) and then develops Theophrastus' thinking on prose rhythm in two steps.[30] First, we are told that the dithyramb developed from the anapaest, and that its members and feet are found throughout opulent prose (3.185). Crassus does not elaborate on this report and no other source provides additional details. Despite errors regarding Aristotle, there is no reason to doubt this report, but equally we should not assume that Cicero knew much more than he has Crassus say. Second, we are told that the rhythm that occurs in voice is to be counted as a virtue of speech, providing it is not continuous (3.185). There is no problem here. Like Aristotle, who called

[28] On the ear as the measure of prose rhythm, see Section IV. The use of "almost" (*fere*) is interesting, for it suggests that Cicero can tell a difference in time between the paeon and the cretic (two shorts are not quite the same as a long), but Michael Winterbottom has suggested to me in private correspondence that the use of "almost" can be treated as dialogue speech, i.e., the sort of qualifier that people throw in when discussing a matter off the cuff.

[29] *Or.* 218 and 79.

[30] The construction of Cicero's sentence—*et* … *et* following *sicut ille suspicatur* (185)—makes clear that the report concerning Theophrastus will be bipartite.

for a limited use of rhythm (3.8 1409a31–32), Theophrastus will have insisted that the rhythm appropriate to prose be free or loose, so that breaks in the rhythm are a regular feature. In what follows, unbroken verbiage is compared to the continuous flow of a stream, the period is introduced and the desirability of making the final member or colon longer is emphasized (3.185–186). All of this can be Theophrastean, but it should be noted that the metaphor of flowing speech is so common, that it could easily be a Ciceronian addition.[31] More interesting are Crassus' brief remarks on the period and its *cola* or members. As in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 3.8–9, the discussion of the period follows that of prose rhythm, and neither the paeon nor any other metrical foot is mentioned in the discussion of the period. If Crassus' remarks are based on Theophrastus, then Theophrastus followed Aristotle and analyzed the period in terms of its internal structure (i.e., balanced cola or members) without reference to initial and final feet.[32] Still more interesting is the clearly stated preference for a longer final member. That preference is not found in Aristotle, so that Cicero may be reporting an area in which Theophrastus went beyond his master. Of course, Cicero may be adding a preference of his own, but here at least it seems reasonable to believe that Cicero is following Theophrastus. For later when Crassus mentions cola or members apart from Theophrastus, he says nothing about a longer second member (3.190, 198).[33]

If we ask where Theophrastus is likely to have discussed the anapaest and dithyramb in relation to opulent prose (3.185) and the structure of a period including the relative lengths of its members (3.186), the

[31] Cf. *De or*. 3.172, 190 (*fluere*) and 2.68, 188 (*flumen*). To be sure, the words "flowing verbiage" (*loquacitas … profluens* 3.185) may be compared with Theophrastus' *Characters* 7.7, where the loquacious individual says that his tongue is, as it were, in water, but connecting the *Characters* with *On the Orator* is something of a stretch, and as stated, the image is so common that a connection between the two works cannot be pressed.

[32] I am in agreement with R. Fowler, "Aristotle on the Period (*Rhet*. 3.9)," *Classical Quarterly* 32 (1982) 90–92 and D. Innes "Period and Colon: Theory and Example in Demetrius and Longinus," in *Peripatetic Rhetoric after Aristotle*, ed. W.W. Fortenbaugh and D.C. Mirhady = *Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* 6 (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction 1994) 73 against, e.g., D Schenkeveld, *Studies in Demetrius on Style* (Amsterdam: Hakkert 1964) 186–187 and T. Adamik, "Aristotle's Theory of the Period," *Philologus* 128 (1984) 186–187.

[33] After stating his preference for a longer final cola (3.186), Crassus addresses Catulus and says, "These things are said by the philosophers whom you greatly love" (3.187). The address keeps the fiction of a dialogue alive, but there is more. The philosophers to whom Crassus refers are Aristotle and Theophrastus, and that suggests that the immediately preceding remarks on the structure of the period are Theophrastean.

obvious answer is the work *On Style* (Diog. Laert. 5.47 = 666 no. 17a FHS&G). Less obvious is whether Cicero, when he wrote *On the Orator*, knew this work at first hand. The most recent commentators assume that he did,[34] but the evidence is not especially strong. When Cicero has Crassus describe Aristotle and Theophrastus as pleasant and ornate in their style of writing (1.49 = 51 FHS&G), he is exhibiting acquaintance with the dialogues of the two Peripatetics. *On Style* was a school treatise (all scholars seem to agree on that) and will have been written in a style that was less than eloquent. That no figure in the dialogue is made to comment on this lack of eloquence does not prove unfamiliarity on the part of Cicero, but it does make one wonder. Moreover, Cicero has Crassus say that Aristotle and Theophrastus entitle and call their books "rhetorical." That is a generic label that could be applied to *On Style*, but it also raises the question whether Cicero's sources (whether direct or indirect) do not include Theophrastus' *On the Art of Rhetoric* or *On Kinds of Rhetorical Art* (Diog. Laert. 5.48 = 666 no. 1 and 2a). Be that as it may, the only passage that can be said with any certainty to exhibit knowledge of *On Style* is that in which the anapaest and dithyramb and the period and its members are discussed. And in that passage nothing is said that proves first hand knowledge. I leave the matter undecided, but not without a word of mild protest. When it is suggested that Cicero's errors concerning Aristotle's doctrine of prose rhythm may "in a way that now escapes us," derive from Theophrastus,[35] old-fashioned *Quellenforschung* has been introduced with a twist. Instead of diminishing Cicero by attributing his ideas to Greek predecessors, Quellenforschung has been brought in to ameliorate the errors of Cicero by attributing them to Theophrastus.

There is one more reference to Theophrastus in *On the Orator*. It occurs toward the end of the work within the discussion of delivery. Crassus has already discussed voice (3.216–219) and touched upon gesture (3.220). After that he takes up facial expression and emphasizes the importance of the eyes. He refers to the actor Roscius, who failed to win great applause when he wore a mask. We are told that there are as many facial expressions as there are emotions and that no one can produce the same effect with his eyes closed. At this point, Theophrastus is cited for a report concerning a certain Tauriscus. The text is ambiguous, but if I understand it correctly, Tauriscus will have said

34 Wisse (1989) 182 and May-Wisse (2001) 39.
35 Wisse (1989) 182.

that one who delivers a speech while gazing fixedly upon something is an actor with his back turned (3.221 = 713 FHS&G). There is nothing unexpected here. We know from Barlaamus that Theophrastus spoke of signs of emotion appearing in the eyes,[36] and we can imagine Theophrastus citing Tauriscus in his work *On Delivery* (Diog. Laert. 5.48 = 666 no. 24). Moreover, the emphasis placed on the eyes is important for Aristotle mentions only voice in *Rhetoric* 3.1 (1403b27). Apparently Theophrastus developed a theory of delivery that went beyond his master, but that said, it should be underlined that what Crassus says about Theophrastus is quite limited and hardly proves that Cicero knew *On Delivery* at first hand. He may have, but Tauriscus' clever description of a fixed stare is just the sort of one-liner that would be repeated by later Peripatetics and even recorded in an anthology of memorable remarks.[37]

IV

The *Orator* is different in genre from both *On Invention* and *On the Orator*. It is neither an *ars* (or portion of one), nor a dialogue in which dramatic figures may be portrayed in ways that deviate from historical fact. Rather, the *Orator* is a treatise in which Cicero presents his own views in his own voice. Three styles of oratory—plain, middle and grand—are recognized, and the orator of perfect eloquence is said to be a master of all three. Such an orator may never have existed, but Demosthenes will have come close. Were that all, the *Orator* might be expected to exhibit a concern for historical fact and to offer more reliable reports than those found in *On Invention* and *On the Orator*. But there is more. The *Orator* was written in 46 B.C., when Cicero's hopes for renewed political prominence had been dashed.[38] Moreover, Cicero *qua* orator was under harsh attack. Certain Roman Atticists who embraced a severely plain

[36] *Ethica sec. Stoicos* 2.13 = 447 FHS&G.

[37] I do not consider it likely, but it is not impossible that Theophrastus recorded the words of Tauriscus in his own work *On Proverbs* (Diog. Laert. 5.45 = 727 no. 14 FHS&G) and not in *On Delivery*.

[38] Cicero was ineffective in dealing with the struggle for supremacy between Pompey and Caesar. He found himself on the losing side and turned to writing. Among his accomplishments were the *Brutus* and the *Orator* (46 B.C.) and some eleven philosophical works. At *Orator* 148, Cicero acknowledges the collapse of his forensic and political career and connects this collapse with devoting himself to writing.

style were criticizing Cicero for his use of an inflated style labeled Asiatic. Accordingly, the *Orator* was not written in a dispassionate spirit with an eye on historical accuracy. Rather, it is the work of a pained individual who was concerned with his own reputation.[39]

That said, I want to acknowledge that the *Orator* does exhibit a marked improvement in reporting Aristotle's remarks on prose rhythm. In particular, Cicero correctly reports Aristotle's rejection of the heroic rhythm, and like Aristotle, he does so before the iamb and the "trochee" are introduced (192). That contrasts with *On the Orator*, where the heroic rhythm is dealt with incorrectly and in third place (3.182). Furthermore, the *Orator* records certain details passed over in *On the Orator*. In particular, Aristotle's insistence on dignity is reported (192, cf. 3.8 1408b35) as are the ratios assigned to the three named feet (*sesquiplex*, *duplex* and *par* 193, cf. 3.8 1409a4–5). There are, however, errors in Cicero's report. He continues to confuse the trochee and the tribrach, and he compounds that error with a faulty interpretation of the adjective κορδακικώτερος (1408b36). Aristotle means that the trochee is rather like the cordax in that it is a tripping, dancing rhythm, but Cicero has Aristotle call the tribrach a cordax, i.e., a vulgar dance (193). We can say, then, that the *Orator* presents us with more details but also with errors, so that Cicero's reliability as a source is not greatly improved.

One curious passage within the discussion of prose rhythm concerns the metrical feet with which a period may be brought to a conclusion. Cicero tells us that it makes no difference whether a dactyl or a cretic comes last (the final short of the dactyl can be regarded as long), and that Aristotle does not understand this: "the one who said that the

[39] It is obvious to even the most casual reader of the *Orator* that Cicero is concerned with his own reputation. Here I mention just a few passages. After telling us that the ideal orator is a master of several styles, he goes on to illustrate this mastery by citing his own speeches (102–103), after which he tells us with false modesty that he has not achieved the ideal and that he does not admire his own work (104). He declares himself the first to capture attention by mixing styles (106) and does not hesitate to tell us of the applause that greeted his oratory even in his youth (107). He describes himself disingenuously as a person of mediocre ability and then goes on to tell us how his vigorous style won the day (129). He says that no orator, not even among the Greeks, has written so much (108) and that his books are widely read (146). Perhaps Cicero's readers in the late Republic did not find his self-absorption offensive, but it should be of concern to persons looking to Cicero for information regarding his predecessors. Desiring recognition, he would be given to creating unfair comparisons that enhance his own image. See below on Aristotle's understanding of the syllable with which a rhythmic period ends.

paeon, in which the final syllable is long, is more suitable (to the final position) fails to understand, for it does not matter how long the syllable is" (218). The one who recommended the fourth paeon is Aristotle (Cicero has that correct),[40] but the criticism seems unfair. To be sure, the final syllable of a line of poetry is regarded as common—it may be regarded as either long or short—and Cicero applies this rule to prose rhythm (cf. 217 *ad fin.*). But it does not follow that Aristotle's position regarding the final syllable of a prose period must be a failure of understanding. I offer four considerations.

First, although the study of prose rhythm was at an early stage, Aristotle was not a pioneer breaking new ground. Interest in prose rhythm appears to go back to Thrasymachus, who is said to have preferred the paeon.[41] He may have explained this preference in a handbook, but that is uncertain. After him Alcidamas took note of the rhythm found in prepared speeches,[42] and Isocrates, at least in his younger days, not only used but also taught rhythm as part of an attractive style.[43] Aristotle will have known their views, including how they regarded the final syllable. If he is mistaken concerning the final syllable, the mistake is not that of a beginner, who failed to consider the status of a final short.

Second, Aristotle will have recognized that in poetry the final syllable of a verse is common, but there is no compelling reason why he must embrace a common syllable at the end of a prose period. He may have insisted that the prose period is different from a line of poetry, and that the period is noticeably improved when it ends in a long syllable.[44] He prefers the paeon, because it is unobtrusive. It gives rise to no fixed meter (3.8 1409a7–8) and yet brings the period to

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[40] For Aristotle's recommendation of the fourth paeon, see *Rhet.* 8.3 1409a15–21.

[41] See Arist., *Rhet.* 3.8 1409a2–3 and Cic., *Orat.* 175. K. Dover, *The Evolution of Greek Prose Style* (Oxford: Clarendon 1997) 173 points out that the sole surviving sample of Thrasymachus' prose (*ap.* Dion. Hal., *Dem.* 3) does not support the statement that Thrasymachus preferred the paeonic rhythm. Dover suggests that Aristotle may have slipped and written "Thrasymachus" when he had someone else in mind. Nevertheless, he finds it more probable that the sample of Thrasymachus' prose is atypical. (I am grateful to Professor Dover for corresponding with me concerning the matter under discussion).

[42] Alcid., *Soph.* 16–17.

[43] Isoc. *Or.* 5 (*Philippus*) 27.

[44] Cicero seems to assume that poetry is more inflexible than prose, so that any liberty that is permitted in verse can be taken in prose (cf. *Or.* 217 *ne in verso quidem refert*, "not even in verse does it make a difference"). Aristotle need not have shared this assumption, and in my judgment he did not.

a rhythmical end (1409a19–21) with a measure of dignity and force (1408b35–36) that would be lacking were a short syllable to occur in the final position. It might be objected that the pause that occurs at the end of a syntactically complete period makes a final short syllable equivalent to a long (1 time beat becomes 2). Aristotle might respond that a final short becomes longer, but it can still be distinguished from a final long. For the pause has a similar effect on a final long. It is lengthened (2 time beats becomes 3 or at least longer than 2), so that it stands out in a way that adds dignity and pleasure. In the case of the fourth paeon, the final long is especially striking, for it comes after three shorts that are not lengthened by position (three syllables of 1 beat are followed by one syllable of 3). This is, of course, a matter of the ear—a point that Cicero emphasizes repeatedly (162–163, 168–173, 177–178, 198, 203, 215)—and Aristotle's ear told him that there is a significant difference between a final long and a final short (cf. 1409a17–18). We may compare the testimony of Quintilian. He tells us that a final long gives the impression of sitting down, while a final short is like merely coming to a halt (*Inst.* 9.4.94).

Third, among the virtues of style, Cicero practically takes clarity for granted. In *On the Orator*, he calls it easy to learn and the merest minimum (3.38). In the *Orator*, he mentions it as a quality of the plain style (79), but otherwise clarity is largely ignored.[45] In the case of Aristotle, quite the reverse is true. When Aristotle begins his discussion of style, clarity is given pride of place, and the subsequent explanation is straightforward. A speech that fails to convey a clear meaning will not accomplish its task (3.2 1404b1–3). This concern with clarity is not lost sight of in the discussion of prose rhythm. Early on Aristotle tells us that prose needs limitation, albeit not the strict limits that are a mark of verse (3.8 1408b26–27). And in closing the discussion, he tells us that a short syllable lacks finality. A sentence or period should break off with a long syllable, and the end should be clear on account of the rhythm and not the punctuation of a scribe (1409a18–21).[46] For Aristotle, rhythm is important, not only because it adds dignity and lifts the listener out of himself (1408b35–36), but also because it contributes to clarity. And it

[45] Some attention to clarity is shown in, e.g., 122 and 124.

[46] When Aristotle first introduces clarity as a virtue of style, he uses the adjective σαφής (1404b2). Later when he speaks of the end of the period being clear, he uses the adjective δῆλος (1409a20). The variation is unimportant. Immediately after using the adjective σαφής to introduce the virtue, he makes use of the verb δηλοῦν (1404b2). Accordingly, I have not attempted to reflect the variation in my remarks above.

is a long syllable at the end, as in the fourth paeon, that provides the desired clarity. Again, this is a matter of the ear, but I know of no reason to prefer Cicero's ear to that of Aristotle.

Fourth, Cicero's criticism of Aristotle may be compared with what he says earlier about Ephorus. This pupil of Isocrates is named along with Aristotle, Theophrastus and Theodectes as someone who prefers a final paeon (218). But he is also said not to recognize that the spondee is equivalent to the dactyl and the tribrach to the iamb, for he thinks that feet are to be measured by the number of syllables and not by intervals of time (194). I doubt that Ephorus was making the mistake attributed to him by Cicero. More likely he was paying attention to his ear and found the spondee too slow and the tribrach too fast (cf. 216, 193), when placed at the end of the period. And if that is correct, Ephorus, like Aristotle, is being criticized unfairly by Cicero. To be sure, Cicero has good reason to refer to Ephorus and Aristotle. They are respected ancients whose interest in prose rhythm adds legitimacy to Cicero's own interest in and practice of prose rhythm.[47] In other words, he can defend himself against the Roman Atticists, who reject rhythm, by demonstrating that Classical Greek writers were concerned with the rhythms of oratory.[48] But Cicero does not stop there. He muddies the water by criticizing these writers unfairly. He is, I fear, motivated (in part at least) by a desire to magnify himself by setting his own views above those of respected ancients.[49] But whatever the truth concerning Cicero's motivation, we are once again reminded that his reports regarding predecessors must be scrutinized with care.

Before leaving the topic of prose rhythm, I want to call attention to what Cicero says immediately after charging Aristotle with failing to understand the quantity of a final syllable. He tells us, that some peo-

[47] Here I am indebted to Dominic Berry, with whom I corresponded by email.

[48] Cicero's treatment of the Atticists is abusive. He says they lack the ears of human beings (168, 172) and tells us that his ears rejoice in a well-made period. He disingenuously asks, "Why do I speak of my own ears?" (168) He does so because he wants to magnify himself at the expense of his critics.

[49] At *Or.* 196, Cicero calls Aristotle *optimus* and leaves unchallenged the view that the paeon is the principal measure in prose rhythm. After that, progressively through several steps, Cicero elevates himself by setting his own view above that of Aristotle (214, 215, 218). The technique hardly needs documentation, but cf. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 1.9 1368a21–22, where Aristotle is discussing amplification and recommends comparison with famous people, for the subject is amplified, if he is shown to be better than other worthy individuals.

ple hold that the paeon is not a foot but a rhythm because it has more than three syllables. He then rejects this view, saying that the paeon is indeed, as all the ancients agree, the one foot most suited to either the beginning or the middle of the period. Aristotle, Theophrastus, Theodectes and Ephorus are named, after which Cicero expresses disagreement with the ancients concerning the ending. There the ancients prefer the paeon, but Cicero deems the cretic superior (218).[50] What interests me here is the reference to the middle. In *Rhetoric* 3.8, Aristotle does not mention the middle. He refers the first paeon to the beginning and the fourth paeon to the end (1409a10–21). Should we, then, say that Cicero is drawing on one of the other ancients named by Cicero? If we believe that Cicero knew well Theophrastus' work *On* Style, and if we believe that he followed it or at least drew on it when composing the *Orator*, then we may want to say that the reference to the middle is a mark of Theophrastean influence.[51] That may be correct, but it seems to me little more than a guess. Theophrastus is mentioned only in a list of ancients, and his position in the list is not special: he is named after his teacher Aristotle and before Theodectes, who was also a student of Aristotle.[52] In addition, there is no reason to believe that Cicero could not add the reference to the middle on his own, and some reason to believe that he did. Earlier in the *Orator*, Cicero considers whether rhythm belongs throughout the whole of a period or only in the beginning and end (199); after some discussion, he tells us that all the words of the period, both those at the beginning and those in the middle, ought to look to the end (200). A little later he states that rhythm belongs in the whole of a period (203), and when he turns to consider the use of prose rhythm, he again asks whether rhythm belongs in the whole of a period or in the beginning or in the end or in each part (204). Here there is no explicit reference to the middle (as there is in 200), but the mention of the whole period suggests that Cicero is not narrowly concerned with beginnings and endings apart from the middle. Moreover, in the passage under consideration (218), Cicero may make mention of both the beginning and the middle, because he wants to isolate emphatically the end from the rest of the sentence.[53] In doing

[50] *Or.* 218 is Theophrastus no. 702 FHS&G.

[51] Cf. J. Sandys, *Marcus Tullius Cicero, Ad Marcum Brutum* "Orator" (London: Cambridge 1885) 227 and W. Kroll, *M. Tullii Ciceronis Orator* (Berlin 1913; reprint Zürich: Weidmann 1964) 186.

[52] *Or.* 172.

[53] Compare *De or.* 3.192.

so, he makes even clearer his disagreement with (and imagined superiority to) Aristotle and other like-minded ancients. There is then good reason not to draw any conclusions concerning Theophrastus. Most likely the mention of the middle is directly attributable to Cicero himself.

Theophrastus is named in three other passages that are concerned with prose rhythm. In the first (172 = 700 FHS&G), Cicero says that Aristotle requires rhythm and not verse in a oration. Cicero then adds that Theodectes says the same thing and that Theophrastus expresses himself on the same matters in greater detail (*accuratius*). The use of the comparative may encourage us to believe that the account of prose rhythm given in the *Orator* is especially influenced by Theophrastus, presumably through his work *On Style*. But caution is in order. In the preceding paragraph, I have already suggested that Cicero's reference to the middle of a period is likely to be a Ciceronian addition and not Theophrastean in origin. Moreover, the other two passages in which Theophrastus is named do little to establish Theophrastean influence. In the earlier of the two (194 = 704 FHS&G), Cicero has just completed rather detailed remarks concerning Arisototle's view of prose rhythm (discussed earlier in this section). He then comments that Theophrastus and Theodectes say the same things about the paeon as are found in Aristotle. The comment is remarkably brief and gives no special recognition to Theophrastus. He is named along side Theodectes, and the two are said to say what Aristotle says. In the other passage (228 = 699 FHS&G), Cicero says that rhythm is necessary for ornate speech. Two reasons are given, of which the first concerns us. It runs as follows: Rhythm is necessary, "as Aristotle and Theophrastus say, lest speech flow on endlessly like a river; it ought to come to a halt neither on account of the breathing of the speaker nor the punctuation of a scribe, but rather compelled by the rhythm." The idea that the rhythm and not scribal notation should introduce a pause has a close parallel in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* 3.8 (1409a20–21); a concern with breathing is also present in that treatise (1409b14–15). What we miss in Aristotle is the metaphor of the river. Since the metaphor is found in close proximity to Theophrastus' name in *On the Orator* 3.184–185,[54] we may be tempted to say that this portion of the *Orator* passage is derived from Theophrastus,[55] but the temptation should probably be resisted.

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[54] See above, Section III.
[55] Sandys (1885) 235.

The metaphor is simply too common. Most likely Cicero has added it himself in order to enhance what would otherwise be colorless prose.

I turn now to a passage that I have already touched upon in regard to clarity. I am referring to *Orator* 79,[56] where the subject under discussion is the plain style. Cicero lists three qualities exhibited by this style—correctness of language, clarity and propriety—after which he tells us that one thing is missing: namely that pleasing and abundant ornamentation that Theophrastus numbers fourth among the virtues of style. The Latin runs as follows: *sermo purus erit et Latinus, dilucide planeque dicetur, quid deceat circumspicietur; unum aberit quod quartum numerat Theophrastus in orationis laudibus: ornatum illud, suave et affluens.* Almost all scholars accept Cicero's report as an accurate statement concerning the virtues of style recognized by Theophrastus. Whereas Aristotle posited three interdependent virtues, i.e., clarity, propriety and ornamentation,[57] Theophrastus extended the list by adding correct Greek. He will have labeled correct Greek ἑλληνισμός, clarity σαφήνεια, propriety τὸ πρέπον and ornament κεκοσμημένον or κατασκευή.[58]

With this understanding of the passage I have no quarrel, [59] but the words with which the passage ends, *suave et affluens*, "pleasing and abun-

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[56] *Orator* 79 is Theophrastus no. 684 FHS&G.

[57] I agree with, e.g., D. Innes, "Theophrastus and the Theory of Style" in *Theophrastus of Eresus: On His Life and Work = Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities* vol. 2 (New Brunswick NJ: Transaction 1985) 255, who holds that Aristotle's virtue of style is "an interdependent package of three items: clarity, propriety and ornamentation."

[58] For κεκοσμημένον (or κόσμος), see F. Solmsen, "Demetrios, Περὶ ἑρμηνείας und sein peripatetisches Quellenmaterial," *Hermes* vol. 66 (1931) 241, "The Aristotelian Tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," *American Journal of Philology* vol. 62 (1941) 44 and D. Schenkeveld, *Studies in Demetrius on Style* (Amsterdam: Hakkert 1964) 73, and for κατασκευή, see J. Stroux, *De Theophrasti virtutibus dicendi*, part 1 (Leipzig 1912) 10 and G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton: University Press1963) 276.

[59] Certainly, I am not prepared to join forces with G.M.A. Grube ("Theophrastus as a Literary Critic," *Transactions of the American Philological Association* 83 [1952] 180–181 and *The Greek and Roman Critics* [Toronto: University Press 1965] 106–107), who puts forth two objections. First, Theophrastus, following Aristotle, will have spoken of *virtutes* of style—ἀρεταί in Greek—and not *laudes*. Second, it is not stated explicitly that Theophrastus recognized only those four virtues or qualities that Cicero enumerates. Regarding the first objection, Grube is creating a difficulty where there is none: *laudes* is a perfectly good word for virtues of style. We may compare *Brutus* 28, where *laus* is used as a variant for *virtus*: *post Pericles, qui cum floreret omni genere virtutis, hac tamen fuit laude* (i.e., eloquence) *clarissimus*. Concerning the number of virtues recognized by Theophrastus, Grube has a point. Cicero never says "four and only four" virtues, but in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it seems reasonable to assume that Theophrastus limited himself to the four virtues listed by Cicero: one more than Aristotle and one less than the Stoics, who added brevity as a fifth virtue of style.

dant," are problematic. At first reading they appear to continue and to conclude the Theophrastean material reported by Cicero. Indeed, we can read in the scholarly literature that Cicero used *suave* and *affluens* to render the Theophrastean adjectives ἡδύ and περιττόν.[60] That is not impossible, but there are grounds for pause. I mention two. First, the addition of *affluens* seems out of place, if Cicero is reporting Theophrastus' fourth virtue of style. That virtue is ornament or embellishment, which may be abundant but also may be quite modest or even meager. [61] As long as the embellishment is appropriate, it will be a welcome feature that gives pleasure. Second and more important, the context within the *Orator* demands a qualifier like *suave et affluens*. For Cicero is discussing the plain style and has already told us that ornament is not totally foreign to this style. When the plain style was first introduced, Cicero was careful to distinguish between two kinds of users: those who are unpolished and those who are in some small measure ornate, *leviter ornati* (20). Later when he began his formal discussion of the plain style, Cicero stated that a speaker employing the plain style differs more than is supposed from those who lack eloquence (76). And in the sections that follow on the passage in which Theophrastus is named, Cicero discusses the extent to which ornament is a feature of the plain style. For example, a modest use of metaphor and a sparing use of archaisms are said to be acceptable (81). As a result, Cicero would be creating confusion were he to say without qualification that ornament is absent from the plain style. Accordingly, he adds (tacks on) a qualifier, indicating what kind of ornament is missing in the plain style, and he does so in a way that seems to introduce the middle and grand style. For *suave* is repeatedly associated with the middle style,[62] and *affluens* points toward the grand style.[63] Moreover, the order in which the adjectives occur suggests a natural progression from the plain to the middle to the grand style, which is the order in which Cicero proceeds to discuss the three styles.[64] I suggest, therefore, that the adjectives *suave* and *affluens* have no

[60] Innes (1985) 257. Other scholars, like Stroux (1912) 28 and Kennedy (1963) 276, suggest ἡδύ and μεγαλοπρεπές.

[61] *Ornatum* and its cognates may be used inclusively to cover all degrees of embellishment. See *De or.* 1.144 and 3.37, where Cicero lists the four virtues of style without reference to Theophrastus. In both places, the adverb *ornate* without qualification refers generally to speaking with embellishment.

[62] See *Or.* 69. 91, 92 and 99.

[63] Sandys (1885) 91 and Grube (1952) 181 n. 32.

[64] Plain style *Or.* 75–90, middle style 91–96, grand style 97–99.

direct connection with Theophrastus. And if we ask what Greek words, i.e., Theophrastean adjectives, stand behind *suave* and *affluens*, we are being misled by the immediately preceding reference to Theophrastus. Cicero has added on his own a qualifier that is required by the context. We may wish that Cicero had indicated clearly what is Theophrastean and what is his own, but that is best left a wish and not made into a complaint. [65]

There remains one more passage in which Theophrastus is named (*Or.* 39 = 697 FHS&G). It occurs toward the beginning of the work and concerns the historians Herodotus and Thucydides, who are praised for avoiding the choppy sentences and excessive ornamentation that mark the prose of contemporaries like Thrasymachus, Gorgias and Theodorus. The coupling of the two historians is odd, for while Herodotus does write in an unaffected manner, Thucydides can be positively Gorgianic. Cicero, it seems, has expressed himself hastily. That may not affect what follows, but it should give us pause when dealing with passages in which Aristotle and Theophrastus are mentioned together as holding one and the same doctrine. What follows is sound enough. Herodotus is likened to a tranquil river, and Thucydides is said to proceed rapidly and to sound the trumpet of war. Here we have another example of the river metaphor, and again there is no strong reason to think that Cicero is dependent on Theophrastus or any other source. What comes next, however, is Theophrastean. The Peripatetic is cited as Cicero's source for the assertion that historical writing was first moved by the two historians, so that it dared to speak more fully and ornately than had been the case. There is no reason to doubt the Theophrastean origin of this report. We know that Theophrastus was interested in "firsts." He wrote a work *On Discoveries* (Diog. Laert. 5.47 = 727 no. 11 FHS&G) and apparently named Corax as the inventor of words, i.e., the first to compose a rhetorical handbook (736A–C FHS&G). Nevertheless, the report is disappointingly meager. We are not told in what context Theophrastus recognized the importance of the two historians, and aside from the adverbs "more fully" and "more ornately" no characterization of their style(s) is given.[66]

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[65] Cicero is name-dropping. In referring to Theophrastus, he adds a scholarly air to the account of the plain style, but he does not advance the characterization of that style. Moreover, by failing to separate clearly the reference to Theophrastus from what follows (i.e., *suave et affluens*), Cicero runs the risk of misleading the reader (like myself) whose focus is on the lost writings of earlier writers on rhetoric.

[66] *Pace* Kroll (1913, repr. 1964) 47–48, the subsequent material concerning Isocrates

V

I conclude by summarizing the results concerning Theophrastus. We are told that Theophrastus as well as Aristotle wrote better and more than all the teachers of rhetoric (*De or.* 1.43) and that in regard to prose rhythm Theophrastus expressed himself in greater detail (*Or.* 172). That is encouraging, but the information actually reported by Cicero is not great. We learn that Theophrastus recognized four virtues of style (*Or.* 79). He viewed prose rhythm as a necessity (*Or.* 228), warned against a rigid, unbroken rhythm (*De or.* 3.184), took note of the anapaest and dithyramb in prose (*De or.* 3.185) and said the same things as Aristotle about the paeon: it is the foot most suited to the beginning and end of a period (*Or.* 194, 218). In discussing the period, Theophrastus may have gone beyond Aristotle in expressing approval of a longer final member (*De or.* 3.186). Theophrastus is said to have recognized Herodotus and Thucydides as pioneers in the development of ornate historical prose, but we are left wondering to what extent he discussed their contributions (*Or.* 39). Similarly Theophrastus' report concerning Tauriscus is of interest, for it emphasizes the importance of the eyes in delivery (*De or.* 3.221), but the theme is not developed. There is the repeated metaphor of the river (*De or.* 3.185–186, *Or.* 39, 228), but in my judgment it is attributable to Cicero, and anyway it is far too common to be of real significance. Two other details that have been claimed for Theophrastus are most likely additions by Cicero. I am thinking of the reference to the middle of the period as a suitable place for a paeon (*Or.* 218) and the two qualifiers, "pleasant and abundant," which are applied to ornamentation *qua* the fourth virtue of style (*Or.* 79). It may be that Cicero knew Theophrastus' works *On Style* and *On Delivery*, but as the summary makes clear, Cicero provides little material for a substantial reconstruction of these works. Of course, we could embrace old-fashioned *Quellenforschung* and attempt to find Theophrastean influence in passages where Theophrastus is not named. But that is a dangerous game, which I leave to others who are more courageous than I.

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is not to be assigned to Theophrastus. The material has not been included in text 697 FHS&G.

Appendix to Section IV (see note 20) on
To Atticus *4.10 and* To Friends *1.9*

Two letters of Cicero have been cited in the literature to support the idea that when Cicero wrote *On the Orator*, he had read Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in the original.[67] The earlier of the two letters dates from 55 B.C., which is the year in which *On the Orator* was composed. Cicero is writing to Atticus from Cumae, where he describes himself as feasting on the library of Faustus. Cicero explains that since the political situation denies him other pleasures, he is finding support and recreation in literature (*Att.* 4.10.1). There is no mention here of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, and there is no compelling reason to imagine one. To be sure, Faustus was the son of Sulla, who is reported to have brought the library of Apellicon to Rome. [68] That library contained Aristotelian and Theophrastean treatises, which will have passed to Faustus on the death of Sulla. What is not clear from Cicero's letter is how the library or what portion of it arrived in Cumae. It has been suggested that Cicero or his friend Atticus had purchased some portion of the library at auction, or that Cicero had borrowed a portion from Faustus and taken it with him from Rome to Cumae.[69] Be that as it may, Cicero does not say that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was among the books in Cumae, let alone that he was especially interested in that work. In what follows in the letter, Cicero says that he would rather be at Atticus' house sitting on the stool under the portrait of Aristotle, than (in Rome) sitting in the curule chair. Here we do have an explicit reference to Aristotle, but it has nothing to do with Faustus' library and what Cicero may have read there. Rather, Cicero is alluding to the current political situation (sitting in the curule chair lacks appeal), and at the same time he is flattering Atticus by describing a niche in his house that is distinguished by a portrait of Aristotle.[70]

The second letter dates from 54 B.C. and makes clear that Cicero had recently finished the work *On the Orator*. Addressing Publius Lentulus Spinther, Cicero says that he will be sending him some new speeches

[67] Wisse (1989) 158–162 and May-Wisse (2001) 39.
[68] Strabo, *Geogr.* 13.1.54; Plutarch, *Sulla* 26.1–2.
[69] Moraux (1973) 37, 39.
[70] May-Wisse (2001) 39 omit any reference to the context in which Cicero names Aristotle. That encourages the incautious reader to connect the portrait with the library of Faustus and to believe that in mentioning the portrait, Cicero is indicating the works that interest him.

and a dialogue in three books entitled *On the Orator*. The work is said to be written in the manner of Aristotle and to be useful to Lentulus' son, for it avoids the common (trite) precepts and embraces the entire oratorical theory of the ancients, both Aristotelian and Isocratean (*Fam.* 1.9.23). In referring to the manner of Aristotle, Cicero is not making special reference to the *Rhetoric*; rather, he is thinking of the manner in which Aristotle composed his dialogues.[71] The assertion that the books cover the entire oratorical theory of the ancients is a typical Ciceronian exaggeration,[72] unless the addition of the phrase "both Aristotelian and Isocratean" is meant to limit the assertion to the Aristotelian and Isocratean tradition.[73] In that case, Cicero may be referring generally to the school of Aristotle (cf. *De or.* 1.43) and in particular to the teachings of rhetoricians who claimed to have taken their start from Aristotle and Theophrastus (cf. *Inv.* 1.61). Be that as it may, the phrase does not tell us anything about Cicero's knowledge of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. But that may not matter, for as we have seen, his reports are not always reliable. At very least they appear hasty and sometimes careless.

[71] Aristotle's dialogues contained long speeches in which a speaker developed a particular theory or point of view. In this way, Aristotle's dialogues differed markedly from the Socratic dialogues in which short speeches, often question and answer, were used to investigate a subject.

[72] Cf. *Inv.* 2.4–5, discussed above in Section II.

[73] In translating *Fam.* 1.9.23, G. Kennedy, *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World* (Princeton: University Press 1972) 209 supplies "tradition" after "both the Aristotelian and Isocratean."

V

INDICES

I

ANCIENT SOURCES

2

SUBJECTS